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REGULATING TO LIMIT ACCESS TO CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET: A MULTIPLE-CASE 
STUDY
SUMMARY
This investigation addresses the regulation of access to child pornography available on the 
Internet to evaluate the implications of hybrid regulation for free speech, privacy and 
democracy in the online environment.
It  aims to investigate these implications in relation to current regulatory measures designed to 
limit  access to child pornography available on the Internet. As such, it  establishes evaluative 
criteria divided into three broad categories: (1) free speech - involving the issues of unchecked 
private censorship and scope creep; (2) privacy protection - involving the issues of increased 
unchecked and more invasive surveillance powers given to law enforcement  authorities; and (3) 
general principles of good regulation and democratic values - involving issues around the lack 
of transparency, accountability, legitimacy, proper oversight, and citizen involvement as well as 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness of regulatory intervention.
Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom were chosen as case studies because they had 
generally similar anti-child-pornography laws, both domestically and in terms of their 
commitments under international treaties, they were considered democratic countries subject to 
democratic controls of content, and access to data was relatively unproblematic in these 
jurisdictions. This provided a common ground for comparison. More importantly, they were 
chosen as case studies because despite so different  constitutional frameworks and varied 
regulatory scope and mechanics, they all settled on similar approaches to child pornography. 
regulation. This provided an opportunity to explore different aspects and variations of hybrid 
regulation, and also to address its broader implications for free speech, privacy and democracy 
on the Internet.
There are a number of contributions made here. First, this research proposes evaluative criteria 
for anti-online child pornography regulations. Second, it suggests a scheme of safeguards to 
minimise negative regulatory consequences in relation to free speech, privacy and democracy in 
the online environment. It  discusses the broad lessons and the economics of online child 
pornography regulation, the use of decentred and polycentric theories of regulation, and 
explores the adjudication of apparent  illegality of online material by private actors, showing 
what regulatory and governance theorists as well as criminologist may learn from this research.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
During its early days, the Internet  was considered a free environment  and regarded as a separate 
jurisdiction invulnerable to state regulation. Such initial enthusiasm about  the self-regulatory 
and anarchic nature of the Internet can be explained by the historical and political contexts of 
that time. The Internet was not yet  part  of the everyday life of many people, many online 
content-related conflicts was outside the political agenda, and many governments were ill-
prepared to enforce the law in cyberspace. 
Nevertheless, the Internet  is now part  of the everyday life of modern industrialised countries, it 
has substantially changed the way people live and interact, and this has a number of 
implications not only for the media but economy, politics, national security and the law. As a 
result, regulators across the world, including state and private actors, have employed a number 
of regulatory strategies and tools, in an ongoing struggle for regulatory control, combining a 
variety of social resources and capacities as well as enrolling a range of online intermediaries to 
control different aspects of the Internet, whether in the pursuit  of public policy goals or private 
interests.
There are a number of different regulatory targets in relation to the Internet environment, 
including the domain names, Internet  infrastructure, technical protocols, and wider political 
issues of digital divide and market  competition. Different  regulatory actors are involved, both 
domestically and internationally, depending on the target  being pursued (for example,. the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers - ICANN, government  statutory 
regulators, the Internet Engineering Task Force - IETF, the World Summit on the Information 
Society - WSIS, and Internet industry associations). More importantly, each of these domains 
have particular features and demands a regulatory analysis of its own.
One important focus of regulatory intervention concerns the control of content  available on the 
Internet. Content  often carries with it criminal or civil liability; it may infringe copyrights, be 
defamatory, incite racial hatred, or violate the privacy of individuals. It  can be terrorism-related, 
involve classified information related to national security, or contain images of children. Given 
that these can be digitised, distributed and accessed on the Internet, regulators have attempted to 
control this material online, but this has proved problematic for a number of reasons.
First, digitisation of content  has facilitated the transmission of information via the digital 
networks and the storage of a substantial volume of material. Digitised text, image, audio and 
video can be easily and rapidly transferred from one location to another across the world 
without degeneration of original information.
Second, the architecture and technical protocols of the Internet allow information to be 
transferred via an international network without a central point of control. This resilience of the 
network limits the ability of governments to control online content and facilitates the anonymity 
13
of alleged offenders. There are a number of different points of control; more actors are now 
involved in the production and distribution of content  such as the Internet  service providers - 
ISP, Internet content providers - ICP, and Internet host providers - IHP. 
Third, the Internet poses a multi-jurisdictional challenge to the enforcement of content-related 
laws. The Internet is an international network that  connects people across different jurisdictions 
and it  is subject to different regulatory schemes and legislation. It  crosses national borders 
where national governments have no sovereign authority. In addition, many countries without 
updated laws may be safe havens for cybercriminality. Finding the origin of material and 
identifying the offender associated with the criminal content can be difficult  to establish. Also, 
the question about  which jurisdiction should prosecute is controversial. In short, these issues 
render the choice of jurisdiction and the enforcement  of jurisdictional powers problematic when 
applied to online content.
Because of these challenges, many regulatory strategies have been employed. Regulation of 
copyrights infringement on the Internet has moved forward from the safe harbour principle (i.e. 
no liability of online intermediaries unless notified which lead to notice of take down schemes 
and no explicit  obligation to monitor content) towards a new policy of ‘constructive 
knowledge’ via graduated responses (e.g. notice and disconnection), filtering, blocking, traffic 
monitoring and throttling undertaken by private actors.1  For example, in a recent legislative 
attempt to minimise copyright infringements, enforce intellectual property rights on the Internet, 
and place policing responsibilities on ISPs, the British Parliament  enacted the 2010 Digital 
Economy Act,2 a piece of legislation that  threatens domestic civil infringers with an escalation 
of technical measures that include monitoring and notifications by ISPs, slowing down Internet 
connection, Internet disconnection and blocking of websites by the ISPs.3  There has been 
opposition from British ISPs (e.g. BT and TalkTalk) to implement this piece of legislation, but 
their legal challenge to the 2010 DEA was struck down by the courts in March 2012.4
Governments have also employed domestic legislation to control access to online adult 
pornography to protect  children. For example, two pieces of legislation originally designed to 
block access to legal adult pornography by children, the US 1996 Communications Decency Act 
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1 See Edwards, L., 'Role and Responsibility of Internet Intermediaires in the Field of Copyright and Related Rights', 
(Geneve: WIPO, 2011) at <http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/doc/
role_and_responsibility_of_the_internet_intermediaries_final.pdf>, accessed 28 December 2011.
2 Digital Economy Act (c. 24) 2010 (England and Wales).
3 Edwards, L., 'Law and sausages:  How Not to Legislate for the Digital Economy', at <http://blogscript.blogspot.com/
>, accessed 03 May 2010. Nevertheless, according to the Ofcom initial obligation code, a further act of the UK 
Parliament is required to implement  measures such as throttling or disconnection. See OFCOM, 'Online Infringement 
of Copyrights  and the Digital Economy Act 2010: Draft Initial Obligations Code', (London: Ofcom, 2010) at <http://
stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/copyright-infringement/summary/condoc.pdf> Accessed 24 
November 2012. 
4  Halliday, J., 'BT and TalkTalk lose challenge against Digital  Economy Act', The Guardian, 06 March 2012, sec. 
Technology at  <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/mar/06/internet-provider-lose-challenge-digital-
economy-act>, accessed 22 March 2012.
(CDA 1996)5 and the US 1998 Child Online Protection Act  (COPA 1998)6 were enacted in the 
United States of America. Nevertheless, they did not pass the constitutional test of freedom of 
speech.7 The US courts found both Acts to be over-broad in the sense that they placed excessive 
burden on the rights of adults to access constitutionally legal adult pornography, because of the 
blunt  and costly technical measures available at  that  time for age verification and content 
classification.
In addition, LICRA et UEJF v Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo France showed how a nation state 
attempted to assert  its national laws in the online environment  via the courts.8 The French law 
prohibits the trafficking of Nazi memorabilia in France, but  this material was easily available to 
all French Internet users via an auction website of Yahoo! hosted in the US, where the 
availability of Nazi goods was perfectly legal under the wide constitutional protection of free 
speech.9  The US company argued that  it  was technically impossible to restrict access to their 
servers only to French customers. Nevertheless, on 20 November 2000, after consulting a panel 
of Internet  experts who confirmed the feasibility and effectiveness of online content filtering 
based on geographical location, Judge Jean-Jacques Gomez issued a final decision ordering 
Yahoo! to employ its best  efforts to block access to Nazi memorabilia in France and warned the 
US firm that  it  would have until February 2001 to comply before facing a substantial fine. 
Following this, on 02 January 2001, Yahoo! decided to remove the controversial content  from 
its US auction website, apparently to avoid bad publicity and damage to its financial assets in 
France, despite bringing the issue before the US courts later on free speech protection 
grounds.10
Other regulatory strategies have been employed for privacy protection of personal data available 
on the Internet. The protection of privacy online has been enforced via a mix of self-regulation, 
community persuasion (online activism), terms of service, governmental oversight (e.g. pre-
authorised contracts by a regulatory agency, domestic and international law) and privacy 
enhanced technologies (e.g. allowing data migration between different platforms and data 
expiration).11 
Another regulatory target  concerns state classified information. The whistleblower organisation 
Wikileaks has proved its resilience to host  and provide access to classified information, 
particularly the War logs and the US diplomatic cables amidst  widespread governmental threats 
15
5 Communication Decency Act 1996 § 502, 110 Stat. (United States of America).
6 Child Online Protection Act 1998 (United States of America).
7  Although the former was struck down by the US Supreme Court, the latter still struggles through the courts. See 
generally Edwards, L., 'Pornography, Censorship and the Internet', in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds.), 
Law and the Internet (3rd edn.; Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 623-69, p 644-47; Lessig, L., Code: version 2.0 
(New York, NY: Basic Books, 2006), p 249-50. 
8 LICRA et UEJF v Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo France, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Superior Court of Paris.
9  See generally Edwards, L., 'Pornography, Censorship and the Internet', in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde 
(eds.), Law and the Internet (3rd edn.; Oxford: Hart  Publishing, 2009), 623-69, p 626; Goldsmith, J. and Wu, T., Who 
Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World (New York, NY: OUP, 2006), p 1-10.
10 CDT, 'Yahoo France case', at <http://www.cdt.org/grandchild/yahoo-france-case>, accessed 04 June 2010.
11 See Chapter 2.
around the world.12  Wikileaks employed sophisticated computational techniques and hosted 
their servers in nations with more protective speech laws to preserve the anonymity of 
informants and evade governmental control. As a result, it has been subject to intense pressure 
from governments.
These examples show the wide range of existing online content regulatory policies and the 
problematic interaction between private and state regulatory actors tackling controversial online 
content.
This investigation considered the models of online regulation according to the relevant 
regulatory actors involved.13  This decision was taken to organise the numerous regulatory 
practices employed and thus facilitate the analysis. These models were (1) self-regulation; (2) 
state and multi-state regulation; and (3) hybrid-regulation. Generally (1) self-regulation was the 
regulation performed by private actors amongst themselves, particularly the Internet  industry, 
via Codes of Conduct  - CoC; (2) state and multi-state regulation was generally the traditional 
command-and-control regulation14 that imposed standards by the threat of criminal sanctions 
and involved monitoring, enforcement and sanctioning by a single state or a group of states; and 
(3) hybrid regulation was a mix of the approaches in (1) and (2) in addition to the use of 
architecture-based regulatory tools and invasive surveillance powers by law enforcement 
authorities.
This investigation focuses on the hybrid regulatory strategies tackling child pornographic 
material available on the Internet. This is because the problem of child pornography involves a 
convincing regulatory rationale based on the protection of children that  is pushing further the 
boundaries of online content  regulation in ways that other problematic online content  are not; 
online child pornography is therefore a critical case study to analyse the developments of 
content-related regulatory strategies on the Internet, and more generally the potential threat 
these measures pose for free speech and privacy protection as well as for democracy generally, 
for example in terms of transparency, legitimacy and accountability of regulatory policies.
Notably, there is an ongoing call to replace the term child pornography. It  has been argued 
elsewhere that ‘child abuse images’ or ‘abusive material’ are both more inclusive and able to 
reflect the real nature of the problem in comparison to the term ‘child pornography’.15 Although 
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12  See Star, A. (ed.), Open Secrets: Wikileaks, War, and American Diplomacy (The New York Times) (Grove Press, 
2011);  and also Leigh, D. and Harding, L., WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange's  War on  Secrecy (London: Guardian 
Books, 2011).
13  Other taxonomies exist. For example, Hood and Margetts categorises regulatory intervention by policy 
instruments. See Hood, C. and Margetts, H., The Tools of Government in  the Digital Age (2nd revised edn.: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007).
14  Of course, states do employ a number of other regulatory strategies; state regulation will be discussed further in 
Chapter 2.
15  See e.g. Quayle, E., Loof, L., and Palmer, T., 'Child  Pornography and Sexual Exploitation of Children Online: A 
contribution of ECPAT International to the III World  Congress against Sexual Exploitation of Children and 
Adolescents ' , (Bangkok:  ECPAT International, 2008) at <http:/ /www.childcentre.info/public/
Thematic_Paper_ICTPsy_ENG.pdf>, accessed 09 June 2010, p 17; See also IWF, 'Internet Watch Foundation - The 
UK Hotline for reporting illegal online content', at <http://www.iwf.org.uk/>, accessed 21 March 2010.
these are legitimate concerns, this investigation employs the term ‘child pornography’ because 
of its wide currency in legal documents, international policymaking and academic literature.16 
Use of the term ‘child pornography’ does not deny the cruelty and violence involved in the 
production of such material, and it  is arguably closely related to the popular understanding of 
the problem. Furthermore, the criminal laws and regulations in place in the jurisdictions studied 
here rarely employ such a definition (i.e. ‘child abuse images’) and thus a term such as ‘child 
pornography’ may be a more useful for comparison.
The development  of modern anti-child pornography laws can be traced back to the late 1970s 
following the exposure of child sexual abuse as a social problem.17 As a result, domestic anti-
child pornography laws were created in a number of developed countries. This reaction was 
arguably effective in limiting the availability of child pornographic content within national 
borders until the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, the developments associated with the Internet  and 
digital communication technologies have facilitated the proliferation of child pornography and 
this led to enforcement of domestic anti-child pornography laws becoming largely ineffective. 
These developments were mentioned above and include the digitisation of content, anonymised 
access, and the decentralised and multi-jurisdictional architecture of the Internet  which rendered 
the choice of jurisdiction and the acts of policing state agencies heavily problematic.
The resulting ineffectiveness of law enforcement led to a number of regulatory developments. 
First, domestic anti-child pornography laws escalated in some jurisdictions: new types of 
conduct  and new classes of content  associated with child pornography were criminalised in 
addition to the establishment of harsher penalties. Responses also came at  the international level 
to tackle the multi-jurisdictional nature of the Internet  and the disparities in domestic laws e.g. 
the 2000 United Nations (UN) Optional Protocol18  and the 2001 Council of Europe (CoE) 
Cybercrime Convention.19 Nonetheless, the enforcement  of these international instruments fell 
short  in terms of disparities in domestic laws, technological know-how and slow ratification of 
international treaties.20 Second, Internet  industry self-regulation was also employed via Internet 
industry CoCs and voluntary filtering schemes employed by online intermediaries. These 
strategies were however largely ineffective at stopping people producing, distributing or 
accessing online child pornography. Third, hybrid regulation was taken onboard via closer 
partnership between state and private regulatory actors, increased liability placed on online 
17
16  The same reason is given by O'Donnell, I. and Milner, C., Child pornography: crime, computers and society 
(Devon: Willan Publishing, 2007), p 68; Akdeniz, Y., Internet child  pornography and the law: national and 
international responses (Surrey: Ashgate, 2008), p 11; Ost, S., Child Pornography and Sexual Grooming: Legal and 
Societal Responses  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p 32; and Edwards, L., 'Pornography, 
Censorship and the Internet', in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds.), Law and the Internet  (3rd edn.; Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2009), 623-69, p 629.
17 See Chapter 2.
18 UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child  Pornography 2000 (adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by  General Assembly 
resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000, entered into force on 18 January 2002) (United Nations).
19  Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 2001 (opened for signature on 23/11/2001, entered into force on 
01/07/2004, CETS No. 185, Budapest) .
20  Akdeniz, Y., Internet child pornography and the law: national and international responses  (Surrey: Ashgate, 
2008), p 207 and 223.
intermediaries, more investigatory and surveillance powers given to law enforcement 
authorities, and the use of architecture-based regulatory technologies.
The academic literature discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that there are a number of rationales 
driving the hybrid regulatory expansion in relation to child pornographic material available 
online: (1) amplified dimension of perceived harms; (2) the new venues where child abuse can 
be performed whether against  a real or a fictitious child; and (3) institutional agendas geared by 
symbolic politics (i.e. something has to be done about  it  whether it  is effective or not), moral 
entrepreneurs, media-made criminality, the prospect of financial gain and survival (e.g. by 
Internet hotlines, politicians, and software and hardware companies), and also a legitimate 
interest in protecting children against  sexual abuse. They involve rationales tackling market 
failure (i.e. the Internet industry was unable to tackle the spillovers or negative consequences 
derived from their operation) and also protecting human rights (i.e. the protection of children), 
and this is one of the reasons why the politics of regulatory choice in this area is a complex 
matter: these regulatory decisions are based not only in market  efficiency or better allocation of 
goods and services, but also on ethical grounds and questions of justice,21 involving trade-offs 
between children protection and civil liberties’ principles.
Many critics have argued that regulation of child pornography should focus on the primary 
abuse of children and international cooperation, not on blocking access to online material, 
because the latter is costly, ineffective and deflects attention from more important issues, e.g. 
protecting children against traditional ‘offline’ sexual abuse.22  This investigation shows that 
such ‘hands-off’ rhetoric in relation to state involvement on the Internet has been defeated: the 
regulation of child pornography available online is increasing across the world. Governments 
were convinced that  online child pornography has implications in the ‘offline’ world, i.e. that 
there is a causal relationship between the online child pornography and sexual abuse committed 
against children, that these images were not only fulfilling ‘sexual fantasies’ but  are part  of a 
comprehensive sexual exploitation industry. Indeed, the regulation of online child pornography 
is ‘an idea whose time has come’ and whose proponents (for example politicians, public 
opinion, the media, and group pressure campaigns) were ready to ‘ride the wave’.23
Although these regulatory rationales have been successful in justifying the expansion of anti-
child pornography laws and regulations for the online environment, their implementation raises 
a number of questions. Do these hybrid regulatory policies designed to limit access to child 
pornographic material available on the Internet  represent a threat  to free speech, privacy and 
other democratic values, e.g. the accountability, legitimacy and transparency? Do these concerns 
about free speech, privacy and democracy hold cross-nationally? Are there any safeguards in 
18
21 See ch 2 in Baldwin, R., Cave, M., and Lodge, M., Understanding Regulation: theory, strategy and practice (2nd 
edn.; Oxford: OUP, 2012).
22  See e.g. Akdeniz, Y., Internet child pornography and the law: national and international responses (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2008).
23  See generally Kingdon, J., Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies  (Updated 2nd edn.;  London: Longman, 
2011).
place to protect  such values? What are the mechanics and administrative constraints of these 
policies? Is hybrid regulation employed in similar ways across different jurisdictions? Are these 
strategies converging towards a single universal model of regulation? Who is bearing the 
financial costs to implement these regulatory measures? Are these policies efficient, effective 
and ethical? These are questions that will drive this research.
1 The scope of this investigation
This study addresses the regulation of child pornography available on the Internet  to evaluate 
the implications of hybrid regulation for free speech, privacy and democracy in the online 
environment. Nevertheless, a few issues in relation to the scope of this investigation are worth 
stressing in advance.
First, the problem of child pornography available on the Internet involves not only the 
production but the distribution of, and the access to, child pornographic material. Each activity 
involves a number of features and is subject to multiple regulatory responses. The production 
and distribution of child pornography on the Internet is addressed only peripherally in this 
investigation because they are not the focus of this research; this study focuses on the regulatory 
measures designed to limit access to child pornography available on the Internet.
Second, this investigation is not limited to the public web environment, but it takes into account 
the availability of child pornographic material in non-web applications and platforms. Although 
most of the regulation addressed in the case studies are about the measures tackling the child 
pornography available in public websites (i.e. notice and take down - NTD, and website 
blocking strategies), child pornography can also be accessed via anonymised peer-to-peer (P2P) 
channels and encrypted digital repositories, which are outside the reach of current  policy and are 
a matter of time-consuming police investigation. As such, although the policymaking addressed 
in this investigation is focused mainly on web-based applications, the more inclusive term 
‘Internet’ will be employed hereinafter so the wider regulatory phenomenon is included in the 
analysis and the partial effectiveness of current measures is exposed.
Third, although the focus is on the regulations to limit  access to online child pornography, this 
study also explores the laws against child pornography per se, the criminal liability of 
intermediaries and surveillance powers of law enforcement authorities, and court  cases in each 
jurisdiction in order to present the overall environment  where these regulations operate. As 
such, it  covers not  only the laws and regulations that  directly aim to limit access to child 
pornography available online (e.g. prohibition of knowingly accessing, and the use of NTD and 
blocking strategies) but those which indirectly inhibit or have a deterrent effect  in such conduct 
(e.g. the prohibition of mere possession, production and distribution of child pornography, the 
facilitation of surveillance powers of law enforcement authorities, and the increased criminal 
liability of online intermediaries).
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The study of lawmaking, police operations, criminal prosecution, sentencing, convicted 
offenders and victims in relation to online child pornography offences are outside the scope of 
this research. Although these issues are touched upon for the case studies to provide the context 
where the content regulatory policies were employed, this investigation is mainly about  the 
relationships established between public and private actors to limit access to online child 
pornography hosted domestically, or hosted overseas but  accessed within the relevant 
jurisdiction.
Finally, although Chapter 2 stresses that  the regulation of controversial material available on the 
Internet occurs in a decentred and polycentric environment, the case study material shows that 
the state plays a central regulatory role in relation to the problem of child pornography whether 
by increasing the surveillance powers of law enforcement authorities or in bringing the online 
intermediaries into line via legislation, or otherwise. This issue is discussed further in Chapter 6, 
but it is important to bear this in mind from the outset.
2 Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom: the case studies
Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom were chosen because they had generally similar anti-
child-pornography laws both domestically and internationally, they were considered democratic 
countries subject  to democratic controls of content, and access to data was relatively 
unproblematic in these jurisdictions. This provided a common ground for comparison. More 
importantly, they were chosen as case studies because they had fundamentally different 
approaches to the constitutional framework, scope and mechanics of regulatory policies 
designed to limit access to child pornographic material on the Internet, despite the fact that  they 
had similar anti-child pornography laws. This provided an opportunity to explore the ways in 
which substantively similar standards can be interpreted and enforced in different  constitutional 
and enforcement settings.24
In Australia, the Commonwealth government  established the online content regulations via 
legislation in 1999 so as to extend the existing regulation of television broadcasting to the 
online environment; this legislation was amended in 2004 and 2007. The scheme was centred in 
the government, via a statutory body, the Australian Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA), and relied on a substantial number of statutes and administrative regulations to 
control the access to child pornography available on the Internet. Although the Commonwealth 
government was the central regulatory actor, online intermediaries (e.g. ISPs, ICPs, IHPs and 
Internet industry associations) also played a significant  regulatory role via industry Codes of 
Practice (CoP). The Australian regulatory scheme targeted not only illegal material, e.g. child 
pornography but a wider range of content considered inappropriate to minors, e.g. adult 
pornography and violent material. Child pornographic material found and hosted domestically 
was required to be notified to the Australian police forces and the relevant online intermediary. 
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Child pornography hosted overseas but accessible via the Internet by Australian residents was 
targeted via a voluntary filtering scheme at the user-level. Nevertheless, there was also a 
voluntary blocking scheme at the ISP-level targeting child pornography websites employed by 
major Australian ISPs after July 2011. In addition, the Commonwealth government had plans to 
implement via legislation a mandatory filtering scheme at the ISP-level.
In Brazil, the criminal liability of online intermediaries and the NTD regime in relation to child 
pornography hosted domestically were established by legislation, but there was no 
comprehensive law to regulate the activities of online intermediaries in relation to other 
controversial content. Generally, the regulations in relation to online child pornographic 
material were put into place via agreements, not legislation, negotiated between the law 
enforcement authorities and the relevant  online intermediaries: these measures included NTD, 
procedures regarding the recording and disclosure of users access’ logs, and the relevant 
notification scheme. The Brazilian regulatory scheme also targeted not  only child pornography 
hosted anywhere in the world, but  material which could incite racial hatred or religious 
intolerance that was available to Brazilian residents via the Internet. Child pornographic 
material found and hosted domestically was required to be notified to the relevant  law 
enforcement authority and online intermediary. Child pornography hosted overseas but accessed 
by Brazilian residents was notified to the relevant foreign police authority and overseas Internet 
hotline, if such existed in the host country. Online content  filtering software could be used 
voluntarily at the user-level, but  there had not  been in Brazil any comprehensive use of filtering 
strategies to limit access to child pornography hosted in overseas websites.
In the United Kingdom, the regulatory scheme was centred in the Internet Watch Foundation 
(IWF), a self-regulatory body created in 1996 by the UK Internet industry under threat  of 
legislation if online intermediaries did not come with a solution of their own. The IWF managed 
the reporting scheme, and notified both the police and the relevant online intermediary about  the 
availability of child pornographic material available online. The IWF targeted not only the child 
pornographic material hosted anywhere in the world, but  both the criminally obscene adult 
content and the cartoon child pornography hosted in the UK. Child pornographic material found 
and hosted domestically was required to be notified to the relevant  police force and online 
intermediary. Child pornography found and hosted overseas but  accessed by UK residents was 
targeted via a voluntary blocking scheme at  the ISP-level that covered around 98% of Internet 
users in the United Kingdom; the reported URLs were also voluntarily notified to overseas 
Internet hotlines, if such existed in the host country.
3 Evaluation of regulatory policies to limit access to online child pornography
Chapters 2 shows that the academic literature has been concerned with a number of potential 
problems in relation to control of online content via hybrid regulation. These issues involve: (1) 
problematic interaction of public and private actors; (2) excessive reliance on architecture-based 
21
regulatory strategies and invasive surveillance powers; and (3) unintended regulatory 
consequences. The hybrid regulation of controversial material available on the Internet  involves 
the delegation of regulatory powers from the state to private actors and a number of trade-offs, 
because both state and private actors have agendas of their own. As such, the problematic 
interaction of public and private regulators has a number of potentially troubling implications 
(e.g. increasing the democratic deficit of regulatory policies, and the lack of transparency, 
legitimacy and accountability of regulatory measures put in place). The intensive use of 
architecture-based regulatory tools and increased surveillance powers given to law enforcement 
authorities have also raised a number of criticisms in the academic literature (e.g. violation of 
privacy, scope creep, and unchecked private censorship). Other potential negative consequences 
of hybrid regulation are the displacement  of crime to darker corners of the Internet, inhibition of 
international cooperation, and the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of regulatory policies.
Given that this research addresses the regulation of access to child pornographic material on the 
Internet to evaluate the implications of hybrid regulation for free speech, privacy and 
democracy in the online environment, it  established evaluative criteria divided into three broad 
categories: (1) free speech - involving the issues of unchecked private censorship, scope creep 
and lack of focus; (2) privacy protection - involving the issues of increased unchecked and more 
invasive surveillance powers given to law enforcement authorities; and (3) general democratic 
values - involving issues around the lack of transparency, accountability and legitimacy; lack of 
judicial and legislative oversight, and of citizen involvement; and also the inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness of regulatory intervention. In short, this investigation evaluates current hybrid 
regulatory initiatives to limit access to online child pornography in three different jurisdictions 
based on such evaluative criteria.
This exercise was important  to confront  the ideas, concepts and assumptions from the academic 
literature with the case study material. It  also made evident the need for a flexible evaluative 
criteria able to incorporate fieldwork issues not  previously found in the literature so as to reflect 
the different  priorities and agendas, cultural regulatory contexts and cultures in place in different 
jurisdictions. Notably, the evaluative criteria were not intended to privilege any jurisdiction in 
terms of ‘best’ regulatory practices according to a pre-established top-down criteria,25 but rather 
to identify, evaluate and discuss relevant issues that should be taken into consideration when 
designing regulatory measures tackling online child pornography.
4 The thesis roadmap
The first  part  of Chapter 2 includes a review of the literature and presents the overall conceptual 
framework of this investigation. It  addresses models for regulating the controversial material 
available on the Internet taking into account  the regulatory actors involved (i.e. the self, state 
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25 See Bulmer, R., 'Why the Cassowary is not a bird', in Mary Douglas (ed.), Rules and Meanings: the anthropology 
of everyday knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), 163-67.
and multi-state, and hybrid regulation) and explores the decentred and resilient  nature of the 
online environment that  rendered these regulatory models problematic. It  also explores the 
negative consequences that hybrid regulation of content  may have for free speech, privacy and 
democracy on the Internet, and develops evaluative criteria to assess such consequences. The 
second part of Chapter 2 presents the problem of child pornography on the Internet and explores 
regulatory measures employed in general taking into account  the typology of regulatory models 
developed in part 1.
In sum, Chapter 2 reviews the relevant academic literature, establishes the conceptual 
framework on which this investigation is grounded and makes a case for a comparative study of 
regulatory policymaking employed in relation to child pornography available on the Internet in 
Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom. The literature review also shows the reasons why 
online child pornography regulation was chosen to evaluate the implications of hybrid 
regulation.
Following this, Chapter 3 explains the methodological and ethical choices made to conduct  this 
research. In addition, it explains how the documentary analysis and the expert  consultation were 
employed to explore the anti-child pornography laws and regulations in the chosen jurisdictions 
under the framework of a cross-national multiple-case study. 
Chapters 4 presents the case study material. It  explores in detail the development of anti-child 
pornography laws and regulations to limit access to child pornographic content available on the 
Internet in Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom, respectively.
Chapter 5 develops the comparative analysis. It applies the evaluative criteria to the case study 
material and discusses the relevant findings so as to produce an evaluative report  on each 
jurisdiction for each criteria. 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion of this investigation. It  is based on the relevant findings of the 
comparative analysis and where links are made with the theory explored in Chapter 2. Notably, 
it shows what regulatory, governance and criminology theorists may learn from this research. 
Finally, Chapter 7 considers the strengths and limitations of this research, addresses its 
importance and contribution to knowledge, and suggests an agenda for further research in the 
field.
Overall, this research selected the problem of child pornography available on the Internet  to 
address the negative consequences of current  online content  regulatory policies, to explore the 
problematic implementation of regulatory measures and the trade-offs involved in protecting 
both children and civil liberties in the online environment, and to test  out a number of concepts, 
ideas and assumptions from the academic literature.
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CHAPTER 2: REGULATION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON 
THE INTERNET
[…] societal communication is a practice regulated by political institutions in all 
countries because of the essential role communication plays in both the infrastructure and 
the culture of society.26
[…] child pornography offers a critical case study for efforts to regulate the Internet, to 
enforce law in cyberspace.27
Endowed with an alleged unregulable, borderless, control-averse and anarchic nature, the 
Internet has changed the way people live and interact. It is now part  of the everyday life of 
modern industrialised countries and has a number of implications not only for the media but 
economy, politics, national security and the law. Unsurprisingly, governments across the world 
have implemented a number of strategies to regulate different aspects of the Internet, 
particularly online material, ranging from a period of incipient  top-down state intervention and 
self-governing libertarian activism towards escalation of domestic law, harmonisation of 
international laws, increased criminal liability of online intermediaries, more investigatory 
powers given to law enforcement agencies, use of architecture-based regulatory tools and 
implementation of sophisticated hybrid institutional arrangements. 
The regulation of online material is problematic and has attracted the attention of regulation 
scholars. The decentred, polycentric and resilient regulatory environment of the Internet  has 
challenged the ability of both state, via state regulation, and private actors, via self-regulation, 
to achieve efficient and effective results in line with the protection of civil liberties and human 
rights. As this chapter shows, a hybrid regulatory approach has been employed involving state 
and private regulators, the use of architecture-based regulatory tools, increased use of invasive 
surveillance powers by law enforcement  authorities, and more legal liability placed on online 
intermediaries for the content  they host or distribute. Nevertheless, this regulatory approach has 
been criticised on free speech, privacy and democratic grounds and a number of 
recommendations have been made in the academic literature.
Against this background, this chapter will: (1) explore regulatory and governance models 
employed to control online content; (2) design a typology of regulatory models for online 
content; (3) develop evaluative criteria to assess hybrid regulation applied to online content; and 
(4) make the case for applying this evaluative criteria to assess the regulation of online child 
pornography.
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27 Jenkins, P., Beyond Tolerance: Child Pornography on the Internet (New York:  New York University Press, 2001), 
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Child pornography was chosen because it  is pushing the boundaries of online content regulation 
in ways that  other problematic online content cannot because of an almost  public disgust at 
child sexual abuse that  makes criticism of such legislative drives morally difficult. In 
jurisdictions, such as Brazil, whilst cybercrime legislation moved slowly through Brazilian 
Parliament, specific provisions against online child pornography were enacted in 2008; in 
Australia, a voluntary scheme at the ISP-level to block access to websites allegedly hosting 
child pornographic images has been implemented whilst discussions of a broader scheme are 
still under way; and in the UK, anti-child pornography laws and regulations have developed 
well in advance when compared to copyrights infringement.28 Child pornography is therefore a 
critical case study with which to analyse the developments of content-related regulatory 
strategies on the Internet and the negative implications that anti-child pornography regulatory 
measures have for free speech and privacy protection as well as for online democracy and good 
regulation, for example in terms of transparency, legitimacy and accountability of regulatory 
policies.
1. Regulation
This section explores concepts, ideas and debates from the regulation and governance literature 
to develop a conceptual framework within which online content regulation can be explored 
further. They involve the decentred and polycentric nature of the regulatory environment and 
models of regulation.
1.1 Regulation in a decentred regulatory environment
Regulation is addressed by a variety of disciplines such as law, economics and political science, 
and defined in a number of different  ways leading to an ‘excessive theoretical diffusion’29 and 
no consensual definition about  the topic,30 but  it  is usually associated with the law and a discrete 
mode of governmental activity. For example, Baldwin et al point  out  three meanings of 
regulation: (1) targeted rules and their subsequent  enforcement usually by the state; (2) any 
form of state intervention in the economic activity in general; and (3) all forms of social control 
whether initiated, intentionally or not, by a central actor such as the state or non-state agents.31 
In addition, Baldwin and Cave suggest  that regulation can be used in the sense of: (1) a specific 
set of commands; (2) a deliberate state influence; or (3) all forms of social control that aims at 
restricting or facilitating behaviour.32  Similarly, Morgan and Yeung define regulation more 
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28 These issues will be discussed in detail in the case study material.
29 Baldwin, R., Scott, C., and Hood, C., 'Introduction', in Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott, and Christopher Hood (eds.), 
A Reader on Regulation (Oxford: OUP, 1998), 1-55, p 35.
30 See Baldwin, R. and Cave, M., Understanding  regulation: theory, strategy, and practice (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p 2; 
Baldwin, R., Scott, C., and Hood, C., 'Introduction', in Robert  Baldwin, Colin Scott, and Christopher Hood (eds.), A 
Reader on Regulation (Oxford: OUP, 1998), 1-55, p 2;  Black, J., 'Decentring regulation: understanding the role of 
regulation and self regulation in a 'post-regulatory' world', Current Legal Problems, 54 (2001), 103-46, p 134-5.
31 Baldwin, R., Scott, C., and Hood, C., 'Introduction', in Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott, and Christopher Hood (eds.), 
A Reader on Regulation (Oxford: OUP, 1998), 1-55, p 3.
32 Baldwin, R. and Cave, M., Understanding regulation: theory, strategy, and practice (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p 2.
broadly as the phenomenon of using all forms of social control (intentionally or not) by actors in 
an authoritative position (usually the state) via different enforcement mechanisms in the pursuit 
of policy goals and according to predefined rules.33  Finally, Brownsword employs a working 
concept of regulation that  defines the ‘regulator’ narrowly and ‘regulation’ broadly so that 
regulation is regarded as any controlling or channelling mechanisms used by regulators (in the 
narrower sense of agent or agency in a position to control and channel behaviour).34
Not only the definition of regulation but  also that of regulatory environment is framed in 
different  ways to cope with the complexity of the modern networked society. For Black, 
regulatory regimes are increasingly decentred because the state has no central role in regulation 
because authority is diffused throughout society, and polycentric because of multiple sites where 
regulation occurs at sub-national, national, supranational and transnational levels and is marked 
by fragmentation, complexity and interdependency between actors.35  By exploring the 
transformations of modern regulation, particularly the failure of traditional command and 
control strategies, and the shift  of regulatory authority within society, Black examines the 
concept of regulation under a decentred perspective (i.e. decentred from the state and diffused 
through society) and argues that such a decentred understanding of regulation is based on five 
elements: (1) complexity, referring to both causal complexity (i.e. social problems are a result  of 
different  factors) and complexity of interaction between actors; (2) fragmentation of knowledge 
because no single actor has all knowledge to solve the problem, and fragmentation of the 
exercise of power and control because the government has no monopoly of regulation; (3) 
autonomy of actors in the sense that  actors will continue to develop and behave as self-
determined bodies; (4) complexity of interactions and interdependencies amongst social actors; 
and (5) the rejection of a clear distinction between the public and private (for example, 
formation of institutional arrangements that combine governmental and non-governmental 
actors in a number of different ways).36 
This concept  is in line with approaches applied to the regulation of online child pornography 
which considers the regulatory environment as multi-layered: not only the state regulates but  a 
wide range of private actors, such as online intermediaries, Internet  industry associations and 
Internet users are enrolled in the regulatory process at both national and international levels.37
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Furthermore, there is a growing body of literature applying insights from both network and 
complexity theories to Internet  regulation. For example, Murray describes the regulatory 
environment  of the Internet in terms of a symbiotic system where relevant  actors and regulatory 
instruments produce a complex array of interactions with both intended and unintended 
consequences.38  Similarly, Guadamuz stresses that awareness of concepts such as network 
robustness and resilience, power laws and scale-free networks, spontaneous ordering and self-
organising environments may help regulators understanding the implications of a particular 
regulatory initiative applied to the online environment and thus improve the ability of regulators 
to deliver better regulation.39
There is also an international dimension that adds up to the complexity of the regulatory 
environment  as regulatory problems escape national boundaries. For Morgan and Yeung, 
regulatory tools designed to address such international dimension are more consensus and 
communication-orientated, informal dimensions of enforcement  are explored further, and 
expert-based models of legitimacy are more common in international regulatory environments.40 
Similarly, Black points out  that  transnational regulatory regimes are: (1) organised around 
particular regulatory domains, for example environment, food and trade, rather than 
geographical regions; (2) characterised by an intertwined international, transnational, national 
and sub-national decisionmaking and jurisdictional overlapping; (3) found to have no pattern of 
institutional interrelationships; and (4) linked through negotiations and informal 
communications.41
This international dimension is a crucial element  for the success of multi-state regulation of 
online child pornography. The multi-jurisdictional nature of the Internet  challenges the 
enforcement of both national laws and international treaties because of the different definitions 
given to child pornographic material and types of criminal conduct associated with such 
material, and the varying levels of expertise and motivation of domestic police forces, to name a 
few examples. 
The regulatory challenges posed by modern networked society-led regulation theorists frame the 
regulatory environment as a decentred and polycentric environment subject  not only to 
government intervention but  to multiple actors within a wider scope of governance. This occurs 
in relation to different regulatory domains be it  environmental42 or crime control. Indeed, as a 
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result of numerous changes in social order (for example technological, cultural, social, political, 
and economic), new regulatory rationales and configurations have been implemented: e.g., the 
monopoly of policing by state actors has given place to governance of security. As a result, 
police functions became more diverse and complex within society, because state police alone 
has been unable to tackle contemporary crime and maintain order.43 
For example, control of controversial online content is performed not  only by traditional law 
enforcement agencies, but by a multitude of private actors in a pluralistic and multilayered 
manner.44  The responsibility for policing controversial online content has been delegated to 
online intermediaries, commercial firms and Internet  users in a network of shared 
responsibilities and this occurs not  only in relation to actual policing of content  but  in regards to 
provision of services and goods for crime prevention (for example, online content  filtering and 
surveillance systems).45 For Zedner, however, private policing has a much longer history. As she 
argues, state policing responsibility grew out of individual responsibility.46 Yet, the fact  is that 
this systematic and widespread dispersion of policing powers to private actors has a number of 
implications in contemporary society and this has became more evident in recent times.
Indeed, the decentred regulatory environment and displacement  of regulatory responsibilities to 
private actors raise a number of issues in relation to democratic legitimacy, transparency and 
accountability, because of conflictual public and private interests involved. Each individual 
actor will ultimately push their own agendum forward in detriment of public interest. 
Accordingly, Dupont argues that traditional mechanisms of accountability and evaluation are 
unable to grasp the new morphology of security networks, because these mechanisms are 
generally focused on single organisations or individuals.47  Loader points out  that policing 
functions are being passed on to non-state actors which are not  subject to traditional 
mechanisms of police accountability (such as legal restraints, a framework of democratic 
institutions and internal organisational devices).48  Similar criticisms have also been made in 
relation to international regulatory regimes generally. For example, Black argues that there are 
issues in relation to non-transparent operation, poor consultation processes and decisionmaking 
not open to public scrutiny, undemocratic operation, inadequate systems of redress, and a lack 
of proper accountability. For Black, there are fundamental regulatory dilemmas and trade-offs 
associated with the emerging technologies that include finding a balance between flexibility and 
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48 Loader, I., 'Plural Policing and Democratic Governance', Social & Legal Studies, 9(3) (2000), 323-45.
predictability; independence and accountability; expertise and detachment; and speed and due 
process.49 For Stenning, however, this apparent lack of accountability of private policing bodies 
in comparison to public agencies is debatable, because there are a variety of mechanisms in 
place (e.g. criminal and civil liability, state regulation, industry self-regulation, labour law, 
contractual liability, and the market) whereby private actors may be held accountable; and also 
because public police accountability via constitutional and statutory regimes (whether political, 
judicial or administrative) may be exaggerated and ineffective.50
In sum, the analysis of online content regulation developed here is based on a broader definition 
of regulation (i.e. multiple regulatory actors and strategies) and of a decentred and polycentric 
regulatory environment  (i.e. one approach that displaces the loci of regulatory authority away 
from the state and towards multiple locations).51 It is also worth stressing that  the decentred and 
resilient nature of the regulatory environment and the dispersal of regulatory powers away from 
the state are central to understanding which consequences regulatory intervention has for free 
speech, privacy protection and also for legitimacy, transparency and accountability of current 
policies.
1.2 Regulatory models
Another important issue to address in this investigation are the models of regulation applied to 
online content. Regulators employ a number of tools in the pursuit  of their goals. For example, 
the government  not only regulates when it  enacts criminal law (i.e. primary legislation) but 
when it runs public awareness programmes and adopts product  design strategies.52  The 
government also regulates via administrative rules (e.g. second and tertiary legislation) and 
discretion. Lawmakers regulate via the production of primary legislation,53 the courts regulate 
when they issue a sentence, private actors regulate when an industry association designs and 
approves a code of practice and try to enforce it  against its members, and citizens also regulate 
via different participatory channels.54  Morgan and Yeung classify regulatory tools into five 
categories: (1) command; (2) competition; (3) communication; (4) consensus; (5) and code (i.e. 
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architecture).55 For Black, there are rules (legal, quasi-legal and non-legal), social and economic 
forces, and technologies.56
Lessig’s online regulatory model has four modalities of regulation which includes the law, 
social norms, the market  and architecture; each modality affects the regulatory target  in a 
different  way. Lessig gives the example of an anti-smoking regulatory policy that employs these 
regulatory modalities to limit  smoking behaviour.57 The law can prohibit  the selling of cigarettes 
to children and restrict  smoking to certain areas. In addition, social norms may affect smoking 
behaviour, because people have to ask permission for smoking in someone’s car or may be 
judged negatively by non-smoking individuals. Similarly, the market can impose restrictions on 
smoking by altering its price. Finally, the architecture can also regulate smoking habits when 
cigarettes are designed to be odour-free or monitoring equipment  is installed in a non-smoking 
area. Based on Lessig’s four modalities of regulation, Murray and Scott  identify fifteen (pure 
and hybrid) regulatory tools that  may be used to control different  aspects of the online 
environment.58 Finally, Brownsword presents the concepts of regulatory (1) mode, (2) pitch, (3) 
phasing, and (4) range, adding new layers of complexity to regulators’ toolbox.59
Hood and Margetts classify government regulatory tools under the concepts of detectors as ‘[…] 
all the instruments government  uses for taking in information’, and of effectors as ‘[…] all the 
tools government can use to try to make an impact on the world outside.’60 Based on these 
instruments, they introduce four types of government  resources used to regulate: nodality, 
authority, treasure and organisation. Nodality is the property of being in an advantageous 
regulatory position within the network. Authority is the ability to command and control via 
procedures and symbols. Treasure is generally the stock of moneys and organisation is the stock 
of land, building, equipment and specialised personnel available to the government. Notably, 
detectors and effectors (i.e. tools for information collection and shaping behaviour, respectively) 
are available in each one of these domains. As a result, governments can combine detectors and 
effectors within each domain in different manners to control controversial online content. For 
example, organisation like the police or a statutory regulator may be used to suppress 
information (e.g. Internet filtering in China) or to regulate access to online adult  pornography 
(for example, Australia). Treasure may be used as an incentive for voluntary filtering usage (for 
example free online content  filtering available in Australia) or adoption of a blocklist (for 
example only ISPs that  implement  the IWF blocklist can provide Internet services to the British 
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government).61  Authority may be used to create the obligation to notify criminal content (for 
example, US ISPs are obliged by law to notify law enforcement  about  the availability of child 
pornographic content) and force online intermediaries to take down content. Governments are 
struggling to find nodality in an environment  where regulatory power is dispersed and such 
nodal position can be gained via formal authority, such as forcing online intermediaries to work 
for the government as online gatekeepers.62
Hood and Margetts produced a useful conceptual framework around the use of regulatory tools 
not only because it  mapped different ways in which governments regulate online content  (and 
the government is often the main regulatory actor in such domain, despite regulatory dispersal) 
but because it could be used in cross-national comparison (for example comparing ways in 
which these tools are used cross-nationally). In addition, such a model can be used to 
characterise the varying institutional arrangements of content  regulation, because of its focus on 
tools not the regulatory actor.
As the last few paragraphs show, there are a number of regulatory tools and approaches 
available to regulators and a mix of them will often be employed to address the regulatory 
target.63 For example, different regulatory targets in relation to the online environment  such as 
domain names, technical protocols, pornography, privacy protection and copyrights 
infringement, involve different actors and demand different  strategies.64 Ultimately, there is no 
easy solution that  gives regulators an ‘off-the-shelf’ regulatory tool, because some targets may 
be more responsive to certain tools and there are sensitive cultural and political issues involved.
The politics of regulatory choice proved useful in guiding regulators vis-à-vis such variety of 
regulatory targets and tools available. For some, however, the choice over the proper regulatory 
mix often results not from pure rational choice but from ‘irrational policymaking, faith and 
politics’.65  Often technically inefficient  instruments are chosen because of domestic 
constitutional constraints, human rights concerns, pressure from particular interests groups and 
political parties, or treaties’ obligations, instead of more economically efficient choices with 
lower social costs.66
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Indeed, there are a number of trade-offs and political struggles involved in the process of 
choosing regulatory tools and models of intervention,67 and such politics of choice can be even 
more problematic within a cross-national regulatory environment, because similar regulatory 
problems may have quite dissimilar regulatory responses in different locations as a result of 
available resources available, social relationships as well as cultural and technological 
contingencies.68 
Regulatory arrangements also reflect the jurisdiction they are based on.69 For example, some 
governments regulate in a ‘spirit of collaboration’ (e.g. government  and private actors 
participating in decisionmaking), whereas others address them in a spirit  of ‘threat’ (e.g. 
government forcing private actors to follow a particular strategy under the threat of passing a 
draconian legislation). For example, Baldwin et al suggest  that  regulation in the United 
Kingdom tends to be generally less formal and less transparent because British regulators are 
prone to use self-regulation under the shadow of threats of legislative development, whereas in 
the US, regulation tends to be generally more formalised and legalistic.70  Regulatory models 
tackling online child pornography also differ in jurisdictions such as Australia, Brazil and the 
United Kingdom, although they all settled on a similar approach to child pornography 
regulation.
Another issue worth mentioning is the redundancy of regulatory tools that may be a strength in 
some circumstances, such as flight security, data transmission and corruption control in 
government, as a device for the suppression of error.71 Nevertheless, it  may constitute excessive, 
unnecessary and costly control in other events, for example the regulation of controversial 
material available online, where duplication of reports, unchecked private censorship and 
delaying red tape are undesired.
This wide range of regulatory tools can be used by either state, such as the law, and private 
actors (for example, Internet  industry Codes of Conduct); they combine a variety of social 
resources and capacities in the pursuit of policy goals and private interests, and these regulatory 
configurations, or models of regulation, can be classified according to different criteria. 
For example, the literature classifies regulatory models for the online environment in different 
ways. Solum divides regulatory strategies for the Internet into: (1) self-governing; (2) 
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transnational and international institutions; (3) national regulation; (4) code; and (5) the 
market.72  Weber also includes a self-governing strategy73  and Lessig’s four modalities of 
regulation is based on the law, social norms, the market and architecture.
They are classified here instead as state (state and multi-state regulation), non-state (self-
regulation) or a mix of the two (hybrid regulation) and this classification takes into account the 
main regulatory actors involved, be it the state, private actors, or a mix. These models are 
therefore: (1) self-regulation; (2) state and multi-state regulation; and (3) hybrid-regulation. 
There are other classifications74  but  the choice of such taxonomy was to facilitate the analysis 
developed along this research.
State regulation is centred on the notion of the state imposing standards backed by the threat of 
criminal sanctions.75  Its use often reflects the desire of state regulators to impose rules and 
prohibit  behaviour with immediacy in a way that shows to public opinion that the government  is 
acting forcefully,76 and involves not  only rule-making but also enforcement and sanctioning by 
the state.77  This regulatory model has a number of limitations. It  is prone to capture and 
legalism; it is difficult  to set appropriate standards; it  may be either excessively narrow or broad 
in scope which makes its enforcement  problematic; its instruments may be inappropriate and 
unsophisticated; the government  may lack the proper expertise; its implementation is often 
inadequate and the regulated may be insufficiently motivated to comply.78 It  may also fail for 
example to tackle the resilient and multi-jurisdictional nature of the Internet.
Self-regulation involves the development of rules by an organisation or association which 
attempts to enforce these rules against its own members,79  and is commonly employed in a 
variety of areas such as advertising, financial services and professional occupations. As a policy 
option, it  may be hard to define because it  can materialise via intra-firm regulation, legal civil 
contracts (private contracting), soft-law, collective arrangements, unilateral adoption of 
standards, and involvement of industry in rule-formation.80  Nevertheless, Ogus argues that 
although substantially different  institutional arrangements may be labelled self-regulatory, they 
do share common features and tend to be employed whenever: (1) one activity is affected by 
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market failure (usually due to externalities and information asymmetry); (2) private law 
instruments are inefficient  or excessively costly; and (3) it  is considered a better policy option 
when compared to state regulation.81
Generally self-regulatory rationales are based on the assumption that non-state actors have more 
expertise than public agents, enforcement costs are reduced, rules are more flexible and less 
formal, and the overall regulatory costs are not borne by taxpayers.82 Nevertheless, Black argues 
that both state and non-state institutions may have similar levels of expertise and capabilities, 
because usually no actor within the decentred regulatory arena has the capabilities and resources 
to tackle alone the regulatory problems (i.e. the regulatory authority, expertise and resources are 
dispersed throughout  society).83 Similarly, Ogus argues that self-regulation may lack democratic 
legitimacy and accountability, show unfairness of procedure and fail to effectively enforce rules 
against disobedient members.84 
Self-regulation involves the state to some extent, because private actors can rarely act out  of 
purely private initiative, but  rather within prior government mandate and legislative framework, 
be it  veiled or clearly manifested act. For example, Baldwin and Cave argue that  despite its 
state-less appearance, self-regulation may be in place as a result of government threat that  ‘[…] 
if nothing is done state action will follow’.85 Similarly, Price and Verhulst stress that there are 
different configurations for the ‘self’ of self-regulation.86
Finally, other regulatory strategies involve closer partnership amongst state and non-state 
institutions as regulatory actors, intensive use of architecture-based strategies, and increased 
surveillance measures; it  is often referred as co-regulation or hybrid regulation and will be 
explored further in Section 3 below.
So far, this section has addressed two building blocks of this investigation: (1) the decentred 
nature of the regulatory environment  that allows for a dispersal of regulatory powers which has, 
in its turn, implications for regulatory policies; and (2) a taxonomy of regulatory models. This 
analytical framework will be developed further in the next  sections in relation to the regulation 
of online content. 
2 Regulation and the Internet
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Section 1 addressed a number of issues from the regulation literature in order to start a dialogue 
with the literature about  online regulation. Nevertheless, before the latter is explored, it is 
important  to explain what the Internet  is and discuss the concept of Internet regulation used 
within the scope of this investigation.
2.1 Defining the Internet
This “Internet” that  everyone is talking about  is, fundamentally, nothing more than a 
gigantic global machine designed to move zeroes and ones from one place to another.87
Human interaction is each day becoming more and more mediated by communication 
technologies and the Internet  is perhaps the one that most  radically and rapidly transformed the 
dynamic of interactivity between human beings.88  It  is increasingly common to find people 
working, interacting with friends, exchanging ideas, purchasing goods, paying taxes and 
developing a wide range of social relationships via and with the support of the Internet.
The Internet  can be described as a distributed digital network derived from an academic, 
military and industry joint partnership that was later shaped by commercial actors in addition to 
the increasing activism and participation of the online community.89 For example, Curran argues 
that the Internet is a contested space that  reflects a combination of different values from 
scientists, political activists, market  agents and the government.90 In fact, Internet  is an umbrella 
term that gives name to a range of different  things interchangeably: it  may be considered a 
computer network, a mechanism for information dissemination, a platform of collaborative 
work, a technological tool to facilitate interaction amongst  individuals, a disruptive technology, 
but also a playground for paedophiles and a safe haven for illegal filesharing. It  is also a 
resilient, international, and self-organising network that embraces numerous platforms and 
applications. These numerous different views emphasise specific features and uses of the 
technology and fulfils different agendas.91
For Post, there are different networks including home-, office-, local area-, wide area- and TCP/
IP-networks that  connect  computers and also other networks around the world. The type of 
network that connects other networks are referred to as inter-network or internet. There are 
thousand upon thousands of internets connecting networks out there. Post  refers to the big 
global-spanning network as the inter-network or simply, the Internet  (capitalised) in order to 
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differentiate it from the other existent  internets,92 and this is the definition used within the scope 
of this investigation. This is because such definition highlights the regulatory domain addressed 
in this research which involves not  only the public but  also the private networks that  constitute 
the Internet.
The literature commonly refers to the social environment  where human interactions occur as 
cyberspace, whereas the infrastructure, software, technical standards and protocols are referred 
to as the Internet. For example, Lessig considers cyberspace as the social environment where 
people interact, whereas the Internet  is considered the medium of communication.93 Taylor and 
Quayle assume a similar distinction whilst examining the role of the (1) infrastructure, 
protocols, software and technical standards (i.e. the Internet) in regard to the increased 
distributive nature of online child pornography, and the role of the (2) online social environment 
(i.e. cyberspace) affecting the way online sexual offenders normalise and validate their criminal 
conducts within the peer community.94  The terms Internet  and cyberspace will be used 
interchangeably within the scope of this investigation because they often overlap and it is often 
irrelevant to make this distinction when considering online content regulation.
Notably, this investigation assumes no clear-cut  divide between the non-virtual and the virtual 
world;95  it  does not distinguish between the online and the offline environment, because to 
speak of cyberspace as a distinct  place, disconnected from the ‘real’, offline, non-virtual space 
is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Human interaction is each day more and more 
mediated by communication technologies and ‘online’ behaviour has real implications for the 
‘offline’ world.
2.2 Defining Internet regulation
Internet regulation involves regulation of human behaviour, regulatory institutional action, and 
the use of regulatory technologies on the Internet in the broader sense of the term, i.e. without 
making distinctions between the online and offline world.  Internet  regulation is considered here 
as the social phenomenon whereby regulators attempt to control and channel behaviour within 
the Internet, in the sense of its infrastructure, technical protocols and standards, and content, be 
they related to political, economic, technical or legal issues. As such, there are a number of 
different  regulatory challenges and targets in relation to the Internet  environment (for example 
infra-structure, technical protocols, controversial content, domain names) and each of them 
raises a regulatory analysis of their own.
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It  is also important to address the concept of Internet  governance and explain how it  relates to 
the concept of Internet  regulation used here. Governance is usually perceived as an alternative 
to government  but it  has multiple meanings and uses, including the reform of government, the 
set of coordinating activities in regulatory networks, new trends in economic development and 
the dynamics of international institutions.96 In addition, it is considered a by-product  of recent 
challenges towards the concept  of the state (i.e. institutions and personnel exercising authority 
within a territory) and the state’s ability to influence behaviour by using alternative tools rather 
than traditional command-and-control instruments.97  Governance may also indicate a 
transformation in policymaking from central state authority and coercive regulatory instruments 
towards a decentred and polycentric understanding of regulation (as discussed in Section 1.1 
above), reflecting the patterns of regulation distributed amongst  social actors where uncontested 
state authority is replaced by shared social responsibility.98  In addition, it involves the 
interdependence amongst state and non-state actors, the blurred distinction between the public 
and the private and the autonomy from the state, which raises issues about  the ‘democratic 
deficit’ (meaning the lack of legitimacy and accountability) in decentred regulatory regimes.99 It 
should be clear by now that the concept of Internet regulation used in this investigation reflects 
this change in governmental role as well as the decentred nature of the regulatory environment. 
It is therefore in line with the idea of governance explored in political science literature.100
Regulation and governance may be used interchangeably to reflect this understanding of 
regulation where authority is diffused, the regulation is decentred and the environment is 
polycentric. Nevertheless, Internet regulation will be preferred so as to distinguish the 
regulatory target addressed here (the controversial content available online) from the broad use 
of Internet governance referring to issues around the infrastructure, protocols and technical 
standards of the Internet.101  This is because Internet governance may refer to different domains 
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of regulatory intervention on the Internet  and, depending on the issue at stake, such as domain 
names disputes, Internet infrastructure, technical protocols, or wider political issues of digital 
divide and market  competition, regulatory analysis may involve different regulatory actors and 
strategies (for example, the Internet  Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, government 
statutory regulators, Internet  Engineering Task Force, or the Word Summit  on the Information 
Society).102  In short, this investigation addresses models of regulation applied only to 
controversial content  available on the Internet. Regulation of Internet infrastructure, its 
protocols and technical standards, or public policies against the digital divide, to name a few 
examples, are outside the scope of this investigation.
3 Regulating online content
Which social actor is better equipped to deliver effective responses to online content regulation: 
the state, non-state actors, or both? Are the Internet  community and industry able to resolve on 
their own the conflicts in relation to problematic online material? Should the state delegate this 
regulatory responsibility to non-state actors? What  are the trade-offs involved? What are the 
implications of this dispersal of regulatory power for democratic legitimacy, accountability and 
transparency? These questions were briefly addressed in Section 1 above in relation to 
regulation generally; they are explored below in more detail in regards to online content 
regulation.
The self-governing mantra of cyberlibertarians argues that traditional command-and-control 
state-based regulation is ill-prepared and unable to tackle the complex regulatory issues found in 
cyberspace. The state therefore should give way to bottom-up, online community and Internet 
industry self-regulatory strategies. It  puts forward a ‘hands-off’ rhetoric in relation to state 
involvement in the Internet. Nevertheless, the self-regulation argument  failed to convince 
regulators, particularly after the Internet achieved substantial economic, social and political 
importance across the world after the mid-1990s. As a result, nation states updated their laws 
and regulations to tackle controversial content  available online, whether it is related to 
pornography, violation of privacy, defamation, incitement to racial hatred, copyright 
infringement, politically sensitive material or child pornography. These measures were however 
challenged by the multi-jurisdictional nature of the Internet. This led governments to harmonise 
criminal laws and procedures via international treaties. Nevertheless, multi-state regulation also 
proved to be problematic for a number of reasons that will be explored later. Against  this 
background, hybrid regulatory strategies were taken onboard to address the limitations of both 
self and state regulation.
3.1 Self-regulation
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After its inception, the Internet  was considered a free environment by its own nature. It  was 
regarded as a place invulnerable to state regulation, a separate jurisdiction, a control-averse and 
anarchic space. According to this standpoint, information should flow freely in cyberspace and 
state intervention was neither possible nor legitimate. The Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace encapsulates this anarchic ethos103  and influenced many scholars thereafter. 
According to this manifesto, the Internet was a place where governments ‘[…] have no moral 
right  to rule us nor […] possess any methods of enforcement  we have true reason to fear 
[…].’104 A number of features of the Internet  such as no central point  of control, the distributed 
way it  transported digital content, its multi-jurisdictional nature, the claimed protection of 
anonymity of users and novelty of the media helped to advance the cyberlibertarians’ discourse.
This initial enthusiasm about the self-regulatory and anarchic nature of the Internet can be 
explained by the historical and political contexts of that time. The Internet  was not yet part of 
the everyday life of many people, many online content-related conflicts was outside the political 
agenda, and many governments were ill-prepared to enforce the law in cyberspace as 
individuals were enhanced in their power to overcome traditional state-based regulatory 
strategy.105  Against  this background, Post and Johnson argued that  ‘[…] new rules will emerge 
to govern a wide range of new phenomena that have no clear parallel in the nonvirtual world.’106 
For them, the proper way of policy-making in cyberspace is to leave it  to develop on its own via 
bottom-up decisionmaking by the individuals directly involved;107  a process also called 
spontaneous self-organisation, or ‘spontaneous ordering.’108
Although often used interchangeably, self-regulation and spontaneous ordering are conceptually 
different. Spontaneous ordering, also self-organisation, means that the environment  will regulate 
itself without external influence (for example Internet  users regulating their own environment  or 
online vigilantes tackling child pornographic content). On the other hand, Internet  self-
regulation means generally the initiative of private actors (e.g. Internet  service and content 
providers, software and hardware manufacturers, schools and public libraries) adopting 
common guidelines and regulating themselves within an environment  with little state 
interference.109 The latter involves a degree of intentional regulatory action, whereas the former 
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means no-regulation at all. Yet, self-regulation is used here in a wider sense involving a number 
of similar regulatory strategies and thus also encompasses the notion of spontaneous ordering 
by the private actors involved.
The self-regulation approach assumes that the Internet  is an organic force non-regulable and 
able to resist  regulation.110 It  also assumes two distinct social environments (i.e. the traditional 
‘real’ offline and the new virtual online space). Based on the assumption that ‘[…] cyberspace 
has no territorially based boundaries’, Post  and Johnson argue that the law and the sovereign 
states are unable to effectively regulate content and exercise territorial jurisdiction in the online 
world.111 In addition, individual freedom is supposedly secured by the Internet’s ‘intrinsically’ 
free nature, and cyberspace’s rules derive from the Internet community. Although this argument 
has failed to reflect reality, for them, such a self-regulated environment  would organically 
develop legal and regulatory institutions of its own.
The development of a true “law of Cyberspace” therefore, depends upon a dividing line 
between this new online territory and the nonvirtual world. Our argument  so far has been 
that the new online sphere is cut off, at least to some extent, from rule-making institutions 
in the material world and requires the creation of a distinct law applicable just  to the 
online sphere.112
Similarly, Johnson et al. maintained that  structures and relationships already in flux on the 
Internet are able to tackle online threats and problems, because new technologies and their 
resulting social interactions would enable a decentred and efficient decision-making process for 
the online environment. For them, the decentralised decisionmaking strategy is the best option 
for Internet governance when compared to the ‘benevolent  dictatorship’ (i.e. single central 
authority over the Internet) or the ‘representative democracy’ (i.e. the transposition of 
democratic institutions to the online world), both of which are based on traditional state-
regulation.113
For Post, the self-regulation strategy is still able to help understanding and managing the 
Internet regulatory dilemmas. Against  the background of Jefferson’s legacy he analyses current 
dilemmas posed by the Internet, such as those involving the law and governance, networks, and 
system design as a conversation between the Jeffersonian rationale (i.e. an approach based on 
liberty) which embraces chaos and diffusion of power, and the Hamiltonian rationale (i.e. an 
approach based on authority) which embraces order and concentration of power:
I don’t  know, to be honest, what they’ll come up with, what those lawmaking institutions 
and processes will look like, or should look like, in a virtual world […] What I do know 
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is that  people have the right to make those decisions and answer those questions for 
themselves.114
The self-regulatory stance encapsulates important insights for online regulation and 
establishment of technical protocols of the Internet. The bottom-up decisionmaking, the 
principle of rough consensus and running code,115  the self-organising ability to interpret 
censorship as damage and ‘routes around it,’116 and agreements negotiated via community self-
regulatory mechanisms are considered by governance bodies (e.g. the ICANN and IETF) as 
innovative and efficient managerial practices to tackle the critical technical resources and 
operations of many technical aspects of the Internet.
During the early days of the Internet  some states like the US were slow to regulate and let  the 
Internet (meaning the Internet infrastructure and its commercial uses) develop by private 
investment in an environment  relatively free from governmental influence. For example, 
Zittrain argues that there has been a historical forbearance assured by US Courts for lax state-
regulation towards the Internet.117 Similarly, self-regulatory strategies play an important  role in 
maintaining order in online environments such as eBay,118  Facebook and Wikipedia. These 
strategies also include the establishment  and enforcement of terms of service and other private 
agreements, Internet industry CoCs, online communities own decisionmaking, parental and 
school content monitoring, and also individual users’ choice have relevant roles to play here.
Nevertheless, self-regulation has proven to be problematic not only in relation to infrastructure 
issues,119  but in regard to controversial content  available on the Internet. Indeed, the protection 
of critical infrastructure and national cybersecurity, control of criminal activities, protection of 
privacy and the rights of copyright  holders, amongst  other things, demand direct  state 
intervention and mediation, because self-regulation and self-governing strategies alone are 
unable to resolve the problems these issues bring about; the Internet  has challenged traditional 
state-based regulatory approaches but  it has also failed to be an entirely self-regulated 
environment.120
3.1.1 Limitations of self-regulatory strategies to control online content
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The conclusion that this notion of two separated spaces (i.e. one online and one offline 
environment) is not reflected in reality undermined the self-regulation argument. Online human 
behaviour has implications for the offline world because they are intertwined. As noted in 
Section 2.2 above, ‘offline’ actions have implications in the ‘real’ world. The Internet has 
always been regulated by governments since its inception:121  it is ‘full of laws’.122  Self-
regulation hardly operates without any type of state-based regulatory framework. For example, 
Oswell argues that self-regulation occurs within a context  of statutory powers and law 
enforcement agencies, otherwise private actors would have limited powers and no criteria about 
how to operate.123  Similarly, Price and Verhulst argue that self-regulation occurs in different 
configurations and via different levels of involvement  with state actors (e.g. regulatory agency 
oversight  and judicial review), because it rarely exists in a vacuum.124 Ultimately a nation state 
will exercise its authority over the Internet  if online transactions reach its territory, pose a threat 
to its national security or interests, or affect its nationals.
For example, Brazilian criminal courts requested overseas online intermediaries operating in 
Brazil (such as Google and Microsoft) both the connection and content  data about Brazilian 
residents involved in online-related criminal offences, and also requested removal of alleged 
criminal material from their overseas hosts, but accessed from within Brazil, whenever the 
reported material violated Brazilian domestic laws.125  In 1999, the Australian government 
updated its offline censorship laws to enforce them in relation to the online environment.126 
Similarly, the controversial content  restrictions enforced in ‘offline’ China are employed in the 
Chinese ‘online’ environment.127  The US and British governments responded to the growing 
threat that cyber-attacks pose to their critical national infrastructure, and to society in general, 
with the creation of specialised units, and increased surveillance powers.128
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Self-regulation alone was unable to tackle copyrights’ violation on the Internet  and the state had 
to come onboard. See for example the case of the 2010 Digital Economy Act.129  This piece of 
legislation threatens alleged domestic civil infringers with an escalation of technical measures 
that include notifications by ISPs, slowing down Internet connection, Internet disconnection and 
blocking of websites.130 Nevertheless, according to an initial obligation code, a further act  of the 
UK Parliament is required to implement measures such as throttling or disconnection.131
In addition, a British court  has recently ordered domestic ISPs to block access to the alleged 
illegal filesharing website Pirate Bay.132  The British attempt to regulate online copyright 
infringement  via legislation and the courts exposed the failure of the market  to regulate illegal 
filesharing of copyrighted material on the Internet on its own. Given that the Internet  service 
and content providers, Internet users, right-holders, and the media industry were unable to 
resolve the conflicts in relation to copyright protection on the Internet by themselves, 
governments were forced to intervene via legislation and the courts.
The limitations of self-regulatory strategies to control online content are also in relation to 
privacy protection on the Internet. Self-regulation can be employed to protect privacy online via 
different  regulatory tools (e.g. commitments, codes of conduct, standards, seals, guidelines and 
terms of service).133 For Charlesworth, the scope of self-regulation has expanded and broadened 
over the years to protect online privacy. He points out  the move from mere symbolic 
commitments towards codes of conduct, standardisation of practices and the identification of 
non-compliant members as well as from a focus on organisations towards sectors and functions 
at  the national and international levels, respectively.134  For example, it  has been reported that 
Google, Microsoft, Yahoo and AOL have agreed to sign a voluntary agreement, created by the 
US federal government, to set  minimum standards in relation to privacy protection of US 
customers.135
Nevertheless, self-regulation of privacy protection on the Internet is not  without criticisms. 
There is little evidence to support the conclusion that  free market  regulation is able to tackle 
commercial private abusers and preserve the public interest of Internet users. In addition, it  is 
increasingly hard to believe that industry funded agencies will effectively enforce privacy 
44
129 Digital Economy Act (c. 24) 2010 (England and Wales).
130  Edwards, L., 'Law and sausages: How Not to Legislate for the Digital  Economy', at  <http://
blogscript.blogspot.com/>, accessed 03 May 2010.
131  See OFCOM, 'Online Infringement of Copyrights  and the Digital Economy Act  2010: Draft  Initial Obligations 
Code', (London: Ofcom, 2010) at <http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/copyright-infringement/
summary/condoc.pdf> Accessed 24 November 2012.
132 Halliday, J., 'British ISPs will block The Pirate Bay within weeks', The Guardian, 30 April  2012, sec. Technology 
at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/apr/30/british-isps-block-pirate-bay>, accessed 01 May 2012.
133 Bennett, C. and Raab, C., The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 2006).
134  Charlesworth, A., 'Data Privacy in Cyberspace:  Not National  vs. International but Commercial vs. Individual', in 
Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds.), Law and the Internet: A Framework for Electronic Commerce. (2nd 
edn.; Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), p 81.
135  See Arthur, C. and others, 'Google, Microsoft, Yahoo and AOL back US 'consumer privacy bill  of rights'', The 
Guardian, 2012, sec. Technology at  <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/feb/23/google-microsoft-yahoo-
aol-privacy>, accessed 22 March 2012.
policies, particularly when the costs of compliance exceed the benefits of breaching the policies, 
so it may be the case that regular oversight  from government  is necessary when incentives for 
compliance are weak.136  For Bennett and Raab, there is a perception that self-regulation of 
online privacy is more symbolic than real because those responsible for the implementation of 
protective policies have real interest in processing personal data with as little regulation as 
possible.137  For example, the US Federal Trade Commission has notified Facebook about 
violations of privacy138 and this is one of the reasons why the politics of privacy protection on 
the Internet involves not only self-regulation, but  domestic statutory protection via legislation, 
regulatory agencies, jurisprudence as well as transnational and technical instruments.139  The 
House of Lords and House of Commons Joint  Committee on Privacy and Injunctions has 
recently recommend that  there should be legislation forcing search engines like Google to block 
search results containing information found by the courts to be violating the privacy of 
individuals.140
In sum, a lack of governmental oversight on the Internet  may leave online users vulnerable to 
market interests. This is true not only in regards to the protection of online privacy and the 
regulation of illegal content, but in respect of management of the network infrastructure. 
According to Weiser, private actors have been working with the network management with little 
government interference. Taking the example of the Spring/Cogent  Internet backbone issue and 
the Comcast/Bit Torrent network management  case, both of which are conflicts between private 
actors managing a infrastructure which is considered to be a public resource, he argues that a lax 
governmental policy may harm Internet users’ interests.141  Similarly, the poor availability of 
Internet access in economically deprived areas is also a case of the private overcoming the 
public interest and of a necessary state intervention to achieve a balance.
Self-regulation seems to be not only ineffective but also a source of unintended consequences. 
For example, Marsden et al. argue that  whilst self-regulatory strategies seem to be more 
responsive and flexible, it is less transparent and often operates with lower procedural 
standards.142  Similarly, Cave et al. points out that  the use of self-regulation to control online 
content may also result in privacy and free speech violations, function creep, private censorship, 
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and the same content  may be subject  to numerous CoCs and accountable to several different 
bodies in a self-regulatory regime.143  This is why many propositions have been made in this 
regard. For example, Marsden et al. suggest that  in order to strengthen efficiency of self-
regulation intervention, such practices should: (1) suffer external auditing; (2) be able to fulfil 
public interest criteria; (3) publish clear benchmarks over transparency, accountability and due 
process; (4) share public guidelines on transparency and due process; (5) avoid capture by 
industry; and (6) empower consumer groups.144 Similarly, Price and Verhulst suggest  that  self-
regulatory instruments need more consumer and citizen involvement, stronger commitment  of 
industry members, effective accountable channels, effective monitoring rules and proper 
enforcing standards to improve current policies.145
Although self-regulation has an exciting libertarian appeal in the sense of freedom from 
government interference and more flexible governance arrangements, state intervention is not 
only necessary to mediate conflicts and avoid abuses but it is a sine qua non condition for 
overall stability and development of the online environment. For Goldsmith and Wu, state 
coercion is needed for any source of governance on the Internet, because ‘[…] the greatest 
dangers for the future of the Internet come not when governments overreact, but when they 
don’t react at all.’146 The next section explores state and multi-state regulation applied to online 
material.
3.2 State and multi-state regulation
Other technologies have challenged government’s authority; other pioneers have gleefully 
declared the death of the state. What their stories show us, though, it  that  while 
technology can gravely wound governments, it rarely kills them. Instead, governments 
survive because, ironically, both society and entrepreneurs want them. Governments 
provide the property rights that entrepreneurs eventually want, the legal stability that 
commerce craves, and the stability that society demands. For in the end, even pirates and 
pioneers want order. Once they have staked their claim or claimed their loot, they want 
someone else to protect it. And that someone else is usually the state.147
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Self-regulation neglected the role that  governments were playing since the beginning of Internet 
and many potential regulatory mechanisms available to regulators. Although little governmental 
intervention was evident during the early days of the Internet, the state was involved whether 
financing its creation or providing the legal framework whereby private actors could exploit it 
commercially. The cyber-libertarian rhetoric in relation to online content regulation failed to 
reflect reality as nations across the world are increasingly exercising national sovereignty over 
their territories and nationals via lawmaking, enforcement and sentencing, making way to ‘[…] 
a bordered network where territorial law, government, power, and international relations matter 
as much as technological invention.’148
Governments have employed domestic legislation to control access to online adult pornographic 
to protect children. For example, two pieces of legislation originally designed to block access to 
legal adult pornography by children, the US 1996 Communications Decency Act (CDA 1996)149 
and the US 1998 Child Online Protection Act (COPA 1998)150 were enacted in the United States 
of America. In a similar vein, LICRA et UEJF v Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo France showed how a 
nation state attempted to assert its national laws in the online environment via the courts.151 The 
French law prohibits the trafficking of Nazi memorabilia in France, but  this material was easily 
available to all French Internet users via an auction website of Yahoo! hosted in the US, where 
the availability of Nazi goods is perfectly legal under the wide constitutional protection of free 
speech.
The Internet  has no geographical boundaries and it reaches a number of different jurisdictions. 
Child pornography for example became a notorious problem in the online environment  across 
the world. As a result, different jurisdictions criminalised conducts (e.g. production, distribution 
and access), types of material (e.g. photographs, pseudo-photographs, cartoon pornography, text 
and audio recordings) and increased criminal penalties associated with online child 
pornographic content.152  The escalation of anti-child pornography laws occurred not  only 
domestically but  internationally. The 2001 CoE’s Cybercrime Convention153 and the UN 2000 
Optional Protocol154  are examples of such attempt to harmonise anti-child pornography laws at 
the international level in order to face the multi-jurisdictional challenge posed by the Internet.
State regulation is not limited to lawmaking and sentencing but enforcement. Specialised police 
agencies were created in many jurisdictions to tackle online child pornographic content, 
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incitement to racial hatred, online financial crimes and copyrights infringement. International 
police operations were conducted to tackle online content-related crimes and the harmonisation 
of procedural criminal law has been pursued.155
Although state regulation of online content is increasing, this model has a number of limitations. 
The proliferation of laws, court decisions and policing of online material domestically have 
been challenged by the resilient nature of the Internet. Similarly, international harmonisation of 
online content-related criminal laws and the police cooperation at  the international level fall 
short  because of the slow ratification process of international treaties and of different levels of 
expertise and financial resources available to law enforcement agencies. The next section will 
explore these limitations further.
3.2.1 Limitations of state and multi-state regulatory strategies to control online content
Enforcement  of domestic laws targeting production, distribution and access to problematic 
content was arguably relatively effective and straightforward before the Internet. Access to adult 
pornographic material by children was easier to control because of architectural constraints such 
as the presentation of a valid identification for age verification,156 and the proliferation of child 
pornography was limited by the constraints of the print copies, analog cameras, and mail 
services available. Nevertheless, following the exponential growth of the Internet  after the 
mid-1990s, the enforcement  of domestic laws in relation to controversial content became 
problematic.
[…] it is extremely difficult and costly to enforce traditional legal-regulatory control 
systems within cyberspace, due to a variety of factors including a relative degree of 
anonymity, lack of physicality, digitisation of content, environmental plasticity and the 
international or cross-border nature of the network.157
First, digitisation of content facilitated the transmission of information, be it  photographs, video, 
print  documents or music, via the digital networks. Digitised text, image, audio and video could 
be easily and rapidly transferred from one location to another without degeneration of original 
information. This also facilitated storage of information. For example, a large volume of print 
pornographic material could be stored in a small hard disk after being digitised. 
Second, the architecture and technical protocols of the Internet allowed information to be 
transferred via an international network without a central point of control. This limited the 
ability of governments to control problematic content and facilitated the anonymity of alleged 
offenders. The Internet protocol (IP) address identifies not the person that  produced, distributed 
or accessed the content on the Internet but  only the machine where data is sent  or received (i.e. 
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the user’s digital identity is not necessarily his/her physical world identity).158  The Internet can 
be accessed via different  encrypted channels to protect anonymity and make identification 
difficult. There are also a number of different points of control, because more actors are now 
involved in producing and distributing content. There are different  online intermediaries 
responsible for receiving, hosting and passing on packets of data (e.g. Internet  service and 
content providers, Internet backbones, transmission hosts, resource hosts, communication 
services, social networking and online payment systems).159
Third, the Internet  poses a multi-jurisdictional challenge to enforcement of content-related laws. 
The Internet is an international network that  connects people across different  jurisdictions and it 
is subject to different  regulatory schemes and legislation. It  crosses national borders where 
national governments have no sovereign authority.160 Many countries with underdeveloped laws 
can become safe havens for cybercriminality, finding the origin and the offender associated with 
the criminal material can be problematic, and the question of which jurisdiction should 
prosecute is open to debate.161  In short, these issues render the choice of jurisdiction and 
enforcement of jurisdictional powers heavily problematic when applied to criminal content 
available online.
Although state regulation is necessary to frame a cadre of privacy responsibilities and rights, it 
hardly prevents inappropriate collection and use of personal data online. Governmental 
initiatives to protect personal data online have limitations. For example, the 1995 EU Data 
Protection Directive162  is based on the concept of informed users but people hardly read the 
terms of service when signing up for an online service, and given that  personal data is both a 
human rights and a commercial construct, ultimately, governments have to balance the pros and 
cons of prioritising the protection of personal data or the commercial interest, because this could 
attract or repel global investments.163
The Internet  challenged not only enforcement of domestic laws but  law-making processes. The 
choice of whether to enforce the old or create new laws, the design of proportionate criminal 
retribution and deterrent  measures, the flexibility to cope with technological changes, the 
protection of civil liberties, and the need to harmonise laws at the international level are 
examples of challenges that lawmakers face.164 For Reed, the difficulties of enforcing the law in 
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cyberspace made it nearly impossible to achieve minimum levels of effectiveness in areas such 
as tackling copyrights infringement  via online filesharing, and thus it  is necessary to include the 
cyberspace actor’s perspective and a normative understanding into the lawmaking equation to 
increase the chances of people acting lawfully.165 The ever changing online environment is far 
ahead of the lawmaking process and this creates a problematic regulatory gap that produces an 
arguably irrational escalation of content-related criminal laws. For example, although no real 
child is involved, computer-generated images and cartoon imagery associated with child 
pornography have been criminalised in the UK.
The multi-jurisdictional nature of the Internet  has forced governments to design content-related 
criminal laws at  the international level via a sui generis non-country specific body of law or the 
harmonisation of existing laws.166  The 2001 CoE’s Cybercrime Convention167  contains 
substantive and procedural criminal law to tackle online child pornography and copyrights 
infringement. It  was supplemented by the 2006 Additional Protocol168  to cover racist  and 
xenophobic content available on the Internet. The 2001 Convention shows how problematic 
multi-state regulation is on the Internet. The signature, ratification and implementation by 
member and non-member states is slow and the right to exclude certain provisions may lead to 
discrepancies amongst states which undermines cross-national policing and mutual 
assistance.169  For example, multi-state regulation of online child pornography via international 
law (e.g. the 2000 UN Optional Protocol and the 2001 CoE’s Cybercrime Convention) faces 
numerous difficulties to be enforced internationally, because moral, cultural, political and legal 
domestic environments may render a uniform criminal regulatory approach towards legal 
definition and types of child pornographic content as well as the relevant criminal conducts and 
penalties particularly problematic on the Internet.170  Indeed, discrepancies in terms of 
substantive and procedural criminal laws can limit the success of the law as a form of state-
regulation in a borderless international environment.171  The future implementation of the 2001 
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CoE’s Cybercrime Convention by non-European states has been undermined, because some 
countries are for the establishment of a new agreement based on a non-Eurocentric process.172
In sum, the Internet  has challenged the ability of self, state and multi-state regulatory strategies 
to control problematic content  available online. Against this background, a number of other 
strategies have been taken onboard. First, governments legislated domestically to increase the 
criminal liability of online intermediaries as well as the investigatory powers of law 
enforcement agencies so as to identify alleged offenders, collect criminal evidence and take-
down alleged criminal content available online. Second, regulators started to force online 
intermediaries to police online content bypassing conventional judicial and legislative channels. 
Third, both state and non-state actors used a number of architecture-based regulatory tools 
extensively (for example online filtering and blocking systems as well as tethered appliances) at 
both the ISP  and user-levels to control content available online. The problematic enforcement  of 
content-related criminal laws on a decentred regulatory environment led to the implementation 
of a multitude of regulatory strategies by state and private actors. These hybrid strategies will be 
explored in detail below.
3.3 Hybrid regulation
The sections above showed that  self, state, and multi-state regulatory strategies have been 
employed across the world to control controversial content  available online, and that these 
strategies showed a number of limitations. The problematic enforcement of such strategies has 
lead to a multitude of regulatory arrangements involving state and private actors and this 
combination is regarded elsewhere as the best  regulatory strategy not only in relation to the 
online environment but other domains.173 For Murray, for example, de facto control over online 
content can only be achieved via ‘[…] a web of terms and conditions of service and thorough 
Lessigian code-based solutions […]’ not merely thorough legal documents whether 
domestically or internationally.174
Some hybrid regulatory armaments encourage relevant  private actors to implement  regulatory 
systems of their own that  can be scrutinised by regulators, blend persuasion and coercion, and 
release, at least partially, the state from the burden of exclusive direct enforcement.175 
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In sum, hybrid regulation (also co-regulation, smart regulation, or meta-regulation) is a 
regulatory strategy that involves both state and non-state actors as active regulators. For 
Marsden et al., it is a:
[…] a middle way between state regulation and ‘pure’ industry self-regulation […] 
expresses a dialogue between stakeholders, which results in a form of regulation which is 
not state command-and-control regulation in its bureaucratic central […] specialised 
functions, but it is also not ‘pure’ self-regulation as we observed in industry-led standard 
setting in Internet infrastructure.176
Perritt Jr. also employs the concept of hybrid regulation but  with a different meaning. For him, 
hybrid regulation is the public law framework that  inhibits excessive control of content 
undertaken by private actors. He regards hybrid regulation as a public remedy to deficiencies of 
self-regulation (e.g. when private control is enforced via filtering systems that excessively block 
access to online content  in opaque and unaccountable manners).177  Nevertheless, this 
investigation takes a more sceptical view of governmental agency, because the ‘government 
itself is a power that  must  be checked’.178  The state may also use private actors to control 
content so as to bypass due process and democratic values. As such, it  is the hybrid regulation 
(state and private actors acting together), not  self-regulation (unchecked censorship by private 
actors), that needs a public law framework to protect democratic values.
For Ayres and Braithwaite, alternative regulatory strategies should be employed in order to 
advance the unfruitful debate between strict government  regulation and pure market regulation. 
For them,
Good policy analysis is not choosing between the free market and government regulation. 
Nor is it  simply deciding what the law should proscribe. If we accept that sound policy 
analysis is about understanding private regulation - by industry associations, by firms, by 
peers, and individual consciences - and how it  is interdependent with state regulation, 
then interesting possibilities open up to steer the mix of private and public regulation.179
Their proposition is materialised in the concept  of ‘enforced self-regulation’, a hybrid regulatory 
strategy that  blends together features of state-regulation and market  self-regulation. This 
approach places significant responsibility upon individual firms, which are responsible for 
establishing specific regulatory rules towards their own environment. These rules are then 
reviewed and approved by the government and are later subject to state sanctions if violated. 
The concept of enforced self-regulation has thus two important features (i.e. ‘public 
enforcement of privately written rules’ and ‘publicly mandated and publicly monitored private 
enforcement of those rules’). This strategy tackles the poor compliance commonly found in self-
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regulatory schemes (e.g. ISP non-compliance with Internet industry codes of conduct), because 
the state will be able to escalate power to sanction when delegated regulation fails. In addition, 
it  tackles the inflexible nature of command-and-control regulation, because private actors have 
key roles in decisionmaking, monitoring and enforcing processes.180  Another potential 
advantage is that  public regulators can escalate the enforcement  response if the industry fails to 
self-regulate, so they can start  with advisory and persuasive measures and then escalate towards 
mild administrative sanctions and punitive sanctions at the top to secure compliance.181
Generally hybrid regulatory strategies come into existence as more creative, inclusive, flexible 
and imaginative regulatory responses to problems not properly addressed by traditional forms of 
regulation and have been largely based on the assumption that  ‘[…] the use of multiple, rather 
than single policy instruments, and a broad range of regulatory actors, will produce better 
regulation’.182  Indeed, regulatory redundancy may be welcome in some circumstances,183  but 
this assumption is debatable and hybrid regulation has shortcomings of their own as will be 
discussed later.
Nevertheless, hybrid strategies are already in place to tackle controversial content available on 
the Internet in Europe.184  There has also been increased use of online intermediaries to police 
online content via legislation that increased their criminal and civil liability in relation to 
controversial content, and to strengthen their cooperation with law enforcement agencies for 
surveillance. For Marsden, there has been an increased latitude for private censorship during the 
2000s, be it ‘aided, abated, funded, and cheer led by governments’.185
Hybrid regulation has been enforced by the Chinese government to control problematic material 
available online. It employs a wide set of techniques ranging from direct governmental 
intervention to heavy and extensive architecture-based regulation, carried out at different  points 
of control and involving thousands of state agents and private personnel.186  Similarly, co-
regulation and ‘after the fact adjudication’ have been implemented to resolve infrastructure 
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disputes around the US Internet backbone regulation making the government  act  as a facilitator 
rather than directly enforcing state-regulation.187
Hybrid regulation has been employed for privacy protection of personal data available on the 
Internet. Self-regulatory instruments have been supplemented by state and multi-state 
mechanisms in addition to architecture-based regulatory tools (e.g. privacy enhanced 
technologies).188  The protection of privacy online is enforced via a mix of self-regulation, 
community persuasion (online activism), terms of service, governmental oversight (e.g. pre-
authorised contracts by a regulatory agency, domestic and international law) and privacy 
enhanced technologies (e.g. allowing the data migration between different platforms and data 
expiration).189
Moreover, hybrid strategies have been used to stop the publication of other types of 
controversial content  on the Internet (e.g. state classified information). The whistleblower 
organisation Wikileaks has proved its resilience to host and provide access to classified 
information, particularly the War logs and the US diplomatic cables amidst widespread 
governmental threats around the world.190  Wikileaks employed sophisticated computational 
techniques and hosted their servers in nations with more protective speech laws to preserve the 
anonymity of informants and evade governmental control. As a result, it  has been subject to 
intense pressure from governments. Julian Assange, editor-in-chief of the Wikileaks, has been 
fighting in the UK against his extradition not to the US but to Sweden, where he faces criminal 
charges in relation to an alleged sexual offence.
The battle against  Wikileaks following the ‘diplomatic cables’ affair showed how governments 
are bypassing courts to control the availability of controversial content  via online 
intermediaries. For Benkler, the US government would be defeated in a court challenge against 
Wikileaks (in relation to the unauthorised release of US confidential diplomatic messages by 
Wikileaks) on free speech grounds, and instead of going to the US courts, the US government 
bypassed the US judicial control employing a multi-stakeholder attack against the organisation 
via online intermediaries (e.g. Amazon and online payment systems) by the mere insinuation of 
illegality.191  As such, the US government mobilised private resources to regulate online content 
and achieved a success (i.e. Wikileaks stopped its operation because of financial hardship) not 
likely to occur via US courts.
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Regulation of copyrights infringement on the Internet is another example of hybrid regulation 
applied to the online content. In a recent  legislative attempt to minimise copyright 
infringements, enforce intellectual property rights on the Internet, and place policing 
responsibilities on ISPs, the British Parliament  enacted the 2010 Digital Economy Act,192  a 
piece of legislation that threatens domestic civil infringers with an escalation of technical 
measures that  include monitoring and notifications by ISPs, slowing down Internet connection, 
Internet disconnection and blocking of websites by the ISPs.193
Similarly, the 2011 e-G8 Meeting in France showed how governments are increasingly forcing 
Internet companies (e.g. Facebook and Google) to follow governments’ requests in relation to 
disclosure of users’ data, violation of privacy and illegal filesharing without resorting to judicial 
control.194  Legislation has been proposed in the US (i.e. the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and 
Protection Bill - CISPA)195  to facilitate the sharing of information between private companies 
and the federal government so as to increase cybersecurity, and similarly the UK coalition 
government has unveiled plans to increase regulation of online intermediaries by law 
enforcement authorities.196  Some online intermediaries (e.g. Google) promised to fight any 
attempt to use website blocking technologies to stop illegal downloading of copyright  protected 
works197  but the company shows a different approach in relation to alleged child pornographic 
material given that it employs the IWF blocklist in its search engine available in the UK. 
Generally, companies are inclined to cooperate and agree to follow censorship demands of 
governments, because of economic interests and also to avoid the risk of criminal liability.198 
Nevertheless, there is opposition from online intermediaries particularly when regulatory 
measures may result  in extra costs being imposed on them. Three major UK ISPs requested a 
judicial review in relation to the 2010 Digital Economy Act to avoid such costs.199  It is 
estimated that the costs to implement the measures required by the legislation is of around £6 
million.200
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Another feature of the hybrid regulatory strategies is the extensive use of architecture-based 
regulatory tools by both state and private actors to control material available on the Internet as 
well as increased surveillance and monitoring capabilities of law enforcement authorities.
The self-regulation school argues that governments are unable to regulate cyberspace, because 
of the alleged non-regulable architecture of the Internet. Nevertheless, this architecture is not 
derived from Nature. On the contrary, it was built  according to political and technical choices 
available at a particular historical context. As such, this architecture (meaning the Internet’s 
infrastructure, technical standards and protocols) can be modified so as to produce a more 
regulable environment; an environment more responsive to regulation. For Lessig:
Whether cyberspace can be regulated depends upon its architecture […] The original 
architecture of the Internet  made regulation extremely difficult. But  that original 
architecture can change. And there is all the evidence in the world that it  is changing. 
Indeed, under the architecture that I believe will emerge, cyberspace will be the most 
regulable space humans have ever known.201
For Lessig, the hardware and software that  build the Internet are the code or the ‘law of 
cyberspace’ and it is one modality of regulation that  can enforce its control directly over online 
content.202  The architecture-based regulatory tools have different  forms and enforcement 
features. For Yeung, they can be classified under different criteria whether it  encourages 
behavioural change, changes the impact  of the harm generating behaviour or prevents the harm 
generating behaviour.203  Similarly, Brownsword stresses that these tools may be enforced ex 
ante, during the action, or ex post.204  Filtering can be implemented at  different  points of the 
network (e.g. at the ISP-, user- and backbone levels). These architecture-based regulatory tools 
have been associated with self-regulatory strategies205  but they can be designed and employed 
by both state and non-state actors under voluntary or mandatory schemes.
Online filtering is an example of an architecture-based regulatory tool to control access to 
online material. Generally a filtering system allows the free flow of uncensored material but 
blocks the censored content via different  techniques (e.g. blacklisting, whitelisting or content 
analysis).206  Notably, they have been largely implemented on the Internet. For example, Faris 
and Villeneuve reported in 2008 that online content filtering systems were active in 26 countries 
targeting different  categories of content  related to politics and power; social norms and morals; 
and security concerns. In addition, they reported that filtering has been implemented by non-
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state and state actors either domestically or internationally.207  Similarly, Zittrain and Palfrey 
argue that the Internet has been increasingly ‘balkanised’ by governmental and private filtering 
mechanisms making the alleged unregulated nature of the Internet far from reality.208  Deibert 
and Rohozinski stressed that concerns over cybersecurity and censorship are leading to the 
militarisation of the Internet where the exercise of power over content  is being enforced via 
more pervasive ways.209 These architectures of content  control are increasingly taking the place 
of traditional law enforcement goals such as removing controversial content  at  its source and 
building online walls to protect from overseas controversial content.210
Website blocking has also been employed to tackle copyrights infringement  on the Internet 
whether via self-regulation, legislation or court orders. For example, Mr. Judge Arnold has 
recently ordered British Telecom to block access to an alleged copyrights infringement website 
under the s. 97A (injunctions against  service providers) of the 1988 CDPA,211 which confirmed 
the legality and actual use of website blocking in relation to copyrights infringement.212  This 
measure has also been implemented via legislation, e.g. Section 10 of the 2010 DEA213 which 
established that  the Secretary of State may order ISPs to limit Internet  access in order to tackle 
the problem of online copyright infringement.214  Yet, Edwards argues that  website blocking has 
only limited effect and may be disproportionate, resulting in displacement of filesharing to other 
platforms, increased costs to online intermediaries, private censorship and other unintended 
consequences.215
Other examples of architecture-based regulatory tools are tethered appliances and surveillance 
equipment. Tethered appliances facilitate the enforcement  of content  regulation at  the user-level, 
because their internal configuration may be prompted from afar, they are subject  to 
instantaneous revision and they make surveillance extremely easy to perform.216 For Zittrain:
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Tethered appliances belong to a new class of technology. They are appliances in that  they 
are easy to use, while not  easy to tinker with. They are tethered because it is easy for their 
vendors to change them from afar, long after the devices have left warehouses and 
showrooms.217
The iPhone and iPad are examples of closed technologies where the user has less control over 
the equipment, its functionalities, and the type of content it  can access.218  Similarly, 
Amazon.com was subject  to intense criticism over the changes it  made remotely to a digital 
book already purchased by its customers via the Kindle service.219
The usage of mobile phones has increased over the years and it  is becoming the way most 
people access the Internet. This means that online content  may be easier to regulate in the future 
via these devices and mobile networks.220  For example, all mobile operators in the UK already 
employ the controversial IWF blocklist  within their networks to limit  access to online child 
pornography; this means 100% coverage in relation to Internet access made via 3G and some 
wi-fi providers.221  In addition, the growing usage of smartphones, tablets and ‘pre-approved 
apps’ to access and use of the Internet  makes evident  the diminished role that  the world wide 
web plays at the moment.222
Such devices are used not only to limit  access to controversial online material but  for 
surveillance. The spacial location of mobile phones are recorded by network operators for the 
operation of the system and this information is usually only obtained via court  orders in special 
cases such as criminal investigation, but there is no guarantee that this information is kept 
confidential. For example, it  has been found that  the iPhone was recording spatial data without 
any level of encryption.223 In addition, these devices can be used by law enforcement  agencies 
in cooperation with mobile operators to investigate alleged offenders by activating the 
microphone and camera of the device without the knowledge of its owner. It  is also the case that 
increased investigatory powers given to law enforcement agencies has lead not only to a 
58
217 Zittrain, J., The future of the internet - and how to stop it (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), p 106.
218 Arthur, C., 'I want  the iPad porn-free, says Apple's Steve Jobs: Apps for the new iPad have had  to self-censor ', The 
Guardian, Tuesday 25 May 2010 2010 ; Zittrain, J., 'A fight over freedom at Apple’s core', Financial Times, 03 
February 2010 2010 at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/fcabc720-10fb-11df-9a9e-00144feab49a.html?nclick_check=1>, 
accessed 14 December 2011; Dredge, S., 'Apple bans satirical  iPhone game Phone Story from its App Store', The 
Guardian, 2011, sec. Apps Blog at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/appsblog/2011/sep/14/apple-phone-story-
rejection>, accessed 28 December 2011.
219  Stone, B., 'Amazon Erases  Orwell  Books From Kindle', The New York Times, 2009, sec. Technology at <http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1325158251-
ts7AYblRq6cBBmaPrJP1SQ>, accessed 29 December 2011.
220 See Zittrain, J., 'The Personal Computer Is Dead', The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It (2011) at <http://
futureoftheinternet.org/blog> Accessed 29 December 2011; Naughton, J., 'Smartphones can do everything – except 
safeguard the web', The Guardian, 17 July 2011, sec. Technology at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jul/
17/smartphones-internet-corporate-threat>, accessed 28 December 2011.
221  Carr, J., 'BlackBerry has some explaining to do', Desiderata (2011) at <https://johnc1912.wordpress.com/
2011/12/09/blackberry-has-some-explaining-to-do/> Accessed 28 December 2011.
222 Guadamuz, A., Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation: Scale-Free Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 
2011), p 209.
223 See Arthur, C., 'iPhone keeps record of everywhere you go', Guardian  News and Media Limited, 20 April 2011 at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/apr/20/iphone-tracking-prompts-privacy-fears>, accessed 21 April 
2011; See also Warden, P., 'iPhone Tracker', at <http://petewarden.github.com/iPhoneTracker/>, accessed 21 April 
2011.
growing cooperation between them and online intermediaries but  also to increased use of 
monitoring equipment to detect  alleged offenders, collect criminal evidence and take-down 
controversial online content. For example, it has been alleged that during the 2011 London riots, 
the Metropolitan Police used equipment able to shut off mobile phones remotely and track 
movements from individual phones.224  Although these measures may be allowed under RIPA 
2000,225 it raises a number of issues in relation to proportionality and fairness.
Governments around the world are investing massively in more invasive surveillance equipment 
and strategies to cope with perceived threats (for example, terrorism, child pornography, 
political dissent etc.) associated with the Internet  and digital technologies. See for example the 
surveillance project developed by the US National Security Agency, a massive datacenter to 
intercept, store and analyse online communications from around the world,226  and also the 
current attempt  of British government to expand existing surveillance powers of law 
enforcement authorities.227  Other more extreme examples include governments cutting off the 
Internet entirely.228
4 The negative consequences of hybrid regulation
The cyberlibertarian self-governing rhetoric in relation to online content  regulation did not 
materialise. On the contrary, censorship of online content by both state and private actors is 
increasing in either democratic or authoritarian states across the world.229  After new 
technological developments expanded the ‘geometries of social interaction’ and produced a 
number of ‘perceived’ harms in relation to the Internet, governments responded with increased 
control that may be creating additional harms instead of maximising the positive benefits.230 
The question at the moment  is no longer whether the Internet  can or should be regulated but 
how civil liberties are to be protected in an increasingly regulated Internet.231
The delegation of regulatory powers from the state to private actors, the increased legal liability 
of online intermediaries, the more investigatory powers given to law enforcement agencies, and 
the extensive use of architecture-based regulatory tools make evident the regulatory escalation, 
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the potential for the violation of free speech and privacy protection, and the conflicts between 
private and public interests involving children protection, human rights protection and free 
speech associated with implementing such regulatory responses.
Examples of hybrid regulatory strategies in relation to online content were addressed above. 
This section will explore a number of negative consequences of hybrid regulation for free 
speech, privacy protection and democracy on the Internet found in the literature.
4.1 Unchecked private censorship, scope creep and lack of focus
One of the problems related to hybrid regulation of online content  by private actors is the 
potential for unchecked private censorship.232  For example, the UK self-regulatory body IWF 
manages a website blocklist  that targets alleged child pornography since 2004, but  this strategy 
raised concerns about  private censorship particularly after the Wikipedia incident in December 
2008, which showed the problematic adjudication of apparent  illegality of online criminal 
content by private actors.233  For Edwards, given the powers it  ‘[…] possesses to exclude any 
kind of online content  from the UK […],’ the remit  of the IWF should be reviewed to minimise 
the risk of unchecked private censorship.234  McGuire also stresses that IWF’s operation is a 
matter of concern because of the powers it has,235  and Yar has also argued that the IWF has 
acted as police, judge and jury bypassing due process of law and unilaterally censoring online 
content.236
In a similar vein, Kreimer argues that regulation of online content  by private actors is prone to 
scope creep, i.e. after regulatory schemes are implemented to block child pornography other 
controversial material can follow suit.237  This situation has led some to argue that online 
blocking schemes should be established by legislation, not self-regulation, because this 
allegedly brings more transparency and minimise opaque censorship of private actors.238
Indeed, increased legal liability placed on online intermediaries and the ability of law 
enforcement agencies to implement online surveillance without judicial oversight have forced 
online intermediaries to implement regulatory measures of their own to avoid the risk of legal 
liability beyond what is usually required.239  Online intermediaries have more incentives to 
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zealously accept  government demands and avoid the risk of legal liability rather than protecting 
civil liberties online.
For Marsden, the ‘safe harbour’ principle created incentives to censor the reported content 
expeditiously without further scrutiny by the courts, because ‘immediate compliance is self-
serving, cheaper and easier’ and ‘ISPs will take the path of less resistance’.240  Similarly, the 
threat of criminal prosecution in relation to alleged child pornography has forced major online 
intermediaries in Brazil to develop strategies of their own (for example automated filtering of 
child pornographic images via file hashing, human content  analysis, and recording of users’ 
log). None of these measures was established via legislation but implemented by private actors 
without any safeguard against potential abuse.241
Many Internet companies are prone to accept without discussion the censorship demands of 
their hosting states in order to operate there.242  Zittrain and Palfrey report that  many 
multinational Internet  companies must comply with restrictions imposed by the countries where 
they operate and in so doing they commonly violate legal and ethical frameworks of their home 
state.243  This has lead to calls for an international protective framework around online 
intermediaries and hardware manufacturers so they are not  forced to comply with censorship 
demands nor do they provide censorship-related hardware, software and services to 
authoritarian regimes.244
Although, systems of notices and take down (NTD) in relation to controversial online content 
are prone to abuse. For example, Ahlert  et al. assessed NTD procedures in regard to copyrights 
infringement  in 2004 and showed that they were abused in the United Kingdom. They uploaded 
material already in the public domain in British online hosts and made a complaint  to the 
relevant online intermediary about alleged copyright  infringements. Generally, British ISPs took 
the perfectly legal content  down ‘almost  immediately’245  which seems to suggest  that 
safeguards are needed to improve transparency and accountability of the UK NTD scheme for 
protection of copyrighted material.
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The NTD regime is an example of a ‘fire-alarm’ type of oversight, i.e. it  is a less centralised, 
active and direct  form of oversight that involves a number of procedures to encourage 
individual citizens to participate via a reporting mechanism. Nevertheless, this approach has 
been giving way to a ‘police patrol’ type of oversight, i.e. more centralised, active and direct 
mechanisms of content monitoring via online blocking, automated filtering and deep packet 
inspection technologies.246  This change occurred not only in relation to child pornographic 
content but copyrights infringement and increase the chances of unchecked private censorship 
of online content.247
Another regulatory tool that  facilitates unchecked private censorship is the implementation of 
online blocking schemes. They have been largely criticised for its potential for scope creep, lack 
of focus and limited effectiveness. They are only partially effective because often target 
websites, but there are a number of other Internet platforms and applications which are used to 
distribute child pornography (e.g. anonymised channels, P2P networks, email, and encrypted 
platforms). The website blocked can also have its domain name altered and move jurisdictions 
easily and rapidly, which renders the blocklist  quickly outdated. Online blocking schemes are 
also prone to circumvention.248  For example, Clayton pointed out in 2005 the possibility of 
circumventing the IWF blocklist of alleged child pornography URLs and also of determining 
what has been blocked, which could have been used by distributors of online child pornography 
to realise that they have been discovered.249
Stol et. al criticise the use of website blocking of alleged child pornographic content  in the 
Netherlands and argue that  it is not  only ineffective but unlawful.250  Similarly, McIntyre 
criticises the use of blocking systems within Europe because of their lack of legislative basis 
(violation of Article 10 of the EU Convention on Human Rights - ECHR251) and procedural 
safeguards (i.e. they are opaque and unaccountable).252 Akdeniz also suggests that  the operation 
of online blocking across Europe is likely to violate Article 10 of the ECHR.253  Blocklists can 
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also leak.254 As a result, people can have access to compiled lists of child pornography websites 
hosted abroad and the relevant  content provider may delete evidence after they find that  their 
illegal website has been blocked, undermining future evidence collection by police forces. 
There are also fears that  after blocking schemes are implemented, they are susceptible to scope 
creep.255
4.2 Lack of transparency, accountability, legitimacy, proper oversight and citizen 
 involvement
Another problem of decentred and polycentric regulatory regimes is their lack of transparency, 
accountability, and legitimacy. When regulatory powers are transferred to private actors, there is 
the risk of opaque and unaccountable indirect content regulation. 
For Lessig, indirect content regulation puts governments in a comfortable position because the 
political and technical burden of content regulation is transferred to private actors.
Here the government  is regulating indirectly by using the structures of real-space code to 
effect  its ends, but  this regulation, again, is not  seen as regulation. Here the government 
gets an effect at  no political cost. It  gets the benefit of what would be an illegal and 
controversial regulation without even having to admit any regulation exists.256
Indirection misdirects responsibility. When a government uses other structures of 
constraint to effect a constraint  it  could impose directly, it  muddles the responsibility for 
that constraint and so undermines political accountability. If transparency is a value in 
constitutional government, indirection is the enemy. It  confuses responsibility and hence 
confuses politics.257
For Lessig, ‘[…] we should worry about  a regime that  makes invisible regulation easier […]’258 
and therefore improve governmental oversight  over content regulation performed by private 
actors. Similarly, Kreimer argues that regulation of online content  by private actors is generally 
excessive, illegitimate and unaccountable; without adequate channels to correct distortions; 
without  due process of law or judicial oversight; without  guarantee of proportionality and not 
subject to review.259
Not only the lack of accountability of current regulatory policies has been a cause of concern, 
but poor citizen involvement  in formulating and operating such measures is another issue that 
causes concern to policymakers. Generally, these policies are designed and implemented 
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without  adequate input from civil rights and consumers’ organised groups, and the public at 
large. 
4.3 Difficulties in evaluation of hybrid regulation
Assessing how successful a policy has been in tackling online child pornography is also 
problematic, because evidence about  the production, distribution and access to such content  is 
difficult to obtain,260  which makes any attempt to assess the effectiveness of regulatory 
intervention heavily problematic. Some indications can be obtained from international police 
operations, domestic criminal prosecution and from convicted offenders but such available 
evidence is too small in size to be representative, and online child pornography can be produced 
and assessed via a number of channels that remain unmonitored.
In addition, the concept of ‘success’ has to be constructed to mean not only less child 
pornographic material being produced and distributed, but  also that  fewer children are being 
abused, that investigation and surveillance are undertaken with due process and proper privacy 
protection, and that there are sufficient  safeguards in place to protect free speech and secure that 
such policies are accountable, legitimate and transparent.
4.4 Crime displacement and unchecked investigatory powers
Regulatory interventions in decentred and polycentric regulatory environments may lead to 
unintended results because the actors involved are not only reactive but  active; the behaviour of 
a single actor affects the others in unexpected ways.261  The resilience and self-organising 
features of the Internet  challenge regulatory intervention applied to controversial online 
material.262  For example, the anonymised access via P2P networks and the availability of non-
indexed online repositories make possible the displacement of online content related crimes to 
more resilient non-web environments.
Another implication of hybrid regulation is the unchecked investigatory powers given to law 
enforcement agencies in order to identify alleged offenders and collect criminal evidence, which 
may undermine civil liberties on the Internet, if there are no safeguards in place. For Grabosky, 
the protection of individual freedom has been undermined to increase the perceived security of 
the online environment.263 As a result, a balance has to be struck between the right of privacy 
and the need of police surveillance to tackle online crime so as to avoid unchecked and 
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excessive powers being assigned to law enforcement  agencies under a cybercrime ‘moral 
panic’.264
4.5 Excessive use of architecture-based regulatory tools
Another negative consequence of hybrid regulation of online content is the excessive use of 
architecture-based regulatory tools that raises not only fears of free speech violation but also a 
number of ethical issues. For example, Brownsword rejects utilitarianism as the prominent  ethic 
to govern the way regulators control technology.265  Similarly, Baldwin and Cave argue that 
questions involving rights and justice should not be answered only in terms of an utilitarian 
rationale,266  and Sunstein argues that  technological regulation that  excludes the possibility of 
doing wrong may impede individuals from realising that  they face a choice between right and 
wrong and therefore this denies them some practice of moral agency.267  In a similar vein, 
Brownsword states that
The most  precious thing that an aspirant  moral community can hand on to the next 
generation is an environment  that  is conducive to a moral way of life that hinges on 
agents trying to do the right  thing, trying to respect  the legitimate interests of fellow 
agents, and being held responsible for their actions.268
Indeed, architecture-base regulatory tools are criticised on different grounds. It has been argued 
elsewhere that  they are prone to circumvention; technical failure by being either too narrow or 
too broad (false positive and false negative); it is developed in the shadow of public interest and 
legal rules; it  overemphasises private interests; it  is automatic and self-enforcing; and it  may rob 
users of moral agency.269  For McGuire, architecture based regulatory tools may be useful for 
legitimate policing but  it is often used for no clear purpose.270 This becomes more problematic 
because not  only governments but  private actors have policing functions in relation to online 
material.
4.6 Minimising the negative consequences of hybrid regulation: safeguards
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The academic literature addressed so far indicates that there are a number of negative 
consequences of hybrid regulation. Nevertheless, the literature has also made a number of 
suggestions to minimise such negative consequences. 
For example, Loader proposes basic principles to bring this dispersed network under democratic 
control which include individual and social groups involvement, human rights, and politics of 
allocation of police resources.271  Similarly, building ‘publicness’ of the new configuration of 
public service providers via transparency mechanisms (for example increasing the quality of 
information, representation, choice and voice) and accountability channels in this fluid 
regulatory environment have also been proposed elsewhere.272
For Black, the regulatory responses in decentred regulatory environments should provide 
systems of extended accountability, enhanced democratic governance, and increased judicial 
review and parliamentary agency.273  Similarly, the threat of uncontrolled private censorship of 
the online content has lead to calls for a more protective regulatory framework.274 For Nunziato, 
free speech laws in the US have been more lenient  in relation to online intermediaries (i.e. ‘free 
speech conduits’ engaged in transportation, communication and other public services related to 
online content) when compared to traditional conduits of content  (e.g. newspaper and 
magazines) and this resulted in much of the operations of online intermediaries going 
unchecked by both the US government and courts. Nevertheless, he argues that  such private 
actors should be considered as public organisations under free speech laws and be subject to 
closer governmental scrutiny and judicial oversight to minimise the risk of uncontrolled online 
content censorship.275  Similarly, Stalla-Bourdillon argues that the increasingly regulatory 
powers of private actors on the Internet should be limited by a legal framework designed to 
enforce public principles.276 Wu makes a similar point arguing that  information industries ‘can 
never be properly understood as normal industries’ and ‘perform a vital public function’. 
Therefore they should be subject  to something more than just  US antitrust  laws, whose focus is 
on economic issues and neglects basic civil liberties’ protection.277
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Laidlaw employs a similar argument in relation to search engines like Google arguing that  it 
should be subject  to more public oversight  because of the public function they undertake as 
information gatekeepers.278  There are not only financial concerns involved here (for example, 
placing sponsored companies at the top of the searches) but search engines have also been 
targeted by regulators (for example, employing content filtering of politically sensitive material 
and blocklists of websites allegedly hosting child pornography) without appropriate 
transparency and accountability channels. Moreover, there have been recommendations for 
user-generated content  platforms to mitigate the negative effects of content removal and account 
deactivation taking into account human rights considerations.279
Others have called for an impact  assessment of online content filtering schemes to identify and 
minimise abuses. For example, Edwards suggests a speech impact  assessment based on five 
criteria, including: purpose of the scheme and audience restricted; judges; effectiveness; 
resources; and alternatives to inhibit the growth of unchecked censorship on the Internet.280 
Similarly, Bambauer presents a framework to assess the legitimacy of online filtering based on 
their openness, transparency, narrowness, and accountability in order to identify how regulators 
describe what  they censor and why; whether they effectively block proscribed material and 
allow others; and the level of citizen involvement and participation.281
To assess legitimacy, the framework asks four questions. First, is a country open about its 
Internet censorship, and why it  restricts information? Second, is the state transparent 
about what  material it  filters and what it leaves untouched? Third, how narrow is 
filtering: how well does the content that  is actually blocked - and not blocked - 
correspond to those criteria? Finally, to what degree are citizens and Internet users able to 
participate in decisionmaking about  these restrictions, such that  censors are accountable? 
Legitimate censorship is open; transparent about what is banned; effective, yet narrowly 
targeted; and responsive to the preferences of each state’s citizens.282
Often private actors lack the democratic legitimacy to perform a public function of assessing 
and limiting access to controversial online content. This legitimacy derives in part from citizen 
involvement. There are different  levels of citizen participation in designing and monitoring the 
operation of online content regulatory policies.283  For Klang, the regulation of technology 
should be subjected to legitimate oversight  by the public at  large.284  This may have been the 
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case of the 2010 Marco Civil Bill in Brazil,285 which aims to establish the general framework of 
a NTD regime and there has been substantial citizen involvement during its formulation. 
Nevertheless, there are no guarantees that these inputs will be kept  during parliamentary debate 
expected to occur in the late 2012.
For Lessig, the regulation of online content  via architecture-based tools, be it  implemented by 
state or non-state actors, should be limited to the strictly necessary so regulators can achieve 
their aims with precision.286 Indeed, architecture-based regulation of content  should be crafted 
and implemented carefully to meet democratic controls and the rule of law.287
Bardach also argues that remedies to implementation problems should be taken into account in 
advance, in the policy-design and adoption stage, to overcome the perils of the ‘implementation 
game’, as a game of putting the administrative machine together to enforce the law and, of 
managing the different actors and institutions involved via persuasion and bargaining to achieve 
the regulatory aims pursued.288
In sum, regulation of controversial online content is heavily problematic and led to a range of 
hybrid regulatory strategies involving both state and private actors. These strategies may have a 
number of negative consequences to society and suggestions have been made to tackle them in 
order to achieve a balance between the conflictual interests at  stake such as privacy protection 
vs accountability of users; children-friendliness of technology vs children protection; security vs 
creativity; and private vs public interests.289 The next  section will develop evaluative criteria to 
assess these negative consequences in the fieldwork in order to evaluate them in practice. This 
is important not only to adjust current policymaking but also to guide future initiatives.
5 Evaluative criteria to assess the negative consequences of hybrid regulation
This chapter has showed so far that regulation of controversial material available on the Internet 
is problematic and has been a concern for regulatory and governance scholarship. 
First, regulation has been defined as a social phenomenon involving all forms of social control 
(whether intentionally or not) by different  social actors in order to restrict or facilitate 
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behaviour, according to predefined rules. This provided flexibility to explore many aspects of 
online content  regulation, taking into account the numerous actors and regulatory strategies 
used.
Second, the regulatory environment  was described as decentred and polycentric, meaning that 
regulatory authority is diffused throughout society, there are multiple sites where regulation 
occurs, actors are autonomous entities interacting in complex ways, knowledge is fragmented, 
and more importantly, there is a blurring distinction between public and private regulatory 
action. 
Third, the Internet  was defined as a resilient  and complex international communication network 
involving a number of applications and platforms, and as able to resist  traditional regulatory 
intervention. Against  this background, it  has been argued that there are many regulable aspects 
of the Internet  including infrastructure, protocols and technical standards, domain names, 
controversial content, and crime, and each one of these regulatory targets involve specific 
actors, challenges and strategies. Although regulation of such varied targets raises a number of 
relevant issues, there has been a substantial body of literature devoted to regulatory challenges 
posed by controversial content  available on the Internet. This is the area where both state and 
private actors are struggling to develop new regulatory strategies across the world and they have 
been subject to a number of criticisms.
New communication technologies have challenged traditional regulatory intervention and, as a 
result, hybrid strategies were employed to face such challenges. The initial ‘hands-off’ rhetoric 
in relation to state involvement  in the Internet  no longer applies to regulation of criminal 
material available on the Internet. State-regulation has increased but has been unable to regulate 
alone. As such, state actors had to liaise with private actors (such as online intermediaries, 
software companies, Internet industry associations) to achieve its regulatory aims. This involved 
delegation of regulatory powers from the state to private actors and therefore a number of trade-
offs were made, because both state and private actors had agendas of their own and pushed them 
forward that results in a number of negative consequences addressed above.
They were: (1) unchecked private censorship, scope creep, lack of focus, and excessive use of 
architecture-based regulatory tools; (2) increased unchecked and more invasive surveillance 
powers given to law enforcement authorities; (3) lack of transparency, accountability, 
legitimacy, proper oversight, and citizen involvement; and (4) issues around the inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness of regulatory intervention. Item (1) is related to free speech concerns, item (2) 
has to do with privacy protection, and items 3 and 4 are related to potential threats to democratic 
values and good regulation.
These are the evaluative criteria employed here to assess hybrid regulation of online content. 
Notably, these criteria are derived from academic literature and, as it  is employed in the field, it 
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may incorporate not  only other issues but also it  may show that  some variables are not so 
relevant in some jurisdictions as academics may think.
Do these criteria make sense in the fieldwork, and if so, in relation to which type of 
controversial content? Is there a particular type of online content that  could serve as the best 
case study to evaluate such concerns? Are these concerns representative cross-nationally? Are 
there cross-national variations in relation to the regulatory approach employed? Are policies of 
online content  regulation effective, efficient and ethical? Are regulators aware of such 
implications and are they including safeguards to minimise potential abuses? This research is 
expected to answer these questions and the evaluative criteria above is the starting point  for 
such endeavour: the criteria are a tool to adjust  current policymaking and guide future 
intervention.
Furthermore, it  is a tool for designing a scheme of safeguards. The literature explored above 
indicates that  a scheme of safeguards should be put  in place to minimise the risk of free speech 
and privacy violations as well as to tackle the democratic deficit  vis-à-vis the use of hybrid 
regulation. Suggestions include extending accountability, enhancing democratic governance, 
strengthening judicial and legislative oversight  as well as citizen involvement, improving 
transparency, implementing impact assessment mechanisms, and following pre-stablished 
safeguards established before the implementation process. Although most people would agree 
that safeguards are necessary, not  only the implementation of safeguards but  of the regulatory 
model is more complex than it might  seem at first. It  involves political bargaining, conflicting 
agendas, cultural differences and financial interests. It  also raises crucial issues such as the 
adjudication of apparent illegality of online content by private actors, success and failure of 
online content regulation, and the economics of regulation.
Assessment of current hybrid regulatory interventions of online content is an opportunity to 
explore these issues further and confront the literature findings with fieldwork evidence. But 
against which type of controversial content should these evaluative criteria be employed?
Although other controversial types of material available on the Internet are worth exploring, the 
problem of child pornography was chosen for a number of reasons. First, it  has been used by 
governments worldwide to successfully justify the use of hybrid regulation in relation to online 
content. Second, it  makes evident the resilient  nature of the Internet to evade regulation. Third, 
it  is in this area that regulatory measures have been pushed farther with little opposition and 
thus the negative implications for free speech, privacy protection and other democratic values 
can be assessed. Finally, child pornography has at  the moment a relative international consensus 
about its criminal nature and this has pushed governments to cooperate at the international level; 
as a result, it makes a cross-national comparative approach less problematic.
The next  part of this chapter will address the problem of online child pornography and the 
regulatory arrangements to limit access to such material, taking into account the typology of 
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regulatory models developed above. It  will also justify the focus on child pornography and the 
choices of jurisdiction on which these evaluative criteria will be employed.
6 Child pornography on the Internet
The fight  against  online child pornography mobilised a number of governments around the 
world to erect a complex regulatory matrix involving both state and private actors, operating in 
different  locations, at different degrees of evolution, under distinct legal cultures and 
jurisdictions, and with different  amount  of allocated budget. Generally, regulation of online 
child pornography is implemented with little opposition under the undebatable and successful 
argument of children protection and this is the reason why child pornography has been chosen. 
Because it shows the multitude of ways in which content regulation can be enforced on the 
Internet and the implications these strategies may have.
The development  of modern anti-child pornography laws can be traced back to the late 1970s 
following the exposure of child sexual abuse as a social problem.290  As a result, domestic anti-
child pornography laws were created in a number of developed countries. This reaction was 
arguably effective in limiting the availability of child pornographic content within national 
borders until the mid-1990s.291  Nevertheless, developments associated with the Internet and 
digital communication technologies have facilitated the proliferation of child pornography and 
so the enforcement of domestic anti-child pornography laws became largely ineffective. These 
developments include the digitisation of content, anonymised access, and the decentralised and 
multi-jurisdictional architecture of the Internet which rendered the choice of jurisdiction and the 
acts of policing state agencies heavily problematic.
This problematic law enforcement  led to changes in three areas. First, domestic anti-child 
pornography laws escalated in some jurisdictions. New conducts and types of content  associated 
with child pornography were criminalised in addition to the establishment of harsher penalties. 
Another response came at the international level to tackle the multi-jurisdictional nature of the 
Internet and the disparities in domestic laws such as the 2000 UN Optional Protocol292  and the 
2001 CoE’s Cybercrime Convention.293  Nonetheless, the enforcement  of these international 
instruments fell short of disparities in domestic laws, technological know-how and slow 
ratification of international treaties.294  Second, Internet industry self-regulation was also 
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employed via Internet industry CoCs and voluntary filtering schemes by online intermediaries. 
These strategies however were unable to tackle the problem of child pornography available on 
the Internet. Third, hybrid regulation was taken onboard via closer partnership between state 
and non-state regulatory actors, increased liability of online intermediaries, more investigatory 
and surveillance powers given to law enforcement  authorities, and the extensive use of 
architecture-based regulatory technologies. Before these regulatory models are explored, the 
next section will introduce the problem of online child pornography.
The definition of child pornographic content was subject to international variations and proved 
to be controversial. Nevertheless, this investigation will employ the definitions established by 
the 2000 UN Optional Protocol and the 2001 CoE’s Cybercrime Convention, because they 
addressed the key conceptual aspects of the problem and were generally accepted 
internationally. Both provisions defined a child as a person under the age of 18, in line with 
Article 1 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.295
The 2000 UN Optional Protocol defined child pornography in Article 2(c):
Child pornography means any representation, by whatever means, of a child engaged in 
real or simulated explicit  sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a 
child for primarily sexual purposes.296
The 2001 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention defined child pornography in Article 9(2): 
[…] the term “child pornography” shall include pornographic material that  visually 
depicts: a) a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; b) a person appearing to be a 
minor engaged in sexually explicit  conduct; c) realistic images representing a minor 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.297 
Lawmakers across the world faced a number of challenges to define child pornographic content 
on the Internet.298  The age of a child, the involvement of real children or of a totally virtual 
child, and the different ways that child pornographic content can be represented were heavily 
controversial and subject to national variations. First, defining the legal age of a child proved to 
be problematic. Although many jurisdictions ratified the age limit of 18 established in Article 1 
of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, some countries consider the age of 16 as 
the age of sexual consent and this creates domestic legal inconsistencies. For example, two 
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children aged 16 can perform consensual sexual activity legally but are prohibited from taking 
photographs of the act, because such visual depiction is defined as child pornographic content. 
In addition, it  is difficult to identify whether the person depicted in the image is a child or not, 
particularly those persons near the age limit. Generally the rule of ‘appears to be a child’ is 
employed at  the discretion of law enforcement agencies and is not subject to any objective 
guidance.299  Second, the production of child pornography may involve a real or an entirely 
computer-generated child.300  Another problem is whether the material where adults pose and 
dress as children is also to be considered child pornography.301  Third, the legal definitions of 
child pornography may take into account the type of media (for example a photograph, altered 
photograph, entirely computer-generated photograph, drawings, tracings, cartoon imagery, 
annotated photographs, video and audio recordings, and written material) and the level of 
seriousness involved.302  As a result, the law has permanently changed to address the latest 
technological developments and the demands of specific social groups.303
Finally, the activities associated with online child pornography can be divided into three areas: 
the production (for example, taking or making), distribution (e.g. publishing or selling) and 
access (for example, downloading, viewing, possessing or collecting). Generally domestic anti-
child pornography laws and other regulatory strategies target  these activities. Nevertheless, such 
categories are not  watertight  and alleged offenders may perform not  only one but two or all 
three conducts simultaneously, because distinctions amongst the producer, distributor and 
viewer of child pornography became blurred after the Internet. For example, gaining access to 
online child pornographic content, such as viewing and downloading, may result in a making or 
distribution offence if the material is saved locally by the website browser or is stored in a P2P 
shared folder of a home computer, respectively.
7 The driving forces pushing domestic state regulation of online child 
 pornography forward
Domestic anti-child pornography laws widened their scope in a number of jurisdictions to 
address conducts and types of content associated with child pornographic content after the 
arrival of the Internet. This escalation of domestic laws occurred jurisdictions such as Australia, 
Brazil and the United Kingdom304 and was a result  of enforcement  challenges posed by the 
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Internet, but  there were also other driving forces behind this regulatory escalation that  deserve 
further explanation. These include the media-made fear of crime, commercial private interests, 
use of child pornography as a ‘soft-spot’ to increase regulation in other areas, symbolic politics, 
and the legitimate interest of child protection.
The next subsections will explore such regulatory rationales and a number of driving forces 
behind the escalation of anti-child pornography laws both before and after the Internet. This 
discussion is important  because it  makes evident why these laws and regulations overcame the 
online censorship debate and were implemented much easier than other online content related 
laws and regulations (for example, in relation to copyrights infringement, adult pornography 
and privacy protection).
7.1 The harms before the Internet
Provisions against  child pornography implemented after the late 1970s were based on a number 
of regulatory rationales. The protection of real children from direct harm was the key rationale 
supporting anti-child pornography laws at first. It  was believed that  direct harm would have to 
be imposed against  the child involved in the production of child pornography. This argument 
was straightforward because if the material depicted the sexual abuse of a real child, the harm 
was self-evident.305 This rationale led to the criminal provisions enacted during the late 1970s 
regulating the production and distribution, irrespective of commercial intent, and the possession 
with a view to distribution (i.e. qualified possession). It  was not  until the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s that other rationales were added to the mix via the criminalisation of the mere 
possession of child pornography in England and Wales, and United States, respectively.306
The criminalisation of mere possession was supported by a different argument because this act 
alone did not  involve a direct  harm being inflicted against a child nor did it involve further 
distribution. It was argued that mere possession of child pornography should be criminalised 
because it: (1) provides a market and makes the demand evident; (2) perpetuates the image and 
memory of the abuse over time; (3) may cause further sexual offences and promote harmful 
attitudes towards children; (4) may be used to seduce other children; (5) may normalise sexual 
interest in children; and (6) threatens society’s shared sense of morality.307 In addition, there are 
claims to consider child pornography not  a crime of sexual abuse but  of sexual exploitation 
irrespective of commercial gains so as to emphasise the fact  that the abuse is prolonged over 
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time even though the image is merely possessed by the alleged offender.308  These rationales 
make clear that the harm continues after the material is produced; it  is prolonged over time via 
mere possession. The criminalisation of mere possession was also for policing reasons because 
it arguably facilitated the arrest  of alleged producers and distributors of child pornography. 
These successful arrests may be however a result  of other factors such as motivation of police 
forces, more public awareness about the problem, and media influence.
7.2 The harms after the Internet
The next step was the criminalisation of the making, distribution and mere possession of 
pseudo-photographs and the use of computers during the mid-1990s.309  Pseudo-photographs 
were photographic depiction of non-real children (for example, computer-generated, morphed, 
juxtaposed and collages). Another rationale is employed here. It  is argued that  although pseudo-
photographs did not  involve a direct harm towards a real child for its production, they could be 
undistinguishable from child pornographic photographs that  involved a real child. As such, the 
pseudo-photographs could be used to: (1) groom and seduce other children; (2) normalise the 
deviant sexual behaviour of paedophiles and escalate towards further sexual abuse of children; 
(3) restrict prosecutors in their ability to obtain convictions, because otherwise persecutors 
would have to prove that real children were involved; and (4) facilitate paedophile 
interaction.310 The criminalisation of pseudo-photographs accepted that the harm not necessarily 
always derived from the direct  sexual assault  of a real child. Although no real child was 
involved, there was harm being caused against  all children as a universal concept.311  The 
provisions criminalising pseudo-photographs were enacted in the US312  but were later struck 
down by the Supreme Court on the grounds of free speech protection.313 This placed the burden 
on US prosecutors to prove that the material charged depicted real children. Although this 
burden was expected to limit  successful criminal convictions in the US, Akdeniz reports that 
there were successful prosecutions in this regard.314  Later in the US, such material was 
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criminalised but only in relation to production and distribution, not mere possession, which was 
still regarded as obscene child pornography.315
Non-photographic child pornography material, such as cartoon and drawings, was criminalised 
in England and Wales in 2009 under a similar rationale. The relevant consultation process 
acknowledged that although there was no strong evidence to support  a causal relationship 
between these images and further sexual abuse of children, ‘[…] it is felt by the police and 
children’s welfare organisations that  possession and circulation of these images serves to 
legitimise and reinforce highly inappropriate views about children.’316 
One common ground for criminalisation of mere possession of both photographs and pseudo-
photographs was the alleged causal relationship between them and further sexual assault 
committed against  a child. It was believed that  viewing could escalate into actual sexual abuse 
of a child. This relationship is challenged by the academic literature, because it  lacked 
substantial empirical proof of causality.317  In addition, Taylor and Quayle report that  not all 
offenders involved with child pornography sexually assault  children nor are all pictures a sexual 
assault  in progress.318  Indeed, the people involved in the proliferation of child pornographic 
content are not only interested in financial reward but have non-commercial motivations (for 
example, grooming children, entertainment, sexual gratification, blackmail, and sense of 
belonging to a community of like-minded people).319
It  is evident that the scope of the law broadened and escalated to include new perceived harms 
derived from latest technological developments. The mere possession of child pornography in 
England and Wales was a criminal offence not only in relation to photographs and pseudo-
photographs but non-photographic content such as tracings, drawings and other cartoon 
imagery. Similarly, any sexually explicit material involving adults conveying the impression of 
being a child could be considered child pornography. 
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Against this background, anonymised P2P, encryption, widespread unregulated mobile access, 
virtual reality games and human-machine sexual interaction are perceived as new venues for 
regulation and will eventually be the target of future anti-child pornography laws. Similarly, the 
availability of human-machine interaction devices,320 virtual reality sex games321  and sexting322 
produced new perceived harms to children and new opportunities for criminalisation. The 
convergence amongst artificial intelligence, robotics and biomedical engineering provided new 
avenues for the proliferation of harms associated with child pornographic content. This makes 
evident the vicious circle of escalating criminal laws to cope with technological developments 
that not only displaces crime but has chilling effects to free speech and privacy protection of 
Internet users.323
7.3 Other driving forces
The regulatory rationales described above were supported by an arguably legitimate interest  in 
protecting children against sexual abuse in the online environment. The technological advances 
led to new opportunities for crime commission and the law has adapted accordingly to tackle 
such crimes.324  Nevertheless, there were other driving forces pushing the state regulation of 
child pornography on the Internet: the media-made fear of crime, commercial private interests, 
use of child pornography as a ‘soft-spot’ to increase regulation in other areas, and symbolic 
politics. These issues will be explored below.
In Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Cohen addresses the demonisation of certain social groups 
and issues, the allocation of blame, and the following exaggerated media representation that 
ignites social control responses.325 For him, these responses are shaped not by real evidence but, 
to a greater extent, by the perceived threat of a particular issue. Generally this seems to explain 
governmental reaction in relation to the criminal content  available online. For example, Wykes 
and Harcus argue that  social control of online terror has been based on a perceived threat 
mediated by media discourses and disconnected from the realities of crime, and this perceived 
threat often informs and misleads policymaking.326 Similarly, Jewkes and Yar argue that societal 
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responses to online crime have been largely mediated and constructed via many domains of 
representation.327  For Wall, the perceptions of cybercrime have been ‘shaped by the cultural 
origins of cybercrime in social science fiction’ whilst ‘the practical reality is quite different.’328 
As a result, a growing culture of fear about  cybercrime329 has shaped the regulatory responses 
amidst little evidence about  the regulatory target; indeed, there is little knowledge about the real 
dimension of online child pornography, because the occurrence of cybercrime often goes 
unreported to authorities,330  global crime statistics are problematic,331  and this is an 
underground criminal activity. These are reasons why assessing regulatory success and 
effectiveness in relation to online child pornography regulatory policymaking is fraught with 
difficulties.
Similarly, this tendency to respond quickly to an immediate or anticipated crisis with potential 
for political consequences and the difficulties in regulating complex issues have been 
demonstrated in another regulatory arena; the regulation of dangerous dogs. Although 
substantially different  in nature, both the problem of child pornography and dangerous dogs 
share some similarities which are relevant to the regulatory analysis (e.g. unthinking reflex 
legislative response to media agenda, apparent consensus about the threat posed to children, 
regulation more problematic than what appears to be at  first sight, and legislation that  is difficult 
to enforce).332 These examples make evident how institutions shape their responses differently 
in a process of ‘selective adaptation’ from outside pressures.333  As such, not only the media 
influence but the institutional response and institutional capabilities played a role here.
Nevertheless, such responses are not the only factors driving anti-child pornography regulation. 
A number of ‘moral entrepreneurs’ used this exaggerated perceived threat to their advantage 
pushing their own agendas forward.334  For example, legislators, non-governmental 
organisations, businesses, and regulators embarked on moral crusades to increase political 
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capital, achieve governmental funding, obtain commercial revenues, and accumulate more 
authority, respectively. In addition, after their crusade was finished, new rules were created and 
the relevant  machinery of enforcement  was put  into place, they acted to secure their institutional 
survival. As such, they often searched for other alarming issues, widened the relevant 
bureaucracy and regulatory powers, justified their authoritative position, and acted to win the 
respect of the regulatees. The actors responsible for the actual enforcement lived a permanent 
dialogical dilemma of showing that, whilst their work was necessary, worthwhile, and effective, 
the threat  still existed, whether it was moving to new venues or being transformed somehow.335 
Their work was never completely finished and the problem was permanently put  into the 
political agenda to secure their institutional survival.
The little opposition to anti-child pornography laws and regulations explains why this 
regulatory enterprise found fewer obstacles to implementation in comparison to other 
problematic online content. Generally regulation of online content  involves conflicting 
principles such as free speech vs censorship and fighting terrorism vs privacy protection,336 and 
it is followed by strong opposition by anti-censorship groups. Nevertheless, it  seems that  under 
the protection of children from sexual abuse rationales, anti-child pornography laws overcame 
both free speech and privacy protection concerns and found little obstacles so far to escalate 
across the world. In addition, people who opposed these laws risked being seen as collusive 
with paedophiles.337 The limited debate during lawmaking facilitated the passing of these laws 
without greater public scrutiny.
7.4 Final remarks
From the 1970s onwards, there were a number of rationales and driving forces pushing 
domestic state regulation of online child pornography forward faster than those in relation to 
other problematic online content. This led to an escalation of anti-child pornography laws 
targeting a number of conducts and types of content as well as establishing harsher penalties 
associated with child pornography on the Internet. As argued by O’Donnell, the domestic state 
regulation of child pornography has produced since the late 1970s a ‘tsunami of laws and 
promises’ in some jurisdictions.338
Both commercial and non-commercial production and distribution of child pornography were 
outlawed during the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Mere possession was criminalised in the 
late 1980s in England and Wales. The use of computers in the production and distribution of 
child pornography was outlawed around the mid-1990s which led to the criminalisation of 
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pseudo-photographs in England and Wales. The age of a child was raised from the age of 16 to 
18 in most  jurisdictions.339  The courts in England and Wales blurred the distinctions between 
possession and distribution, downloading and making, printing and making, and in 2009 non-
photographic child pornography (for example cartoon pornography) was criminalised. As of 
until 2010, any image (photographic, pseudo-photographic or non-photographic) depicting 
children (real or computer-generated) or adults (conveying the impression of a child) in sexual 
activity was outlawed in England and Wales. 
There was a strong international call to criminalise written material, child erotica (meaning 
child nudes without any sexual activity involved) and cartoon imagery.340  Indeed, anti-child 
pornography laws were increasing in most  jurisdictions across the world. Nevertheless, this 
regulatory response via domestic criminal laws and the courts (domestic state regulation) was 
only partially successful in limiting access to online child pornography, because of the multi-
jurisdictional and resilient nature of the Internet. Following Hood, laws and the courts do not 
enforce the rule on their own and therefore making rules is something completely different  from 
enforcing them; it involves difficult choices about  enforcement  options (for example, modifying 
the rule, persuasion, pursuing and punishing violators, or making it difficult  to break the rule), 
enforcement levels (how much to enforce?), and enforcement actors (public or private?).341
The next section will explore some reasons why enforcement of anti-child pornographic laws is 
problematic on the Internet and will employ the typology of regulatory models explored above 
in Section 1.2.
8 Regulatory models for online child pornography
Just when suppression of the child pornography trade seemed within sight  as national 
legislatures finally began to take seriously the harms caused by magazines and videos, the 
Internet arrived on the scene.342
In the past, obtaining child pornography was difficult  […] but  now circumstances have 
changed […] this is because of the Internet.343
8.1 State and multi-state regulation
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Although domestic anti-child pornography laws escalated in many jurisdictions with the advent 
of the Internet, child pornographic content  was produced across the world, sexual offenders 
were able to groom children in wider geographical basis, photographs and videos were digitally 
manipulated and uploaded onto the Internet with ease, and child pornographic material was 
distributed and accessed on the Internet via different  platforms and applications.344  Once 
uploaded onto the Internet, child pornography could be accessed virtually anywhere in the 
world, be it  via hypertext applications, social networking systems (SNS), real-time instant 
messaging systems, closed paedophilia online groups or anonymised and encrypted channels. 
Domestic state regulation alone is unable to effectively limit access to online child pornography.
The reasons why domestic state regulation has been challenged include the digitisation of 
content, anonymised access and multi-jurisdictional nature of the Internet.
First, digitisation of content  facilitated the production, distribution and collection of child 
pornographic material, particularly derived from print material freely available in the past. In 
addition, the alleged offender does not  have to go to a photography store to have the film 
developed, can avoid using the mail services to access and distribute such material, and have a 
number of computer graphics software to manipulate original images or create new material.
Second, anonymised access has challenged the policing of content, identification of alleged 
offenders and collection of criminal evidence. In addition, there are more actors involved in the 
transmission of child pornography than only the sender and receiver. A number of online 
intermediaries are responsible for receiving, hosting and passing on packets of data (for 
example Internet service, content and host  providers, social networking and real-time messaging 
systems)345 and this diversity of actors makes the policing of child pornographic content  more 
complex.
Third, the Internet  is a transnational communication medium and therefore subject  to regulation 
by numerous sovereign states. It connects people worldwide in a number of different 
jurisdictions subject  to different  child pornography laws and content-related regulatory schemes 
and this renders the choice of jurisdiction and the enforcement of jurisdictional powers heavily 
problematic when applied to Internet  transactions. For example, although there is a rough 
consensus about the criminal nature of child pornographic content across the world, domestic 
anti-child pornography laws of each jurisdiction may define the age of a child as well as the 
type of content, conducts and penalties associated with child pornography differently. 
Nevertheless, taking into account that content made available on the Internet is generally 
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accessed in all jurisdictions, and that domestic laws cannot  be enforced in a foreign jurisdiction 
without  a bilateral agreement or international convention, harmonisation of criminal laws is 
necessary for the regulation of child pornography at  the international level. Otherwise, country 
A with harsher anti-child pornography criminal laws is unable to enforce its laws limiting access 
to such material within its jurisdiction, if a more tolerant  country B, outside the jurisdiction of 
A, is a producer or host of child pornographic content as defined in A. 
Another problem is the complex cross-national law enforcement and cooperation between 
domestic police forces. Differences in relation to domestic procedural criminal laws, budget, 
expertise and priority given to fighting online child pornography amongst  police forces across 
the world make law enforcement  heavily problematic. Finally, the multi-jurisdictional nature of 
the Internet facilitates the access to and grooming of children in wider geographical areas and in 
real-time. Before the Internet, sexual offenders generally would have to access real children in 
the vicinity or travel to other countries.346 Nevertheless, the Internet  provides access to children 
located virtually anywhere in the world, and such feature expanded opportunities for sexual 
abuse against children and production of child pornographic material.347
The multi-jurisdictional challenges faced by domestic state regulation led governments to 
employ multi-state regulatory strategies to harmonise anti-child pornography laws and law 
enforcement at the international level. Domestic state regulation had limited success in limiting 
access to child pornographic content largely because of the multi-jurisdictional nature of the 
Internet. This led some governments to employ multi-state regulatory responses to improve the 
cross-national functionality of national legal systems.348  These responses included the 
international harmonisation of anti-child pornography substantive and procedural criminal laws.
There are a number of cross-national variations in relation to domestic anti-child pornography 
laws. For example, the 2008 International Center for Missing and Exploited Children reports 
that of the 187 Interpol members only 29 have ‘sufficient’ legislation to tackle online child 
pornography, and suggests that countries should increase efforts towards the harmonisation of 
anti-child pornography laws at the international level to avoid safe havens for offenders.349 
Similarly, Akdeniz argues that  seeking international harmonisation of laws is crucial to address 
the problem of child pornographic content available on the Internet.350
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The 1989 UN Convention351  and the 2000 UN Optional Protocol352  provided the legal 
framework of children’s rights and defined what online child pornography is. The 1999 UN 
Child Labour Convention353 established in Article 3(b) that the use of a child for the production 
of pornography or pornographic performances is one of the worst forms of child ‘labour.’ The 
UN published a number of reports to push anti-child pornography policymaking worldwide.354 
Another example of international lawmaking is the 2001 CoE’s Cybercrime Convention355 
which established a number of substantive and procedural anti-child pornography criminal laws 
to harmonise legislation, facilitate investigation and improve cooperation within Europe and 
beyond. Expanding extradition capabilities is another example of multi-state regulation 
designed to target  alleged offenders. Many countries passed domestic laws to facilitate the 
extradition of nationals committing child pornography related offences in other countries, where 
such laws are inexistent as well as domestic laws to punish nationals returning from these 
countries. The 2011 EU Directive established in Article 5(3) that EU member states shall take 
the necessary measures to punish the intentional access to child pornography available on the 
Internet.356
Nevertheless, multi-state regulation has a number of limitations to stop access to child 
pornographic content  on the Internet. These international treaties are not  directly binding, 
countries reserve the right not to apply some provisions, and the ratification process is slow and 
politically problematic.357  For example, the implementation of the 2001 CoE’s Cybercrime 
Convention by non-European states was limited because some countries had concerns about the 
Eurocentric nature of the treaty and they demanded the establishment  of another agreement 
based on wider global participation.358  Similarly, the UK signed the 2001 CoE’s Cybercrime 
Convention on 23 November 2001 but  ratified it  only on 25 May 2011, because of issues 
relating to some procedural provisions.359
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International law enforcement is another key strategy to limit access to child pornography 
available online, because international anti-child pornography laws would be largely ineffective 
if law enforcement  agencies did not cooperate internationally to enforce them. For Grabosky 
and Smith, communication and collaboration amongst police forces, creation of specialised 
units, improved training funding and staffing are essential tasks to tackle online crimes.360 As 
such, there were advances in the area of cross-national policing, harmonisation of investigatory 
and prosecutorial protocols for reaching offenders overseas. A number of law enforcement 
agencies and specialised police forces operated cross-nationally to fight child pornography on 
the Internet, such as the G8 Virtual Globe Task Force,361  Interpol362  and the 24/7 protocol 
established by the 2001 CoE’s Cybercrime Convention. In addition, there were a number of 
arguably successful international police operations (for example, Operations Wonderland, 
Landslide, Ore, and Starburst). Nevertheless, international law enforcement was not  without 
problems. Generally domestic police forces lacked the proper financial resources and technical 
expertise, the political will to prioritise the protection of children over property-related online 
crimes, and the ability to cooperate internationally.363  The permanent  rotation of police 
personnel, the conflicts over the ownership of the investigation by different police forces and 
the under-reporting of online crime were reasons for unsuccessful Internet policing.364
Domestic anti-child pornography laws were already in place before the advent of the Internet 
and digital communication technologies. Nevertheless, such technological developments 
challenged the enforcement  of domestic laws in a number of ways and this led to an escalation 
of both state and multi-state regulation. Alongside this escalation process, self-regulatory 
strategies were employed by private actors, particularly the Internet industry, to limit  the 
availability of child pornographic content on the Internet. This is the topic of the next section.
8.2 Self-regulation
In the early days of the Internet, self-regulation and spontaneous ordering have been advocated 
by some authors as the proper regulatory approach to tackle controversial content available 
online.365  The self-regulation school considers the Internet  a free environment, a place 
unresponsive to state regulation, a separate jurisdiction, a control-averse and anarchic space 
only subject  to laws of its own. As a result, the Internet  industry, online communities and users 
are believed to be in a better position to regulate controversial online material by themselves 
without any regulatory intervention from the state.
84
360 Grabosky, P. and Smith, R., Crime in the Digital Age: controlling telecommunications and cyberspace illegalities 
(New Brunswick-NJ and Sydney: Transaction Publishers and Federation Press, 1998), p 216-18.
361 'Virtual Globe Taskforce', at <http://www.virtualglobaltaskforce.com/>, accessed 09 August 2010.
362 INTERPOL, 'Interpol', at <http://www.interpol.int/>, accessed 09 August 2010.
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365 See Section 3.1 above about self-regulation.
In a number of regulatory issues, private actors are regarded as holding more technical expertise 
and flexibility than state agencies to address the regulatory problem and this position is also 
advocated by the online self-regulation school. For Akdeniz, self-regulatory strategies are 
commonly regarded as cost-effective and tailor-made, and therefore able to avoid blunt 
censorship laws.366  Indeed, self-regulation strategies against  online child pornographic content 
have been implemented in the UK to avoid the burden of domestic laws regulating the operation 
of online intermediaries.367  In addition, self-regulation has been employed as a regulatory 
response not only in relation to content  ‘harmful to minors’ (e.g. use of voluntary online content 
filtering, rating systems and public awareness programmes), but in regard to online child 
pornography (for example via Internet industry self-regulation and the creation of Internet 
hotlines) as a complement of domestic criminal law.368 The self-regulatory instruments available 
to limit access to child pornographic content  on the Internet may include private agreements and 
terms of service (ToS) regulated by contract  law, Internet  industry codes of conduct (CoCs), 
online community-based decisions and parental monitoring.
Online intermediaries such as Internet  service, content and host providers, online content 
filtering manufacturers, and online payment  systems may belong to an Internet industry 
association. There are a number of such associations across the world and they are generally 
expected to protect and represent online intermediaries’ interest  nationally and regionally (for 
example, Internet Service Providers Association - ISPA UK, EURO ISPA, the Australian 
Internet Industry Association - IIA, and the Brazilian ABRANET).369  These associations may 
establish CoCs to regulate the behaviour of its members and indicate the best  practice in the 
industry.370 For example, the ISPA UK CoP 371 was adopted in 1999 and established the minimal 
general requirements and best practices that their members should follow as well as the type of 
sanctions they are subject  to, setting the grounds for the work developed by the Internet  Watch 
Foundation.372  Similarly, the Australian IIA established a code of conduct  of its own that 
complement the Australian censorship laws.373  Generally these CoCs contain provisions about 
the availability, removal and notification of controversial content including child pornography. 
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Nevertheless, although these private actors established self-regulatory provisions to limit  access 
to child pornography, these measures were only enforceable towards a limited number of 
voluntary members, because membership was generally voluntary. In addition, the regulatory 
provisions established via CoCs may vary in practice, and there was only a limited range of 
sanctions available.374  Industry associations have tended to be lenient when applying sanctions 
against their own members.
The ToSs of a company and the private agreements regulated by contract  law were employed to 
regulate the controversial content available online. Generally violations may lead to interruption 
of the service, cancellation of accounts, civil compensation or criminal prosecution. For 
example, if one user was found to be uploading, hosting or exchanging child pornography, its 
account may be closed, the alleged criminal material removed, the evidence preserved, and the 
relevant law enforcement  agency notified. Nevertheless, enforcement of ToSs has had only a 
limited, if any, impact on stoping people accessing child pornography on the Internet. Closing 
an account  does not  stop the user from creating another account  or using the service of another 
company operating within the same country or abroad. Enforcing private agreements was also 
problematic because users might  have provided false information about  themselves and 
accessed the service via anonymised channels.
Another self-regulatory strategy employed against  child pornography is the activity of online 
‘vigilantes and militias.’375  These self-appointed groups often took the ‘law into their own 
hands’ and tried to disrupt the child pornography activities online. Private and grassroots groups 
(for example the Anti-Pornography League, Condemned, Cyberangels, Pedowatch and Ethical 
Hackers against Paedophilia) have targeted online child pornography since the mid-1990s.376 
Although online vigilantism by self-appointed communities may have some advantages over 
formal law enforcement, such as employing specialised expertise without being subject  to 
formal legal constraints, law enforcement via the state is arguably more legitimate, transparent 
and accountable.377  Indeed, online vigilantism has a number of limitations that  includes the 
violation of the law, deletion of criminal evidence, function creep, and perhaps pathological 
motives.378
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The use of state, multi-state, and self-regulation strategies to limit access to child pornography 
on the Internet has been explored so far. The hybrid regulation of child pornography on the 
Internet is the topic of next section.
8.3 Hybrid regulation
This is too big a task for the police alone. The active cooperation of ISPs, businesses and 
other institutions, as well as individual users, is essential if there is to be any prospect of 
success.379
[…] the governance of Internet  child pornography requires a collective and ‘multi-
pronged response to a multifaceted problem’ in which both public and private bodies are 
involved at various levels.380
In relation to the internet we need a shared culture of responsibility with families, 
industry, government  and others in the public and third sectors all playing their part 
[…].381
Hybrid regulation was explored generally in Section 3.3 above. It involves regulation by both 
state and private regulatory actors, increased legal liability and control placed on online 
intermediaries, and increased capabilities of systems of social control via more investigatory 
powers given to law enforcement agencies and the use of architecture-based regulatory tools.382 
These features will be explored below in relation to online child pornography regulation.
8.3.1 Online content regulation via private actors
Generally regulation of controversial online content  via online intermediaries is increasing383 
and this is also the case in relation to child pornography. Under the threat of arrests and 
regulatory legislation, Internet service and content providers in the UK have set  up an Internet 
industry organisation to receive reports from the public, notify relevant online intermediaries 
and police forces, and manage a blocklist  of URLs associated with alleged child pornographic 
content available on the Internet. A Parliamentary Investigation Committee (CPI) forced the 
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major Brazilian ISPs to establish standardised procedures to record online logs of Internet users 
in order to identify alleged offenders. Online payment systems were also targeted. The Financial 
Coalition against Child Pornography on the Internet 384  was created in 2006 to tackle 
commercial websites allegedly selling access to child pornography (e.g. blocking the payment 
and unregistering the relevant  websites). Domain names’ registers were asked to revoke domain 
names of websites allegedly involved with child pornography. There were growing domestic 
legislation to establish criminal liability of online intermediaries for the content they host or 
distribute, and to establish mandatory recording of users’ identification and online logs. In 
addition, governments passed domestic laws to increase surveillance powers of law enforcement 
agencies investigating child pornography related offences. These laws facilitated the use of 
surveillance equipment, collection of evidence, identification of users, and cooperation between 
relevant police forces and online intermediaries. The increased use of cloud-computing and 
distant digital storage facilitated the regulation of content  by private actors, because user-
generated content is under the supervision of an easily regulated node of the network.
8.3.2 Internet hotlines
Hybrid regulation was also implemented in the EU via the EU Safer Internet  Programme, the 
face of the European policymaking in relation to harmful and illegal online content. Generally 
child pornography was tackled via the creation of national Internet hotlines and the International 
Association of Internet Hotlines (INHOPE) Forum,385  and legal liability of online 
intermediaries. The EU involvement with online regulation started in 1996. Under the motto 
‘what is illegal offline remains illegal online,’ the 1996 Green Paper386  and the 1996 
Communication387  established the distinction between illegal (e.g. child pornography, racial 
hatred and terrorism) and harmful (i.e. material that is harmful to minors, for example legal 
adult  pornography, political opinions, religious beliefs or any other material that might  offend 
the values and feelings of other persons) online content. The 1996 Communication 
recommended the use of self-regulatory measures (e.g. empowerment of parental supervision 
via voluntary filtering and rating systems) to tackle harmful content, whereas it suggested the 
enforcement of domestic laws (i.e. domestic state regulation), co-operation between member 
states (i.e. multi-state regulation), the legal liability of online intermediaries, and the creation of 
reporting mechanisms (e.g. Internet hotlines) to limit  the availability of child pornography on 
the Internet.
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The EU Safer Internet Programme can be divided into four stages: (1) Safer Internet Action Plan 
- SIAP (1999-2002); (2) Safer Internet  Action Plan - SIAP (2003-2004); (3) Safer Internet  Plus 
Programme (2005-2008); and the (4) Safer Internet Programme - SIP (2009-2013).
The 1999 SIAP (1999-2002)388  covered a period of four years with a budget  of €25 million 
(euros) and promoted the use of Internet industry self-regulation (e.g. codes of conduct) and 
content monitoring schemes (e.g. Internet  hotlines) to limit  access to child pornography in 
addition to the use of domestic state regulation. The 1999 SIAP Evaluation389  reported 
unsatisfactory uptake of filtering and rating systems for harmful content, poor involvement  of 
the Internet  industry, the need for addressing the role of new technologies and engaging with 
foreign actors, but also the successful creation and networking of Internet hotlines in all member 
states, except for Portugal and Luxembourg. 
The 2003 SIAP (2003-2004)390 covered a period of two years with a budget of €13,3 million 
(euros). It  addressed the protection of children in relation to the use of new technologies (for 
example mobile broadband content, online games, P2P networks, and real-time messaging 
systems), it fostered the involvement  of the Internet industry and international cooperation. The 
2003 SIAP  Evaluation391 reported little improvement  in relation to uptake of filtering or harmful 
content, but it emphasised the success of national Internet hotlines tackling child pornography. 
The following 2005 Safer Internet Plus Programme (2005-2008)392  established four lines of 
action: (1) fighting against  illegal content; (2) tackling unwanted and harmful content; (3) 
promoting a safer environment; and (4) awareness raising. It  continued to support the use of 
voluntary filtering at  the user-level to tackle harmful content  but started to encourage the use of 
blocking systems to limit  access to child pornography at the 2006 Safer Internet  Forum and 
funded the CIRCAMP Project in 2007.
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Finally, the 2009 Safer Internet Programme (2009-2013)393  has a budget of €55 million (euros) 
and addresses the threats posed to children by the so-called web 2.0 (e.g. social networking 
systems, user-generated content  etc.). It  also targeted the problem of cyberbullying and 
grooming. It  has four lines of action: (1) ensuring public awareness; (2) fighting against illegal 
content and ‘harmful conduct’ online; (3) promoting a safer Internet  environment; and (4) 
establishing a knowledge base. Most  of its allocated budged (48%) was for public awareness 
and only 34% was for tackling illegal and harmful content. The term harmful content  was 
replaced by harmful conduct (for example cyberbullying and grooming) which may be a result 
of the unsuccessful use of online content filtering and rating systems at  the user-level to tackle 
harmful content. The 2009 SIP also unified the work performed by the Internet  hotline, help-line 
and awareness about children safety online into a single institution.
Overall EU policymaking encouraged domestic state regulation, promoted public awareness, 
and supported the work of Internet  hotlines to limit access to child pornographic content across 
Europe. The creation of hotlines to report the availability of child pornography and other 
controversial online content  started in the mid-1990s. For example, the British IWF394  was 
created in 1996 and was followed by similar organisations across Europe.395  There has been a 
European network of hotlines since 1999.396  The idea of one network of Internet  hotlines was 
suggested by the UK NGO Childnet  International in 1997. Later, the initiative was funded via 
the DAPHNE Programme and established as a Dutch company in November 1999 and called 
the INHOPE Forum. INHOPE was created to provide support  to Internet hotlines in Europe and 
beyond, encourage the exchange of expertise and technical reports, and also inform 
policymakers. It  was designed to provide Internet  hotlines with a fast  channel to remove alleged 
child pornographic material hosted overseas where there was another affiliate member in 
operation.
8.3.3 Criminal liability of online intermediaries
Domestic state regulation was employed to regulate online intermediaries and establish their 
legal liability in relation to child pornographic material. This was the case not only in domestic 
jurisdictions such as Australia397  and Brazil,398  but  across jurisdictions such as the EU. For 
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example, the 2000 EU Directive on Electronic Commerce established the legal liability of 
online intermediaries located in Europe for the content they hosted or distributed.399
For Edwards, the European ISPs were in a difficult position during the late 1990s, because of 
potential legal liability of the content they transmitted and hosted. Against  this background they 
demanded exemption from strict  legal liability based on three main arguments: the lack of 
effective legal and actual control over the content; that they were mere intermediaries; and for 
economic survival. This set  the context  where the legal framework for the legal liability of 
online intermediaries in Europe was established in 2000.400
The 2000 EU Directive defined online intermediaries as information society service providers 
but also call them intermediary service providers. As such, online intermediaries included a 
wide range of private actors such as Internet service, content  and host providers, weblogs, 
search tools, social networking systems, and backbone providers. The 2000 EU Directive 
established the safe harbour regime, meaning that  online intermediaries are exempt  from legal 
liability so long as they cooperate when asked to do so, and the NTD approach in relation to 
criminal content. 
When one online intermediary operated as a (1) ‘mere conduit’ of content, they were basically 
exempted from all liability. Nevertheless, if it  operated as a (2) ‘content  host’:401  (a) it was 
exempt from civil liability if it had no ‘actual knowledge’ of the illegal activity and was not 
‘aware of facts and circumstances from which the illegal activity or information was apparent’; 
and (b) it  was exempt from criminal liability if it had no actual knowledge. Generally they were 
not required to actively seek this knowledge via proactive monitoring of content but  would 
become liable if they did not  act  expeditiously to remove the content reported after notification. 
Nevertheless, Walden has stressed that  the increased production of user-generated content and 
the availability of filtering systems may push online intermediaries to exercise more editorial 
control over the online content to avoid the risk of litigation.402
The context  where online intermediaries operated changed and it became more difficult to 
demand exemption from legal liability as it was the case around the late 1990s. Indeed, there are 
cheaper technologies of online content  control, the cost of surveillance is decreasing and the 
implementation of these regulatory technologies did not undermine the economic survival of 
online intermediaries after all.403
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8.3.4 Architecture-based regulatory tools
A number of architecture-based regulatory tools were employed to limit access to child 
pornography on the Internet. These included content filtering and blocking systems, tethered 
appliances, and the use of surveillance equipment for interception and analysis of data 
trafficking.
The problematic removal of child pornographic content hosted overseas challenged the 
effectiveness of state, multi-state and self-regulation. Although there was state regulation in 
place to remove alleged child pornographic material hosted within the jurisdiction, the relevant 
content was also hosted overseas and therefore still accessible from within the jurisdiction. This 
led to the implementation of content  blocking systems to limit access to child pornography 
hosted overseas. Blocking systems were employed in a number of countries and applied to 
different  online applications (for example, websites, e-mail, spam, newsgroups, peer-to-peer 
networks, search engines and Internet messaging).404 
For Quayle et al., although online blocking is not the definitive solution to stop people sexually 
abusing children, ‘[…] at  least this initiative contributes to an overall solution.’405 Similarly, the 
IWF argues that although the removal at the source is the most  effective way to tackle the 
availability of child pornographic content hosted overseas, they ‘[…] consider blocking to be a 
short-term disruption tactic which can help protect users from stumbling across these images, 
whilst processes to have them removed are instigated […]’.406
The use of website blocking against  alleged child pornographic websites has been employed by 
the IWF since 2004 and became law within the EU in 2011. The mandatory blocking of 
overseas websites hosting alleged child pornography was never included within the EU 
policymaking, but  in a change of policy the 2009 EC Proposal for a Council Framework 
Decision established in Article 18, the use of website blocking to stop access to child 
pornography.407  After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this was replaced with the 2010 
Proposal for a Directive408  and the original 2009 text  was slightly altered so as to remove any 
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reference to police and judicial authorities undertaking blocking of Internet pages.409 The 2010 
Proposal was enacted in December 2011 and established in Article 25(1) and (2) that  EU 
member states shall take necessary measures to obtain removal of child pornographic webpages 
hosted outside of their territory and may take measures to block access to webpages containing 
or disseminating child pornography towards Internet users within their territory.410
Generally the EU established that the use of online content blocking strategies was at the 
discretion of each member state and generally not  encouraged explicitly. Nevertheless, the EU 
seems to have adopted a more prescriptive role in this regard and the use of blocking systems to 
limit  access to online child pornography has increased in the EU since 2006. For McIntyre, the 
2003 SIAP Evaluation,411  the increased number of overseas illegal websites reported, the 
existence of blocking systems already operating in a number of member states and the 
alignment of domestic anti-child pornography laws were reasons for this change in EU 
policymaking.412
Indeed, website blocking carried out  in the United Kingdom413  and Norway provided the 
empirical evidence for other trials across Europe. European police-led initiatives funded by the 
EU like CIRCAMP 414 also implemented website blocking systems as a preventive strategy. The 
CIRCAMP (COSPOL Internet Related Child Abuse Material Project) is a police initiative from 
COSPOL415  funded under the 2005 Safer Internet Plus Programme that employed the ‘child 
abuse anti-distribution filter’ to block access to child pornographic content hosted in overseas 
websites. These initiatives showed the increasing acceptance of website blocking mechanisms 
to limit access to child pornographic content in Europe.
More recently, the policies of NTD for material hosted domestically and of website blocking for 
overseas websites became legally required in all 27 member states of the EU. The 2011 EU 
Directive on child abuse, child sexual exploitation and child pornography mentioned earlier 
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to  URLs allegedly hosting child pornographic content. See Chapter 7 about online child pornography regulation in 
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414 See CIRCAMP, 'Cospol Internet  Related Child Abusive Material Project', at  <http://circamp.eu>, accessed 30 June 
2010.
415 COSPOL is an European law enforcement network created in 2004 that amongst other things  aims to improve the 
law enforcement cooperation in the EU against the commercial sexual exploitation of children. See EUROPOL, 
'CIRCAMP - COSPOL Internet Related Child Abusive Material  Project', at <http://www.europol.europa.eu/
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established a uniform law in relation to limiting access to and blocking websites with alleged 
child pornographic content across Europe. Article 5(3) about the offences concerning child 
pornography established that ‘ […] knowingly obtaining access, by means of information and 
communication technology, to child pornography shall be punishable by a maximum term of 
imprisonment of at least 1 year […].’ According to Article 25(1) and (2):
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure the prompt  removal of web 
pages containing or disseminating child pornography hosted in their territory and to 
endeavour to obtain the removal of such pages hosted outside of their territory.
2. Member States may take measures to block access to web pages containing or 
disseminating child pornography towards the Internet users within their territory […].416
There were a number of safeguards in Article 25(2) in relation to the implementation of the 
website blocking schemes by the EU member states. For Carr, the 2011 EU Directive raised a 
number of issues around the role Internet hotlines and particularly the INHOPE in Europe in 
relation to NTD (domestically) and website blocking (overseas) of child pornographic 
material.417
In Australia, there has been a website blocking voluntary scheme at the ISP-level to limit  access 
to child pornography in operation since July 2011.418  In the US, there was an unsuccessful 
legislative attempt in the State of Pennsylvania to require ISPs to block access to websites 
allegedly hosting child pornography,419  but this was achieved in the State of New York via 
agreements negotiated between the attorney general and major ISPs (for example Vernon, Sprint 
and Time Warner Cable) to prohibit access to newsgroups allegedly hosting child pornography 
related content.420
In addition to website blocking, hardware and software were employed to monitor and analyse 
the traffic on the Internet  in relation to controversial content  including child pornography. For 
example, Carnivore was a system designed by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation to 
monitor e-mails and electronic communications in the US. It changed its name to DCS1000 and 
was abandoned in 2001 in favour of a commercial piece of software.421 More importantly, the 
National Security Agency (NSA) developed a surveillance scheme involving a massive 
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'Communications Decency Act Tipping Under Cuomo Kid-Porn Accord', Wired, 2008, sec. Threat  Level at <http://
www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/06/analysis-commun/>, accessed 28 December 2011.
421 See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carnivore_(software)>, accessed 11 August 2010.
datacenter able to intercept, store and analyse online communications from around the world.422 
The EU Project MAPAP targeted the exchange of child pornographic content via P2P networks 
and received funding under the EU Safer Internet Action Plan. Another example of architecture 
based regulatory strategy is the so-called Deep Packet Inspection (DPI). This technique 
accessed not only the header, but  the content of the data being distributed and it was used in a 
wide range of areas for surveillance and censorship purposes. Software for automated analysis 
of images were created and used by online intermediaries to prevent users uploading alleged 
child pornographic content to their networks.423
In England and Wales, the 2000 RIPA424 established a number of provisions to facilitate the 
collection of evidence and surveillance on the Internet. A warrant could be issued by the 
executive (not the judiciary) and the RIPA also demanded that  the ISPs maintained real-time 
interception capabilities to facilitate monitoring. In addition, it  is argued elsewhere that its strict 
provisions about  encryption and access to encrypted information may have violated the 
presumption of innocence, undermined the privilege from self-incrimination, and inverted the 
burden of proof.425  The UK government announced plans to expand the existing surveillance 
powers of law enforcement authorities.426
Regulation of online child pornography was performed not  only via online intermediaries, but at 
the user-level via tethered digital devices such as mobile phones and tablets.427  The internal 
configuration of these devices may be altered and prompted from afar and subject to 
instantaneous revision: this made surveillance and content control much easier to perform.428 
For example, the US company Apple had the intention to keep its products porn-free429  and 
enforced strict regulatory rules against  pornography on the applications developed for its 
tethered devices.430  This was known as the Apple’s walled garden. These devices could be 
unlocked with the special software but this was considered a breach of the terms of use and may 
have voided the warranty.431 It is also worth pointing out that such special software is developed 
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by hacker communities and are hard to find and use. In some cases, breaking digital locks was 
against the law even if no copyright  infringement  was committed.432  Similarly, some 
governments like United Arab Emirates, India, Saudi Arabia and China threatened to ban 
Blackberry mobile phones applications, because these devices allegedly used the manufacture’s 
own encrypted network to transmit data and were therefore able to circumvent state 
regulation.433
9 Employing evaluative criteria for assessing hybrid regulation of online child 
 pornography in Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom
The second part of this chapter presented the problem of child pornography on the Internet  and 
explored relevant  regulatory measures in the area taking into account the typology of regulatory 
models developed in Section 1.2: self-regulation; state and multi-state regulation; and hybrid 
regulation. In addition, it  showed how the digitisation of content, anonymised access, and multi-
jurisdictional nature of the Internet challenged the enforcement of laws and regulations against 
online child pornography. This led to updates and expansion of anti-child pornography laws 
across the world and also to a number of hybrid regulatory measures involving both state and 
private actors.
These measures include increased investigatory and surveillance powers of law enforcement 
authorities, more liability imposed on the online intermediaries, financing of initiatives, e.g. 
creation of Internet  hotlines and implementation of filtering strategies, use of architecture-based 
regulatory strategies, and international cooperation of policing. The rationales driving this 
regulatory expansion are not only motivated by economic reasons but  also by human rights 
concerns. Such rationales include: (i) the amplified dimension of perceived harms; (ii) the new 
venues where child abuse can be performed whether against  a real or a fictitious child; and (iii) 
institutional agendas geared by symbolic politics (i.e. something has to be done about  it  whether 
it is effective or not), moral entrepreneurs, media-made criminality, prospects of financial gains 
and survival (for example, by Internet hotlines, politicians, and software and hardware 
companies), and also a legitimate interest to protect  children against abuse. Indeed, these 
agendas were successful to justify the expansion of anti-child pornography laws and regulations 
for the online environment.
Many critics have argued that regulation of child pornography should focus on the primary 
abuse of children and international cooperation. As such, less emphasis should be put on the 
circulation of online material, because it  is costly, ineffective and it deflects attention from 
more important issues. This chapter showed however that  such ‘hands-off’ rhetoric in relation to 
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state involvement in the Internet has been defeated: the regulation of child pornography 
available online is increasing. 
Yet, this regulatory escalation raises a number of questions. Do these hybrid regulatory policies 
designed to limit  access to child pornographic material available on the Internet represent a 
threat to free speech, privacy and other democratic values? Do these concerns hold cross-
nationally? Are there any safeguards in place? Is hybrid regulation employed in similar ways 
across different jurisdictions? Are these strategies converging towards a single universal model? 
What  are the mechanics and administrative constraints of these policies? Who is bearing the 
financial costs to implement these regulatory measures? Are these policies efficient  and 
effective? In order to address these questions, this research will employ the evaluative criteria 
designed above against current regulatory policies in Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom. 
It  seems that  most concerns highlighted in the literature hold true but  many others are not 
substantiated by evidence. For example, it may be the case that the actual regulatory 
mechanisms put in place are far less threatening to free speech and privacy than trumpeted by 
the literature. The actual implementation of anti-child pornography regulations may be only 
symbolic politics in the sense that online child pornography is not a top regulatory priority in 
daily police routines when compared to the regulation of property and financial related online 
crimes. In addition, although regulatory measures, for example notices of take down and 
blocking of websites have been considered ‘successful’ strategies, these have only little effect in 
limiting access to child pornographic content available online, because people are able to 
exchange such content  via non-web channels and platforms. In other words, these policies may 
be displacing crime to more resilient channels.434 
In addition, Section 6 onwards shows the relevance that the control of online child pornography 
has for the regulation, governance and criminology literature. This is a problem that concerns a 
number of researches in these areas, and makes evident the need to articulate ideas and concepts 
from each field in order to develop policies that not only work in practice but protects free 
speech and privacy. Many of these ideas and concepts were covered here to explain the 
phenomenon of online child pornography regulation from different  perspectives, and will be 
referenced in the following chapters.
Against this background, Chapter 4 will explore in detail the laws and regulations for limiting 
access to online child pornographic material in Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom, and 
Chapter 5 will apply the evaluative criteria described above so as to produce a report on each 
jurisdiction for each criteria. These jurisdictions were chosen because, although they have 
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reasonably similar anti-child pornography laws, they have crucially different approaches to the 
constitutional framework, scope and mechanics of anti-online child pornography regulations.435 
The next  chapter will explore methodological and ethical issues involved in this investigation 
before the case study material is addressed in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
1 Introduction
Chapter 2 explored the academic literature about regulation and the problematic enforcement  of 
regulatory measures to control controversial material available on the Internet. It classified 
regulatory interventions into three categories according to relevant regulatory actors involved: 
(1) self-regulation; (2) state and multi-state regulation; and (3) hybrid regulation. Chapter 2 also 
highlighted the negative consequences of hybrid regulation and developed evaluative criteria to 
assess such consequences. Subsequently, it explained the problem of child pornography and 
addressed the self-, state and multi-state, and hybrid regulatory initiatives to limit  access to child 
pornographic material available on the Internet.
This research employs the evaluative criteria developed in Chapter 2 against  current regulatory 
models limiting access to child pornographic material on the Internet in three different 
jurisdictions to evaluate the implications of hybrid regulation for free speech, privacy and 
democracy in the online environment. The problem of child pornography was chosen because, 
in this area, regulatory measures have advanced faster and relatively unopposed in comparison 
to the regulation of other types of controversial material. For example, in Brazil, although the 
cybercrime and online intermediaries’ regulation bills were under parliamentary discussion, a 
number of agreements, pro-active content monitoring performed by private actors and specific 
legislation placing criminal liability on online intermediaries, only in relation to child 
pornographic content, are already in place. In the United Kingdom, although only recently 
courts required ISPs to block access to URLs allegedly violating intellectual property rights,436 
URL blocking of alleged child pornographic content  has been in operation since 2004. In 
Australia, blocking of alleged child pornography websites has already been employed 
voluntarily at the ISP-level, whereas the regulation of other violent  material available online 
was pursued via user-level voluntary filtering.
This investigation analysed comparatively the Australian, Brazilian and the UK regulatory 
models and it  was based on documentary evidence and unstructured interviews employed under 
a multiple-case study strategy. Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom were chosen as case 
studies because they had generally similar anti-child-pornography laws, both domestically and 
in terms of their commitments under international treaties, they were considered democratic 
countries subject  to democratic controls of content, and access to data was relatively 
unproblematic in these jurisdictions. This provided a common ground for comparison.
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Of course, this common ground for comparison is open to debate. Australia, Brazil and the 
United Kingdom437 have different legal systems in relation to the application of criminal laws, 
different  degrees of autonomy amongst levels of government (e.g. federal, state and territories), 
and varied powers given to law enforcement agencies. However, they share a substantial 
number of similar anti-online child pornography criminal provisions in terms of criminal 
conducts, types of content and sentencing. They also share the will to regulate child 
pornographic material available on the Internet. More importantly, they were chosen as case 
studies because despite so different constitutional frameworks and varied regulatory scope and 
mechanics, they all settled on similar approaches and rationales to child pornography regulation. 
This provided an opportunity to explore different aspects and variations of hybrid regulation, 
and also to address its broader implications for free speech, privacy and democracy on the 
Internet.438
This study is important  for at least three key reasons. These include: (1) policymaking; (2) legal, 
criminological and regulatory scholarship; (3) and new case study evidence of how regulation 
works in practice.
First, the analysis developed here is expected to help reform current policymaking in relation to 
access to online child pornography, a field that  is growing in importance across the world.439 It 
also identifies a range of potential threats from anti-online child pornography regulation, 
developed cross-national evaluative model and a scheme of safeguards, and explores the 
regulatory costs involved. These have further practical utility as a guide for policymaking in 
relation to regulation designed to limit access to child pornographic material available online. 
The academic literature about  Internet regulation was explored and tested out against  the 
evidence from case studies, including the potential implications of hybrid regulation, the use of 
decentred and polycentric theories of regulation, the assessment of apparent illegality of online 
material by private actors, the cross-national similarities and differences of regulatory and 
institutional arrangements, and the problematic implementation of such measures.
Second, it  has implications for criminological scholarship, particularly in the field of 
comparative criminology and social control, because it addresses responses to crime that depend 
on international mutual efforts and occur within a decentred regulatory framework.440  It deals 
with crime and social control in a modern society where the governance of security and order 
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has been rapidly and radically transformed.441  It  addresses the evolution of anti-online child 
pornography laws, the resilient nature of the Internet and displacement of cybercrime, and the 
regulatory rationales used to criminalise a number of conducts and material associated with 
child pornography. Furthermore, it  shows the enforcement  of existing frameworks to be 
problematic (for example, in relation to criminal content  regulation) because of the resilient and 
multi-jurisdictional nature of the Internet  and it  suggests that more flexible regulatory 
approaches and robust safeguards have the potential to resolve something of these issues.
Third, this research explores the evolution of anti-child pornography laws and regulations in 
Brazil, where little academic information is available. It shows that  not  only regulation of online 
content based on agreements are problematic for free speech, privacy protection and good 
regulation but it also provides a starting point for further research in the field.
Although most  regulatory policies addressed in detail here (NTD and website blocking) target 
child pornographic material available on the world wide web (WWW), this investigation does 
not restrict its scope to web-based child pornographic material. Instead, it takes into account  that 
other means of distribution and access exist such as anonymised P2P, FTP, real-time chat 
systems, and darknet. This choice was made to: (1) explore other avenues of regulatory 
intervention (particularly within the remit  of law enforcement authorities) that had a deterrent 
effect  in limiting access to online child pornography; and (2) show how access to child 
pornography was displaced to less regulated online environments once NTD and website 
blocking policies were in place.
The problem of child pornography available on the Internet  involves not  only the production but 
the distribution of, and the access to, child pornographic material. Each activity involves a 
number of features and is subject  to multiple regulatory responses. The production and 
distribution of child pornography on the Internet  are addressed only peripherally in this 
investigation because they are not the focus of this research; this study focuses on the regulatory 
measures designed to limit access to child pornography available on the Internet.
Although the focus is on regulations to limit  access to online child pornography, this study also 
explores laws against child pornography per se, the criminal liability of intermediaries and 
surveillance powers of law enforcement  authorities, and court cases in each jurisdiction in order 
to present  the overall environment  where these regulations operate. As such, it covers not  only 
laws and regulations that directly aim to limit  access to child pornography available online (for 
example, prohibition of knowingly access, and the use of NTD and blocking strategies) but 
those which indirectly inhibit or have a deterrent effect  in such conduct (e.g. the prohibition of 
mere possession, production and distribution of child pornography, the facilitation of 
surveillance powers of law enforcement  authorities, and the increased criminal liability of 
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online intermediaries). Notably, the study of lawmaking, police operations, criminal 
prosecution, sentencing, convicted offenders and victims in relation to online child pornography 
offences are outside the scope of this research.
This chapter will explore the methodological and ethical issues choices made to conduct  this 
investigation. First, the documentary analysis and the unstructured interviewing scheme will be 
addressed within the scope of a multiple-case study strategy. Subsequently, a few issues in 
relation to cross-national research and the professional involvement  of this author with the 
research topic will be discussed.
2 Documentary analysis
For Atkinson and Coffey, if people need to understand organisations they cannot  ignore 
documents, because institutions are deeply dependent on paperwork.442 Indeed, documents are 
relevant to understand how both state and private actors regulate to limit  access to child 
pornography available on the Internet. This is the reason why documents were the main research 
evidence of this study, and the documentary analysis was employed as a method of research on 
its own right rather than playing a secondary role.443
Generally, the documentary analysis employed here aimed to provide a detailed account  of 
regulatory measures in place to limit  access to online child pornography in all three chosen 
jurisdictions. It  was expected to: (i) describe and explain the legal and regulatory frameworks in 
operation; (ii) highlight  key similarities and differences amongst regulatory models; (iii) 
identify the implications of hybrid regulation for democratic legitimacy, transparency and 
accountability; (iv) inform the following unstructured interviewing scheme;444  and (v) to 
validate the findings derived from interviews.445 
Different types of documents were collected and analysed during this investigation. They were 
divided into three categories: (1) conventional legal sources (for example parliamentary bills, 
explanatory memorandums, statutes, cases and agreements); (2) institutional documents derived 
from state and private sources (e.g. public and private administrative documents and reports); 
and (3) academic literature. Mass-media outputs (e.g. newspaper and magazine articles, 
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television programmes, blogs and radio broadcasts) were considered but  only as indicators of 
other documentary sources.446
Documentary collection and analysis followed a coding scheme designed to organise the 
documentary data according to relevant  research questions and objectives.447  Against this 
background, the coding scheme divided the documents collected into two categories: (1) 
documents related to anti-child pornography laws, and also legislation in relation to legal 
liability of online intermediaries and investigatory powers of law enforcement agencies; and (2) 
documents related to the overall online content regulatory framework. The size, scope and 
period of documentary sample varied according to the phenomenon’s occurrence in each 
jurisdiction. For example, documents related to legal framework were dated 1990 to 2010 
(Australia), 1990 to 2010 (Brazil) and 1978 to 2010 (United Kingdom); and documents related 
to regulatory framework were dated 1990 to 2010 (Australia), 1999 to 2010 (Brazil) and 1990 to 
2010 (United Kingdom). Again, this coding system was in line with the enactment of domestic 
anti-child pornography laws and initial operation of regulatory measures in each jurisdiction.
Generally access to most  documents was unproblematic, because they were publicly available 
online. Conventional legal documents were publicly available online in all three jurisdictions. 
Institutional documents were generally found online but more restricted documents were only 
available upon request. Academic literature was easily found in Australia and the UK when 
compared to Brazil, where only a few academic studies and reports were available.
Documentary analysis in legal research is associated with doctrinal research methods.448  This 
approach to legal research is based on the assumption that  law is a product  of rules derived from 
cases and statutes which are applied by an impartial judge in order to resolve a dispute. As a 
result, analysis of legal problems is limited to the interpretation of cases and statutes, assuming 
an artificial separation between law and society. Some critics argue that although the doctrinal 
legal approach is able to provide a normative evaluation of law and its regulations, it fails to 
address the ‘why’ questions, institutional agendas, power struggles and the politics of regulation 
in relation to the phenomenon investigated.449
In contrast  to doctrinal studies of law, socio-legal approaches to legal research incorporate the 
social context into legal analysis. According to these approaches, law and regulations are not 
only mere extensions of statutes, cases, and governmental documents but are social products 
shaped by different actors, and influenced by variables such as power struggles, ideological 
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conflicts, gender, class and race. In short, the socio-legal analysis of law takes on board different 
voices left unheard by the doctrinal approach and may supplement it accordingly.
The documentary analysis (or doctrinal approach) has limitations. First, documentary evidence 
may reflect or disguise the institutional agendas where they are produced. They are not 
transparent  windows of the world but  create a particular version of reality that  represents 
potential rather than actual meaning.450 For Scott, they should be analysed as social constructs, 
as part of their social context of production, distribution and consumption, and interpreted 
according to their authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning.451
For example, civil rights organisations emphasise the drawbacks of regulation for the protection 
of civil liberties online; state regulators focus on the need of regulation to protect children, 
arrest offenders and maintain order; online content filtering manufacturers overemphasise the 
advantages of their products; and online intermediaries might advocate a ‘hands-off 
government’ approach to the Internet  on privacy and free speech grounds, but  in reality they are 
only reluctant  to implement regulatory measures to avoid any additional operational expenses 
on their side. Generally each organisation produces documentary evidence that emphasises 
certain aspects that  pushes their agendas forward, whereas issues that are against their interests 
are either underemphasised or suppressed entirely.
In addition, documents may provide contradictory information, and it  is commonly the case that 
the law found in documents, i.e. the ‘law in books’, differs from the actual phenomenon under 
investigation, i.e. the ‘law in action.’ In other words, documents about legal and regulatory 
frameworks may provide information substantially different  from the actual daily operation of 
institutions responsible for implementing these regulations in practice. Furthermore, access to a 
few relevant institutional documents could only be granted after email conversations or 
interviews, when participants get  to know the researcher and develop a sense of trustworthiness. 
For example, in Brazil many relevant  documents and other contextual issues were only 
acknowledged after interviews were conducted.
These issues became clear after data was collected and the analysis began. The documentary 
evidence was only able to answer certain questions (for example the scope and structure of 
relevant law and regulations, the detailed practical information about how the regulatory scheme 
works, the potential negative implications of regulatory measures) and only peripherally could 
answer other questions such as the reasons why certain regulatory measures were preferred, and 
the agenda of institutional actors. In sum, there are wider social questions that documents, or the 
doctrinal approach, may be unable to answer. As a result, it  is important to establish the research 
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question in advance bearing in mind the limits of documentary analysis, and if necessary, 
include other research methods such as questionnaires, interviews or participant  observation, to 
achieve what the research aims.
This investigation was only peripherally interested in conflictual institutional agendas, whether 
within or outside the organisation, political power struggles, or other issues around gender, race 
and ideological conflicts. Although these were interesting research topics on their own right and 
were briefly discussed in this study, this investigation was designed to address the regulation of 
access to online child pornography to evaluate the implications of hybrid regulation for free 
speech, privacy and democracy in the online environment. And, in this regard, the documentary 
evidence fulfilled its role.
In order to tackle some limitations of documentary analysis, this investigation employed a 
validation scheme, and this will be explored below.
3 Validation scheme for the documentary analysis: an expert consultation 
 exercise
The documentary analysis explored and explained each regulatory model in detail, including 
anti-child pornography criminal laws, relevant legislation about regulation of online 
intermediaries and investigatory powers of law enforcement  authorities as well as online content 
regulations, historical context, key actors, regulatory mechanics and scope, which constitute the 
case study material found in Chapter 4. Again, the documentary analysis explored relevant 
official documents from each jurisdiction, including conventional legal sources and 
institutional documents. A number of academic articles and media articles were also included, 
and the coding strategy was designed to identify the legal and regulatory frameworks from each 
jurisdiction.
After draft chapters were finished, a validation exercise was conducted. The validation scheme 
was based on an expert  consultation exercise and aimed to: (1) resolve any contradictions found 
in the documentary analysis; (2) explain some policymaking decisions not found in documents; 
(3) obtain more documents and follow other relevant leads; (4) correct  errors and omissions; 
and (5) minimise the cultural misunderstandings derived from a cross-national investigation.
Potential participants were chosen from a range of different  backgrounds such as academia, 
civil service and non-governmental, and were specialists in the topic capable of validating the 
documentary evidence collected. The participation process followed ethical guidelines 
established by the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sheffield, and the potential 
participants were invited and approached via email, telephone or both.452  According to these 
guidelines, (i) participants were able to choose to be identified or not; (ii) responses were to be 
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kept  confidential, unless permission was given; (iii) a consent form was provided to inform 
participants about  the research and their participation. During the invitation process, all relevant 
information (i.e. explanatory statement, consent forms, and confidentiality agreement) were 
provided to potential participants. Eighteen people were approached this way. Six participants 
agreed to provide feedback on each relevant draft chapter: two experts from Australia; one from 
Brazil; and three from the United Kingdom. Subsequently, each draft  chapter (all in English) 
was submitted for feedback via email to the expert according to his/her jurisdiction.
The invitations were sent around late November 2011 and five written feedbacks were received 
by February 2012. After the feedback was received, it was briefly discussed with the participant 
via email, whenever necessary. In addition, follow-up interviews were conducted with the 
Brazilian expert. These interviews were unstructured so as to include the participant’s 
understanding of the problem and be flexible enough to reveal issues neglected in the 
documentary analysis. This research method will be discussed further in Section 4 below.
Eighteen people were invited to participate in this research but only six took part  in the 
consultation exercise. Ten people agreed to participate initially, but four of them did not  reply 
after the relevant information was sent, and they gave no reasons for this. Some respondents 
were concerned about the confidentiality agreement and made clear that  the contribution would 
be of their own and not of the institution they were associated with, perhaps to avoid any 
potential conflict  of interest. In other situations, social skills were needed to build up trust and 
convince participants to accept the invitation.
After this feedback was received and analysed, a number of changes were made in each case 
study chapter. Of course, all changes were made according to my own judgment and based on 
previous documentary analysis. Feedback received was in written text format  (five altogether), 
except  in the Brazilian case, where the participant provided feedback via unstructured 
interviews.
Most  changes in the Australian case study were about omissions, minor errors and 
misunderstandings of Australian legislation, particularly, because of complex constitutional 
arrangements asserting powers to the Commonwealth, States and Territories in terms of criminal 
laws and content regulation. A few historical events were added to the revised version, and a 
number of websites and official documents were recommended for reading. A number of 
important  details were added in relation to most recent ISP-level voluntary website blocking 
scheme. In addition, there were invitations for further reading and thinking in a few occasions 
when the expert disagreed with my point of view.
The Brazilian case study underwent  a substantial change in content. Perhaps, this was because 
there were only a few academic works available about  child pornography regulation in Brazil, 
and accounts about key discussions and decisions on the topic were not  publicly easily 
available. In addition, the Brazilian expert was able to provide long and detailed feedback on the 
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draft  chapter. Many omissions, errors and misunderstandings were found; a number of gaps in 
the historical development of regulatory measures were filled; the expert invited me to do more 
reading and thinking about my prior point  of view whenever s/he disagreed; and a number of 
documents and websites were recommended for reading. Perhaps because of the substantial 
amount of information unintentionally neglected during the documentary analysis, most 
considerations made by the expert were taken into account, but  again, these changes were made 
after consulting documents in order to validate the feedback given.
The feedback given by the Brazilian expert  was given under an unstructured approach and 
conducted via the software Skype; these interviews amount  to about 10 hours of conversation. 
The structure of the Brazilian case study chapter remained generally the same after the 
validation, but  it  was enriched with more information and initial criticisms had softened in some 
parts; this is because the information gathered during the validation process changed the 
understanding of a few particular issues. A number of issues neglected during the documentary 
analysis were taken onboard. For example, the reluctance of online intermediaries to implement 
regulatory measures because of operational costs and political struggles occurring behind the 
scenes were information not  available on documents. On a few occasions, the expert criticised 
my point  of view but this was largely because of the institutional agenda s/he pursued. 
Whenever any change was made to the original draft chapter, this was either based on new 
documents initially neglected, or on a new reading of a document already read during the 
documentary analysis.
The feedback about  the United Kingdom case study was relatively less extensive when 
compared to the other two case studies, perhaps because of the wide range of academic work 
already available on the subject. The responses were generally punctual and in relation to minor 
errors and omissions, particularly, about  legislation, interpretation of key court decisions and 
actual operation of the regulatory scheme. Few important documents were suggested for further 
reading, particularly a recently enacted piece of legislation. There were however invitations to 
rethink my views on the controversial Wikipedia incident, to soften the criticism on the URL 
blocking scheme managed by the IWF and to put other criticisms under a wider perspective. In 
fact, this was more like an invitation for discussion rather than a straightforward request  to 
change my point of view about these issues.
Overall, the expert  consultation exercise was able to (i) correct  minor mistakes, errors and 
omissions of draft  chapters; (ii) include other relevant  documents in the analysis; (iii) either 
support  or soften the criticisms made in the draft chapters; and (iv) minimise potential 
misunderstandings derived from cultural differences and language misinterpretations.453  The 
consultation exercise can be compared to a peer review prior to a publication on a journal: 
improvements are made to draft papers without  interfering substantially on the author’s point  of 
view and the gist of argument advanced. After the consultation process was finished, one can 
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safely say that  the reviewed chapters are valid accounts about  how online child pornography 
regulation was addressed in each jurisdiction.
This consultation process was a relatively easy, fast  and cheap method to validate the 
documentary evidence. Of course, it depended on the generosity of experts, who contributed 
with their time and intellectual effort  towards the research. Another advantage is that it can be 
conducted at a distance, whether via e-mail or Internet telephony, and thus reach people in other 
jurisdictions. In addition, it is a chance to test out  the issues highlighted in the academic 
literature and the researcher’s own perspectives on a particular subject. It  is an opportunity to 
include other issues and concerns omitted in the literature but  which are important to take on 
board. 
Nevertheless, this sort  of validation exercise is not  recommended when institutional immersion 
is necessary, e.g. when the research question demands methods such as participant observation 
over a period of time. The researcher must critically approach the recommendations made by 
experts, and understand in advance the potential agendas they may be pursuing. More 
importantly, the experts’ considerations must always be contrasted with the documentary 
evidence available.
Finally, the validation scheme opened a window of opportunity for experts to impose their 
visions and agendas onto the research. In addition to a number of errors and misunderstandings 
being promptly corrected, and new references being included, in a few cases the participants 
disagreed with the tone or approach taken to a particular problem and tended to push their own 
agenda and understanding. Although these interventions were often thought-provoking and 
improved the analysis, they were taken with care and explored further via email discussions and 
documentary analysis.
4 Unstructured interviewing scheme
The documentary analysis was sufficient  to describe and explain the legal and regulatory 
frameworks as well as the regulatory mechanisms operating in each jurisdiction. This technique 
was able to answer the research questions of this investigation. Nevertheless, the draft  chapter 
about Brazil was initially considered rather unsatisfactory because of too few documents 
collected. This was the reason why unstructured interviews were conducted.454 These interviews 
aimed to: (1) explain further issues from the expert’s feedback; (2) explore decisionmaking 
processes relevant  to the research question; and (3) explore in more depth the experts’s own 
understanding of the problem.
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454  Unstructured interviews are more time demanding and costly when compared to other interviewing techniques, 
but the small size of the sample used in this investigation made this possible under the resources available.
The academic literature stresses that  although there are a number of ways to collect  information 
from participants such as questionnaires and structured interviews,455  unstructured interviews 
are more appropriate to observe respondent’s workplace environment, perceive things like body 
language and clarify inconsistent information immediately, instead of assuming that  the 
respondent’s reality would fit a prior theoretical scheme.456  Accordingly interviewees are 
expected to construct rather than reveal something; they act as collaborative partners in the 
process of knowledge construction instead of being considered vessels of answers.457 
Interviewees and interviewer are expected to actively interact so as to weaken the dominant  role 
of the latter and the degree of procedural reactivity. As such, the interview was guided not  by a 
rigid list of questions, but by the draft chapter about the Brazilian case study and the coding 
scheme found in Appendix 4; the expert was also free to follow other issues. The interview, 
albeit flexible and unstructured, was controlled.458
The unstructured interviews employed for this research involved only the Brazilian expert (who 
took part  in the validation scheme. They were qualitative-oriented, based on the Brazilian draft 
chapter and coding schedule, and conducted only in relation to the Brazilian case study, because 
the draft  chapter was considered only partially satisfactory, and therefore a substantial number 
of extra readings and amendments were necessary.
These interviews were conducted via the Internet  telephony software Skype and digitally 
recorded after the participant  gave informed consent.459  They were then transcribed and the 
audio destroyed. Personal identifiers were not collected from the interviewee. A coding system 
was used to avoid using the interviewee’s name within the transcribed text and as filenames. 
The audio digital record was encrypted and stored in a password protected personal computer. 
Later, the digital audio was transcribed and then destroyed. The transcribed data (digital text) 
was printed and kept  in a locked cabinet. In sum, (i) the participant was able to choose to be 
identified or not; (ii) responses were kept confidential; (iii) audio recordings were destroyed 
after transcription; (iv) a consent  form was provided before the interview in order to inform the 
participant about the research and his/her participation.
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Interviews were analysed in the light of prior documentary analysis and served to improve the 
Brazilian case study chapter. It made evident that a number of issues and new avenues for 
research may arise during the conversation, and that  the researcher can easily lose track of the 
research question being pursued if unstructured interviews are not  controlled. Indeed, a number 
of issues, such as insider information and ‘behind the scenes’ political conflicts, albeit 
interesting in their own right, were outside the scope of the investigation and only peripherally 
mentioned in the case study. Other issues, however, were relevant  and thus explored in more 
detail. All amendments made to the Brazilian case study chapter were not  only based on 
experts’ feedback but  also validated by the existing and the new documents collected. This 
served to enrich the case study with more than one perspective and led to a few amendments 
whenever this author agreed with them. Of course, the resulting final chapter is all this author’s 
own responsibility.
Bryman highlights a number of limitations associated with unstructured interviews, such as 
problematic access to participants, language barriers and misunderstandings, and personal 
reactivity (i.e. the effects of the researcher’s interaction upon respondents’ responses).460 
Nevertheless, the small sample size of this investigation contributed to keeping the interviewing 
scheme under control.
5 Multiple-case study strategy
Both the documentary analysis and unstructured interviews were employed under a multiple-
case study strategy. For Yin, this strategy embeds research design, data collection techniques 
and data analysis, and it is recommended whenever it is necessary to provide an in-depth 
description of, or explain how a contemporary social phenomenon, over which the researcher 
has little control, works.461  Indeed, such a strategy was employed here to explore and 
understand a complex social phenomenon (the regulations to limit access to online child 
pornography) taking into account  the policies implemented in three different  jurisdictions. This 
aimed to illuminate the question of how regulatory policies operated and also to explore a few 
contextual issues involved.462 As such, the unities of analysis are regulations to limit access to 
online child pornography in Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom: each jurisdiction is a 
case study to explore the implications of hybrid regulation.
A multiple-case study strategy was preferred here because inferences from a single-case study 
were likely to be unreliable, a single-case study would offer limited scope for generalisations 
from the empirical evidence463  and, particularly, because of the cross-national nature of online 
child pornography regulation.464  Furthermore, a multiple-case study strategy offered the 
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opportunity to develop comparative evaluative criteria to assess the implications of hybrid 
regulation. This strategy facilitates the inclusion of other jurisdictions in order to test out 
inferences already produced. More importantly, a multiple-case study strategy was needed to 
identify as many implications of hybrid regulation as possible in order to guide policymaking, 
and to explore the multi-jurisdictional regulatory challenges posed by the Internet.
Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom were chosen as case studies because they had 
generally similar anti-child-pornography laws, both domestically and in terms of their 
commitments under international treaties, they were considered democratic countries subject to 
democratic controls of content, and access to data was relatively unproblematic in these 
jurisdictions. This provided a common ground for comparison. More importantly, they were 
chosen as case studies because despite very different constitutional frameworks and varied 
regulatory scope and mechanics, they all settled on similar approaches and rationales to child 
pornography regulation. This provided an opportunity to explore different aspects and variations 
of hybrid regulation, and also to address its broader implications for free speech, privacy and 
democracy on the Internet. They were also representative samples in relation to the models of 
regulation described in Chapter 2.465
This follows the comparative logic of a ‘most similar systems design’ (i.e. choosing countries as 
similar as possible in relation to relevant  features) which will produce intersystemic similarities 
(the controlled variables - such as similar anti-child pornography laws) and intersystemic 
differences (the explanatory variables that are theoretically relevant and may be used in 
explaining such differences - for example, regulatory policies implemented in each 
jurisdiction).466  This research intends, to a certain extent, to explain the divergence of hybrid 
regulation in place in these jurisdictions vis-à-vis the similar anti-child pornography laws they 
adopted.
In addition, language and easy access to documents and participants were important in selecting 
these jurisdictions. These choices were based on a brief literature search about the topic, but 
were also exploratory in nature to some extent. Other jurisdictions were potential candidates 
(for example the US, Russia and China) but  the limited resources available, and the more 
difficult access to data were substantial obstacles; they were discharged as a result.
Although anti-child pornography legislation and interpretations varied significantly in England 
and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, ‘United Kingdom’ was used as a case study. This was 
because the research focused on the work of the Internet Watch Foundation, whose operation is 
UK wide.
5.1 The difficulties of a cross-national study
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For Nelken, there are three approaches to comparative criminology. The behavioural science 
approach that  aims to ‘transcend cultural diversity in order to achieve genuine scientific 
statements.’ The interpretative approach that  intends to ‘show how the meaning of crime and 
criminal justice is embedded within cultural contexts.’ Finally, the comparativist  approach that 
aims to ‘classify and learn from the rules, ideals and practices from other jurisdictions.’467  The 
comparativist  approach is the one taken here. This investigation was neither intended to explain 
the regulatory differences in terms of cultural and institutional dissimilarities, nor to exclude 
cultural diversity from the analysis. Instead, this investigation was designed to improve current 
policymaking by learning from other jurisdictions’ experiences.
The cross-national approach to research was relevant  not only for this investigation but also for 
other areas within the field of criminology. This is largely because of the increased importance 
of transnational crimes and the academic search for understanding and reforming of current 
policymaking.468  There are however a number of difficulties associated with the conduction of 
cross-national studies on both practical and theoretical grounds.469  The core dilemmas are in 
relation to the notion of culture. Who and what is going to speak for the culture studied 
(documents, people, institutions)? Is culture just another variable to be taken on board or the 
overall context  where the social phenomenon occurs? Should culture be approached as a 
monolithic or as a multidimensional concept?470 
The notion of local culture has therefore a significant role in cross-national comparative 
criminology. This investigation made a number of assumptions in this regard however to 
provide grounds for comparison. It  assumed that child pornographic content was similarly 
disapproved, that  law and regulation were straightforward concepts, and that  free speech, 
privacy protection and democratic values were similarly perceived in all three jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, child pornography may not be objectionable at the same level, laws and 
regulations in Brazil follow the civil law tradition, and free speech, privacy protection and 
democratic values may not be similarly perceived in Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom.
In addition to the problematic notion of culture, there are issues in relation to ‘equivalence of 
measurement’. Is there any assurance that  cross-national researchers are comparing ‘like with 
like’? How can they be sure that  similar questions have similar meanings in different cultural 
contexts? Bottomley and Pease argue that different countries define and measure crime in 
different  ways: crime statistics therefore are products of human interaction in dissimilar cultural 
settings.471 Similarly, Vagg argues that the process of collecting, processing and disseminating 
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crime-related evidence is influenced by cultural contexts.472  Of course, the cross-national 
comparison conducted here had to use approximations to provide grounds for comparison and 
analysis, and to assume that similar questions had similar meanings in all jurisdictions studied.
Researcher reflexivity raises a number of questions. What are the taken-for-granted assumptions 
and how does the researcher’s cultural background influence research findings? Is it  more 
appropriate to be a native or a foreign researcher when the subject  addressed is under a cross-
cultural perspective? What is the role played by language barriers?
These questions are far from resolved, but there should be a sense of pragmatism in this regard. 
Indeed, there is little consensus about  how to conduct a cross-national research because 
different  strategies involve both benefits and drawbacks. For Nelken, the best  choice for 
approaching a cross-national investigation is to match what  the study is purported to achieve 
with the methodology employed for such endeavour.473  Similarly, Smelser points out that these 
problems may be mitigated if the comparative dimension achieves what the research aims.474 
It  may be the case that  conducting a successful cross-national research has more to do with 
employing research methods that are adequate to the nature of the research questions and aims, 
rather than being overwhelmed by the orthodoxy of extreme relativism; a touch of responsible 
pragmatism is necessary to overcome the paralysis of excessive relativism.475
6 Personal involvement
The sections above discussed methodological issues associated with this investigation and 
explained a number of choices made. This section will explore the professional involvement of 
this author with the research topic.
I was an undergraduate in Computer Science in 1998 when a number of legal issues related to 
the Internet called my attention. During that time, academics started to address a number of 
implications that the Internet had on issues such as domain names’ disputes, protection of 
privacy, regulation of online pornography, incitement to racial hatred, protection of intellectual 
property, jurisdiction, and law enforcement. The criminological aspects of cyberspace and the 
study of cybercrime led this author to apply for a degree in Law to explore these issues further.
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In 2001, I was invited to work part-time coordinating an experimental Internet  hotline project  at 
CEDECA-BA,476  and worked there until the mid-2002, when I was accepted for a Master of 
Arts in International Criminology at  the University of Sheffield in September of 2002, after 
successfully obtaining a scholarship from the British government (the Chevening Scholarships 
Programme). Along this period, I conducted a comparative investigation between the pilot-
Internet hotline created in CEDECA-BA and the British hotline Internet Watch Foundation. The 
masters’ dissertation addressed the operation of both Internet  hotlines and provided a cross-
national comparative analysis.477
Later in 2004, I started my career in the civil service in the State of Bahia in Brazil. The 
formulation and assessment of public policies were amongst  my responsibilities. I was 
interested in how the Brazilian government was tackling the proliferation of online child 
pornography in the country. As a result, I proposed an investigation to map the operation of 
different  public and private actors tackling the availability of child pornographic material on the 
Internet in Brazil. The research addressed not only the role of Brazilian Internet hotlines, but  the 
Internet industry, Parliament and police authorities. It was conducted from September 2004 to 
November 2005 and adopted a qualitative approach: questionnaires and unstructured interviews 
were applied. Eight  police authority representatives (Federal and State Police); six association 
of internet  service providers; 13 Internet hotlines; and 39 legislative bills (under appreciation by 
the Brazilian National Congress) were included in this study.478
It  was against this background that this doctoral research came to life. The decision to focus on 
regulatory initiatives limiting access to child pornography on the Internet was a result of my 
past  experience in academia, civil society (i.e. children protection non-governmental 
organisation) and the public sector. Perhaps, losing my wife and friend Samantha Reis, who also 
worked in the field as a child psychologist, in a tragic accident  in 2006, or perhaps, being a 
single father of a young boy aged 3 at  the start  of this investigation also played a role in 
choosing this research topic. This author believes however that  these two events, instead of 
crystallising any radicalism in his views or in the analysis developed here, helped him in 
keeping the faith, motivation and academic criticism during the most difficult of times, 
particularly when this investigation seemed to be going nowhere.
A personal interjection: despite the formal layout  of this thesis and the critical approach towards 
the subject, which may suggest that  I am insensitive towards human suffering or, perhaps to 
some, that  I am sympathetic to the claims of paedophiles, I do believe child sexual abuse is an 
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outrageous aggression; I do feel angry and upset  at such revolting violence; I do feel 
compassionate towards those who are recovering from the trauma. 
Notably, this investigation did not involve any child victim of sexual abuse nor any convicted 
sexual offender. Similarly, no illegal website was visited nor was any child pornographic 
material viewed under any circumstance.
This reduced considerably the ethical issues around the research topic. Nevertheless, although 
this research focused only on regulatory responses to online child pornography, there are a 
number of ethical issues involved. This investigation owns ethical responsibilities towards the 
sponsors, respondents and the silenced victims of sexual abuse. First, I had to be extremely 
concerned with my claims not to be collusive with paedophiles’ arguments. Second, I had to be 
sensitive to sponsorship standpoints and expectations.479  Third, I added to the proliferation of 
discourses around children sexual abuse. I could absolutely not  be exempted from any of these 
ethical dilemmas.
Although I was a civil servant and this doctoral project was partially funded by the Government 
of the State of Bahia, in Brazil, this investigation was subject to no influence from the 
government. I was absolutely free to conduct  the research without any political pressure that 
could influence the final result; there was neither any fear from retaliation nor threat of any sort 
in this regard. On the contrary, being a civil servant made me aware of how things work inside 
the government  in practice, and facilitated access to people and documents. My prior experience 
at  a non-governmental organisation and involvement with children rights’ activists also 
facilitated access to relevant  people and documents. Generally, rather than providing a partial 
account about the research topic, this condition contributed to enrich this research.
7 Final comments
This chapter addressed methodological and ethical issues associated with this study. The 
documentary analysis and unstructured interviewing scheme employed under a multiple-case 
study strategy were discussed. In addition, difficulties of conducting cross-national investigation 
and the professional involvement of this author were addressed. The next  chapter explores the 
laws and regulations in place to limit  access to child pornography on the Internet  in Australia, 
Brazil and the United Kingdom, respectively.
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479  This investigation  was partially sponsored by the Government of the State of Bahia (Brazil). All  other expenses 
were paid for by my personal means.
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CHAPTER 4: CURRENT MODELS FOR REGULATING 
ACCESS TO CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL 
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
This chapter explores in detail the laws and regulations to limit access to online child 
pornographic content  in Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom. It  is an overview of the 
substantive law and regulatory framework in place in these jurisdictions based on the 
documentary evidence available.
1 Australia
The online regulatory scheme established in 1999 extended the existing regulation of television 
broadcasting to the online environment and relied on a substantial number of statutes, 
administrative regulations and industry self-regulation to limit  access to illegal material 
available on the Internet, and also to online material deemed unsuitable for children and young 
people. In fact, the Australian scheme targeted not  only illegal material, e.g. child pornography 
but content considered inappropriate to minors such as adult pornography. The federal 
government is the central regulatory actor but online intermediaries (e.g. ISPs, content service 
and hosting service providers) play a significant role via Industry Codes of Practice (CoP).  
Child pornographic material hosted in Australia was targeted via notices of take down480 sent by 
the federal regulator ACMA to relevant  Internet content  service or hosting service providers. 
Overseas child pornographic websites were targeted via a voluntary user-level filtering scheme 
employed since 2000. Nevertheless, another voluntary filtering scheme, employed at  the ISP-
level, was launched by the Internet Industry Association in July 2011 to block access to overseas 
child pornographic websites by the means of a partnership with the Australian Federal Police 
and Interpol. Furthermore, the federal government has been trying since 2007 to implement a 
nationwide mandatory filtering scheme at  the ISP-level, via legislation, to target not only child 
pornographic content but other types of material included in the federal regulator’s blocklist.
Section 1.1 explores the historical context of online content regulation in Australia particularly 
in relation to child pornographic material. Section 1.2 addresses Commonwealth, State and 
Territory criminal laws tackling the production, distribution and possession of online child 
pornography. Subsequently, Section 1.3 provides a detailed account  of the Commonwealth 
online content regulatory laws and regulations to limit  access to online child pornography, be it 
hosted in Australia or overseas. Although this research focuses on regulation to stop accessing 
child pornography on the Internet, the case study material addressed the wider scope of the 
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480  Generally, notices of take down are the requests sent by the relevant authority to hosting  services or content 
service providers informing that either illegal or inappropriate content  was found to be hosted in their servers. After 
being notified, the online intermediary may be liable if it does not act expeditiously to remove access to such content.
Australian regulatory regime so as to place the research question into the overall regulatory 
context.
1.1 Historical context481
The debate about online content  regulation in Australia started in the mid-1990s following the 
report of the Bulletin Board System (BBS) Task-force in 1994.482  Later in June 1996, the 
Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA)483  published a report484  about  online content 
regulation suggesting a self-regulatory approach via Internet industry Codes of Practice (CoP), 
monitored by ABA, to regulate the content available on the Internet. Subsequently, in February 
1997, a Senate Select  Committee launched an inquiry and issued a report  in late June 1997. The 
majority report  recommended criminal offences for online publication or distribution of various 
types of material including material unsuitable for minors (i.e. material lawful to publish or 
distribute offline), while the minority report (by opposition parties' Committee members) 
opposed this and various other recommendations.485  On 15 July 1997, a proposal for a 
regulatory framework486 formulated by the Ministry of Communications and the Arts, and the 
Attorney General, was issued for public consultation. The Minister for Communications 
contended, in an associated media release, that the proposal was ‘[…] consistent  with […] the 
recommendations, released last  June, of the ABA's major study of on-line content regulation.’487 
On 15 December 1997, Commonwealth, State and Territory Attorneys-General issued a media 
release ‘[…] reaffirm[ing] that  criminal sanctions should apply to people who place offensive or 
illegal material on the Internet  […]’ and that ISPs would be subject to a new criminal offence 
‘[…] of knowingly, though passively, allowing another person to commit  an offence.’488  For 
Griffith, the debate that  followed made evident the conflict  between self-regulation and a more 
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481 For an overview about online content regulation in Australia, see EFA, 'History of Internet  Regulatory Proposals/
Activity in  Australia', (updated January 2000) at <http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/censhistory.html>, accessed 
19 September.
482  'BBS Task-force Report', (Australia, 1994) at <http://web.archive.org/web/20020906144005/http://
www.dca.gov.au/nsapi-graphics/?MIval=dca_dispdoc&pathid=/pubs/bulletin_board/report.htm>, accessed 05 March 
2012.
483  The ABA was the federal regulator at that time, but it has now been replaced by the ACMA. See ACMA, 
'Australian Communications and Media Authority - The ACMA is a statutory authority within the federal government 
portfolio of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy', at <http://www.acma.gov.au>, accessed 28 
March 2010.
484 ABA, 'Investigation  into the Content of On-line Services', (Australia: Australian Broadcasting Authority, 1996) at 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20060827020412/http://www.acma.gov.au/acmainterwr/aba/about/recruitment/
olsfinal.pdf>, accessed 05 March 2012.
485  'Report of the 'Senate Select Committee on Community Standards Relevant  to the Supply of Services Utilising 
Electronic Technologies', (Australia, 1997) at <http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/comstand_ctte/online3/
index.htm>, accessed 05 March 2012.
486  'Principles for a Regulatory Framework for On-line Services in the Broadcasting Services Act 1992', (Australia: 
Ministry  for Communications and the Arts  and the Attorney-General, 1997) at <http://web.archive.org/web/
20000226172048/http://www.dcita.gov.au/nsapi-text/?MIval=dca_dispdoc&pathid=/policy/framework.html>, 
accessed 05 March 2012.
487  'Minister's  media release', (1997) at <http://web.archive.org/web/20031124104143/http://www.dcita.gov.au/
Article/0,,0_1-2_1-4_10366,00.html> Accessed 05 March 2012.
488  'A-Gs' media release', (Australia, 1997) at <http://web.archive.org/web/20070608032701/http://www.ag.gov.au/
www/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Alldocs/086E324FF9AA0947CA256B53000F1B19?OpenDocument> Accessed 05 
March 2012.
‘stringent criminal’ stance in relation to online content regulation and this led to a co-regulatory 
compromise.489
In April 1999, the Commonwealth Government  introduced a Bill into Parliament,490  which 
came into effect  in January 2000 and amended the Broadcasting Services Act  (BSA) 1992.491 
The 1999 amendment492 aimed to extend the current  content regulatory framework applied in 
relation to television broadcasting to the Internet. This regulatory approach was subject to 
substantial criticism493 particularly after a similar statute was struck down by the US Supreme 
Court in 1997.494
Amongst other things, the Australian legislation established a voluntary content  filtering scheme 
that was arguably unable to block access to content hosted overseas, be it  illegal or harmful. As 
a result, the Australian Institute published a survey in 2003 showing how easily children could 
access inappropriate material online and this raised public calls for an ISP-level mandatory 
content filtering. The Australian Labor Party opposed a mandatory filtering scheme but this 
approach changed in 2007 when such policy was included in the political programme as part  of 
the election campaign. It was also in 2007 that a new piece of legislation495  amended the 
existing online content regulatory laws to cope with new technological developments (e.g. 
streaming and live content services). The 2007 amendments were introduced by the Howard 
Coalition Government and were passed before the 2007 election with a commencement  date of 
01 Jan 2008.
Although the government was the key online content  regulator in Australia, the Internet industry 
was involved by developing and complying with Codes of Practice (CoP). In fact, a number of 
CoPs were produced, registered and reviewed over time and they generally guided Australian 
online intermediaries to comply with the relevant regulatory legislation so as to avoid the risk of 
legal liability. Domestic laws not only established the regulatory regime of online content in 
relation to the Internet  industry but it also tackled the production and distribution of, and the 
access to child pornography on the Internet by ordinary members of the public. As a result, a 
number of anti-child pornography criminal laws were amended at the Commonwealth, State and 
Territory levels. Generally the Commonwealth criminal laws were applied in relation to inter-
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489 Griffith, G., 'Censorship in Australia: Regulating the Internet and other recent developments', NSW Parliamentary 
Library Research Service, 2002) at <http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au>, accessed 25 September 2011, p 23.
490  'Minister's media release announcing the introduction of the 1999 Bill', (Australia, 1999) at <http://
web.archive.org/web/20020821095852/http://www.dcita.gov.au/Article/0,,0_1-2_1-4_13762,00.html > Accessed 05 
March 2012.
491 Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth Australia).
492 Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act 1999 (Cth Australia).
493  See particularly the work developed by the Australian non-profit  organisation (i) EFA, 'Electronic Frontiers 
Australia', at <http://www.efa.org.au/>, accessed  22 August  2011; and also Graham’s personal website (ii) Graham, I., 
'Libertus.net: about censorship and freedom of expression, in Australia and elsewhere', at <http://libertus.net/>, 
accessed 22 August 2011.
494 See Chapter 3 about US governmental attempts to regulate online material considered inappropriate to minors.
495 Communications Legislation Amendment (Content Services) Act 2007 (Cth Australia).
state offences (e.g. online intermediaries and intentional access), and the relevant State and 
Territory criminal laws were applied in relation to intra-state offences (e.g. mere possession).
Nevertheless, the constitutional position on this was not that  straightforward. The 
Commonwealth did not have general power to regulate in relation to inter-state matters, and the 
States and Territories were not limited to regulating in relation to intra-state matters. Which 
level of government could regulate what, depended on provisions from the Australian 
Constitution, which limited the Commonwealth's powers to regulate to specific matters stated in 
the Constitution, and also depended on how the Australian High Court had interpreted those 
specific powers in the Constitution in cases challenging or disputing the constitutionality of a 
particular piece of legislation.
The Commonwealth did not  have a constitutional head of power enabling them to enact 
criminal offences applicable to the conduct  of ordinary members of the public, in relation to 
activity that did not involve use of a carriage service (except in circumstances, e.g. damage to 
Commonwealth owned property). That was the reason why laws concerning offline child 
pornographic material (possession, production and offline distribution, which were either a part 
of, or contributed to the child pornography online industry) were laws of States and Territories, 
because only they had constitutional power to regulate in that  regard.496  As a result, these 
different  jurisdictional levels defined child pornography, the age of a child, the relevant 
offences, defences and penalties differently.  Australia ratified the 2000 UN Optional Protocol497 
on 08 January 2007 but it was not a signatory of the 2001 CoE’s Cybercrime Convention.498 
Child pornographic content  hosted overseas has been targeted since 2000 via a voluntary 
filtering scheme at  the user-level, following the 1999 and 2007 amendments of the 1992 Act.499 
Nevertheless, another voluntary filtering regime at  the ISP-level was launched by the Internet 
Industry Association in July 2011. This scheme blocked access to overseas website domains 
(not  particular URLs) allegedly containing child pornographic material, it was based on a 
blocklist  created and maintained by Interpol and it was voluntarily employed by a few 
Australian ISPs. The Commonwealth government  has been trying to implement a mandatory 
ISP-level filtering scheme via legislation since 2007, which was expected to target not  only 
child pornography but other material.
1.2 Legislation
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496  See the 'Chapter 6 of the Joint Parliamentary Committee report  on their inquiry into the Cybercrime Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2011', (Australia, 2011) at <http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jscc/cybercrime_bill/report/
chapter6.pdf>, accessed 05 March 2012 for more information about the constitutional situation.
497 UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child  Pornography 2000 (adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by  General Assembly 
resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000, entered into force on 18 January 2002) (United Nations).
498  Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 2001 (opened for signature on 23/11/2001, entered into force on 
01/07/2004, CETS No. 185, Budapest) .
499 Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth Australia).
Australia was a federal country comprised of one federal entity (i.e. the Commonwealth),500 six 
States (i.e. New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and 
Tasmania) and two Territories (i.e. the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory) 
and they all had jurisdiction in relation to anti-child pornography criminal laws. Generally the 
Commonwealth had criminal jurisdiction over inter-state offences, whereas Australian States 
and Territories had criminal jurisdiction over intra-state offences but this was not  so 
straightforward as discussed above. As a result, anti-child pornography criminal laws applied in 
each jurisdiction differed not  only in relation to the definition of child pornography and age of a 
child, but  also in relation to types of child pornographic content, criminal conducts, defences 
and relevant  penalties. It  has been argued that these jurisdictional discrepancies created a 
number of difficulties to law enforcement agencies,501 but  others believe that  these differences 
showed ‘relatively coherence’ in practice.502
Australia regulated both online content  and online intermediaries via legislation, in addition to 
self-regulatory guidelines developed by the Internet industry. The online content  regulatory 
framework in relation to online intermediaries is explored in Section 1.3 below. This section, 
however, addresses Australian anti-child pornography criminal laws, particularly the provisions 
that attempted to limit  access to child pornographic content  available on the Internet  (for 
example possession and intentional access by individuals) as well as legislation that had a 
deterrent effect  on online access (for example regulation of investigatory powers of law 
enforcement bodies), and also the relevant international treaties ratified by Australia.
1.2.1 State-regulation:503 anti-child pornography criminal laws
Generally anti-child pornography criminal laws tackling production and distribution of, and 
access to online child pornography have at  least five elements: (i) the definition of online child 
pornography (i.e. what child pornography is and the age of a child); (ii) the types of child 
pornographic content (i.e. photographs, pseudo-photographs, cartoons, text, audio); (iii) the 
criminal conducts (i.e. production, distribution and access); (iv) the legal defences (i.e. 
exemption from criminal liability); and (v) the relevant  penalties.504 The Commonwealth, States 
and Territories criminal laws addressed each one of these elements differently.
[…] state and territory legislation dealing with internet  content  continues to vary 
enormously. For example, Operation Auxin, a national investigation of those buying child 
pornography via the internet, resulted in arrests and charges being laid across Australia. 
Due to the continuing lack of uniformity across jurisdictions, those arrested were charged 
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500  The words ‘Commonwealth’  and ‘federal’  will be used hereinafter interchangeably to mean the federal  entity of 
the Australian government.
501 See Penfold, C., 'Village Idiot, or Wisest Person in Town?  Internet Content Regulation in Australia', University of 
Ottawa Law and Technology Journal, 3(2) (2006), 333-52.
502  Griffith, G. and Simon, K., 'Child Pornography Law', New South Wales Parliament, 2008) at <http://
www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications/>, accessed 12 July 2010, p 73.
503  See the definition of state regulation developed in Chapter 2. This  definition is not to be confused with the 
legislation enacted by the Australian States.
504 See Section 1 in Chapter 3 about the problem of online child pornography.
under state and territory laws, which included a variety of offences, defences, and 
penalties depending on whereabouts a person was charged. Thus even those in possession 
of the same content, in the same format, of the same quantity, and from the same source 
are still subject in Australia to hugely varying laws.505
This subsection presents an overview of Australian anti-child pornography criminal laws at the 
Commonwealth (within its constitutional remit to regulate broadcasting services); and States 
and Territories levels. Although the five elements abovementioned are generally covered in 
relation to each jurisdictional level, the focus here is placed on criminal provisions relevant  to 
limit access to child pornographic material available on the Internet.
1.2.1.1 Commonwealth anti-child pornography criminal laws
Criminal offences under the Commonwealth jurisdiction were established by the Criminal Code 
Act  1995506 as amended by the Telecommunications Offences and Other Measures Act  2004;507 
these amendments came into effect from March 2005.508  Online child pornography provisions 
were found in Division 273 (offences involving child pornography material or child abuse 
material outside Australia) and Division 474 (telecommunications offences) of the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 as amended. Carriage (also carrier) service provider had the same meaning as in 
the Telecommunications Act  1997 (i.e. a service for carrying communications by means of 
guided and/or unguided electromagnetic energy).509  In addition, Internet content host and 
Internet service provider had the same meaning as in Schedule 5 of the 1992 Act as amended. 
The amended Criminal Code Act 1995 defined what child pornography was, the age of a child, 
types of child pornographic content, criminal conducts, legal defences and relevant penalties at 
the Commonwealth level and were in relation to offences committed via the use of a carriage 
service. Child pornographic material was defined in Section 473.1 of the amended 1995 Act as 
material that: 
(1) depicts a person, or a representation of a person, who is, or appears to be, under 18 
years of age and who: (i) is engaged in, or appears to be engaged in, a sexual pose or 
sexual activity (whether or not  in the presence of other persons); or (ii) is in the presence 
of a person who is engaged in, or appears to be engaged in, a sexual pose or sexual 
activity; or 
(2) the dominant  characteristic of which is the depiction, for a sexual purpose, of: (i) a 
sexual organ or the anal region of a person who is, or appears to be, under 18 years of 
age; or (ii) a representation of such a sexual organ or anal region; or (iii) the breasts, or a 
representation of the breasts, of a female person who is, or appears to be, under 18 years 
of age; or 
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505  Penfold, C., 'Village Idiot, or Wisest Person in Town?  Internet  Content  Regulation in Australia', University of 
Ottawa Law and Technology Journal, 3(2) (2006), 333-52, p 345.
506 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth Australia).
507  Crimes Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Offences and Other Measures) Act  (No. 2) 2004 (Cth 
Australia).
508  The Customs Act 1901 (Cth Australia) targets the importation and exportation of child  pornographic content in 
relation to e.g. print publications, DVDs, video tapes and content stored on physical goods such as computer disks 
and laptops. It does not target the importation or exportation of digital data by means of telecom networks.
509 Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth Australia).
(3) describes a person who is, or is implied to be, under 18 years of age and who: (i) is 
engaged in, or is implied to be engaged in, a sexual pose or sexual activity (whether or 
not in the presence of other persons); or (ii) is in the presence of a person who is engaged 
in, or is implied to be engaged in, a sexual pose or sexual activity; or 
(4) describes: (i) a sexual organ or the anal region of a person who is, or is implied to be, 
under 18 years of age; or (ii) the breasts of a female person who is, or is implied to be, 
under 18 years of age.
Child pornographic content covered thus both visual and textual materials under the 
Commonwealth criminal law.510  Provisions in relation to child pornography were found in the 
Division 474 about  telecommunications offences of the amended 1995 Act, and relied on 
Section 51(v) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution about  the broadcasting power of 
the Commonwealth to legislate in this regard.511  Its Subdivision D targeted offences related to 
using a carriage service for child pornography material, and its Subdivision E addressed 
offences related to the obligations of Internet  service providers and Internet content  hosts in 
relation to this. The amended 1995 Act  distinguished between child pornographic content and 
child abuse material (i.e. material depicting a person under 18 as a victim of torture, cruelty or 
physical abuse), and criminalised online grooming (i.e. to procure or groom under-aged 
persons). 
The amended 1995 Act criminalised in Section 474.19 to access (i.e. to access or solicit) or 
distribute (i.e. to cause material to be transmitted to him/herself, transmit, make available, 
publish, distribute, advertise or promote) child pornography material using a carriage service. In 
addition, Section 474.20 made it  an offence to possess (i.e. to possess or control), distribute (i.e. 
to produce or supply) or access (i.e. to obtain) child pornography material with the intention that 
the material be used using a carriage service. Note that  the offences above were in relation to 
the use of a carriage service and that was the reason why they are under the Commonwealth 
jurisdiction. In addition, Section 474.21 established a number or defences in relation to child 
pornographic material (e.g. if the conduct  is of public benefit, if the person was conducting his/
her duties as law enforcement officer, or if the person engaged in the conduct  in good faith). 
Online content filter companies were exempt from criminal liability in relation to online child 
pornographic content according to Section 474.21(4)(b).
There were provisions in relation to child pornography offences committed outside Australia by 
Australian nationals or residents; these provisions were found in Section 273.5. They made a 
criminal offence to produce, distribute or possess child pornographic material outside Australia 
and attached a penalty of 15 years imprisonment. These were to prevent Australian nationals or 
residents going overseas to engage in such criminal activities aiming to evade criminal 
prosecution in Australia.
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www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications/>, accessed 12 July 2010, p 24.
511 Commonweatlh of Australia Constitution Act 2003 as amended (Australia).
1.2.1.2 Australian States and Territories anti-child pornography criminal laws
Commonwealth criminal laws in relation to online child pornography covered offences 
committed via carriage services and they were explored above. The reach of both State and 
Territory criminal laws was much broader512 and therefore most offences related to offline child 
pornographic content  (e.g. production and possession of child pornography for commercial or 
non-commercial purposes) were under their criminal jurisdiction.
Australian States and Territories established their own substantive criminal law and had 
different  provisions about  what child pornography was, the age of a child, types of child 
pornographic content, criminal conducts and relevant penalties. For example, child 
pornographic content  could be defined as child pornography, child exploitation material or child 
abuse material depending on the jurisdiction.513  The mere possession offence was subject  to 
varying penalties depending on the State or Territory where the offence was committed, despite 
the fact  that  intentional access to child pornography via a carriage service was punished 
uniformly under Commonwealth criminal law.514  In addition, the States and Territories anti-
child pornography laws covered not  only photographs and pseudo-photographs but  drawings, 
cartoons, written texts and spoken words.
Similarly, in some jurisdictions the age of a child in relation to child pornographic content was 
of a person under 16 (e.g. New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and Western 
Australia), whereas in other jurisdictions the age of a child was of a person under 18, which was 
in line with the 2000 UN Optional Protocol.515  The age of 16 was the age of consent in most 
States and Territories. In a number of them, where the age in relation to child pornographic 
material was 18 years, the situation existed where 16 and 17 year olds were lawfully permitted 
to engage in sexual activity but if they took a photograph of themselves (whether or not sexually 
explicit), they could be convicted of a criminal offence and put on a sex offenders’ register.
It  was unclear whether these differences had any relevant implications, for example ‘forum 
shopping,’ but it may be the case that such legal uniformity led to complications in terms of 
nation-wide or international police operations and varying levels of deterrence to potential 
offenders. In addition, the sense of fairness may an issue here because the same offence may be 
subject to different definitions and penalties depending where the offence was committed in 
Australia. Yet, in terms of the regulation of access to child pornographic content it seemed 
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Ottawa Law and Technology Journal, 3(2) (2006), 333-52, p 351.
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unlikely that offenders would move around Australian States and Territories in order to avoid 
higher punishment if caught.
1.2.1.3 Law enforcement investigatory powers
Regulation of law enforcement investigatory powers, particularly in relation to online content 
criminal offences, addressed the collection of criminal evidence, the identification of alleged 
offenders and the cooperation of online intermediaries with the law enforcement  bodies for 
purposes of criminal investigation. Although these provisions did not target individuals directly, 
but rather indirectly via online intermediaries, it is important  to address them here because they 
may have a deterrent effect in limiting access to child pornography available on the Internet. In 
Australia, the legal framework for the interception of communication at  the Commonwealth 
level was established by the Interception and Access Act  1979516 and the Telecommunications 
Act  1997,517  both amended by the Interception and Access Amendment  Act  2007;518  and the 
Surveillance Devices Act 2004.519
The Interception and Access Act 1979 made it  an offence for a person to intercept a 
communication passing over a telecommunication service or to access stored communications 
without  a relevant warrant. It regulated the issuing of warrants and established an oversight 
scheme to protect  against unlawful interceptions. The Surveillance Devices Act 2004 regulated 
the use of surveillance devices such as. computer-based surveillance, listening devices, optical 
and tracking devices.520  These two Acts were within the portfolio responsibilities of the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General and it  applied to carriage service providers, which included 
Internet access service providers, according to Section 87.521
Section 313 of the amended 1997 Act  established that  service providers were required to do 
their best to prevent their networks being used for the commission of offences and to help the 
Australian police forces enforcing the criminal law. As a result, it has been advocated by the 
Internet Industry Association as the legal basis for the voluntary ISP-level filtering scheme 
targeting overseas child pornographic website domains in 2011. Nevertheless, this claim is 
debatable and is discussed later in this chapter.
Part  13 of the amended 1997 Act  imposed an obligation on carriage service providers to protect 
the privacy and confidentiality of communications and information about the affairs and 
personal particulars of persons, except when an exemption specified in Part  13 was applicable. 
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Exemptions included the disclosure of information to law enforcement agencies under the 
conditions and circumstances specified in the amended 1997 Act. It set out  several means by 
which law enforcement agencies were authorised to obtain information from carriage service 
providers such as: (i) interception warrants (e.g. to listen to or require recording of the content 
of real time communications); (ii) stored communications warrants (for example, to access or 
obtain copies of the content of stored communications such as email messages stored on an 
ISP's server); (iii) ‘authorised requests’522 to obtain information about a particular customer (e.g. 
name and address of a person who was using a particular IP address at  a particular time); and 
(iv) to obtain information about (excluding the content  or substance of) a communication such 
as source, path, and destination.
A number of police operations took place in Australia. The Australian Federal Police and State 
police forces launched Operation Auxin in 2004 and were able to arrest and charge 191 
Australians in relation to child pornography offences. Following the 2004 amendments,523 
Operation Centurion was launched in June 2008, via cooperation with Interpol, and resulted in 
136 people arrested in Australia for accessing child pornography available on the Internet.524 
There was a memoranda of understanding negotiated between the Australian Communications 
and Media Authority (ACMA) and Australian police forces regulating the notification and 
investigation of child pornographic content  hosted in Australia (thus involving the Australian 
content service providers and hosting service providers). This memoranda established the roles 
and responsibilities of both governmental bodies in this regard in addition to knowledge sharing 
and training events.525
1.2.2 Multi-state regulation: the international treaties
Australia had anti-child pornography laws not only domestically but  it  was a signatory of the 
2000 UN Optional Protocol.526 This multi-state regulatory instrument established a definition of 
child pornography in Article 2 and suggested that  signatories should criminalise a number of 
conducts in relation to child pornographic content (such as production, distribution and 
possession). It  also established a number of provisions to protect children against  sexual 
exploitation. Australia signed the 2000 UN Optional Protocol on 18 December 2001 and ratified 
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522  Authorised requests  are not permitted to be used to obtain information about the content or substance of a 
communication; a warrant is required for disclosure of content of communications.
523  Crimes Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Offences and Other Measures) Act  (No. 2) 2004 (Cth 
Australia).
524  See 'Proposed Reforms to Commonwealth Child Sex-Related Offences', (Attorney-General's Department, 
Australian Government, 2009) at <http://www.ag.gov.au> Accessed 25 September 2011, p 55; and also 'AFP 
successfully combats child sex exploitation', Platypus Magazine,  (2009) at <http://www.afp.gov.au/~/media/afp/pdf/
1/11-child-protection.ashx> accessed 07 March 2012.
525  See ACMA, 'ACMA hotline – Frequently asked questions: 25. What is the relationship between the ACMA and 
law enforcement?', (updated 02 September 2011) at <http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/
pc=PC_310147#25>.
526 UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child  Pornography 2000 (adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by  General Assembly 
resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000, entered into force on 18 January 2002) (United Nations).
it  on 08 January 2007. The 2001 CoE’s Cybercrime Convention527  established a number of 
provisions in relation to substantive and procedural criminal law to facilitate international police 
cooperation mainly within Europe, but  Australia was not  a signatory of this international 
instrument.
1.3 Regulatory policies
The preceding section explored the Australian anti-child pornography criminal laws, particularly 
those designed to limit  access to child pornographic content  available on the Internet  in relation 
to individuals who produce, distribute or access child pornography. Against  this background, 
this section addresses the online content regulatory model established by Commonwealth 
legislation in partnership with the Internet industry to target child pornographic content 
available on the Internet whether hosted in Australia or overseas. Although the anti-child 
pornography criminal laws discussed above were established at different jurisdictional levels 
(i.e. by the Commonwealth, States and Territories), the Australian content  regulation scheme 
was established by Commonwealth legislation and enforced, to a large extent, uniformly across 
the country. The reason for this was because the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 
limited Commonwealth powers to enact laws in this regard.
The regulation of online material in Australia targeted a number of issues: (i) it addressed both 
material considered inappropriate to minors and illegal material such as child pornography; (ii) 
although the Internet  industry played a role via self-regulatory practices, the framework was 
centred in the government regulator and involved substantial regulatory bureaucracy (i.e. 
legislation and administrative regulation); (iii) there was a federal statutory regulator forcing 
online intermediaries to remove the relevant  content  hosted in Australia; (iv) the relevant 
content hosted overseas was addressed via a voluntary filtering scheme at  the user-level, but 
there was a voluntary ISP-level scheme in operation since 2011 supported by the IIA, and the 
government has been trying since 2007 to implement a mandatory ISP-level filtering system via 
legislation based on its own blocklist.
Although this case study was about  child pornography, this section explores the overall online 
content regulatory scheme because it was within this framework that the access to online child 
pornography has been targeted in Australia.
1.3.1 Online content regulation in Australia: the Commonwealth legislation
The regulation of content  involving television broadcasting in Australia was established by the 
Broadcasting Services Act 1992,528 until 01 January 2000, when amendments established by the 
Services Act 1999529  commenced. The basis of such amendments was a government decision 
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527  Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 2001 (opened for signature on 23/11/2001, entered into force on 
01/07/2004, CETS No. 185, Budapest) .
528 Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth Australia).
529 Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act 1999 (Cth Australia).
that online content  should be regulated like content transmitted by television subscription 
broadcasting and narrowcasting services, not  like offline material such as print  publications, 
films and videos.530  As a result, the 1999 Act  extended the laws applied to traditional media 
towards the content  available online taking into account the classification system as applied to 
the television broadcasting industry.531  The regulatory scheme was amended again by the 
Content  Services Act 2007532  so as to cover new technological developments, e.g. online live 
streaming and linking services available in Australia. All these regulatory developments are 
explored below.
1.3.1.1 The amendments in 1999
In April 1999, the Commonwealth Government  introduced a Bill into Parliament,533  which 
came into effect  in January 2000 and amended the Broadcasting Services Act  (BSA) 1992.534 
The 1999 amendments came into force via the Online Services Act 1999535 and aimed generally 
to extend the current content regulatory framework applied in relation to television broadcasting 
to the Internet  and established a co-regulatory approach toward the content  available online. The 
1999 Act aimed to: (i) implement  a complaint mechanism; (ii) implement a take-down notice 
scheme in relation to online content  defined as ‘prohibited content’ which includes material that 
is lawfully available to adults in offline videos and print  publications; and (iii) restrict  access to 
other types of content unsuitable for children and young people.
Generally the 1999 amendments established a complaint-based mechanism operated by a 
federal statutory regulator (i.e. the Australian Broadcasting Authority - ABA), placed a few 
regulatory responsibilities on the Australian Internet  industry by the means of Internet industry 
Codes of Practice (CoP) and industry standards, and established a number of public awareness 
policies. Bodies and associations representing the Australian Internet industry were implicitly 
compelled to develop CoPs and ABA had a reserve power to impose an industry standard, if no 
CoP was developed, or if the CoP was judged deficient. These CoPs were to be registered by the 
ABA before coming into force.
The ABA was made responsible for the operation of the complaints hotline in relation to 
prohibited or potential prohibited content available on the Internet, for the international liaisons 
and for ensuing the compliance of Australian online intermediaries with the relevant legislative 
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530 See the explanatory memorandum at 'Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Bill 1999: Explanatory 
Memorandum', The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia: The Senate, 1999) at  <http://
www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2004B00465/Explanatory%20Memorandum/Text>, accessed 05 March 2012.
531 See Penfold, C., 'Village Idiot, or Wisest Person in Town?  Internet Content Regulation in Australia', University of 
Ottawa Law and Technology Journal, 3(2) (2006), 333-52, p  338. See also Alston, R., 'The Government's Regulatory 
Framework for Internet Content', University of New South Wales Law Journal, 23(1) (2000), 192-97.
532 Communications Legislation Amendment (Content Services) Act 2007 (Cth Australia).
533 The original bill required the Australian ISPs to  block access  to prohibited content available on overseas websites 
using ISP-level  filtering, but this provision was later removed from the bill because of wide criticism and was 
replaced by a user-level voluntary filtering scheme. See Graham, I., 'The Net Censorship Dilemma: Liberty or 
Tyranny', (updated 06 June 2009) at <http://libertus.net/liberty/>, accessed 01 September 2011.
534 Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth Australia).
535 Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act 1999 (Cth Australia).
provisions. The definition of prohibited content covered RC (Refused Classification) and X18+ 
rated content as well as the R18+ rated content  not  subject to a Restricted Access System 
(RAS). Generally, ABA was responsible for investigating and assessing these complaints made 
by members of the public and, if applicable, for issuing interim or final take-down notices to the 
relevant Australian Internet  content  host so the material could be removed. If the prohibited or 
potential prohibited content was hosted overseas, an Australian police force was contacted (if 
the content was of serious nature, e.g. child pornography) and content  filter vendors were 
notified, so ISPs could deal with the issue according to the relevant CoP or industry standard 
provisions (i.e. the ISPs would inform its customers about the availability of such filters).
1.3.1.2 The amendments in 2007
Online content regulatory legislation was amended again in 2007 by the Content  Services Act 
2007.536  This not  only amended Schedule 5 but included Schedule 7 in the already amended 
BSA 1992. Generally the 2007 amendments extended the categories of prohibited and potential 
prohibited content (i.e. including the RC and X18+ rated content as well as the R18+ and 
MA15+ rated content537 not subject  to a Restricted Access System (RAS);538  for the relevant 
prohibited content  hosted in Australia, it established the take-down, service-cessation and the 
link-deletion notices in relation to a hosting, live content  and links service, respectively; it 
established the concept of an ‘Australian connection’ so as to cover content  hosted in Australia 
and content  provided from Australia, as in the case of a live content  service; and it established 
the requirements for future industry CoPs and standards in relation to content service and 
hosting service providers.
In addition, the 2007 amendments altered the existing prohibited category to include the 
commercial MA15+ rated content not  subject to a Restricted Access System; and the overseas-
hosted content that was or 'could be' classified R18+ (enabling the ACMA - which replaced the 
Commonwealth regulator ABA - to add such content  to its blocklist). This gave ACMA a new 
power to issue 'interim' take-down notices in relation to Australian-hosted suspected R18+ rated 
content, on the basis of its guess as to the likely classification of such material.539
1.3.1.3 The National Classification Scheme: the online content targeted
The Australian regulator targeted online content according to a National Classification Scheme 
as applied to the film industry that  covers a range of content  categories. For example, child 
pornographic content  was rated as Refused Classification (RC) and was included in the list  of 
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536 Communications Legislation Amendment (Content Services) Act 2007 (Cth Australia).
537 These categories will be explained in Section 4.1.3 below.
538 The RAS involves a number of administrative procedures to be implemented by online intermediaries in order to 
limit  access to material  considered inappropriate to minors. See Restricted Access  Systems Declaration (2007). 
Australian Communications and Media Authority, ACMA . See also ACMA, 'Restricted  Access Systems Declaration 
2007 - Explanatory Statement', (Australian Communications and Media Authority, 2007) at <http://
www.comlaw.gov.au/> Accessed 22 August 2011.
539  Previously, ACMA was required to have a suspected R18+ rated content classified by the relevant classification 
body before issuing any type of take-down notice.
prohibited material, but  other types of content  (e.g. involving sex, nudity or violence) could also 
be rated prohibited and thus included in the ACMA blocklist.
The Australian National Classification Scheme was established by the Commonwealth 
Classification Act 1995540  and comprised the Classification Board (the independent  body for 
classification),541  Classification Review Board (the review agency), National Classification 
Code and the Classification Guidelines.542  The content classification was implemented 
uniformly by the Classification Board, but restrictions on display and distribution (e.g. public 
exhibition, sale and advertisement of films) were enforced by the relevant State or Territory.543
The reason that a National Classification Scheme existed was because in 1995 the 
Commonwealth, with the agreement of all States and Territories, used its constitutional power 
under Section 122 of the Constitution to regulate. As a result, all States and Territories each 
enacted legislation giving effect in their jurisdictions to decisions of Classification Boards and 
various other parts of the Commonwealth Act and enacted related classification and censorship 
enforcement provisions, e.g. offences for exhibiting or distributing unclassified films and so 
forth. The enforcement  legislation was intended to be uniform nationwide, but in reality it was 
not, because various States and Territories’ legislation had different  rules, offences and 
penalties, and also one or more retained the right  to apply, in their own jurisdiction, a different 
classification decision to, for example, a film than that  made by the Commonwealth 
Classification Board.544
The material available online was classified according to categories applied to the film 
industry545  and included: G-General; PG-Parental Guidance; M-Mature; MA15+-Mature 
Accompanied; R18+-Restricted; X18+; and RC-Refused Classification).546  These categories 
were applied according to classifiable elements of sex, nudity, violence, language and drug use 
and themes. For example, the MA15+ material involved content unsuitable for under-15s but it 
was lawfully screened in free air television. The R18+ material involved content unsuitable for 
under-18s. The X18+ material involved non-violent  sexually explicit  material depicting 
consenting adults.
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541 Formerly named the Federal Office of Film and Literature Classification.
542  See generally the 'Classification Website, Australian  Commonwealth Government', at <http://
www.classification.gov.au/>, accessed 07 September 2011.
543  Penfold, C., 'Village Idiot, or Wisest Person in Town?  Internet  Content  Regulation in Australia', University of 
Ottawa Law and Technology Journal, 3(2) (2006), 333-52, p 337.
544  See Agreement between [Commonwealth, States & Territories] relating to a revised co-operative legislative 
scheme for censorship  in Australia (1995). at <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/
(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF)~30000 in t e rgove rnmen ta l+ag reemen t . pd f /$ f i l e /
30000intergovernmental+agreement.pdf> accessed 06 March 2012.
545  Except for the ‘eligible electronic publication’  (i.e. digital content  that is  also available offline as print material), 
which follows the rules  applied to the print publications. See Clause 11, Schedule 7, Broadcasting Services Act 1992 
(Cth Australia).
546  See Clause 7, Division 1 of the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth 
Australia).
According to the 2008 Guidelines for Classification, Refused Classification (RC) material 
involved (i) detailed instruction or promotion in crime, violence or drug use; (ii) the promotion 
or provision of instruction in paedophilic activity, offensive descriptions of depictions of 
children; (iii) gratuitous and exploitative depictions of violence or sexual violence; and (iv) 
bestiality and material the advocates the doing of a terrorist act.547  Nevertheless, the 2005 
National Classification Code arguably gave wider scope to RC material and defined such 
material as publications that:
(a)  depict, express or otherwise deal with matters of sex, drug misuse or addiction, crime, 
cruelty, violence or revolting or abhorrent phenomena in such a way that  they offend 
against the standards of morality, decency and propriety generally accepted by reasonable 
adults to the extent that they should not be classified; or
(b) describe or depict  in a way that is likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult, a 
person who is, or appears to be, a child under 18 (whether the person is engaged in sexual 
activity or not); or
(c)  promote, incite or instruct in matters of crime or violence.548
In short, both RC and X18+ rated materials were included in the list  of prohibited or potential 
prohibited content.549  The R18+ and the commercial MA15+ materials might also have been 
rated prohibited or potential prohibited, unless they were subject to age verification and a 
Restricted Access Systems (RAS). There were two situations where the MA15+ material might 
have been rated prohibited or potential prohibited: (i) if commercial video or audio content  and 
not subject  to RAS; (ii) if provided by mobile premium services and not  subject to RAS.550 
Prohibited content  was the material classified as such by the Classification Board. Potential 
prohibited content was the material not rated yet as such but likely to be so if classified. Content 
rated prohibited or potential prohibited was included in the ACMA Blocklist and the relevant 
online intermediary notified according to the notification scheme. Child pornography was rated 
Refused Classification and targeted by the Australian regulator as prohibited or potential 
prohibited material.
The regulatory scheme applied to the online environment was perhaps more restrictive than the 
scheme applied to print  publications and offline films and videos. For example, most types of 
RC rated materials (child pornography excluded) were legal to access and possess in most parts 
of Australia; X18+ rated material was lawfully sold by shops in the Australian Capital Territory 
to adults and it was lawful for adults to obtain it by mail order in all Australian States and 
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the Classification Board.
548  National Classification Code 2005 (Cth Australia). See also Graham, I., 'Outline of "RC" material', at <http://
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'Detailed information and examples of "RC" material', at <http://libertus.net/censor/isp-blocking/au-govplan-
refusedclassif.html#RCexamples>, accessed 06 March.
549 See Clauses 20 and 21, Schedule 7, Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth Australia) as amended.
550 This does not apply to MA15+ content  that  consists  solely of text and/or static images, whether or not  that  type of 
MA15+ content is commercial. See Clause 2, Schedule 7 of the BSA 1992 as amended.
Territories (except in 'prescribed areas' of the Northern Territory).551 It may be also the case that 
the regulatory scheme applied to print publications and offline films and videos (where the 
classifiers are named and the list of prohibited material known) was more transparent  and 
accountable than the online regulatory scheme (in this case, the ACMA list of prohibited 
websites was exempt from disclosure and the classifiers were not named).552
1.3.1.4 The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA)
The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA)553 was the latest  incarnation of 
what used to be the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA). In short, the ACMA was the 
Commonwealth statutory agency regulating the broadcasting, telecommunications, radio-
frequency spectrum management and online content, including both Internet and mobile phone 
content in Australia in accordance with Schedules 5 and 7 of the BSA 1992 as amended. 
Generally it  was responsible for investigating complaints about  the online content, encouraging 
and regulating the Internet  industry self-regulation scheme, developing public awareness 
policies and international liaisons in the field.
The amended BSA 1992 established a regulatory model that involved both state-regulation and 
Internet industry self-regulatory practices; and the ACMA played a central role within this 
regulatory scheme. In fact, ACMA had a number of powers to make Australian online 
intermediaries come into line in relation to the content these intermediaries hosted or made 
available. Generally bodies and associations representing the Internet industry in Australia554 
were encouraged to develop CoPs which were to be registered by the ACMA. The compliance 
with a CoP  was voluntary on the part  of online intermediaries, but  the ACMA could force them 
to comply with the CoP if necessary. In addition, the ACMA could impose an industry standard 
if the CoP was considered deficient, whether partially or totally, and after that the relevant 
industry standard would be mandatory.555
In addition, the ACMA operated an Internet  hotline556 that  received complaints from Australian 
residents about alleged prohibited content. These complaints were usually submitted via the 
online form (or alternatively via electronic mail, fax or mail) and could be made anonymously. 
The content reported was investigated and assessed according to the National Classification 
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551  Graham, I., 'Australia's Internet Censorship System', (updated 11 April 2010) at  <http://libertus.net/censor/
netcensor.html>, accessed 01 September 2011.
552  Bambauer, D., 'Filtering in Oz: Australia's Foray into Internet Censorship', Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies 
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554  See for example the IIA, 'Internet Industry Association: policy, advocacy and representation for Australian 
business', at <http://www.iia.net.au/>, accessed 22 August 2011.
555 See Clause 52, Schedule 5, Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth Australia) as amended.
556  ACMA, 'The ACMA Hotline: combating child sexual abuse', at <http://www.acma.gov.au/hotline>, accessed 01 
September 2011.
Scheme guidelines explored above, and if applicable, it might have been labelled prohibited (if 
already classified by the Classification Board) or potential prohibited (if not yet  classified but 
likely to be prohibited if properly classified by the Classification Board). 
The ACMA hotline did not  cover all types of online platforms. It was within its remit to tackle 
publicly available websites and newsgroups hosted in Australia or abroad; it did not investigate 
electronic mail messages, instant messaging systems or P2P networks, which were a matter of 
police investigation. Although the hotline was not  required to actively search or monitor the 
online content, proactive monitoring could be performed.557 In addition, the ACMA hotline was 
a member of the INHOPE Association558 and it was able to notify partner hotlines in relation to 
alleged child pornographic websites hosted overseas. 
1.3.2 Mechanics
The Commonwealth government  implemented a complaint-based mechanism that addressed 
both material considered inappropriate to minors and illegal material, e.g. child pornography. It 
targeted prohibited and potential prohibited material hosted in Australia via notification to the 
Australian Internet  content service and hosting service providers as well as to an Australian 
police force in the case of more serious offences, for example child pornography; and it  targeted 
the relevant  material hosted overseas via notification to the ‘accredited’ filter vendors in a 
partnership with the Australian ISPs (i.e. under the voluntary user-level filtering scheme).
According to the amended BSA 1992,559 an Internet service provider was a person that  supplied 
or proposed to supply an Internet  carriage service to the public (Clause 8 of Schedule 5). An 
Internet content host  is a person who hosts or proposes to host Internet  content  in Australia 
(Clause 3 of Schedule 5). There were different definitions of ‘content  service’ and ‘content 
service provider,’ that were relevant to the regulation of online content supplied by a content 
provider, in Schedule 7 of the amended 1992 Act.
Generally Australian content service and hosting service providers were subject  to three notices 
in relation to material hosted in Australia (i.e. link-deletion, service-cessation or take-down 
notices). On the other hand, ISPs were subject  to rules established via the relevant CoP in 
relation to material hosted overseas but accessible in Australia. In this case, the ACMA included 
the URL in its blocklist and notified the ‘accredited’ filter vendors; the Australian ISPs were 
required to inform their customers about  the availability of such filters. The following 
subsections explores the overall mechanics of the scheme.
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1.3.2.1 Protecting children from exposure to online inappropriate content
The protection of minors against inappropriate content involved content categorised or likely to 
be categorised as MA15+, R18+ or X18+. The Australian online intermediaries (i.e. content 
service and hosting service providers of adult  content) were required to implement age 
verification and restricted access systems before making MA15+ and R18+ available online; 
X18+ content  was rated prohibited or potential prohibited and thus subject to NTD, whether or 
not it has been subject to a RAS.
The implementation of a RAS was under the Restricted Access Systems Declaration 2007,560 
which established the rules (e.g. access application procedures, proof of age, risk analysis, 
warning provisions and preserving records of age verification) for making age restricted content 
(i.e. legal adult  content, not child pornography) available by the relevant online intermediaries 
in Australia so as to prevent indiscriminate access to age restricted material.
Non-compliant  online intermediaries were subject to ACMA notices (i.e. take-down, link-
deletion or service-cessation notices, or the decision to apply for classification) and there were 
heavy fees for non-compliance. If the material considered inappropriate was hosted overseas, 
the relevant  URL was included in the ACMA blocklist, the ‘accredited’ filter vendors were 
notified, and the ISPs are required to inform their customers about the availability of these 
‘accredited’ filtering software. Nevertheless, this voluntary user-level filtering strategy has been 
considered ineffective to block access to age restricted content hosted overseas:
It  must  be noted that compliance with both take-down notices and content  referrals may 
have no impact  at all on the accessibility to internet  users of the content  in question. 
Australian-hosted content  can simply be removed to overseas hosts, and overseas-hosted 
content can be accessed simply by not using a content filter. Further, while specific 
notified sites may be blocked by filter products, it  is likely that the same or substantially 
the same content would be accessible from other overseas sites.561
1.3.2.2 Online child pornography hosted in Australia
Child pornographic material was rated RC and labelled prohibited or potential prohibited 
content. Whenever there was a complaint about  alleged child pornographic material hosted in 
Australia, a notice (i.e. take-down, link-deletion or service-cessation notice) was issued by the 
ACMA to the relevant Australian content  service provider or hosting service provider, and an 
Australian police force was also notified. Complaints about child pornographic content could 
also be made directly by a member of the public or by the police to the relevant Australian 
online intermediary. There was a memoranda of understanding negotiated between the ACMA 
and the Australian police that established a protocol for police notification and content  take-
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down so as not  to compromise criminal investigation (for example, ACMA’s investigation was 
suspended whilst the police investigation takes place).562  After the notice was issued by the 
ACMA, the online intermediary was expected to take down the material reported by 6 pm on 
the next  business day, according to Schedule 7 of the amended BSA 1992. Failure to do so was 
a criminal offence and would lead to heavy fees. 
1.3.2.3 Online child pornography hosted overseas
Australian Internet content  service and hosting service providers were the online intermediaries 
based in the country and had the ability to host content  in Australia or provide the content from 
Australia (e.g. live content  services). As a result, they were easily targeted by the national 
regulator because their operation and assets were grounded in the country. On the other hand, 
regulation of access to child pornographic content hosted overseas but accessible in Australia 
was more problematic.
The ACMA dealt  with child pornographic content hosted overseas in accordance with rules 
established by the registered CoP or by the determined industry standard if applicable (see 
Clause 40(1)(b), Schedule 5 of the BSA 1992 as amended).563 The relevant rules were in this 
case under the 2005 CoP.564
Generally the ACMA included the relevant  URL into its blocklist  (of prohibited and potential 
prohibited content) and notified the developers of Internet  Industry Association ‘accredited’ 
family-friendly filters so they could include the URL allegedly containing child pornographic 
content in their products. The ISPs were then required by the CoP to inform about the 
availability of these products to their customers, who could voluntary decide whether to use the 
online content  filter or not. As a result, if the customer was not using any filtering system 
provided by the ISP, s/he could still access the URLs notified.565 Under this user-level voluntary 
filtering scheme, neither were the ISPs nor were the customers required by law to use the filters. 
In addition, a few Australian ISPs offered filtered online access, to any user anywhere in the 
country, by the means of different filtering technologies (e.g. ISP-level filtering, dynamic 
analysis and blocking of peer-to-peer networks). Nevertheless, it  was up to the Australian 
customer to contract these services or not.
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In addition to this, a member of an Australian police force566 was notified, according to Clause 
40(1)(a), Schedule 5 of the amended BSA 1992. The ACMA hotline was a member of the 
INHOPE Association567 and it could therefore forward these overseas URLs to partner hotlines, 
if any, where the content was hosted. 
More recently, the Australian Internet Industry Association (IIA), in partnership with the 
Australian Federal Police and Interpol, implemented an ISP-level voluntary filtering scheme to 
block access to website domains allegedly containing child pornographic material. According to 
the IIA, two major Australian ISPs were implementing the Interpol blocklist and others were 
expected to follow suit covering around 80% of the Australian Internet. In addition, there were 
government plans to implement an ISP-level mandatory filtering scheme via legislation to block 
access not only to child pornography but  the entire range of RC rated content. Yet, this plan has 
been delayed and it faced substantial criticism. These latest  filtering developments are explained 
below.
1.3.3 Regulatory tools: the ACMA notices and the online content filtering scheme
The ACMA hotline notified Australian online intermediaries (i.e. content services - live and 
stored - and hosting services providers) via three different  notices in relation to prohibited or 
potential prohibited content hosted in Australia: the take-down, service-cessation or link-
deletion notices. On the other hand, the relevant content  hosted overseas was targeted via the 
filtering scheme involving Australian ISPs and accredited filter vendors; the voluntarily filtering 
scheme was employed at the user-level. There were plans from the government to make the 
scheme mandatory and employed at the ISP-level, to enact it  via legislation and to target the 
entire scope of RC rated material, but this development has been delayed and subject  to 
substantial criticism. More recently, the problem of overseas child pornographic websites has 
taken the lead in this regard: a few of Australian ISPs, with the support  of the IIA, started to 
voluntarily block access to alleged child pornographic material hosted overseas using the 
Interpol blocklist.
1.3.3.1 Notice scheme
After a report was made, the ACMA would issue a take-down, a link-deletion or a service-
cessation notice to the relevant  Australian content service or hosting service provider in relation 
to prohibited or potential prohibited content  hosted in Australia. The relevant  law enforcement 
agency was also contacted in the case of child pornographic content following the terms of a 
memoranda of understanding.568  There were high fees for non-compliance and generally the 
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566 There are various separate police forces in Australia.
567  See INHOPE, 'International  Association of Internet Hotlines', at <https://www.inhope.org/>, accessed 28 March 
2010.
568  ACMA, 'ACMA hotline – Frequently asked questions: 25. What  is the relationship between the ACMA and law 
enforcement?', (updated 02 September 2011) at <http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_310147#25>.
online intermediary complied with the notice in accordance with the 2008 CoP.569  This 
investigation did not find any event of a content/hosting service provider challenging the 
ACMA notices in court, particularly if child pornographic material was involved. In fact, the 
burden of challenging these notices in courts outweighed the cheap automatic compliance on the 
part of the company.
It  has been argued elsewhere that the content  provider could host the material overseas and 
arguably avoid the Australian regulator in relation to adult pornography.570  It  seems however 
that in the case of child pornography, if the content provider was an Australian resident 
distributing child pornography, s/he was significantly less likely to be able to avoid the police. 
The complications arise when the child pornographic material was hosted overseas (but 
accessible in Australia) and the provider of such content  was outside the reach of Australian 
authorities.
1.3.3.2 Filtering scheme
a) The voluntary regime at the user-level for overseas content
The voluntary online content filtering scheme was established by the Broadcasting Services Act 
1992 as amended. The amended 1992 legislation established the overall filtering scheme and the 
relevant Internet industry CoPs established the operational details.
After a report was made and the investigation was carried on, the ACMA hotline updated its 
own blocklist  and notified the prohibited or potential prohibited overseas URL to the 
‘accredited’ filter vendors571  so they updated their own blocklist. The ACMA notifications were 
issued on a weekly basis via electronic mail. The content  of such notifications (i.e. the ACMA 
blocklist) was exempted from disclosure according to the amended FOI Act  1982572  but  it 
seemed that the procedures for its distribution to and use by filter vendors needed to be more 
secure; as demonstrated by the ACMA blocklist  being leaked on the Internet in 2009.573  The 
blocklist  maintained by the ‘accredited’ filter vendors contained not only the overseas URLs 
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569  IIA, 'Content Services Code for Industry Co-Regulation in the Area of Content  Services (Pursuant to the 
Requirements of Schedule 7 of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 as amended). Registration Version 1.0 - Current 
and in Force. As approved by Australian Communications  and Media Authority  on 10 July 2008', (Internet  Industry 
Association, 2008) at <http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/aba/contentreg/codes/internet/documents/
content_services_code_2008.pdf> Accessed 07 September 2011.
570  See for example Taggart, S., 'Down Under Smut Goes Up Over ', Wired Magazine, 02 February 2000, sec. 
Politics : Law at <http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2000/02/34043>, accessed 22 August 2011.
571  The filter vendors are accredited by the Internet Industry Association which has  a list of ‘family-friendly  filters’ 
available on its webpage. See IIA, 'Internet Industry Association: policy, advocacy and representation for Australian 
business', at <http://www.iia.net.au/>, accessed 22 August 2011.
572 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth Australia).
573  See for example Bingemann, M., 'ACMA blacklist leaked on the internet', The Australian, 19 March 2009, sec. 
Australian IT at <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/acma-blacklist-leaked-on-the-internet/story-
e6frgb5x-1225700508594>, accessed 24 June 2011.
notified by the ACMA but other URLs provided by overseas companies according to their own 
criteria of content analysis.574
Against this background, all Australian ISPs were required to make customers aware of how 
they could obtain a filter. This requirement  could be met  by notifying customers of an URL, e.g. 
on a filter vendor's web site from which the customer could purchase and download a filter. 
Nevertheless, neither were the ISPs nor their customers required to use these filters: it  was a 
voluntary scheme at the user-level. As a result, although the relevant  URL was included in the 
blocklist, it might  be available within Australia if the online content filtering software was not 
used by the ISP  or by their customers. In fact, the customers’ take up of filters in Australia has 
been minimal which made the scheme arguably ineffective to limit access to overseas 
websites.575
The Commonwealth government  has attempted to increase the take up of online content  filters 
but it has failed. For example, the NetAlert Programme was launched in 2007 to support the 
filtering scheme but  was shut  down later in December 2008.576  The NetAlert  Programme was 
established in 2007 by the Howard government as part  of the National Filtering Scheme. It 
established a series of measures to help parents protect their children from accessing 
inappropriate content (education, parental support  and free Internet  content filters) and involved 
a budget  of 189 million Australian dollars. The Programme provided free online content 
filtering to Australian Internet users and public libraries which would use 84.4 million 
Australian dollars. Against the backdrop of a low rate of filtering usage by the Australian 
customers, the Labor government shut down the Programme in December 2008 replacing it 
with plans for a mandatory ISP-level filtering scheme.577
There were a number of Australian ISPs offering filtered access to the Internet as a commercial 
service using different filtering technologies (e.g. human-based or automated content  analysis). 
For example, the ISPs Webshield,578  in South Australia, and iTXtreme,579  in Queensland, 
already offer filtered access to the Internet based on a blocklist of URLs. Although they were 
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574  Collins, L., et al., 'Feasibility Study: ISP Level Content Filtering - Main Report', Internet  Industry Association - 
IIA Australia, 2008) at <http://sydney.edu.au/engineering/it/~bjornl/Main_Report_-_Final.pdf>, accessed  07 
September 2011, p 121-26.
575  Bambauer reports that the low take up of filters has been pictured as a governmental failure by the opposition 
rather than a result of public disinterest. See Bambauer, D., 'Filtering in Oz: Australia's  Foray  into Internet 
Censorship', Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 125,  (2008), p 6.
576 Extended technical support was provided to existing customers until 2010.
577  See 'NetAlert Protecting Australian Families  Online', (Australian Government, 2007) at  <http://
www.dbcde.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/72956/Protecting-Australian-Families-Online-booklet.pdf> Accessed 
25  September 2011. See also Coonan, H., 'NetAlert: Protecting Australian  Families Online - Media Release', 
(Ministry  for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, 2007) at <http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/
coonan/media/media_releases/netalert_-_protecting_australian_families_online> Accessed 25 September 2011; Best, 
J., 'AU$189m govt porn blocking plan unveiled', ZDNet, 10 August  2007 at <http://www.zdnet.com.au/au189m-govt-
porn-blocking-plan-unveiled_print-339281091.htm>, accessed 25 September 2011; Tay, L., 'ICT industry all 
nostalgic for NetAlert', itNews - For Australian Business, 08 July 2012 at <http://www.itnews.com.au/Tools/
Print.aspx?CIID=219281>, accessed 25 September 2011.
578  Webshield, 'Webshield: Australia's First  Content  Filtered Internet Service Provider', at <http://
www.webshield.net.au/>, accessed 07 September 2011.
579 ItXtreme, 'ItXtreme Family Internet', at <http://www.itxtreme.com.au/>, accessed 07 September 2011.
based in those States, their services were available to anyone anywhere in Australia. The 
Webshield blocks access to any P2P networks and used a blocklist  of URLs provided by 
overseas filtering companies. Similarly, ItXtreme had its blocklist of URLs updated every hour 
and it implemented dynamic analysis of online content as it was downloaded by the user.580 
These services were arguably unproblematic as long as implemented on a voluntary basis (i.e. 
when the filtering service was implemented at the request  of customers or when customers had 
the option to contract another filter free ISP in the same location). Nevertheless, safeguards are 
necessary when the system becomes mandatory so as to avoid opaque and unaccountable 
private censorship.
b) Towards a mandatory regime at the ISP-level for overseas content: Commonwealth 
 government
To be perfectly clear, webpages containing pornography, hosted by American companies, 
still exist and are accessible from any Australian personal computer.581
The voluntary online content  filtering regime employed at  the user-level was unable to stop 
people accessing overseas prohibited or potential prohibited content if neither the ISP nor the 
customer used any of the ‘accredited’ filtering software provided. Against this background, the 
Commonwealth government was attempting to implement a mandatory filtering scheme at  the 
ISP-level in Australia since 2007, when this new approach to filtering was part of the Labor 
Party’s programme during the election campaign.582 In order to investigate the feasibility of this 
mandatory scheme, the Commonwealth government  had commissioned a number of studies and 
live trials in Australia.
In January 2003, the Commonwealth Department of Communications, IT  and the Arts 
appointed Ovum to assess the ISP-level filtering technologies available in the market. The 
report showed that  the available filtering technologies had improved over the years but  there 
were still some issues in relation to the financial cost and administrative requirements that 
should be taken into account before implementing a mandatory scheme nationwide.583
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580  Collins, L., et al., 'Feasibility Study: ISP Level Content Filtering - Main Report', Internet  Industry Association - 
IIA Australia, 2008) at <http://sydney.edu.au/engineering/it/~bjornl/Main_Report_-_Final.pdf>, accessed  07 
September 2011p 50-2.
581  Duffy, J., 'Toothless Tiger, Sleeping Dragon: Implied Freedoms, Internet Filters  and the Growing Culture of 
Internet Censorship in Australia.', Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, 16(2) (2009), 91-105, p 94.
582  Ibid , p  94 and 97. Duffy has metaphorically addressed this  increased regulatory  stance (i.e. from the current 
voluntary scheme to a mandatory regime) as a move from a ‘toothless tiger’ towards a ‘sleeping dragon’.
583 Parry, J., et al., 'Internet content filtering A Report to the Department  of Communications, IT and the Arts. Version 
1.0' , Ovum, 2003) at <http://www.dbcde.gov.au/__data/assets/file/0016/10915/Ovum_Report_-
_Internet_content_filtering.rtf.>, accessed 07 September 2011.
Similarly, Collins et al.584  conducted in September 2007 a study commissioned by the 
Department  of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE).585  The 
investigation addressed the impact  of ISP-level online content  filtering on Australian online 
intermediaries and aimed to inform future policymaking in the field. Generally the study found 
that the impact  of mandatory ISP-level filtering in Australia may be significant, because of the 
diversity and lack of preparation of the ISP industry. The report emphasised the importance of 
resolving a series of legal and businesses aspects (for example exemption from criminal liability 
for possessing, creating and distributing the blocklist  of URLs) before this policy was 
implemented nationwide.
Following a ministerial direction received in June 2007, the ACMA commissioned a filtering 
trial in 2008 to assess the performance of ISP-level filtering using the ACMA Blocklist, which 
encompasses a range of prohibited and potential prohibited content available online (i.e. RC, 
X18+, R18+ and commercial MA15+).586  The trial was conducted in a closed laboratory 
environment  and assessed the performance, effectiveness, scope and adaptability of six online 
filtering products available in the market. It  found that  filtering technology has advanced 
significantly (i.e. more filters are available and implemented overseas, they showed low 
degradation performance and were more narrow and customisable). Nevertheless, it  reports that 
the products tested were yet  unable to filter content available via non-web protocols (such as 
emails, file transfer and P2P).
It  was unclear whether the proposed mandatory filtering scheme would filter the entire range of 
categories included in the ACMA blocklist  or only the RC category.587  Nevertheless, the 
DBCDE presented in December 2009 a series of measures for online regulation, including the 
proposed mandatory ISP-level filtering which would apparently target only RC rated online 
content.588  In line with this was the fact that  the RC category was under review following a 
request  of the Commonwealth government and, as a result, the proposed mandatory scheme has 
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584  The study was on behalf of the Internet Industry Association (IIA). See Collins, L., et al., 'Feasibility Study:  ISP 
Level Content Filtering - Main Report', Internet Industry  Association - IIA Australia, 2008) at <http://sydney.edu.au/
engineering/it/~bjornl/Main_Report_-_Final.pdf>, accessed 07 September 2011.
585  See DBCDE, 'Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital  Economy', at <http://
www.dbcde.gov.au/>, accessed 11 September 2011.
586  See ACMA, 'Closed  Environment Testing of ISP-Level Internet Content Filtering: Report  to the Minister for 
Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy', ACMA, 2008) at <http://www.acma.gov.au>, accessed 28 
August  2011. The trial was not concerned with the balance of costs and benefits nor with the potential to be 
circumvented. It has been suggested that the filtering software tested employed a more complex technology than 
those applied solely to block access to child pornography websites because of the wider range of content of ACMA 
blocklist.
587 The government presented a filtering proposal in 2007 but changed it in 2009. See comparative table in Graham, 
I., 'Overview / Summary: AU Gov't  Mandatory ISP  Blocking/Censorship Plan', at  <http://libertus.net/censor/isp-
blocking/au-govplan-overview.html>, accessed 01 September 2011. See also Duffy, J., 'Toothless Tiger, Sleeping 
Dragon: Implied Freedoms, Internet  Filters  and  the Growing Culture of Internet Censorship in Australia.', Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law, 16(2) (2009), 91-105, p 102.
588  DBCDE, 'ISP  filtering - frequently asked questions', (updated 27 May 2011) at <http://www.dbcde.gov.au/
funding_and_programs/cybersafety_plan/internet_service_provider_isp_filtering/isp_filtering_live_pilot/
isp_filtering_-_frequently_asked_questions>, accessed 28 August 2011.
been put  on hold since then.589  The review of the Refused Classification category was being 
undertaken by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) as part of an overall review of 
the National Classification System. The ALRC has been asked to submit  its final report  to the 
Government by 31 Jan 2012.590
The mandatory filtering proposed by the Commonwealth government was expected to include a 
number of provisions to increase the transparency and accountability of the scheme. 
Nevertheless, it  was unclear whether: (i) the scheme would be implemented via Commonwealth 
legislation or administrative regulation;591  (ii) there would be any further guidance established 
via an Internet  industry CoP; (iii) there would be any statutory safeguards to make the scheme 
transparent and accountable.592 
c) Blocking overseas child pornographic websites voluntarily at  the ISP-level: IIA, AFP 
 and Interpol
Although the proposed mandatory filtering scheme against RC rated content has been delayed 
pending the review of the RC category, the problem of child pornography has taken the lead in 
relation to the implementation of a blocking scheme. Overseas child pornography was already 
being blocked voluntarily at the ISP-level after major Australian ISPs (i.e. Telstra and Optus, 
and the small Cyberone) started to voluntarily block access to overseas websites domains (not 
individual URLs) allegedly hosting child pornographic content in July 2011.593  The Internet 
Industry Association announced the scheme as a partnership with the Australian Federal Police 
and Interpol594  and, although the voluntary scheme was said to target  only child pornography, 
scope creep has been alleged.595
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589 See Conroy, S., 'Media Release: Outcome of consultations on Transparency and Accountability  for ISP Filtering of 
RC content', (2010) at <http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media_releases/2010/068> Accessed 06 March 
2012; and also LeMay, R., 'Filter delayed while RC is reviewed', ZDNet, 09 July 2010 at  <http://www.zdnet.com.au/
filter-delayed-while-rc-is-reviewed-339304437.htm>, accessed 22 August 2011.
590  See ALRC, 'National Classification  Scheme Review', (Sydney, Australia: Australian Law Reform Commission, 
2011) at <http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/national-classification-review> Accessed 06 March 2012.
591  According to Moses, the mandatory filtering scheme proposal is  unlikely to receive support from the Australian 
Senate. See Moses, A., 'Web censorship plan heads towards a dead end', The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 
2009, sec. Technology at  <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2009/02/26/1235237810486.html>, accessed 07 
September 2011.
592  There are a number of different  ways to implement filtering at  the ISP-level. See Collins, L., et  al., 'Feasibility 
Study: ISP  Level Content Filtering - Main Report', Internet Industry Association - IIA Australia, 2008) at <http://
sydney.edu.au/engineering/it/~bjornl/Main_Report_-_Final.pdf>, accessed 07 September 2011, p 15.
593 Conroy, S., 'Media Release: Outcome of consultations on Transparency and Accountability for ISP  Filtering of RC 
content', (2010) at <http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media_releases/2010/068> Accessed 06 March 2012. 
The media release reports that three ISPs (i.e. Telstra, Optus and Primus) are implementing the scheme but there have 
not been any reports of Primus blocking against any Interpol list. See LeMay, R., 'ISPs don’t have to collect  voluntary 
filter data', Delimiter,  (2011) at <http://delimiter.com.au/2011/10/26/isps-dont-have-to-collect-voluntary-filter-data/> 
accessed 06 March 2012.
594 See IIA, 'Internet industry moves on blocking child pornography', Internet  Industry Association Australia, 2011 at 
<http://www.iia.net.au/index.php/all-members/892-internet-industry-moves-on-blocking-child-pornography.html>, 
accessed 07 September 2011. See also Ozimek, J., 'Aus  gov, ISPs book seats  for firewall demolition: new filters to 
catch nasty stuff ', The Register, 23 August 2010 at  <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/08/23/aus_firewall_isp/ >, 
accessed 22 August 2011; and particularly pages 104-7 from 'Official Committee Hansard - SENATE - 
ENVIRONMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS LEGISLATION COMMITTEE: Estimates', (Canberra, 2011) at 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/s380.pdf>, accessed 06 March 2012.
595  See Jacobs, C., 'Conroy: Filter alive and kicking', Electronic Frontiers  Australia, 27 May 2011 at  <http://
www.efa.org.au/2011/05/27/filter-alive-and-kicking/>, accessed 01 September 2011.
The ISP-level voluntary filtering scheme blocked access to a list of websites domains provided 
by Interpol, which allegedly contained overseas websites of ‘the worst’ child pornographic 
content.596  According to the IIA, the relevant  CoP to regulate the voluntary blocking scheme in 
relation to child pornographic content  in Australia would be delivered soon and the Association 
expected a voluntary compliance of around 80 to 90% from Australian ISPs, but this has failed 
to materialise as of January 2012; there has been no media reports of any more than the first 
three ISPs abovementioned. The IIA reported that  those who accessed the blocked webpage 
domain would be forwarded to an Interpol webpage, explaining the reasons for the blocking and 
the relevant  appeal procedures; the appeal procedures would be managed by the Interpol and 
AFP. In addition, it  reported that those accessing the blocked domain would not  be tracked 
whether accessing it intentionally or inadvertently.597 
LeMay argues that  this scheme has so far failed to meet  principles of transparency, 
accountability and legitimacy (e.g. the filtering scheme was being implemented without 
transparency by the Australian ISPs, there was no public oversight nor reviewing procedures, 
the blocklist was managed by an international organisation, there was strong potential for scope 
creep and the ISP’s customers were not informed about  the changes in their Internet access).598 
The scheme was not  implemented via legislation but it  was based on agreements negotiated 
between the relevant  organisations (i.e. IIA, AFP, Interpol and the participant ISPs) and centred 
on the blocklist developed and maintained by an international law enforcement agency.
It  has been argued however that  the legal framework for such a scheme was under Section 313 
of the Telecommunications Act 1997599  about the obligations of carriage service providers to 
help the police enforcing the criminal laws, but the use of such provision to provide ‘help’ in the 
form of an ISP-blocking system was controversial. For example, Graham believes that Section 
313 of the 1997 Act did not, of itself, enable the AFP to require ISPs ‘to do anything’.600
It  was unclear whether the voluntary scheme implemented in 2011 and supported by the IIA 
would be part of the planned legislated and mandatory scheme based on the ACMA list. In fact, 
this seemed unlikely given the comments made by the Minister for Communications Senator 
Conroy on 18 October 2011.601 For him, the government-backed ISP-level blocking scheme was 
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596  See Interpol’s criteria in INTERPOL, 'Criteria for inclusion in the “Worst of”-list', (Interpol, 2011) at <http://
www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Crimes-against-children/Access-blocking/Criteria-for-inclusion-in-the-Worst-of-list> 
Accessed 06 March 2012.
597  See generally IIA, 'Internet industry moves on blocking child  pornography', Internet Industry Association 
Australia, 2011 at <http://www.iia.net.au/index.php/all-members/892-internet-industry-moves-on-blocking-child-
pornography.html>, accessed 07 September 2011.
598 See LeMay, R., '5 reasons to worry about the Interpol filter', ZDNet, 11 July 2011 at <http://www.zdnet.com.au/5-
reasons-to-worry-about-the-interpol-filter-339318271.htm>, accessed 12 September 2011. See also LeMay, R., 'Does 
the filter breach user agreements?', ZDNet, 12 July 2011 at <http://www.zdnet.com.au/does-the-filter-breach-user-
agreements-339318375.htm>, accessed 12 September 2011.
599 Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth Australia).
600  See Graham, I., 'Australian ISPs Voluntary Filtering/Blocking', at  <http://libertus.net/censor/isp-blocking/au-
ispfiltering-voluntary.html>, accessed 06 March 2012.
601  See pages 104-7 at  'Official  Committee Hansard - SENATE - ENVIRONMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS 
LEGISLATION COMMITTEE: Estimates', (Canberra, 2011) at <http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/
s380.pdf>, accessed 06 March 2012.
expected to target  child pornography as defined under the Australian law (not  from an overseas 
police agency), to include robust  transparency and accountability mechanisms and to be 
enforced via legislation (so as to include reluctant Australian ISPs).602 Despite these grounds for 
criticisms, the government  has generally welcomed the blocking initiative from IIA, AFP, 
Interpol and the participating Australian ISPs, because it has proved that  such a scheme was 
technically possible, it  paved the way for implementing the government’s scheme, and it  did not 
slow the Internet down in the country as some might have feared.603
Finally, it  was unclear whether the Australian ISPs were implementing filtering mechanisms to 
tackle child pornography before the scheme was launched, but  a number of them already 
provide filtered access at the ISP-level to the Internet in Australia604  and this raised concerns 
about the potential for opaque private censorship.
1.3.4 The nature of the regulatory scheme: state and self-regulation
The Australian online content regulatory scheme has been labeled ‘co-regulatory’ because it 
involved not only the state as the main regulator but private actors via the Industry association 
and the CoPs.605  The regulatory scheme was considered to be complaint-based but  both the 
Commonwealth regulator and the online intermediaries could proactively monitor the 
availability of child pornographic content  at  their own discretion. In line with the discussion 
made in Section 3.3 of Chapter 2, the regulatory scheme implemented in Australia had all 
attributes of hybrid regulation. The state was the central regulatory actor (e.g. rules were 
established via legislation and there was a statutory regulatory agency) but  a number of 
responsibilities were delegated to private actors (e.g. Internet industry CoP) and the Internet 
user (e.g. via the user-level voluntary filtering scheme). Although the overall regulatory 
framework was established via legislation, the remaining specificities (i.e. the notification 
scheme, handling complaints, activity of content assessors, filtering programme etc.) were 
established via CoP designed by the Internet  Industry Association. The Commonwealth 
regulator had a strong legislative mandate to force Australian online intermediaries to come into 
line in relation to the content available on the Internet; the CoPs were registered and monitored 
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602  LeMay, R., 'We'll filter when the law says: Internode', ZDNet, 05 July 2011 at <http://www.zdnet.com.au/well-
filter-when-the-law-says-internode-339317922.htm>, accessed 12 September 2011. See also Wyres, M., 'I'm dumping 
Telstra for the voluntary filter', ZDNet Australia, 24 June 2011 at  <http://www.zdnet.com.au/im-dumping-telstra-for-
the-voluntary-filter-339317382.htm>, accessed 12 September 2011.
603  See pages 104-7 at  'Official  Committee Hansard - SENATE - ENVIRONMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS 
LEGISLATION COMMITTEE: Estimates', (Canberra, 2011) at <http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/
s380.pdf>, accessed 06 March 2012.
604  Some of them were known to be offering filtered  access commercially. See the case of iTXtreme and Webshield 
mentioned above.
605  See Alston, R., 'The Government's  Regulatory Framework for Internet  Content', University of  New South Wales 
Law Journal, 23(1) (2000), 192-97. See also Wright, A., 'Australia: A Case Study on Internet Content Regulation', 
Australian Broadcasting  Authority, 2002) at <http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/aba/newspubs/speeches/documents/
aw_unesco_paper.pdf>, accessed 22 August 2011, p 14.
by the Commonwealth regulator, which had powers to enforce compliance under threat  of heavy 
fees and enforce its own industry standard if necessary.606
1.3.4.1 The Codes of Practice (CoP)
The legal framework for the CoPs were under Schedule 5 of the BSA 1992 as amended. The 
compliance with the CoP was voluntary on the part  of the ISPs but  the ACMA could force them 
to comply with the registered CoP if necessary. As a result, the Australian online intermediaries 
were subject to a number of obligations not only established by the Parliament  but also by the 
Commonwealth regulator and the relevant Internet industry association. Division 4 and Division 
5, Schedule 5 of the 1992 Act  as amended regulated the industry CoPs and industry standards, 
respectively. There were two Internet industry CoPs registered and in force in Australia: (i) the 
2005 CoP607 regulated the Australian ISPs and Internet content hosts; and (ii) the 2008 CoP608 
regulated the Australian content  service providers and hosting service providers following the 
2007 amendments of the 1992 Act. 
The 2005 CoP was registered by the ABA on 26 May 2005. It  addressed Schedule 5 of the 
amended 1992 Act and encompassed three Codes of Practice in the area of Internet  and mobile 
content. Its Code 1 dealt  with the obligations of the Australian Internet content hosts (ICHs) in 
relation to content  hosted in Australia (i.e. take-down procedures). The Code 2 targeted the 
Australian ISPs in relation to content hosted in Australia (i.e. regulating access to minors within 
Australia). Finally, the Code 3 addressed the Australian ISPs in relation to content  hosted 
overseas. The Code 3 established, in Clause 19.2, the notification scheme required by Section 
40(1)(b) of Schedule 5 (of the amended 1992 Act). According to this, the ACMA notified the 
suppliers of family-friendly filters directly and ISPs on a regular basis about the relevant 
prohibited or potential prohibited content  hosted overseas. The ISPs were required to inform 
their customers about  the available family-friendly content  filters, but  it was unclear whether the 
ISPs voluntarily implemented any ISP-level filtering strategy based on the notifications 
received from the ACMA. It was unclear how often these notifications about overseas URLs 
were made to ISPs.609
144
606 Yet, this investigation found no evidence that either the ABA or ACMA ever had ordered an ISP  or ICH to comply 
with  a CoP;  it may also be the case that not all  of them comply with all requirements of the IIA’s CoP, because these 
requirements may be too onerous or impractical administratively.
607 IIA, 'Codes for Industry Co-Regulation in Areas of Internet and Mobile Content (Pursuant to the Requirements of 
the Broadcasting  Services  Act  1992). May 2005 (includes provisions affecting mobile services). Version 10.4. As 
Registered by the Australian Broadcasting Authority.', (Internet Industry Association, 2005) at <http://
www.iia.net.au> Accessed 26 September 2011.
608  IIA, 'Content Services Code for Industry Co-Regulation in the Area of Content  Services (Pursuant to the 
Requirements of Schedule 7 of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 as amended). Registration Version 1.0 - Current 
and in Force. As approved by Australian Communications  and Media Authority  on 10 July 2008', (Internet  Industry 
Association, 2008) at <http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/aba/contentreg/codes/internet/documents/
content_services_code_2008.pdf> Accessed 07 September 2011.
609  One Australian expert, consulted during the validation scheme, said  that ACMA often  did not notify ISPs about 
overseas URLs regardless of what the CoP has established.
The 2008 CoP was registered on 10 July 2008 following the 2007 amendments.610  It only dealt 
with Schedule 7 of the amended 1992 Act  and aimed to provide legal guidelines for compliance 
to Australian content service providers and hosting service providers. Generally it  established 
the take-down regime to the online content  with an Australian connection (i.e. stored or live 
content hosted in or produced from Australia) which was subject  to the take-down or link-
deletion notices (in relation to stored content), or the service-cessation notice (in relation to live 
content). Part C of the 2008 CoP established the handling of complaints of end-users in addition 
to the ACMA notifications.
Generally legal liability of Australian online intermediaries in relation to the content  they hosted 
or made available was established in Clause 91 of Schedule 5 of the amended 1992 Act. They 
were exempt  from liability under State of Territory laws as long as they were unaware of the 
criminal nature of the content they carried and had no obligation to proactively search this 
awareness.
Section 1 above addressed the laws and regulations to limit  access to online child pornography 
in Australia. First, it explored the history of online content regulation particularly in relation to 
child pornography. Second, it  addressed Commonwealth, State and Territory criminal laws 
tackling the production, distribution and possession of online child pornography in addition to 
the investigatory powers of law enforcement authorities. Third, it  explored Commonwealth 
online content  regulatory laws and regulations to limit  access to online child pornographic 
material, be it hosted in Australia or overseas. Section 2 explores the laws and regulations to 
limit access to online child pornography in Brazil.
2 Brazil
The commercial sexual exploitation of children in Brazil is an old phenomenon. Nevertheless, 
the production, distribution and collection of online child pornography became a national 
concern in the mid-1990s soon after the development  of the commercial Internet  in the early 
1990s.611  The major concern of the regulatory policies put  in place was the availability of child 
pornographic content on both commercial and non-commercial overseas websites,612  and this 
was the reason why regulators started to target Brazilian613  Internet  content  service, hosting 
service, and service providers more closely after 2005.
Brazil had outdated anti-child pornography laws and no comprehensive legislation to regulate 
the activities of online intermediaries amidst a pro-self-regulation agenda that was never 
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610 Communications Legislation Amendment (Content Services) Act 2007 (Cth Australia).
611 For an overall description about the development of commercial Internet  in Brazil, see ch  4 in Lemos, R., Direito, 
Tecnologia e Cultura (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. FGV, 2005).
612  Although part of the child pornographic material found on the public Internet and reported to authorities was 
hosted in Brazil, most reported content was hosted overseas.
613  Or foreign companies with a representative office in Brazil such as Google Inc., Microsoft and NewsGroup 
International.
systematically implemented by the Internet industry. On the other hand, law enforcement 
authorities lacked legal and regulatory tools to facilitate: (i) the immediate removal of alleged 
child pornography content hosted in Brazil (or hosted overseas but  produced, distributed or 
accessed by people in Brazil); (ii) the identification of alleged offenders and; (iii) the 
preservation of evidence so as to successfully criminally prosecute alleged offenders. 
Against this background, substantial changes occurred after 2005 in relation to anti-child 
pornography laws and the regulatory landscape. This was first  achieved via agreements 
negotiated between law enforcement authorities and online intermediaries (e.g. content service 
and hosting service providers) to establish measures for notice and take down child 
pornographic material hosted domestically. New anti-child pornography legislation was enacted 
in 2008 and amended the old legislation in regard to the definition, types of content, offences, 
defences and penalties associated with online child pornography. The 2008 legislation put in 
place a provision that established a notice and take down scheme but only in relation to online 
child pornographic content.
Later in 2009, agreements were negotiated amongst telcos, backbone providers and law 
enforcement authorities to facilitate the identification of alleged offenders, preserve evidence 
and improve cooperation with police. These developments occurred amidst no specific 
legislation regulating the activities of online intermediaries in Brazil. In addition, other 
agreements were negotiated with online intermediaries, such as online payment systems to 
target  commercially driven child pornography websites, and with a number of law enforcement 
authorities, governments bodies and private actors to establish a reporting scheme. Amongst 
other things, these developments made a number of online intermediaries implement content 
removal initiatives of their own (e.g. automated filtering via file hashing, content analysis and 
proactive monitoring) without any clear guidance or legislated safeguards to avoid potential 
abuses.
This section explores regulatory developments aimed at limiting access to child pornography 
available on the Internet in Brazil.614  Subsection 2.1 addresses the historical context and 
political processes that  shaped these developments. Subsequently, Subsection 2.2 describes the 
Brazilian anti-child pornography laws, and Subsection 2.3 explores the regulatory framework in 
detail.
2.1 Historical context
The problem of child pornographic content  available on the Internet  gained visibility in Brazil 
after the mid-1990s, when the commercial Internet  started to flourish, and was largely shaped 
by what has been discussed and developed at the international level.
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614 It focused on Brazilian anti-child pornography laws and regulatory measures as of until January 2011.
For example, following the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,615 the 1st World 
Congress against  the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children616  (CSEC) addressed the 
problem of online child pornography and recommended the reform of legislation and law 
enforcement strategies to tackle the problem both nationally and internationally. After the 1st 
World Congress on CSEC other international conferences (e.g. the 1998 ECPAT Expert’s 
Meeting,617 the 1999 UNESCO Expert’s Meeting,618 the 1999 UNESCO Brazil Meeting,619 the 
2001 2nd World Congress against CSEC,620  and the 2001 CEDECA-BA International 
Conference621) continued to pursue the reform of national and international legislation, 
improvement  of law enforcement capabilities, creation of Internet hotlines to report alleged 
illegal content, stronger involvement of Internet  industry and further international cooperation. 
Generally these were the issues debated at the international level that shaped the media 
landscape and national agenda in Brazil after the mid-1990s.
UNESCO Brasil launched in 1999 the ‘ForÉtica-BR,’ a multi-stakeholder committee devoted to 
discuss and propose public policies in relation to the problem of online child pornography 
available on the Internet in Brazil. The committee met a few times and eventually published a 
book,622  but  the group lacked the political force to inform and propose public policies in this 
regard. In addition, a Round-table623 organised by the CEDECA-BA624 in December 2000 was 
the starting point of a pilot-Internet  hotline, the CEDECA-BA Hotline-BR,625  created to receive 
and process reports about the availability of child pornographic content on the Internet in Brazil.
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615  UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by 
General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989. Entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with 
article 49. 1989 (United Nations).
616  '1st World Congress against Commercial Sexual  Exploitation of Children. Declaration and Agenda for Action.', 
(Stockholm: World Congress against CSEC, 1996) at  <http://www.csecworldcongress.org/en/stockholm/index.htm>, 
accessed 18 April 2011.
617  ECPAT, 'Child Pornography and the Internet Expert's Meeting. 28-29 May 1998.', (Lyon: ECPAT International, 
1998) at <http://www.ecpat.net/eng/Ecpat_inter/projects/preventing_pornography/prevent.asp>, accessed 13 May 
2005.
618  UNESCO, 'Expert's Meeting. 18-19 Jan 1999.', (Paris:  UNESCO, 1999) at <http://www.unesco.org/webworld/
child_screen/conf_index.html>, accessed 13 May 2005.
619  UNESCO, 'Fórum Brasileiro de Ética pela Infância e Adolescência na Internet: ForÉtica-BR', (Brasilia-DF: 
UNESCO BRASIL, 1999) at <http://www.dialdata.com.br/foretica>.
620  '2nd World Congress against Commercial  Sexual Exploitation of Children. Yokohama Global Commitment', 
(Yokohama:  World Congress against  CSEC, 2001) at  <http://www.csecworldcongress.org/en/yokohama/index.htm>, 
accessed 18 April 2011.
621 For information about this conference, see CEDECA-BA, 'Pornografia Infanto-juvenil  na Internet: Uma Violação 
aos Direitos Humanos', at <http://www.cedeca.org.br/publicacoes/conferencia.pdf>, accessed 18 April 2011.
622  See UNESCO, 'Fórum Brasileiro de Ética pela Infância e Adolescência na Internet: ForÉtica-BR', (Brasilia-DF: 
UNESCO BRASIL, 1999) at <http://www.dialdata.com.br/foretica> See also UNESCO (ed.), Inocência  em Perigo: 
abuso sexual de crianças, pornografia infantil  e pedofilia na Internet (São Paulo: UNESCO, Garamound and 
ABRANET, 1999).
623 See Reis, F., 'Relatório sobre a Mesa-redonda contra a Pedofilia na Internet', (Salvador-BA:  CEDECA-BA, 2000) 
at <http://www.fabiorei.com>, accessed 18 April 2011.
624  CEDECA-BA was a non-governmental  organisation that provided free of charge legal and psychological 
assistance to children victims of sexual abuse in Brazil. See CEDECA-BA, 'Centro de Defesa da Criança e do 
Adolescente da Bahia', at <http://www.cedeca.org.br>, accessed 31 August 2010.
625  CEDECA-BA, 'HotlineBR CEDECA-BA', at <http://www.hotlinebr.org.br>, accessed 03 November 2005. Note 
that this hotline is no longer available.
Following this, the 1990 anti-child pornography legislation was updated in 2003626 and, in 2004, 
Brazil ratified the 2000 UN Optional Protocol.627  It was also in 2004 that  the Brazilian 
Parliament 628  published the final report  from a Mixed Parliamentary Commission Inquiry 
created to investigate the commercial sexual exploitation of children in Brazil in general, but 
which has made a number of recommendations, for example to criminalise a number of 
conducts and increase penalties in relation to online child pornography offences.629  Another 
multi-stakeholder committee, similar to the one created in 1999, was launched by the federal 
government in 2004 to design a national action plan against child pornography available on the 
Internet in Brazil,630  but after a few meetings this committee lost vigour and such a national 
action plan was neither materialised or implemented.631  The UN Special Rapporteur issued a 
dossier in 2004 with recommendations against  the problem based on feedback received from a 
number of countries, including Brazil;632 these recommendations were generally in line with the 
international agenda discussed above.
In addition, improvements were made to the CEDECA-BA Hotline-BR in 2004.633  Also in 
2004, the CEDECA-BA commissioned a study to identify regulatory initiatives implemented in 
Brazil against the proliferation of child pornographic content  on the Internet.634  The 
investigation addressed the activities of Brazilian Internet hotlines, the Brazilian Federal 
Police,635  the Parliament and the Internet industry. It  found that  a number of Internet hotlines 
were operating in 2005. 
Generally the law enforcement authorities provided channels to receive reports from the public, 
but non-governmental institutions (e.g. the CEDECA-BA Hotline-BR, Censura.Com,636 
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626 The development of the anti-child pornography laws in Brazil will be discussed in Section 3.
627 UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child  Pornography 2000 (adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by  General Assembly 
resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000, entered into force on 18 January 2002) (United Nations).
628  The Brazilian Parliament  is  a bicameral National Congress consisting of the ‘Senado Federal’  (upper chamber) 
and the ‘Câmara dos Deputados’ (lower chamber).
629  See CPMI, 'Relatório Final da Comissão Parlamentar Mista de Inquérito da Exploração Sexual de Crianças e 
Adolescentes', (Brasília-DF, Brasil: Senado Federal, 2004) at  <http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/
getPDF.asp?t=56335&tp=1> Accessed 14 March 2012, p 306-8.
630 This multi-stakeholder Committee (‘Subcomissão Temática de Enfrentamento à Pedofilia e à Pornografia Infantil 
na Internet’) was launched in July 2004 by the Federal Government after they published the report  Reifschneider, E. 
and Reis, A., 'Pesquisa sobre Pornografia Infantil  na Internet  – Brasil. Proyecto sobre Tráfico de Niños, Pornografia 
Infantil en Internet y Marcos Normativos en el Mercosur, Bolívia e Chile', (Montevideo-Uruguay: Instituto 
Interamericano Del Niño, 2004) at <http://www.iintpi.net/informes/index.php>, accessed 25 May 2005.
631 The 2004 Committee resembled the 1999 ‘ForÉtica-BR’  initiative, because they both  lost the political vigour soon 
after inception.
632  See Petit, J., 'Report submitted by Mr. Juan Miguel Petit, Special  Rapporteur on  the  sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography. E/CN.4/2005/78, 23 December 2004.', (New York: United Nations, 2004) at 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,REFERENCE,UNCHR,,,42d66e480,0.html>, accessed 30 June 2010.
633 The CEDECA-BA Hotline-BR attended the INHOPE Meeting on  12-14 May 2004 in Italy, and secured financial 
funding from the Canadian Government to continue its operation during 2005.
634 See Oliveira, T. and Reis, F., Pornografia Infantil na Internet: o enfrentamento no Brasil (unpublished) (Salvador-
BA, Brasil: CEDECA-BA, 2006) 104p.
635 DPF, 'Polícia Federal', at <http://www.dpf.gov.br/>, accessed 25 April 2011.
636  Miranda, A. and Miranda, R., 'Campanha Censura.Com', at  <http://www.censura.com.br/>, accessed 25 April 
2011.
PORTAL-KIDS,637  and ABRAPIA638) received reposts and faced a number of problems 
including the lack of permanent financial support  and the limited feedback received from both 
the relevant online intermediaries and the Federal Police. Notably, the investigation found that 
there was no centralised Internet  hotline service liaising with the law enforcement  authorities so 
as to avoid the duplication of reports. Evidence also suggested that the Federal Police lacked 
both technical expertise and financial support to tackle the problem. It  was also the case that 
they were not able to effectively cooperate internationally. In addition, taking into account 
legislative bills under consideration by the Parliament, the investigation made a number of 
recommendations for legislative reform that  were used to update anti-child pornography laws in 
2008.639
Finally, the study showed that the Brazilian Internet industry had so far little involvement with 
the problem of child pornography and promoted limited feedback whenever demanded. This 
was the case with the Comitê Gestor da Internet no Brasil640  (CGI.br), a multi-stakeholder 
commission (with representatives from the federal government, civil society, academia, and 
Internet industry) created by the Federal Government  in 1995 to coordinate all Internet services 
in Brazil (for example domain names and Internet governance), and formulate public polices, 
but whose work in relation to child pornographic content  regulation has been close to 
nothing.641 Until January 2012, there was no comprehensive national legislation to regulate the 
operation of online intermediaries in general (except  for the notice and take down - NTD of 
child pornographic content  available on the Internet established under the 2008 legislation) nor 
was there a national code of conduct  (CoC) to guide their operation. Nevertheless, there were 
parliamentary discussions in this regard, and they are discussed later.
Amidst no comprehensive legislation to regulate the activities of online intermediaries and a 
pro-self regulation political discourse that  was never systematically implemented, the Internet 
industry avoided setting up any reporting mechanism, public awareness programmes nor any 
other initiative to tackle the problem of child pornography available on the Internet  in Brazil. 
Generally they removed alleged child pornographic content from their servers once notified, but 
hardly gave any feedback about the reports they received from Internet  hotlines nor did they 
develop any regulatory scheme voluntarily (e.g. to record access logs, date and IP addresses) to 
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637 'Portal Kids', at <http://www.portalkids.org.br/>, accessed 25 April 2011.
638  ABRAPIA, 'Do Marco Zero a Uma Política Pública Proteção à Criança e ao Adolescente', (Rio de Janeiro-RJ: 
ABRAPIA:  Associação Brasileira Multiprofissional de Proteção à Infância e à Adolescência, 2003) at <http://
www.abrapia.org.br>, accessed 12 June 2004.
639 See pages 179-83 at  CPMI, 'Relatório Final  da Comissão Parlamentar Mista de Inquérito da Exploração Sexual  de 
Crianças e Adolescentes', (Brasília-DF, Brasil: Senado Federal, 2004) at <http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/
materia/getPDF.asp?t=56335&tp=1> Accessed 14 March 2012.
640 CGI, 'Comitê Gestor da Internet no Brasil', at <http://www.cgi.br/>, accessed 14 March 2012.
641  A federal police officer attended the CGI.br‘s meeting on 09 April 1999 and exposed the difficulties that law 
enforcement agencies have to collect evidence in relation to child  pornographic content available on the Internet. The 
panel has decided to establish minimum requirements that relevant online intermediaries should follow in these cases, 
but this initiative has never came to light. See CGI, 'Reunião de 09 de abril de 1999', (Porto Alegre-RS, Brasil: 
Comitê Gestor da Internet no Brasil, 1999) at <http://www.cgi.br/acoes/1999/rea-1999-04.htm>, accessed 13 March 
2012.
help law enforcement agencies identifying alleged offenders; their key concern was to avoid any 
regulatory measures that could increase costs and minimise profit.
After June 2005, law enforcement  authorities, particularly the Federal Prosecution Service in 
the State of São Paulo (the MPF-SP)642 negotiated agreements with major online intermediaries 
in the State of São Paulo so as to establish common standards to remove material reported as 
potentially criminal, facilitate the identification of alleged offenders and preserve relevant 
evidence for criminal investigation.643 These agreements were gradually replicated by other law 
enforcement authorities in other regions of Brazil.
In addition, another Internet hotline was created in December 2005. The CEDECA-BA Hotline-
BR stopped operating in the late 2005 because of severe financial hardship. Based on the 
expertise accumulated there, its former members founded another institution named Safernet 
Brasil644  and started receiving, processing and forwarding reports in January 2006. These 
reports were mainly about  the availability of child pornographic material found in commercial 
and non-commercial overseas websites and, particularly, in the social network Orkut645 owned 
by the US company Google. Orkut achieved substantial success in the Brazilian social 
networking market  in relation its rival Facebook.646  Most  reports received by Safernet Brasil 
was hosted in Orkut’s servers in the US and only a few reports were about child pornographic 
websites hosted in Brazil. Although child pornographic content  was produced, distributed and 
accessed by Brazilian nationals via Orkut, the material was hosted in Google’s servers in the 
US, outside the immediate jurisdiction of Brazilian law enforcement authorities. There were 
reports about  child pornographic content exchanged via anonymised P2P and other Internet 
applications, but Safernet could do nothing about them as it was a matter of police investigation.
The MPF-SP has also received a growing number of complaints about  child pornographic 
content available in Orkut. Although the removal of material reported was not  often 
immediate,647  the problem here was that  Google Brasil, the Google Inc. subsidiary in Brazil, 
refused to disclose information about access logs and personal data of Brazilian users to law 
enforcement authorities, even though there was a judicial order for such request. Google Brasil 
argued that the information requested by the Brazilian authorities was located in the US and 
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642 The Brazilian Federal Prosecution Service Office in the State of São Paulo. See MPF-SP, 'Grupo de Combate aos 
Crimes Cibernéticos', at <http://www.prsp.mpf.gov.br/noticias-prsp/crimes-ciberneticos>, accessed 18 April 2011.
643 These agreements will be discussed later in Section 4 about the regulatory policies.
644 SAFERNET, 'Safernet Brasil', at <http://www.safernet.org.br/site/>, accessed 28 March.
645  ORKUT, 'A social  networking system and discussion site operated by Google Inc.', at  <http://www.orkut.com>, 
accessed 30 August 2010.
646  According to the comScore statistics, Orkut reached in August 2010 more than 36 million unique visitors. See 
'Orkut Continues to Lead Brazil’s  Social Networking Market, Facebook Audience Grows Fivefold', (São Paulo-SP: 
comScore, 2010) at <http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2010/10/>, accessed 26 April 2011.
647  According to the MPF-SP, the removal  of content reported as alleged illegal was  not immediate and, in some 
occasions, not even performed. See page 604 at 'Relatório Final da Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito. Criada por 
meio do Requerimento nº 2, de 2005-CN, “com o objetivo de investigar e apurar a utilização da Internet  para a 
prática de crimes de ‘pedofilia’, bem como a relação desses crimes com o crime organizado”', (Brasília-DF: Senado 
Federal do Brasil, 2011) at  <http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/comissoes/comissao.asp?origem=SF&com=1422>, 
accessed 20 April 2011.
thus not  subject to Brazilian sovereignty. This argument was unable to convince the Federal 
Public Prosecution Service (MPF-SP) which argued that  Google Brasil was providing services 
in Brazilian territory, to Brazilian nationals, and therefore should be subject to Brazilian laws.
Apparently, Google Brasil was trying to protect  the privacy of its customers by showing a hard-
line stance on privacy grounds. Nevertheless, there were other issues involved, particularly the 
costs involved in being subject  to different regulatory demands around the world (for example 
those involved in recording access’ logs and providing them to the police); it  seemed to be more 
cost-effective to operate under a single jurisdiction than to adapt its services to each different 
jurisdiction where Google offered its services. As such, the dispute here was not only about 
privacy or a free Internet but about jurisdiction and minimising operational costs.
Against this background, both MPF-SP and Safernet  Brasil threatened Google Brasil with civil 
and criminal lawsuits to force cooperation but  achieved little success. Google Brasil was 
approached a number of times from 2005 to 2008, but  defiantly, and expensively,648 declined to 
settle any agreement  nor disclose any information about  access logs and users’ data.649  Law 
enforcement authorities argued that Orkut became a repository of illegal material and an 
incentive to commit criminal offences online, because it  had systematically refused to disclose 
any information about alleged offenders.650  In April 2006, Safernet Brasil filled a complaint 
against Google Brasil in the Lower House of the Parliament.651  In August 2006, the MPF-SP 
filled a criminal lawsuit  against  Google Brasil. As a result, other court orders were issued but 
Google Brasil employed a number of legal technicalities to procrastinate the immediate effect  of 
such orders.
In 2007, Orkut launched an automated and random advertising system worldwide. Given that 
they were hosting alleged child pornographic and other criminal content  via Orkut pages, some 
ads have been placed randomly on webpages containing illegal content.652 As a result, Safernet 
Brasil recorded one of these pages and made a complaint against  Google Brasil in August  2007 
at  CONAR,653 the Brazilian advertising watchdog. This led to substantial losses in revenues for 
Google, because the companies being advertised began to unitarily end their contracts. 
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648 Google Brasil  hired well-known and expensive lawyers, e.g. the former Ministry of Justice, to  defend  their claims 
during the parliamentary public sessions.
649 For a detailed account of the Orkut debacle, see pages 617-30 at Ibid, .
650 Alleged criminal content hosted in Orkut has been a concern  since the early 2005. See Rivlin, G., 'Hate Messages 
on  Google Site Draw Concern', The New York Times, 07 February 2005 at <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/07/
technology/07orkut.html>, accessed 26 April 2011 See also Martins, R., 'Criminosos agem impunes no Orkut', O 
Estado de São Paulo, 06 February 2006 .
651  At the Human Rights Commission of the Lower House of the Parliament, i.e. ‘Câmara dos Deputados’. See 
CDHM, 'Comissão de Direitos Humanos e Minorias da Câmara dos Deputados', at <http://www2.camara.gov.br/
atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-permanentes/cdhm>, accessed 27 April 2011.
652 See Regalado, A. and Delaney, K., 'Google Under Fire Over a Controversial Site: Racist Speech, Porn Stir Battle 
in  Brazil; A 'Pandora's Box'', The Wall  Street Journal,  (2007), A1 at <http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB119273558149563775.html> accessed 30 August 2010.
653  CONAR, 'Conselho Nacional de Autorregulamentação Publicitária', at <http://www.conar.org.br/>, accessed 30 
August.
Following this, Google Brasil changed the stance taken so far and started to negotiate the terms 
of an agreement with the MPF-SP and Safernet Brasil, from September 2007 to March 2008.
In March 2008, the higher chamber of the Brazilian Parliament, the Senate, launched a 
Parliamentary Inquiry Commission654  (CPI) to tackle the proliferation of online child 
pornography in Brazil. Following this, the MPF-SP, the Safernet Brasil and a number of other 
public and private actors were invited to public audiences. During these CPI sessions, a number 
of agreements were negotiated with major online intermediaries (e.g. Internet  hosting service, 
content service and service providers, and online payment systems), so they agreed to employ 
minimum standards towards content  removal, identification of alleged offenders and 
preservation of evidence for criminal investigations. These developments also led private actors 
to implement a number of measures of their own to monitor more closely the content they 
hosted and distributed and to the development  of a national reporting scheme for child 
pornography websites. The CPI also discussed and proposed a new anti-child pornography bill 
that was enacted in November 2008 and criminalised a number of conducts and increased 
existing penalties. Other anti-online child pornography bills were proposed amidst  a slow paced 
parliamentary activity in relation to the regulation of other cybercrimes and of online 
intermediaries in general; child pornography lawmaking has clearly taken the lead here.
Subsection 2.1 above explored the historical context  on which the regulatory initiatives to limit 
access to online child pornographic material were implemented in Brazil. It is against  this 
background that Subsection 2.2 below explores Brazilian anti-child pornography laws both in 
relation to child pornography per se and regulation of online intermediaries that  hosted or 
provided access to such problematic material.
2.2 Legislation
2.2.1 State-regulation: the anti-child pornography laws
The development of modern anti-child pornography laws in Brazil can be divided into three 
stages. The problem was first addressed in 1990 with the ‘Lei No. 8.069/1990’655  (hereinafter 
the 1990 Law). According to Article 241, it  was a criminal offence to photograph or publish 
sexually explicit or pornographic scenes involving children (i.e. any person under 12) or 
adolescents (i.e. any person over 12 and under 18). The 1990 Law provided a definition of child 
pornography (i.e. sexually explicit  or pornographic scenes involving children under 18) and 
outlawed its production (i.e. to photograph) as well as its non-commercial distribution (i.e. to 
publish).
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654 'Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito  do Senado Federal para apurar a utilização da internet na prática de crimes de 
"pedofilia", bem como a relação desses crimes com o  crime organizado', (Brasília-DF, Brasil, 2008) at  <http://
www.senado.gov.br/atividade/comissoes/comissao.asp?origem=SF&com=1422>, accessed 20 March 2012.
655 Lei No. 8.069, de 13 de julho de 1990. Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente 1990 (Brazil).
Later in 2003, following growing concern about  the proliferation of child pornographic content 
on the Internet in Brazil, the ‘Lei No. 10.764/2003’656 (hereinafter the 2003 Law) amended the 
1990 Law. It  modified the definition of child pornography and criminalised a number of 
conducts. The 2003 Law outlawed the production (i.e. to produce), commercial distribution (i.e. 
to sell), non-commercial distribution (i.e. to show, provide or publish), by any means of 
communication, including the Internet, of any ‘photographs or images depicting sexually 
explicit  or pornographic scenes involving children or adolescents.’ The previous definition of 
child pornography was modified so as to include this type of media (i.e. photographs and 
images). In addition, the 2003 Law imposed, in Article 241, §1º, criminal liability on online 
intermediaries so as to punish those private actors which (i) provided the means or services to 
host the child pornographic content; or (ii) provided, by any means, online access to child 
pornographic content. Online intermediaries were only criminally liable if they had actual 
knowledge of the illegal material and did not take any action to remove access;657  they were not 
required however to actually search this knowledge. The 2003 Law also increased imprisonment 
sentences.
Finally, the ‘Lei No. 11.829/2008’658  (hereinafter the 2008 Law) was enacted in 2008 and 
substantially altered the 2003 Law. It modified the definition of child pornography, criminalised 
a number of conducts and clarified the provisions on the criminal liability of online 
intermediaries, putting in place a legislated framework for a notification scheme (but only in 
relation to child pornographic content available online). The 2008 Law still considered child 
pornography as ‘sexually explicit or pornographic scenes depicting children or adolescents,’659 
but it  added that ‘sexually explicit  or pornographic scenes’ meant any representation, by 
whatever means (e.g. photograph or video), of a child engaged in real or simulated explicit 
sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a child for primarily sexual 
purposes. This amendment literally repeated the provision found at the 2000 UN Optional 
Protocol, ratified by Brazil in March 2004.660 
The Brazilian legislator increased the list of criminal conducts in relation to the production, 
distribution and collection of online child pornography. As a result, production661  (i.e. to 
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656 Lei  No. 10.764, de 12 de novembro  de 2003. Altera a Lei No. 8.069, de 13 de julho de 1990, que dispõe sobre o 
Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente e dá outras providências. 2003 (Brazil).
657 For this opinion, see Filho, D. R., 'O crime de divulgação de pornografia infantil pela Internet: breves comentários 
à Lei No. 10.764/03' Infojus (2003); <http://www.advogado.adv.br/artigos/2003/democritoreinaldofilho/
crimepornografiainfantil.htm> accessed 20 April  2011. See also Leonardi, M., Responsabilidade Civil dos 
Provedores de Serviços de Internet (São Paulo: Juarez de Oliveira, 2005), p 108.
658 Lei No. 11.829, de 25 de novembro de 2008. Altera a Lei No. 8.069, de 13 de julho de 1990 - Estatuto da Criança 
e do Adolescente, para aprimorar o combate à produção, venda e distribuição de pornografia infantil, bem como 
criminalizar a aquisição e a posse de tal material e outras condutas relacionadas à pedofilia na internet. 2008 (Brazil).
659 See art. 241-E. Ibid . 
660 The UN Optional Protocol was ratified via the Decreto No. 5.007 de 08 de março de 2004. Promulga o Protocolo 
Facultativo à Convenção sobre os Direitos da Criança referente à venda de crianças, à prostituição infantil e à 
pornografia infantil. 2004 (entered into force on 08 March 2004) (Brasil).
661 See art. 240 of the Lei No. 11.829, de 25 de novembro de 2008. Altera a Lei No. 8.069, de 13 de julho de 1990 - 
Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente, para aprimorar o combate à produção, venda e distribuição de pornografia 
infantil, bem como criminalizar a aquisição e a posse de tal material  e outras condutas relacionadas à pedofilia na 
internet. 2008 (Brazil).
produce, reproduce, direct, photograph, film or register, by any means, child pornography), 
commercial distribution662 (i.e. to sell or to show, with intent  to sell, a photograph, video or any 
other register containing child pornography) and non-commercial distribution663  (i.e. to offer, 
exchange, make available, transmit, distribute, publish, by any means, including computer 
systems, child pornography) were outlawed.
In addition, the 2008 Law criminalised the acquisition664  and the possession665  of child 
pornography, and provided some defences.666  It  legitimised the operation of Internet  hotlines 
and exempted them from criminal liability if they possessed child pornographic content only to 
notify law enforcement agencies.667  Finally, it criminalised the production, distribution and 
possession of pseudo-photographs depicting child pornography (i.e. modified or juxtaposed 
photographs or video).668 For Suiama,669 the child depicted in the pseudo-photographs had to be 
real, non-fictitious and thus identifiable.670  Yet, the legislator’s intention was unclear, because 
the parliamentary proceedings mentioned at  some point that the child should be real but it  also 
mentioned elsewhere that even if there was no real child involved the ‘ideal child’ had been 
harmed.671 The 2008 Law also increased imprisonment penalties.
More recently the Senate has approved the Bill No. 100/2010672  in order to authorise the 
undercover operation of police agents investigating online grooming of children as well as other 
online child pornography offences. If this Bill becomes law, police forces would be able to 
conduct  lawful sting operations in Brazil. According to the 2010 Bill, such operation must have 
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662 See art. 241. Ibid .
663 See art. 241-A. Ibid .
664  The 2008 Law employed the term ‘adquirir’  (i.e. to acquire) and it was unclear whether this  meant buying, 
accessing or knowingly accessing child pornographic content on the Internet. It  was perhaps the case that the 
legislator intended to consider ‘to acquire’ as ‘to buy.’ See page 128 at 'Relatório Final da Comissão Parlamentar de 
Inquérito. Criada por meio do Requerimento nº 2, de 2005-CN, “com o objetivo de investigar e apurar a utilização  da 
Internet para a prática de crimes de ‘pedofilia’, bem como a relação desses crimes com o crime organizado”', 
(Brasília-DF: Senado Federal do Brasil, 2011) at <http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/comissoes/comissao.asp?
origem=SF&com=1422>, accessed 20 April 2011.
665  This  state regulatory tool  (i.e. the criminalisation of possession) was considered an important initiative to limit 
access to  child pornographic content, because it extended the police powers against  alleged viewers; proving a 
possession offence was perhaps easier than proving a distribution offence, but this assumption is debatable.
666  See art. 241-B. Lei No. 11.829, de 25 de novembro de 2008. Altera a Lei No. 8.069, de 13 de julho de 1990 - 
Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente, para aprimorar o combate à produção, venda e distribuição de pornografia 
infantil, bem como criminalizar a aquisição e a posse de tal material  e outras condutas relacionadas à pedofilia na 
internet. 2008 (Brazil).
667  See art. 241-B, §2º, inc. III. Ibid . This provision was general and thus did not establish any monopoly over the 
processing of reports by a single Internet hotline in Brazil.
668 See art. 241-C. Ibid .
669  Suiama, S., 'Nota Técnica GCCC/PR/SP', (São Paulo:  MPF-SP, 2010) at <http://www.prsp.mpf.gov.br/sala-de-
imprensa/pdfs-das-noticias/crimes-ciberneticos> Accessed 19 April 2011.
670 This was in  line with the stance taken in the US. See Section 2 of Chapter 3 for a discussion about  the attempt to 
criminalise virtual child pornography in the US.
671  They mentioned that the child  should be real, i.e. ‘de carne e osso’, (see pages 204 and 207)  but also that the 
harm could be posed to the ideal child, i.e. ‘bem tutelado é a honra’, (see page 367) at 'Relatório Final da Comissão 
Parlamentar de Inquérito. Criada por meio do Requerimento nº 2, de 2005-CN, “com o objetivo de investigar e apurar 
a utilização da Internet para a prática de crimes de ‘pedofilia’, bem como a relação desses crimes com o crime 
organizado”', (Brasília-DF: Senado Federal do Brasil, 2011) at <http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/comissoes/
comissao.asp?origem=SF&com=1422>, accessed 20 April 2011.
672 Projeto de Lei do Senado No. 100 de 2010 - Altera a Lei No. 8.069 de 13 de julho de 1990 (Estatuto da Criança e 
do  Adolescente), para prever a infiltração de agentes da polícia na Internet com o fim de investigar crimes contra a 
liberdade sexual de crianças ou adolescentes (2010). at <http://www.senado.gov.br>,  accessed 13 May 2011.
prior judicial authorisation to be conducted, but even with this safeguard, such a legislative 
proposal might  be violating key principles of the Brazilian criminal code (i.e. the crime was 
impossible to be committed, because there was no child involved but  rather a covert police 
officer; and the police was arguably motivating the alleged offender to produce criminal 
evidence against him/her). It has implications not only for the control of online grooming 
offences but also for limiting access to child pornography if distributed via closed online 
groups.
2.2.2 State-regulation: the criminal liability of online intermediaries
The 2008 Law established that  private parties (i.e. the relevant online intermediaries) were 
criminally liable for hosting or providing access to child pornographic content  hosted 
domestically if, after being ‘officially notified,’ they failed to make the content inaccessible.673 
This provision established the limits of criminal liability of online intermediaries and the legal 
framework for the notice of take down regime but only in relation to child pornography hosted 
in Brazil. There were no further explanations about  what official notification meant, nor which 
private actors was the law targeting (i.e. whether content service, hosting service or Internet 
service providers).674  During the parliamentary discussion prior to the approval of the 2008 
Law, representatives of the Internet industry lobbied to include the term ‘official notification’ 
instead of ‘general communication.’ This was because the latter could potentially be used by 
any member of the public (and thus increased the costs of a reporting scheme on the part  of the 
service provider), whereas the former term meant  an act of recognised institutions, for example 
law enforcement agencies and Internet  hotlines (so only a few institutions would be able to 
notify the relevant content to the service provider).
There was no comprehensive national legislation to regulate the activities of online 
intermediaries in Brazil in general, as there is in other jurisdictions.675  Resolution of conflicts 
were generally guided by civil and criminal legislation about telecommunications and 
broadcasting services. Nevertheless, there were bills under parliamentary discussion in this 
regard.
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673 See art. 241-A, §2˚. Lei No. 11.829, de 25 de novembro de 2008. Altera a Lei No. 8.069, de 13 de julho de 1990 - 
Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente, para aprimorar o combate à produção, venda e distribuição de pornografia 
infantil, bem como criminalizar a aquisição e a posse de tal material  e outras condutas relacionadas à pedofilia na 
internet. 2008 (Brazil) This is  in line with the provisions found at EU Directive on Electronic Commerce 2000 
(DIRECTIVE 2000/31/EC, 08 June 2000). See Chapter 3.
674  For a description of services provided by online intermediaries, see Reed, C., Internet  Law: Text and Materials 
(2nd edn.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) See also Edwards, L., 'The Fall and Rise of Intermediary 
Liability Online', in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds.), Law and the Internet (3rd edn.; Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2009), 47-88.
675 See Chapter 3 about the legal liability of online intermediaries in the EU.
For example, the Bill N. 494/2008676  aimed to regulate the activities of online intermediaries 
(including preservation of access logs, disclosure to law enforcement agencies and a number of 
obligations and sanctions) in relation to online child pornography criminal investigations. This 
bill derived from the discussions that  led to the agreement  negotiated between law enforcement 
authorities and a number of telcos and backbone providers in 2008 during the CPI sessions.
Another example was the 2010 Marco Civil Bill.677  This legislative proposal established a 
number of general principles for the online environment and the rights of Internet users in 
Brazil, particularly the legal liability of online intermediaries and a general notice and take 
down scheme for problematic online content  hosted domestically. The bill has been proposed by 
the federal government  (the Brazilian Ministry of Justice in a partnership with the think tank 
‘Fundação Getúlio Vargas’)678  and was under discussion by the public at large before it  was 
submitted to the Parliament. The discussion so far has made evident the political struggle 
between those for and against  online content regulation. On one side were the Internet  industry 
and civil liberties activists (refusing any or allowing little governmental regulation of the 
Internet) and, on the other side, there were law enforcement and governmental authorities 
(trying to put in place a number of regulatory measures). Article 20 of the bill established a 
general principle of legal liability of online intermediaries in relation to problematic content:
The Internet service provider can only be held responsible for the content  produced by 
third parties if, after a judicial notification, it does not take the measures within the time 
requested, to make such content unaccessible.679
For Thompson, the proposed article established an indiscriminate legal immunity of online 
intermediaries and placed a heavy burden on the judicial system. He points out  that  there were 
no safeguards to protect  free speech and the proposed scheme disincentives the establishment 
and enforcement  of terms of service (under the constitutional provisions) by private actors.680  If 
the bill becomes law, this may have implications in a number of issues discussed here: (i) the 
existing agreements negotiated since 2005 in relation to child pornographic content; (ii) for the 
monitoring being currently conducted by the online intermediaries; (iii) for the parliamentary 
discussion of the Bill N. 494/2008 about  the investigatory powers of law enforcement 
authorities; and, perhaps, also (iv) for the notification system put  into place via the 2008 Law in 
relation to child pornographic content.
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676  See Projeto de Lei do Senado, No. 494 de 2008 - Disciplina a forma, os prazos e os meios  de preservação e 
transferência de dados informáticos mantidos  por  fornecedores  de serviço a autoridades públicas, para fins de 
investigação de crimes praticados contra crianças e adolescentes, e dá outras providências. (2008). at <http://
www.senado.gor.br>,  accessed 26 April 2011.
677 Marco Civil da Internet (2010). at <http://culturadigital.br/marcocivil/>,  accessed 26 April 2011.
678 There has been substantial lobby from telcos  and Internet companies e.g. Google Brasil around the bill to limit the 
regulation of online intermediaries in Brazil to a minimum. This Marco Civil  Bill was considered by some to be a 
counter-reaction against  a highly criticised bill about  cybercrime regulation, the Projeto de Lei No. 84 de 1999. 
Dispõe sobre os crimes cometidos na área de informática, suas penalidades e dá outras providências. (1999). at 
<http://www.camara.gov.br/internet/sileg/Prop_Detalhe.asp?id=15028>,  accessed 18 April 2011.
679 See Marco Civil da Internet (2010). at <http://culturadigital.br/marcocivil/>,  accessed 26 April 2011.
680 Thompson, M., 'Problemas Fundamentais  do Marco - Marcelo Thompson @ Cultura Digital', (Brasília-DF, Brasil, 
2010) at <http://culturadigital.br/marcelothompson/>, accessed 13 March 2012. See also Thompson, M., 'The 
Insensitive Internet – Brazil and the Judicialization of Pain', unpublished,  (2010).
2.2.3 Multi-state regulation: the international laws
Brazil signed the 2000 UN Optional Protocol681  on 06 September 2000 and ratified it  without 
reservations on 27 January 2004.682 The ratification updated the 2003 Law’s definition of child 
pornography and paved the way for future criminalisation of possession as well as the 
implementation of other measures in the 2008 Law, which generally followed the international 
legislative developments. 
Nevertheless, Brazil was not  a signatory to the 2001 CoE’s Cybercrime Convention.683 
Although the Senate CPI suggested that Brazil should ratify the Convention,684  the Brazilian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that  this would demand substantial changes in national 
criminal laws and thus another international convention ought to be designed instead, so as to 
reflect the views of a wider international community.685  Brazil decided therefore not to sign the 
2001 CoE’s Cybercrime Convention because it  was not consulted during its formulation 
process. It  was pursuing instead another cybercrime treaty, under the United Nations authority, 
whose discussions were being held at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
in Vienna.686 This illustrates the limitations of multi-state regulation to tackle the problem of not 
only child pornographic content but cybercrime generally at the international level.687
2.3 Regulatory policies
The major problem that  regulators had to face in relation to limiting the access to child 
pornographic content  until the mid-2005 in Brazil has been mainly the availability of such 
material in commercial and non-commercial websites hosted overseas but  produced, distributed 
or accessed by people in Brazil. There was also material found in public websites hosted in 
Brazil but  this was not the key concern. Of course, other online platforms (for example 
anonymised P2P, FTP, real-time messaging systems etc.) are used to access child pornography 
but these have been outside the regulatory measures discussed above because it was a matter of 
police investigation.
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681 UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child  Pornography 2000 (adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by  General Assembly 
resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000, entered into force on 18 January 2002) (United Nations). See the list of 
rat i f icat ions at  ht tp: / / t reat ies .un.org/Pages/ViewDetai ls .aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-
c&chapter=4&lang=en . Accessed on 20 June 2011.
682  The ratification was via the Decreto No. 5.007 de 08 de março de 2004. Promulga o Protocolo Facultativo à 
Convenção sobre os  Direitos da Criança referente à venda de crianças, à prostituição  infantil e à pornografia infantil. 
2004 (entered into force on 08 March 2004) (Brasil).
683  Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 2001 (opened for signature on 23/11/2001, entered into force on 
01/07/2004, CETS No. 185, Budapest) .
684  See p. 313 at 'Relatório Final  da Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito. Criada por meio do Requerimento nº 2, de 
2005-CN, “com o objetivo de investigar e apurar a utilização da Internet para a prática de crimes  de ‘pedofilia’, bem 
como a relação desses crimes com o crime organizado”', (Brasília-DF: Senado Federal do Brasil, 2011) at  <http://
www.senado.gov.br/atividade/comissoes/comissao.asp?origem=SF&com=1422>, accessed 20 April 2011.
685  See Harley, B., 'A Global Convention on Cybercrime?' The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 
(2010); <http://www.stlr.org/2010/03/a-global-convention-on-cybercrime/> accessed 29 August 2010.
686  See UNODC, 'Open-ended intergovernmental  expert group to conduct a comprehensive study of the problem of 
cybercrime. Vienna, 17-21 January  2011', at <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/expert-group-to-conduct-study-
cybercrime-jan-2011.html>, accessed 17 March 2012.
687 See Section 4 of Chapter 3 for the limitations of multi-state regulation tackling online child pornography.
Against this background, the Brazilian Internet industry had little involvement  helping to tackle 
the problem until 2005, amidst  no comprehensive national legislation to regulate the operation 
of online intermediaries, a pro-self regulatory discourse that was never implemented, and a 
permanent struggle by these online intermediaries to avoid any costs involved in implementing 
regulatory measures. The intergovernmental body CGI.br had also little involvement as 
discussed above.
In order to address the failure of both domestic state legislation and Internet industry self-
regulation, the Federal Public Prosecution Service MPF-SP, the Internet hotline Safernet  Brasil, 
and later, the Senate CPI employed a concerted action to update domestic anti-child 
pornography legislation and bring private actors into line after the late-2005 so as to facilitate 
the reporting and removal of content, identification of alleged offenders and preservation of 
evidence. This concerted action involved a number of regulatory initiatives and implications 
that are described below.
2.3.1 Agreements negotiated with online intermediaries after 2005
The MPF-SP 688 has received since 2003 a number of complaints from members of the public 
about the availability of criminal content on the Internet in Brazil. Given the lack of a 
comprehensive legislated framework to regulate the activities of online intermediaries in 
Brazil,689  the MPF-SP negotiated agreements with major online intermediaries (i.e. Universo 
On-line, Internet Group do Brasil Ltda. IG, Terra Networks Brasil S.A., AOL Brasil, Click 21 
Comércio de Publicidade Ltda. and the ABRANET) in the State of São Paulo in November 2005 
to facilitate criminal investigations.690  This agreement established a number of soft obligations 
against these private actors. These obligations were to develop reporting mechanisms, to adjust 
their terms of service, to inform law enforcement  authorities when any illegal activity was 
found, to keep access’ logs for at least  six months and to develop public awareness initiatives. 
Nevertheless, there were no sanctions for non-compliance but  only the potential threat of legal 
action from the MPF-SP. Following this agreement, a number of others were negotiated in 
similar terms around Brazil after November 2005.691
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688  The Federal Public Prosecution Service in the State of São Paulo. (‘Ministério Público Federal de São Paulo’). 
See MPF-SP, 'Procuradoria da República em São Paulo. Grupo de Combate aos Crimes Cibernéticos', at <http://
www.prsp.mpf.gov.br/noticias-prsp/crimes-ciberneticos>, accessed 27 April 2011.
689 This was the argument  put  forward by the MPF-SP  to justify the use of agreements. See p. 164 at 'Relatório Final 
da Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito. Criada por meio do Requerimento nº 2, de 2005-CN, “com o objetivo de 
investigar e apurar a utilização da Internet para a prática de crimes de ‘pedofilia’, bem como a relação desses crimes 
com o crime organizado”', (Brasília-DF: Senado Federal do Brasil, 2011) at <http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/
comissoes/comissao.asp?origem=SF&com=1422>, accessed 20 April 2011.
690  See Termo de Compromisso de integração operacional celebrado entre o MPF-SP e os principais provedores de 
acesso de São Paulo. (2005). MPF-SP, São Pauloat <http://www.prsp.mpf.gov.br/prdc/area-de-atuacao/direitos-
humanos/dhumint/Crimes%20contra%20Direitos%20Humanos%20-%20Termo%20de%20Compromisso
%20celebr.pdf> accessed 31 August 2010.
691 The use of agreements, not  legislation, by law enforcement  authorities to bring online intermediaries into line has 
also been used in the US. See 'Attorney General Cuomo and Facebook Announce New Model to Protect Children 
Online', (New York: Office of the Attorney General, 2007) at <http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2007/oct/
oct16a_07.html> Accessed 29 April 2011. See also 'Attorney General Cuomo takes legal  action against social 
networking site that  ignores proliferation of child pornography', (New York, NY: Office of the Attorney General, 
2008) at <http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2010/june10b_10.html> Accessed 11 April 2011.
The Safernet Brasil accumulated a number of complaints from the public about the availability 
of child pornographic content in Brazil. In January 2006, the institution informed the 
ABRANET,692 a major Brazilian Internet service providers association, and a number of online 
intermediaries operating in the country (e.g. Microsoft, UOL, Terra and Google Brasil) about 
the existence of alleged child pornographic content hosted in theirs servers; the intention was to 
remove the reported material and create a permanent  channel of communication with these 
companies for future reports.
Around 80% of the reports received were in relation to alleged criminal content hosted in 
Google’s Orkut.693 Although the company eventually removed the content reported, it refused to 
disclose the access’ logs and users’ data to law enforcement authorities, even when there was a 
judicial order. Google Brasil argued that the requested information was hosted in the US and 
thus outside the reach of the Brazilian jurisdiction and, that  the Google Brasil was only a public 
relations office. This argument  did not convince the MPF-SP which argued that  Google Brasil 
should be subject to the Brazilian laws and gave the example of other US companies (such as 
Yahoo! Inc. and Microsoft) which were able to provide these data when requested by the 
courts694  or under law enforcement authorities request  (in the case of access’ logs but  not 
content of private communications).695  In fact, the Internet  Industry Association ABRANET 
declared that  a number of online intermediaries in Brazil already disclose access’ information 
(not content of private communications) to law enforcement authorities without a court order.696
The process of bringing online intermediaries into line via agreements led a number of private 
actors to develop content monitoring and removal mechanisms of their own without 
constitutional scrutiny nor transparency. For example, News Corp.’s MySpace declared that 
they monitor the pictures uploaded by users to their servers, operate automated filters (e.g. 
based on hash values derived from images previously analysed by humans) and disclose access 
logs to law enforcement  authorities without  the need of a court order. Similarly, Microsoft 
declared that  they disclose the access logs when requested by law enforcement authorities 
without  a judicial order. The Brazilian company UOL declared that  they had permanent staff 
dedicated to analyse the content  of webpages created by its customers and that  it  has developed 
automated systems to monitor and block access to alleged illegal content  posted by users.697 
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692 ABRANET, 'Associação Brasileira de Internet', at <http://www.abranet.org.br/>, accessed 30 August 2010.
693  A number of Orkut’s profiles and communities allegedly hosting child pornographic content were already 
intensively reported to the MPF-SP before the Safernet Brasil joined efforts with this federal agency.
694  See p 35 at 'Notas taquigráficas da audiência pública realizada no dia 26 de abril de 2006 sobre utilização da 
Internet como instrumento para a prática de crimes', (Brasília-DF: Comissão de Direitos Humanos e Minorias da 
Câmara dos Deputados, 2006) at  <http://www2.camara.gov.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-
permanentes/cdhm/notas-taquigraficas/nt26042006.pdf> Accessed 20 April 2011.
695  It  has also been reported  that companies such as Microsoft and Yahoo! disclose access’  data to law enforcement 
agencies without a court order. See p 20 at Ibid  .
696 See p 37 at Ibid  .
697 See the testimony of the News Corps Inc., Microsoft  and UOL’s representatives at p 129-37, CPI, 'Relatório Final 
da Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito. Criada por meio do Requerimento nº 2, de 2005-CN, “com o objetivo de 
investigar e apurar a utilização da Internet para a prática de crimes de ‘pedofilia’, bem como a relação desses crimes 
com o crime organizado”', (Brasília-DF: Senado Federal do Brasil, 2011) at <http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/
materia/getPDF.asp?t=85380&tp=1>, accessed 20 April 2011.
This suggests that  online intermediaries started to operate internal procedures of content 
analysis without  proper legislative oversight  and transparency after being threatened by law 
enforcement authorities under the terms of the agreements mentioned above.
2.3.2 Agreement negotiated with Google Brasil in 2008
Google Brasil has insistently refused from 2005 to disclose any access logs of Brazilian 
nationals producing, distributing or accessing child pornographic content, available in its social 
network system Orkut, to law enforcement authorities even when the authorities had a court 
order requesting such information.698  Nevertheless, Google Brasil finally disclosed the 
information requested by courts to law enforcement  authorities in April 2008699 and negotiated 
an agreement for further cooperation with the MPF-SP during the CPI session on 02 July 
2008.700 
Amongst other measures to facilitate the identification of alleged offenders for criminal 
investigation, Google Brasil agreed to: (i) follow future court orders; (ii) to inform the MPF-SP 
about any illegal material they find in Orkut; (iii) to remove access to any material reported by 
law enforcement authorities and preserve the evidence; (iv) to perform content  analysis of 
material uploaded by users (i.e. automated ex ante filtering via hash values of illegal images 
previously reported); (v) to develop proactive monitoring initiatives; (vi) to perform human 
content analysis of reports sent  by the Safernet Brasil; (vii) to remove the alleged illegal 
external links; (viii) and to close the account  of users found to be distributing illegal content in 
Orkut. Google Brasil has developed a number of proactive content monitoring initiatives such 
as filtering technologies that automatically: (i) detect  suspicious images or symbols within 
images; (ii) remove alleged illegal hypertext links; and (iii) detect suspicious text associated 
with child pornographic content.701  The range of obligations was clearly much larger when 
compared to agreements negotiated by private actors in 2005, and this was perhaps a result of 
the long lasting defiance showed by Google Brasil to Brazilian law enforcement authorities.
2.3.3 Agreement negotiated with telcos, backbone providers and other private actors in 2008
Soon after Google Brasil disclosed the information requested by law enforcement authorities in 
April 2008, the CPI created a task-force to analyse the information provided and found another 
160
698 Google Brasil eventually removed alleged illegal material once notified. The MPF-SP  argued that the issues with 
Google Brasil were five: (i) preservation of access logs; (ii) preservation of evidence and immediate notification to 
law enforcement agencies; (iii) monitoring of private communities;  (iv) provision of a costumer service to report 
child pornographic content; and (v) developing systems to monitor and automatically block access alleged illegal 
content. See p 165-9 at Ibid, .
699 In fact, Google Brasil  also disclosed the information requested by courts in other previous occasions. See p  625 at 
Ibid, .
700 See the English version of this  agreement at Term of Adjustment of Conduct settled between the MPF and  Google 
Brasil (2008). CPI da Pedoflia, Brasília-DF at <http://www.prsp.mpf.gov.br/crimes-ciberneticos/
GoogleTAC_english_version.pdf/at_download/file> accessed 27 August 2010.
701  See p 674 and 720 at  CPI, 'Relatório Final  da Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito. Criada por meio do 
Requerimento nº 2, de 2005-CN, “com o objetivo de investigar e apurar a utilização da Internet  para a prática de 
crimes de ‘pedofilia’, bem como a relação desses crimes com o crime organizado”', (Brasília-DF: Senado Federal do 
Brasil, 2011) at <http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/getPDF.asp?t=85380&tp=1>, accessed 20 April 2011.
problem. The massive volume of information, handed to law enforcement authorities by Google 
Brasil, lead to numerous judicial requests issued to telcos, backbone providers and other 
intermediaries so as to identify alleged offenders. These companies disclosed the information 
requested three months later but it  was generally inconsistent, ambiguous, invalid or even 
blatantly wrong; there was no legislation in Brazil requiring online intermediaries to keep 
accurate access’ logs and personal data of Internet users. This led the CPI to compel these 
companies to employ common standards in relation to content removal procedures, 
identification of users, and preservation of access logs and the reported content to be used by 
law enforcement authorities whenever requested.
As a result, another agreement was proposed and negotiated by a number of private actors 
during the CPI session of 12 December 2008. This agreement was negotiated between law 
enforcement authorities and online intermediaries more closely related to the Internet 
infrastructure (i.e. Telemar Norte Leste S.A., Brasil Telecom S.A., and Tim  Celular S.A.), but the 
terms of the agreement included online content  services provided by some of these companies. 
Amongst other things, the agreement  established that companies were required to: (i) keep 
access logs and personal users’ data for three years (ISPs) and six months (hosting service and 
content service providers); (ii) disclose access logs, personal users’ data and content of 
communications to law enforcement  authorities whenever requested and only by judicial order; 
(iii) disclose access logs and personal users’ data to law enforcement authorities without the 
need of a judicial order;702  (iv) develop a permanent  channel to receive such requests from law 
enforcement authorities; (v) record the contents of communication whenever requested by law 
enforcement authorities and disclose them only by judicial order; (vi) inform law enforcement 
authorities about any child pornographic found in their servers, disable access and keep the 
relevant criminal evidence; and (vii) develop a number of public safety awareness measures.703
Some companies negotiated the agreement  as it was originally proposed by the CPI, but  other 
companies (albeit from the same economic group) decided to commission an independent legal 
analysis to assess the constitutionality of the agreement before following suit. The legal analysis 
commissioned by a few reluctant companies highlighted a number of important  issues.704  First, 
it  argued that Brazilian authorities were forcing the companies to act in ways that were not 
based on existing law. Second, it  pointed out that  the Senate CPI had no constitutional authority 
to impose such obligations and sanctions. Third, it  considered many of the provisions unlawful, 
because they forced content  providers to handle access logs and users’ data (not the contents of 
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702 In the case of both (ii) and (iii) the companies were prohibited to inform the particular user/s about these requests. 
The agreement also established  the period of time the companies must provide the requested information:  (1) within 
02  hours, whenever there was an imminent  life-threatening situation posed to a child; (2) within 24 hours, whenever 
there was a life-threatening situation posed to a child; (3) within 72 hours, for all other situations.
703 See Termo de Mútua Cooperação  celebrado entre as prestadoras de serviços de telecomunicações, de provimento 
de acesso à Internet, a CPI da Pedofilia e outros. (2008). CPI da Pedofilia, Brasília-DF, Brasil at  <http://
www.safernet.org.br/site/sites/default/files/Teles.pdf> accessed 31 August 2010.
704  See the legal analysis commissioned by these companies at  Sundfeld, C. A., 'Parecer jurídico redigido a pedido 
das companhias Empresa Brasileira de Telecomunicações S.A. (Embratel), Telecomunicações de São Paulo S.A. 
(Telesp), Claro S.A., Vivo S.A. e Terra Networks Brasil S.A.', (São Paulo-SP, 2009) at <http://www.senado.gov.br/
atividade/comissoes/comissao.asp?origem=SF&com=1422>, accessed 20 April 2011.
the communication) to law enforcement  authorities without  a court order. In addition, the 
document criticised the role of Safernet  Brasil, because it considered the Internet  hotline a non-
governmental institution undertaking a public function without a proper legislative mandate and 
without  any wide public scrutiny.705  This legal challenge led to a few changes in the original 
agreement; but  in the end, all remaining companies invited to the CPI sessions negotiated the 
agreement in August 2009, without challenging the Senate CPI in the courts.
The challenge made by these online intermediaries and the overall reluctance to accept  the 
regulatory mechanisms proposed were also motivated by the costs involved in implementing 
such measures in practice. The private actors did not  want to bear these costs, but to use public 
funds for such regulatory enterprise. As such, the opposition made against the agreement was to 
politically make the case, to a large extent, for the use of public funds if any online regulatory 
structure was to be implemented.
2.3.4 Agreement negotiated with online payment systems in 2009
Although child pornography can be produced and exchanged for non-commercial motives,706 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that  the annual market value of child 
pornography is of about US$250 million,707  and that the groups involved increasingly use 
complex payment schemes that  enable anonymous payment and make it  difficult  for the police 
to trace the money-flow back to offenders.708  Nevertheless, part  of the problem can be 
addressed because child pornography commercial vendors can have their merchant  account 
unregistered if their commercial websites are reported to the relevant online payment system.
In order to target overseas websites providing access to online child pornographic material upon 
payment, the CPI decided to target the online payment systems operating in Brazil.709 In August 
2009, it proposed another agreement so as to require the online payment systems (e.g. Visa, 
Mastercard, Amex etc.) to unregister the websites and merchant accounts reported by Safernet 
Brasil as allegedly selling child pornography as well as to preserve evidence for criminal 
investigations.710 The Brazilian initiative aimed to limit access to commercially driven websites 
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705 See p 912-13 at CPI, 'Relatório Final da Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito. Criada por meio do Requerimento nº 
2, de 2005-CN, “com o objetivo de investigar e apurar a utilização da Internet para a prática de crimes de ‘pedofilia’, 
bem como a relação desses crimes com o crime organizado”', (Brasília-DF: Senado Federal do Brasil, 2011) at 
<http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/getPDF.asp?t=85380&tp=1>, accessed 20 April 2011.
706 See Section 1 of Chapter 3 about online child pornography.
707 The UNODC Report however did not explain in detail how it produced these figures.
708  See ch 10.2 about child pornography in UNODC, 'The Globalization of Crime: a transnational organized crime 
threat assessment', (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010) at <http://www.unodc.org/documents/
data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf>, accessed 13 March 2012, p 211-18.
709  The use of payment  schemes to access child pornography on the Internet  was also discussed earlier during a 
Senate public session on 04 July 2007. See p 38 at 'Ata da 21a Reunião da Comissão de Constituição, Justiça e 
Cidadania em conjunto  com a 19a Reunião da Comissão de Ciência, Tecnologia, Inovação, Comunicação e 
Informática do Senado Federal, 04 de julho de 2007', (Brasília-DF, Brasil: Senado Federal, 2007) at <http://
www.senado.gov.br> Accessed 13 March 2012.
710 See Termo de Mútua Cooperação celebrado entre as empresas associadas da ABECS, a CPI da Pedofilia e outros. 
(2008). CPI da Pedofilia, Brasília-DF, Brasil  at <http://www.safernet.org.br/site/sites/default/files/abecs.pdf> 
accessed 31 August 2010.
hosted overseas, but available in Brazil, which depended on these payment systems to operate. 
Generally this initiative followed the same approach taken by the US Financial Coalition 
Against Child Pornography.711
2.3.5 Agreements to establish a national reporting scheme after 2008
Google Brasil and Safernet  Brasil negotiated an agreement  in July 2008 in relation to the 
reporting system for child pornography found in Orkut webpages.712 The agreement established 
that Google Brasil was responsible to: (i) receive a daily list  of Orkut-related URLs allegedly 
hosting child pornography from the Safernet Brasil; (ii) perform the analysis of the material 
reported; (iii) remove access to the material and preserve the evidence for future investigation713 
if alleged child pornography is found; and (iv) report back to both Safernet  Brasil and the MPF-
SP. Google Brasil also agreed to perform proactive monitoring of content  (using hashing values 
of images already found or known and employing these values to automatically filter images 
uploaded by Orkut users). The daily list  of Orkut-related webpages were reported by Safernet 
Brasil to a permanent  staff of content analysts from Google Brasil. In addition, members of the 
public could also report these webpages to Google Brasil. After assessing these reports, Google 
Brasil was required to notify both law enforcement authorities and Safernet  Brasil if any alleged 
child pornographic material was actually found.
Similar agreements have been negotiated amongst Safernet  Brasil, Federal and State Public 
Prosecution Services, Federal Government agencies and private parties to develop a nationwide 
reporting scheme in relation to child pornographic material available on the Internet.714  All 
reported websites (except those related to Orkut  webpages which are assessed by the Google 
Brasil staff) were forwarded to a single database of reports, created and maintained by Safernet 
Brasil.
If child pornographic material was found and it was hosted in Brazil, the online intermediary 
(e.g. the content service, hosting service or Internet service provider, including the online 
payment  systems) was notified and a report was forwarded to the relevant  law enforcement 
authority to start  a criminal investigation, under the terms of agreements mentioned above. The 
Safernet Brasil reported that only 2% of websites reported were found to be hosted in Brazil.
If child pornographic material was found and it  was hosted overseas, the Brazilian Federal 
Police was notified, and also (i) the relevant  overseas Internet  hotline, if any in the country 
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711  See FCACP, 'Financial  Coalition Against Child Pornography', at <http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/
servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=3703>, accessed 09 June 2010.
712  See e.g. Termo de Cooperação celebrado entre a Safernet Brasil e a Google Brasil Internet  Ltda. (2008). 
SAFERNET, São Paulo-SP, Brasil at <http://www.safernet.org.br/site/institucional/parcerias/google> accessed 31 
August  2010. See also SAFERNET, 'Parceria com a Google Brasil', at <http://www.safernet.org.br/site/institucional/
parcerias/google>, accessed 17 March 2012.
713 The evidence was preserved for 180 days and disclosed only via judicial order.
714 See e.g. the agreement negotiated between the Safernet Brasil  and the Ministry of Justice at  Termo de Cooperação 
Técnica, Científica e Operacional celebrado entre a SEDH-MJ e a Safernet Brasil  e outros (2008). SEDH-MJ, 
Brasília-DF, Brasil at <http://www.safernet.org.br/site/sites/default/files/SEDHDPF.pdf> accessed 31 August 2010.
where the material was hosted; or (ii) the embassy of the country where the material was hosted. 
This investigation found no evidence that filtering of websites was performed voluntarily at the 
ISP-level. There were however online content filtering software available for individual users.
It  was not  only members of the public who were able to report child pornography available on 
the Internet. A number of governmental bodies, NGOs and law enforcement authorities have 
online reporting mechanisms that fed the centralised national database of reports. In addition, 
the Internet  hotline Safernet Brasil did not have a monopoly on receiving, processing and 
forwarding reports in relation to child pornographic content available on the Internet. 
Nevertheless, it was the key institution responsible for such task without a clear legislative 
mandate for doing so. 
The operation of Safernet  Brasil has been based on Article 5(§3) of the amended Brazilian 
Criminal Processual Code,715  which allows for any member of the public to report certain 
offences (including child pornography) to the law enforcement  authority without  any special 
requirements. In addition, the 2008 Law legitimised the operation of Safernet Brasil, under 
Article 241-B(§2)II,716  which provided a legal defence for a possession offence when 
possession was necessary to report the material and, it  was done by institutions created, 
according to the law, to receive, process and forward reports to law enforcement authorities. 
Against this background, Safernet Brasil has taken part  in major national debates around the 
problem of online child pornography, acquired substantial expertise about the theme, created 
and maintained so far the national database of reports, and established a series of agreements in 
relation to the reporting scheme that  placed the institution as a well-know Internet  hotline for 
child pornography in Brazil.
Nevertheless, there has been a row between the Federal Public Prosecution Service MPF-SP  and 
Safernet  Brasil. The MPF-SP has complained that Safernet Brasil has not forwarded a number 
of reports in relation to child pornographic websites to the MPF-SP, following an exclusivity 
clause negotiated in a 2006 agreement. In June 2010, Safernet  Brasil argued that: (i) these 
reports were not  forwarded directly to the MPF-SP but  to the CPI Commission (where the MPF-
SP has a seat); (ii) around 4,000 reports forwarded by Safernet Brasil (from July 2008 to April 
2010) have not been actioned by the MPF-SP; and also (iii) requested a meeting to discuss these 
issues further with the MPF-SP.717 In November 2010, the MPF-SP published a technical report 
and claimed that  Safernet Brasil was (i) unable to process the volume of reports it received and 
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715 Código de Processo Penal. Decreto-Lei No. 3.689, de 03/10/41. 1941 (Brazil).
716 Lei No. 11.829, de 25 de novembro de 2008. Altera a Lei No. 8.069, de 13 de julho de 1990 - Estatuto da Criança 
e do Adolescente, para aprimorar o combate à produção, venda e distribuição de pornografia infantil, bem como 
criminalizar a aquisição e a posse de tal material e outras condutas relacionadas à pedofilia na internet. 2008 (Brazil).
717 SAFERNET, 'Ofício  n. 0017/2010/SAFERNET Brasil referente ao cumprimento do termo de cooperação firmado 
entre a SaferNet e a PR/SP', (São Paulo-SP, Brasil: Safernet Brasil, 2010) at <http://www.safernet.org.br>, accessed 
13 March 2012.
(i) provided inconsistent  statistics about the reports processed along its operation. Subsequently, 
the MPF-SP ended the 2006 agreement with Safernet Brasil on 12 November 2010.718
There were two agreements where the MPF-SP and Safernet Brasil are parties: (i) one was 
negotiated in 2006, in relation to the reporting scheme and the exclusivity clause (Clause 3B) to 
receive all reports processed by Safernet  Brasil;719  and (ii) another was negotiated in 2008, in 
relation to Google’s Orkut alleged child pornographic webpages.720  As a result, although the 
2006 agreement has ended, the 2008 agreement about the reporting scheme for Google’s Orkut 
webpages remained valid.
It  seemed that  the MPF-SP had the intention to centralise the reporting scheme nationwide 
irrespective of the legitimacy of other law enforcement  authorities to undertake this activity and 
it was not in Safernet’s interests to follow an exclusivity clause with the MPF-SP, because the 
hotline has been settling agreements with other law enforcement and government bodies in 
other regions of Brazil. Following these mutual accusations and the end of the 2006 agreement, 
Safernet  Brasil kept  forwarding reports it  received and processed to other law enforcement 
authorities, e.g. the Brazilian Federal Police and seven Federal Public Prosecution Services 
across the country.
2.3.6 The regulatory initiatives: self, state and multi-state, and hybrid regulation
A number of regulatory measures have been employed gradually since 2005 to limit  access to 
child pornographic content  available on the Internet  in Brazil. These measures derived to a large 
extent  from agreements negotiated between law enforcement authorities and private actors. 
Along these agreements, substantial changes have been made in federal legislation both in 
relation to anti-chid pornography offences per se and the establishment of a NTD scheme for 
online child pornographic material.721
The 2008 Law added a definition of child pornography which was in line with the international 
legislative developments and criminalised the possession of child pornography. It  criminalised 
the pseudo-photographs but the person depicted in the material had to be a real child. As such, 
cartoon imagery and texts were arguably not covered by existing criminal law in Brazil.722  The 
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718 See MPF-SP, 'Nota Pública: MPF rescinde Termo de Cooperação com Safernet', (São Paulo-SP:  MPF-SP, 2010) at 
<http://www.prsp.mpf.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/noticias_prsp/12-11-10-nota-publica-mpf-rescinde-termo-de-
cooperacao-com-safernet/> Accessed 29 April 2011. Nevertheless, the existing reporting scheme involving Google’s 
Orkut has not been altered.
719 Termo de Mútua Cooperação Técnica, Científica e Operacional que entre si  Celebram a Procuradoria da República 
no  Estado de São Paulo e a Safernet Brasil. 29 de março de 2006. (2006). São Paulo-SP, Brasilat <http://
www.safernet.org.br/site/sites/default/files/mpsp.pdf> accessed 17 March 2012.
720 Term of Adjustment of Conduct settled between the MPF and Google Brasil (2008). CPI da Pedoflia, Brasília-DF 
at <http://www.prsp.mpf.gov.br/crimes-ciberneticos/GoogleTAC_english_version.pdf/at_download/file> accessed 27 
August 2010.
721  Generally the federal entity had the monopoly to legislate in criminal matters in Brazil. See Article 22(I) of the 
Brazilian Federal Constitution. Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil 1988 (Brazil).
722  Although some may argue that texts could be an offence under Articles  286 and 287 of the Brazilian Criminal 
Code about incitement to commit  a crime and apology of a crime, respectively. See Código Penal. Decreto-Lei No. 
2.848, de 07/12/40. 1940 (Brasil).
act  of knowingly access online child pornography has not  been criminalised neither. In addition, 
the 2008 Law considers a child any person under the age of 18 and established a NTD scheme 
but only in relation to child pornography. Brazil ratified the 2000 UN Optional Protocol in 2004, 
but decided not to join the 2001 CoE’s Cybercrime Convention.
In addition, relevant legislative bills have been proposed. A legislative bill based on the 2008 
agreement  negotiated with the telcos and backbone providers was placed under parliamentary 
discussion to increase the regulation of online intermediaries, in relation to child pornographic 
content, so as to facilitate the immediate removal of the material hosted in the country, the 
identification of alleged offenders and the preservation of evidence. Although there were a 
cybercrime bill and another bill in relation to the regulation of online intermediaries, the anti-
child pornography laws have been enacted in advance.723 This seemed to reinforce the argument 
according to which the problem of online child pornography was being used by online 
regulators as a ‘soft spot’ to advance regulatory initiatives.724
Finally, these regulatory developments led private actors to be more concerned about  the 
content they hosted or distributed, particularly if of child pornographic nature. Following this, a 
number of content service and hosting service providers developed content monitoring and 
removal schemes of their own without any clear democratic scrutiny, transparency nor 
guidance. More importantly, these developments opened the discussion about a national 
legislative framework to regulate the activities of online intermediaries generally in relation to 
the content they hosted or distributed, and made evident  the intention of private actors to avoid 
the costs involved in the implementation of a regulatory structure.
2.3.7 The scope and mechanics of the regulatory model
The regulatory model implemented in Brazil to limit access to child pornography available on 
the Internet targeted online child pornography hosted in Brazil, or hosted overseas but  created, 
distributed or accessed by people Brazil; and it  was based to a large extent on agreements 
negotiated amongst law enforcement and government authorities, and private actors. The focus 
was mainly on commercial and non-commercial websites available in the public Internet. Child 
pornography accessed via other platforms were a mater of police investigation.
The notice and take down scheme in relation to child pornography was established via 
legislation in 2008 but the overall reporting scheme was based on private agreements and was 
largely maintained and operated by the Internet  hotline Safernet Brasil in partnership with 
online intermediaries, law enforcement authorities and a number of governmental bodies. The 
scheme was arguably able to remove alleged child pornographic material hosted in domestic 
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723  The 1999 Brazilian  Cybercrime Bill  is under Parliamentary discussion  since 1999, but the provisions related to 
child pornography were extracted from it and enacted via the 2008 Law. See Projeto  de Lei No. 84 de 1999. Dispõe 
sobre os crimes cometidos na área de informática, suas  penalidades e dá outras providências. (1999). at <http://
www.camara.gov.br/internet/sileg/Prop_Detalhe.asp?id=15028>,  accessed 18 April 2011.
724  Interestingly, although financial and property related cybercrimes had not advanced in terms of legislation, they 
used most resources from the Brazilian Federal Police in comparison to online child pornography investigations.
websites but ineffective to limit  access to websites hosted overseas. Child pornographic content 
hosted overseas was targeted via the traditional police channels (i.e. the reports were sent to 
Interpol via the Brazilian Federal Police or directly to foreign law enforcement authorities) and 
foreign Internet  hotlines, if any operating in the country where the material was hosted. There 
was no evidence that any filtering scheme was operating at the ISP-level in Brazil.
Online intermediaries, for example Internet content service, hosting service and service 
providers played important roles in the regulatory scheme. In addition to developing content 
monitoring schemes of their own, they negotiated a number of agreements in order to secure the 
immediate removal of alleged child pornographic material, report mandatorily any child 
pornographic material found to the relevant  law enforcement  authority, preserve evidence, and 
disclose information about  access’ logs and contents of communication to law enforcement 
authorities whenever required (pending a court  order in relation to the contents of a 
communication).
This section addressed the laws and regulations to limit access to child pornographic material 
available on the Internet in Brazil. First, it  explored the history of online content regulation in 
the country particularly in relation to child pornography. Second, it addressed domestic criminal 
laws tackling the production, distribution and possession of online child pornography in 
addition to the investigatory powers of law enforcement authorities. Third, it explored 
regulations in place to limit access to online child pornographic content, be it hosted in Brazil or 
overseas.
3 United Kingdom
This section addresses the laws and regulations implemented in the United Kingdom to limit 
access to online child pornography. It  covers not only state and multi-state regulation but 
relevant legal interpretations given by courts and regulatory policies put in place forcing online 
intermediaries to remove alleged child pornographic content  hosted within the jurisdiction and 
to block access to related websites hosted overseas. Subsection 3.1 provides an account  about 
how regulation against online child pornography has developed in the UK particularly after the 
creation of the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF)725  in 1996; the IWF was the Internet industry 
‘self-regulatory’ body created to tackle child pornographic material available on the Internet  in 
the United Kingdom. Subsequently, state and multi-state regulatory initiatives as well as 
relevant case law are covered in Subsection 3.2, and the overall regulatory framework is 
explored in detail in Subsection 3.3.
3.1 Historical context
167
725 IWF, 'Internet Watch Foundation - The UK Hotline for reporting illegal online content', at  <http://www.iwf.org.uk/
>, accessed 08 June 2011.
Generally, the problem of online child pornography gained substantial media visibility after 
1994 when a number of events occurred: the commercial Internet started to flourish in the UK; 
legislation was introduced to tackle pseudo-photographs and the making offences in relation to 
indecent photographs of children;726 the police operation Starburst took place; and the IWF was 
created. 
One of the initial concerns was in relation to child pornographic material available via domestic 
Usenet newsgroups.727  Such material was exchanged in a number of public feeds named with 
explicit  labels (e.g. alt.binaries.lolita) and this led to a joint response from the police and 
government against UK Internet service providers (ISPs) hosting these newsgroups. Following a 
meeting on 02 August  1996 between Scotland Yard and the Internet Service Providers 
Association (ISPA),728 the Chief Inspector of the Clubs and Vice Unit  at Charing Cross Police 
Station requested around 140 ISPs to remove alleged illegal material729  found in 133 
newsgroups hosted in their servers.730  The police and the government sent a straightforward 
message to the ISPs: if they did not  act promptly to tackle the problem of child pornographic 
content hosted on Usenet  newsgroups, there would be arrests and a call for legislation to 
regulate more closely the Internet  industry in the UK.731 There was a real danger of UK Internet 
industry senior management and directors being arrested and also a number of stories in British 
tabloids branding these executives as vile child pornography merchants.
Against this background, and under the leadership of the Internet  entrepreneur Peter Dowe, 
several companies set up the Safety-Net Foundation on September 1996 to report the 
availability of online child pornographic content to UK ISPs and thus avoid state intervention 
and criminal liability, i.e. instead of facing the threat of arrests and legislation, the Internet 
industry set up a self-regulatory body (i.e. an Internet hotline) to receive and examine reports 
concerning the availability of potentially criminal content  hosted in British servers.732  The 
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726 See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (c.33) 1994 (England and Wales).
727  Usenet was an Internet discussion system that may be considered a hybrid between email and online forum 
applications (i.e. usenet users are able to read and post articles to one or more categories which were threaded to other 
users and also stored on a web server).
728  The ISPA UK was founded in February 1996. See ISPA, 'Internet Service Providers' Association UK', at <http://
www.ispa.org.uk/home/>, accessed 29 June 2010.
729  It  has been claimed that  these Usenet feeds reported by the police contained not only child pornography related 
images but also mere textual references or even legal adult pornography. See Akdeniz, Y., 'Governing Pornography 
and Child Pornography on the Internet: The UK Approach', UWLALR, 32 (2001), 247 and also Petley, J., 'Web 
Control', Index on Censorship, 38(1) (2009), 78-90, p 83.
730 See generally  Akdeniz, Y., 'Who Watches the Watchmen - Part I: Internet  Content Rating Systems, and Privatised 
Censorship', Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties UK, 1997) at <http://www.cyber-rights.org/watchmen.htm>, accessed 
06  June 2011;  Akdeniz, Y., 'Who Watches the Watchmen - Part II:  Accountability & Effective Self-Regulation in the 
Information Age', Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties UK, 1998) at <http://www.cyber-rights.org/watchmen-ii.htm>, 
accessed 06 June 2011;  Akdeniz, Y., 'Who Watches the Watchmen - Part  III: ISP Capabilities for the Provision of 
Personal Information to the Police', Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties UK, 1999) at <http://www.cyber-rights.org/
privacy/watchmen-iii.htm>, accessed 06 June 2011; Akdeniz, Y., 'The Regulation of Pornography and Child 
Pornography on the Internet' The Journal of Information, Law and Technology 1(1997); <http://
www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1997_1/akdeniz1> accessed 08 June 2010.
731 Around the same time, the French police arrested  ISPs’  directors  and confiscated companies’  equipment on similar 
grounds and this sent a strong message to UK Internet industry.
732  Newey, A., 'Freedom of expression:  censorship in private hands', in Liberty (ed.), Liberating Cyberspace: Civil 
Liberties, Human Rights and the Internet (London: Pluto Press, 1999), p 32.
Safety-Net  Foundation was not the first  Internet hotline to be created; other initiatives appeared 
in Norway (Save the Children) and The Netherlands (Meldpunt)733 about the same time as non-
governmental organisations. The Safety-Net Foundation was renamed Internet  Watch 
Foundation in November 1996 and was subject  to governance and funding reforms in the 
following years so as to represent not only the UK Internet  industry but wider sectors of society. 
Some non-industry actors were involved from the very beginning of the hotline via the IWF 
Policy Board.
The initial policy addressing Usenet  newsgroups was not  proactive. Once a posting in individual 
newsgroups was reported to the IWF, the image was assessed and, if considered potentially 
illegal, the company hosting the newsgroup was notified about  the material. Nevertheless, this 
approach was only partially effective, because after removal, the material was posted again in 
another newsgroup. Because the IWF staff were only allowed to examine and act in relation to 
individual postings which had been reported to them by a third party, there was nothing that 
could be done; they had to wait  until the new posting was reported again. This situation led to a 
policy of automated monitoring which was widened in 2002 so as to implement the removal of 
the entire newsgroup if proved that an image had been found there on a regular basis, or if there 
was a suggestion of paedophilia content  in the groups’ name.734 Around 2002, the use of Usenet 
newsgroups was fading in importance in the UK and child pornographic content  was 
increasingly accessed via public websites hosted domestically or overseas. 
Generally, from 1996 to 2002, the IWF recommended UK online intermediaries to remove 
alleged child pornographic content by notice and this was in line with the general framework for 
the criminal liability of online intermediaries established via the 2000 EU Directive on 
Electronic Commerce.735 Overall, the notice and take down (NTD) regime implemented by the 
IWF was considered a successful initiative in removing child pornographic content hosted on 
UK servers. For example, since 2002, less than 1% of child pornographic content  reported to the 
IWF has been found available on websites hosted in the UK.736 Nevertheless, these figures took 
into account only the UK public websites reported to the IWF and thus, it  may be suggested 
that, these numbers night be higher than reported, because many websites or other online 
repositories hosted in the UK, be they public or closed, might go unreported on the hotline. In 
addition, these figures excluded child pornography available via other Internet  applications 
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733  'Meldpunt Kinderporno op internet', at  <http://www.meldpunt-kinderporno.nl/EN/default.htm>, accessed 29 
February 2012.
734  This zero tolerance measure proved to be controversial with free speech advocates, because entirely  legal 
newsgroups could have been removed irrespective of their actual  content. Nevertheless, the policy was implemented 
despite these concerns. This study was  unable to  find  whether claims of free speech activists were justified or simply 
hypothetical concerns that never really posed an issue. In any case, the measure seemed to be in  line with Section 
1(d) of Protection of Children Act (c.37) 1978 (England and Wales) which makes an  offence to publish or cause to  be 
published any advertisement likely to be understood as  conveying that the advertiser distributes or shows indecent 
photographs or pseudo-photographs of children, or intends to do so.
735 EU Directive on Electronic Commerce. DIRECTIVE 2000/31/EC, 08 June 2000 (European Union).
736  See IWF, 'Annual and Charity Report 2008', (Cambridge, UK: IWF, 2009) at <http://www.iwf.org.uk>, accessed 
07 June 2011.
(such as anonymised peer-to-peer, real-time messaging and closed online groups); these Internet 
applications were not covered by the IWF’s statistics.
In any case, however successful the NTD scheme might have been to tackle child pornographic 
content hosted domestically, such criminal content was still available via public websites hosted 
overseas and, in this case, the IWF had no authority to force a foreign online intermediary to 
take the relevant content  down nor was the conventional international police channel able to act 
expeditiously to remove the material hosted overseas once notified by the IWF.737 Against this 
background, a change in policy occurred in 2004 with the implementation of the IWF blocklist 
to limit  access to child pornography related websites hosted overseas but accessed from the 
United Kingdom. According to the scheme, the IWF managed a blocklist of overseas URLs 
allegedly containing child pornographic content and provided it  to the member UK ISPs, which 
voluntarily implemented the IWF blocklist  against their customers. According to the IWF, 
blocking was only a ‘short-term disruption tactic’ to protect inadvertent access to such images, 
because the most effective way to tackle the problem was to remove the material at its source.738 
Yet  the IWF blocklist was implemented by around 98.6% of UK commercial ISPs739  and there 
has been pressure to make the remaining ISPs follow suit.
The IWF played a key role in limiting access to online child pornographic content  within the 
United Kingdom. It had interfaces with member ISPs, search engines, online payment systems, 
mobile operators, law enforcement  agencies and overseas Internet hotlines. As such, this case 
study was mainly centred on the IWF’s operation. Nevertheless, state regulation (i.e. domestic 
anti-child pornography legislation), multi-state regulation, and the courts also played an 
important  role setting the regulatory environment in limiting access to child pornography in the 
United Kingdom and they are addressed in Subsection 3.2 below.
Finally, another mechanism that influenced the regulation in the United Kingdom was the EU 
Safer Internet Programme740 which was created in 1996 and particularly provided (i) financial 
support  to the IWF and (ii) helping to establishing a network of hotlines throughout Europe by 
the means of the Association of Internet Hotlines INHOPE. The latter provided the IWF with a 
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737 The IWF was a member of the INHOPE Association of Internet hotlines. See INHOPE, 'International Association 
of Internet  Hotlines', at  <https://www.inhope.org/>, accessed 28 March 2010. This institution provided support to 
Internet hotlines in Europe and beyond, encouraged the exchange of expertise and technical reports, and it also 
informed policymakers. It provided Internet hotlines, such as  the IWF, a fast channel to  remove alleged child 
pornographic material hosted overseas where there was another affiliate member. This was only  partially effective 
because not all overseas Internet hotlines were INHOPE members nor were all jurisdictions covered by hotlines.
738 IWF, 'Internet Watch Foundation - The UK Hotline for reporting illegal online content', at  <http://www.iwf.org.uk/
>, accessed 08 June 2011.
739  See the press  release by Coaker, V., 'House of Commons Written Answer from the Home Office Minister, 
Hansard, 16 June 2008, col  684W', (London: House of Commons, 2008) at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080616/text/80616w0011.htm#08061620000413>, accessed 02 March 2012; and also 
'Parliamentary records. Answer given by Home Office Minister Alan Campbell  on 02 November 2009', (London: UK 
Parliament - House of Commons, 2009) at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm091102/text/91102w0017.htm#09110238001607> Accessed 26 May 2012.
740  Safer Internet: A multi-annual Community programme on protecting children using the Internet and other 
communication technologies. Work Programme (2009). Brusselsat <http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/
activities/sip/policy/programme/index_en.htm> accessed 07 July 2011.
fast  channel to take down alleged child pornographic material hosted overseas where there was 
an affiliate Internet hotline member.
3.2 Legislation and case law
3.2.1 Domestic anti-child pornography laws and case law in England and Wales
This subsection describes domestic laws and developments in case law around the regulation of 
child pornographic material from the mid-1950s to 2010 in England and Wales. It  shows how 
the process of digitisation and networking associated with the Internet  challenged domestic state 
regulation of child pornography. The documentary evidence below was based on legislation and 
cases as of until 2010.
3.2.1.1 Indecent photographs of children (child pornography)741
Child pornography was addressed initially in England and Wales via the Indecency with 
Children Act  1960 (c.33). Later the problem of child pornography was tackled by the Protection 
of Children Act (POCA) 1978 (c.37) under the label of ‘indecent  photographs of a child’. A 
number of legal interpretations and court  decisions also shaped the regulatory landscape, 
particularly in relation to online child pornography criminal offences that had a deterrent  effect 
in limiting access to such content (i.e. possession, downloading, and viewing).
Section 7 of the 1978 Act  established that ‘a photograph, film (including any form of video-
recording), a copy of a photograph or of a film, a photograph comprised in a film, and 
references to a photograph including the negative as well as the positive version’ as media able 
to contain an indecent photograph of a child. The 1978 Act criminalised the following conducts: 
(a) to take, or permit  to be taken, any indecent photograph of a child (meaning in this Act 
a person under the age of 16); or (b) to distribute or show such indecent photographs; or 
(c) to have in his possession such indecent  photographs, with a view to their being 
distributed or shown by himself or others; or (d) to publish or cause to be published any 
advertisement  likely to be understood as conveying that the advertiser distributes or 
shows such indecent photographs, or intends to do so.742
3.2.1.2 Possession
Later in 1988, the Criminal Justice Act criminalised the possession of an indecent photograph of 
child in Section 160, making it an ‘offence for a person to have any indecent  photograph of a 
child (meaning in this section a person under the age of 16) in his possession’. This was a 
change from the previous regulatory position in relation to child pornography, because the 
criminalisation of production and distribution offences (i.e. take, distribute, and have in 
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741 For the relevant legislation and case law in England  and Wales see ch 2 of Akdeniz, Y., Internet child pornography 
and the law: national and international responses (Surrey: Ashgate, 2008); and also CPS, 'Indecent  photographs of 
children: legal guidance', (London: The Crown Prosecution Service, 2012) at <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/
indecent_photographs_of_children/>, accessed 03 March 2012. 
742 Protection of Children Act (c.37) 1978 (England and Wales).
possession with a view to distribution) were tackling only the intentional possession for future 
distribution. More importantly, it  represented a departure from the liberal stance employed so 
far (i.e. that the consumption of pornography in the private sphere should not be regulated by 
the state because it only harmed the viewer).743
Some defences were included whenever the person charged with a possession offence proved 
‘(a) that he had a legitimate reason for having the photograph in his possession; or (b) that  he 
had not  himself seen the photograph and did not  know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be 
indecent; or (c) that  the photograph was sent  to him without any prior request  made by him or 
on his behalf and that he did not  keep it for an unreasonable time’.744  These defences were 
known as: (1) legitimate reason; (2) unknown possession; and (3) unsolicited possession, 
respectively. It is argued elsewhere that the criminalisation of possession of indecent 
photographs of children helped law enforcement  agencies pursuing successful investigations, 
prosecutions and convictions, because proving the possession was rather straightforward when 
compared to distribution.745  But  this claim is debatable, because other variables (e.g. police 
officers taking the issue more seriously,  and advances in the surveillance technology) could 
have played a role in those arguably successful police operations.
3.2.1.3 Pseudo-photographs and the act of making
In 1994, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act  amended the POCA 1978 and criminalised 
the ‘indecent pseudo-photographs of children’, meaning ‘an image, whether made by computer-
graphics or otherwise howsoever, which appears to be a photograph.’746 It  also criminalised the 
act  of ‘making’ which had harsher penalties than the mere possession. This was mainly because 
the production of child pornographic content was facilitated by the available techniques of 
digital manipulation of photographs. The amended Section 1 of the the POCA 1978 read as ‘it  is 
an offence for a person: to take, or permit to be taken or to make, any indecent photograph or 
pseudo-photograph of a child.’ According to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, 
references to a photograph would included ‘(a) the negative as well as the positive version; and 
(b) data stored on a computer disc or by other electronic means which is capable of conversion 
into a photograph.’ Similarly, references to an indecent pseudo-photograph included ‘(a) a copy 
of an indecent  pseudo-photograph; and (b) data stored on a computer disc or by other electronic 
means which is capable of conversion into a pseudo-photograph.’ A child continued to mean a 
person under the age of 16. 
3.2.1.4 Conveys the impression of a child
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743  From the liberal point of view, the need to prevent harm to persons other than the actor is always a morally 
relevant reason to support state coercion. See Feinberg, J., The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Self 
(Volume 3; New York: OUP, 1986), p ix.
744 Criminal Justice Act (c.33) 1988 (England and Wales).
745  Easton, S., The Problem of Pornography: regulators  and their  right to free speech (London: Routledge, 1994), p 
131;  Akdeniz , Y., 'Possession and Dispossession: A Critical Assessment of Defences in Possession of Indecent 
Photographs of Children Cases', Criminal Law Review,  (2007), 274-88.
746 See Section 84, Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (c.33) 1994 (England and Wales).
In addition, the 1994 Act  established that ‘if the impression conveyed by a pseudo-photograph 
is that  the person shown is a child, the pseudo-photograph shall be treated for all purposes of 
this Act as showing a child and so shall a pseudo-photograph where the predominant  impression 
conveyed is that  the person shown is a child notwithstanding that  some of the physical 
characteristics shown are those of an adult.’747 Finally, the 1994 Act amended Section 160 of the 
Criminal Justice Act  1988 and criminalised the mere possession of an indecent  pseudo-
photograph of a child.
3.2.1.5 Data stored in a computer and photographs
In R. v Fellows and Arnold the appellants contended that the data stored in a computer was not a 
‘photograph’ for the purposes of the Protection of Children Act 1978. The appeal was dismissed 
because:
[…] in their true construction the definitions of ‘indecent photograph’ set  out in §§ 1 and 
7 of the 1978 Act  were wide enough to include a form of technology which was either not 
anticipated or was in its infancy when the Act  was passed and therefore to include later as 
well as contemporary forms of copies of photographs. In the instant  case, the disk itself 
was not  a photograph, but it contained data which could be converted by appropriate 
technical means into a screen image and into a print  which exactly reproduced the 
original photograph from which it  was derived. The data therefore represented the 
original photograph in another form and, since the 1978 Act did not  restrict  the nature of 
a copy, it came within the definition of ‘photograph’ for the purposes of the Act.748
This decision led to the amendment  of the POCA 1978, via Section 84 of the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 which considered that references to a photograph included ‘data 
stored on a computer disc or by other electronic means which is capable of conversion into a 
photograph.’
3.2.1.6 Harsher punishments
In 2000, the Criminal Justice and Court  Services Act 2000 increased the maximum sentence 
penalties for offences associated with indecent  photographs of children.749  R. v Oliver and 
others750  divided indecent  images of children into five categories and provided sentencing 
guidelines based on this taxonomy. Later, these guidelines were amended by guidance from the 
Sentencing Council.751
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747 Section 84, Ibid .
748 R. v Fellows and Arnold [1997] 2 All ER 548.
749 Criminal Justice and Court Services Act (c.43) 2000 (England and Wales).
750 R v Oliver and others  [2002] EWCA Crim 2766; [2003] 2 Cr App R (S) 64; [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. 28; [2003] 2 Cr. 
App. R. (S.) 15; [2003] Crim. L.R. 127.
751  Sexual  Offences  Act 2003: Definitive Guideline (2007). Sentencing Guidelines  Council, at <http://
sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/web_SexualOffencesAct_2003.pdf> accessed 10 July 2011.
3.2.1.7 Relevant case law in relation to possession, making and access752
In R. v Bowden,753  downloading or printing off an indecent  photograph of a child from the 
Internet was considered ‘making a copy of an indecent  photograph’ because a copy of such 
photograph had caused to exist  on the computer to which it  had been downloaded. This 
judgement created a situation where the prosecution could legitimately choose to charge the act 
of downloading a copy of an indecent photograph of a child onto a computer as either a 
‘making’ offence or a ‘possession’ offence.754  This had implications for law enforcement 
because agents were arguably committing a making offence in order to collect criminal 
evidence, but this was resolved via the statutory defences established in Article 46(1) of the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003.755
Akdeniz criticises the reasoning in R. v Bowden. He believes that downloading and making an 
indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child are different in nature; they involve 
different  levels of human agency. As such, they should not  result  in the same punishment.756 
Gillespie suggests that the treatment of downloading as a ‘making’ offence occurred, because 
the punishment  of a possession offence was considered lenient  at that  time (i.e. only six months) 
when compared to a making offence.757 There were no defences available to those charged with 
the making offences, in contrast  to possession and distribution offences. Unsurprisingly, 
prosecutors may have opted to charge alleged offenders on making offence grounds because this 
held harsher sentences.
Atkins and Goodland v DPP758 established that  knowledge was an essential ingredient of both 
the offences of making and possessing of indecent photographs of children. As such, possession 
and making offences were subject to mens rea because they were not  offences of strict 
liability.759  In addition, the court decided that  an image consisting of parts of two separate 
photographs taped together did not appear to be a photograph, i.e. it  was not  a pseudo-
photograph.
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752  Article 5(3) of the 2011 EU Directive requires all member states to take the necessary measures that act of 
‘knowingly obtaining access  […] to child pornography […]’  is punishable. See Directive 2011/92/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation 
of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA 2011 (European Union).
753 R. v Bowden [2000] 2 All ER 418.
754  This ruling was later confirmed in Atkins v DPP; Goodland v DPP [2000] 2  All ER 425;  [2000] 1 WLR 1427 
(QBD) and in R. v Smith and R. v Jayson [2002] EWCA Crim 683; [2003] 1 Cr App R 13.
755 Sexual Offences Act (c.42) 2003 (England and Wales).
756  Akdeniz , Y., 'Possession and Dispossession:  A Critical Assessment of Defences in Possession of Indecent 
Photographs of Children Cases', Criminal Law Review,  (2007), 274-88.
757  Gillespie also suggests that legislation should be amended so as to allow a clear distinction between accessing 
images for personal  use and creating or distributing  them. See Gillespie, A., 'Indecent  Images of Children:  the ever-
changing law', Child Abuse Review, 14 (2005), 430-43.
758 Atkins v DPP; Goodland v DPP [2000] 2 All ER 425; [2000] 1 WLR 1427 (QBD).
759  Nevertheless, this was doubted slightly in  R. v Collier [2005] EWCA Crim 1411 depending on how ‘strict 
liability’ is defined.
In R. v Jayson and Smith,760 the court held that  downloading an indecent image of a child that 
was capable of being converted into a photograph on to a screen was an act of making that 
photograph or pseudo-photograph; and that no offence of making or possessing an indecent 
photograph of a child was committed by opening an email attachment when the recipient was 
unaware that the image contained or was likely to contain such indecent image. This judgment 
confirmed the understanding in R. v Bowden about the making offence; making and being in 
possession were not absolute offences but subject to prior knowledge (mens rea).
In R. v Collier,761 it was a defence for the defendant  to prove that although he knew or had cause 
to suspect that  the photograph was of an indecent  nature, he had not  seen it, and he did not 
know or have cause to suspect that, it was an indecent photograph of a child.
In R. v Dooley762 the Court  of Appeal considered whether leaving an image, unprotected against 
public access, in the 'My Shared Folder' when using P2P software (i.e. KaZaA) might be 
sufficient for a person to be in possession of an indecent  photograph of a child with a view to 
show or distribute it. In addition, the judge drew a distinction between the words "with a view 
to" and the words "with the intention of."
Finally, in R. v Porter763  the court held that  if the person could not access the relevant images 
(save through the use of specific software) then the person would not  be in control of them and 
thus not be guilty of possession.
Against this background, Walden764 argues that  the advent  of the Internet has blurred in the UK 
the distinctions between the acts of (a) possession and copying;765 (b) possession and incitement 
to publish or supply,766  or some form of conduct ‘beyond the mere act of establishing a 
communication’; (c) possession and distribution or publication. This had important implications 
for the regulation of access to child pornographic content on the Internet. It  showed how 
relevant case law tried to tackle access related conducts (i.e. possession, viewing, downloading, 
and printing) as production (i.e. making) and distribution offences, departing from the liberal 
stance about the criminalisation of possession. In other words, it has disregarded the traditional 
liberal defence mentioned earlier not only based on what  was prescribed in law (i.e. offence of 
mere possession) but it has expanded this to consider possession as production or distribution 
offences via case law.767
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761 R. v Collier [2005] EWCA Crim 1411.
762 R. v Dooley [2006] 1 WLR 775, [2005] EWCA Crim 3093.
763 R. v Porter [2006] EWCA Crim 560; [2006] All ER (D) 236 (Mar).
764  Walden, I., 'Criminal Content  and  Control', in  David  Goldberg, Gavin Sutter, and Ian Walden (eds.), Media Law 
and Practice (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 427-62, p 438.
765 See R. v Bowden [2000] 2 All ER 418.
766 See R. v Goldman [2001] Crim LR 822.
767  From the liberal point of view, the need to prevent harm to persons other than the actor is always a morally 
relevant reason to support state coercion. See Feinberg, J., The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Self 
(Volume 3; New York: OUP, 1986), p ix.
3.2.1.8 Children as a person under the age of 18
In 2003, the Sexual Offences Act  2003 amended the Protection of Children Act  1978 and 
increased the age of a child from 16 to 18 to meet international standards, and also included 
defences regarding marriage and other relationships in cases where the photograph was of the 
child aged 16 or over. This seems incongruent with the age of legal consent (16 years) and may 
put at  risk those involved in films or video which used actors aged 16 or 17 in sexual related 
material.768  Interestingly, for the first  time the words ‘child’ and ‘pornography’ were used in 
regard to indecent  photographs of children in England and Wales in a legislative document. The 
2003 Act  established a number of defences (i.e. the defendant was not criminally liable for 
possessing and or distributing child pornography, mainly to safeguard public authorities against 
the abovementioned developments in case law) if s/he proved that:
(a) it  was necessary for him to make the photograph or pseudo-photograph for the 
purposes of the prevention, detection or investigation of crime, or for the purposes of 
criminal proceedings, in any part of the world; (b) at the time of the offence charged he 
was a member of the Security Service, and it  was necessary for him to make the 
photograph or pseudo-photograph for the exercise of any of the functions of the Service, 
or (c) at  the time of the offence charged he was a member of GCHQ, and it  was necessary 
for him to make the photograph or pseudo-photograph for the exercise of any of the 
functions of GCHQ.769
3.2.1.9 Criminalising non-photographic content (i.e. ‘cartoon’ pornography)
After a consultation process,770 the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 criminalised the possession 
of ‘prohibited images of children.’ This extended the definition of child pornography under the 
1978 Act and included non-photographic child pornography. This was another change from 
previous criminal laws against  child pornography in England and Wales. Not only photographic 
content (i.e. indecent  photographs and pseudo-photographs of children) was criminalised but 
non-photographic content such as cartoons, drawings and tracings were taken onboard. This 
means not only that the scope of material associated with child pornography was expanding but 
that a causal nexus between the material and the abuse of real children (i.e. the evidence of 
harm) was no longer necessary to justify the criminal sanction.
A prohibited image of a child was a material that  was (a) pornographic; (b) fell within 
Subsection 6 of the 2009 Act; and (c) was grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise of an 
obscene character. An image was pornographic ‘if it  is of such a nature that it  must  reasonably 
be assumed to have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal.’ An 
image fell within Subsection 6 if it was: (a) an image which focuses solely or principally on a 
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Law and Practice (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 427-62, p 451.
769 Sexual Offences Act (c.42) 2003 (England and Wales).
770  See 'Consultation on Possession of Non-Photographic Visual Depictions of Child Sexual Abuse', Home Office, 
2007) at <http://scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/1099/0048474.pdf>, accessed 12 July 2010.
child’s genitals or anal region, or (b) portrayed any of the acts mentioned in Subsection 7. 
Subsection 7 read: 
(a) the performance by a person of an act  of intercourse or oral sex with or in the presence 
of a child; (b) an act  of masturbation by, of, involving or in the presence of a child; (c) an 
act  which involves penetration of the vagina or anus of a child with a part of a person’s 
body or with anything else; (d) an act of penetration, in the presence of a child, of the 
vagina or anus of a person with a part of a person’s body or with anything else; (e) the 
performance by a child of an act of intercourse or oral sex with an animal (whether dead 
or alive or imaginary); (f) the performance by a person of an act of intercourse or oral sex 
with an animal (whether dead or alive or imaginary) in the presence of a child.771
Defences were included in the 2009 Act: ‘it  is a defence for the person to prove any of the 
following matters: (a) that the person had a legitimate reason for being in possession of the 
image concerned; (b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not  know, nor 
had any cause to suspect, it  to be a prohibited image of a child; (c) that  the person: (i) was sent 
the image concerned without any prior request having been made by or on behalf of the person, 
and (ii) did not keep it for an unreasonable time.’
The 2009 Act  established that an image included moving or still images produced by any 
means, or any data stored by any means which is capable of conversion into an image. It 
excluded however both indecent photographs and pseudo-photographs of a child, which were to 
be construed in accordance with the POCA 1978. The 2009 Act  established that a child was a 
person under the age of 18 and ‘where an image showed a person the image was to be treated as 
an image of a child if: (a) the impression conveyed by the image is that  the person shown is a 
child, or (b) the predominant  impression conveyed is that the person shown is a child despite the 
fact that  some of the physical characteristics shown are not those of a child’772, following the 
same approach established by the 1994 Act. Finally, the 2009 Act  established that  references to 
an image of a person included references to an image of an imaginary person and that  references 
to an image of a child included references to an image of an imaginary child.
3.2.1.10 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000773
Another legislative development  not  strictly related to substantive online child pornography 
criminal offences but  with important implications for their investigation was the RIPA 2000. It 
is important because of: its deterrent  effect  on those attempting to access child pornographic 
content on the Internet, its potential to violate privacy of individuals in general, and the 
excessive pressure it may place on online intermediaries.
Generally the 2000 Act  established a regime for the interception of communication, acquisition 
and disclosure of data, carrying out  covert  surveillance, use of covert human intelligence 
sources and encryption to catch up with the increased use of digital technologies by alleged 
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criminals. This piece of legislation allowed the police and other law enforcement agencies to 
request  information (i.e. communication records of individual Internet  users) from online 
intermediaries without a court order.774
The RIPA 2000 regulated the disclosure of electronic keys (e.g. cryptographic or otherwise) 
associated with alleged digital criminal evidence. It  made it a criminal offence the refusal to 
supply the actual encrypted traffic and the encryption key; this could lead to up five years in 
prison if there was suspicion that  the material was child pornography, under Article 53. In 
addition, the RIPA 2000 gave powers to law enforcement agencies to force an online 
intermediary to fit equipment to facilitate surveillance as well as to demand secret  access to 
customers’ private communication. The 2000 Act provided an oversight  regime to avoid 
governmental abuse but it has been criticised over the lack of adequate safeguards and the 
threats it  posed to civil liberties in the UK. For example, the Big Brother Watch Campaign 
reported a number of improper uses of the RIPA 2000 provisions by local authorities,775 
particularly its use to monitor petty cases.
Although not  directly involved in the structures of online content removal,776  the RIPA 2000 
might  have played a deterrent factor on those who accessed or exchanged child pornographic 
content on the Internet domestically, because the legislation facilitated the identification of 
alleged offenders. It  facilitated the policing of ISPs’ infrastructure by law enforcement  agencies 
without  the need of a court order, particularly in the case of Internet applications that  were 
beyond the reach of the IWF (such as closed websites, P2P, emails and real-time messaging).
The preservation of evidence for future criminal prosecution involving online child pornography 
related offences arises under the 2009 EU Data Retention Regulations.777  This came into force 
in April 2009 and established that  online intermediaries must  retain communication data on all 
users for 12 months, including mobile phone locations and e-mail logs. ISPs could voluntarily 
store web access logs but access to such information was regulated by the RIPA 2000.
3.2.2 Multi-state regulation: the criminal liability of online intermediaries in Europe
For Edwards, European online intermediaries were in a difficult position in the late 1990s, 
because there was no comprehensive legal framework to protect them against  legal liability 
derived from the potentially criminal content  they hosted and transmitted. According to her, 
they were pushing their argument forward against an indiscriminate liability based on the 
following grounds: (1) the lack of effective legal and actual control over the content they hosted 
or distributed; (2) they were mere intermediaries; and (3) the costs for monitoring content  would 
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call into question their economic survival.778 As a result, these arguments set the context  where 
the legal framework for the legal liability of online intermediaries779  in Europe was established 
via the 2000 EU Directive on Electronic Commerce (hereinafter Directive).780
The 2000 Directive was explored in Chapter 2 and it  constituted a multi-state regulatory 
initiative regulating the activities of online intermediaries in Europe with substantial 
implications in the United Kingdom. Although the IWF has employed a NTD regime since 1996 
to avoid criminal liability being placed on member ISPs hosting potentially criminal content, the 
coming into force of the Directive in 2002 established a legal framework for the operation of the 
hotline. The Directive defined online intermediaries (i.e. information society services providers 
but also intermediary service providers) in a broader sense so as to include ISPs, Internet hosts, 
weblogs, search tools and social networking systems. It incorporated a safe harbour principle 
(i.e. online intermediaries are free from legal liability so long they cooperate when asked to do 
so) and established a NTD regime in relation to the online criminal content in Section 4.
The general framework of the NTD regime was established via Articles 12, 13 and 14 of the 
Directive. Articles 12 and 13 established that the online intermediaries were exempted from all 
liability when they operated as (i) a mere conduit  (i.e. it does not  initiate the transmission, does 
not select  the receiver nor does select  or modify the information); or when they (ii) performed 
mere caching operations to increase performance of transmission. Article 14 established that 
criminal liability could arise when online intermediaries operated as (iii) content hosts781  but 
this was subject  to condition in relation to knowledge and control,782 (i.e. the host provider must 
have actual knowledge of the illegal activity and, upon obtaining such knowledge, acted 
expeditiously to remove or disable access to the content). In addition, Article 15 established that 
online intermediaries were not  required to actively seek this knowledge or awareness, therefore, 
there was no general obligation to monitor the online content. Nevertheless, they could be 
forced to monitor and intercept communications under the RIPA 2000 provisions mentioned 
above.
3.2.3 Multi-state regulation: the international laws
The United Kingdom signed the 2000 UN Optional Protocol783  on 07 September 2000 and 
ratified it  on 20 February 2009. The 2000 Protocol established a definition of child pornography 
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779 Note that the Directive did not apply to backbone providers.
780 EU Directive on Electronic Commerce. DIRECTIVE 2000/31/EC, 08 June 2000 (European Union).
781 Storing and hosting content more than transiently. See articles 14(1)A and 14(1)B of the Directive.
782 See generally Walden, I., 'Criminal Content and Control', in David Goldberg, Gavin Sutter, and Ian Walden (eds.), 
Media Law and Practice (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 427-62.
783  Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child  Pornography (adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly  resolution A/
RES/54/263  of 25 May 2000, entered into force on 18 January 2002) . See the list of ratifications at http://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-c&chapter=4&lang=en . Accessed on 20 
June 2011.
in Article 2 and suggested that  signatories should criminalise a number of conducts in relation to 
child pornographic content (such as production, distribution and possession). It  also established 
a number of provisions to protect children against sexual exploitation.
In addition, the United Kingdom signed the 2001 CoE’s Cybercrime Convention784  on 23 
November 2001 but ratified it only on 25 May 2011, apparently because of issues relating to 
procedural provisions.785 The 2001 Convention established a number of provisions in relation to 
substantive and procedural criminal law to facilitate international police cooperation (mainly 
within Europe) and it entered into force in the UK on 01 September 2011.
The length of time between signature and ratification of these international treaties showed the 
problematic implementation of multi-state regulation already discussed in Chapter 3. The 
implementation of anti-child pornography international law domestically was subject  to a 
variety of political debate, different cultural and legal national contexts, and varying policing 
capabilities. As a result, it took longer than some might  expect and motivated the development 
of more immediate regulatory responses at the national level such as website blocking and 
informal cooperation amongst Internet  hotlines. In the end, something had to be done about the 
problem nationally while the issues were not resolved at the international level.
3.3 Regulatory policies
Section 3.2 above explored state and multi-state regulation, including the regulation of online 
intermediaries, around the problem of online child pornography in the United Kingdom as of 
until 2010. The focus was placed not  only on criminalisation of content and types of conduct 
associated with online child pornography but on criminal liability of online intermediaries and 
investigatory powers of law enforcement  agencies to identify alleged offenders. Generally this 
was the legal landscape where regulatory policies were implemented in the UK to limit access 
to child pornography available on the Internet. This section presents an overview of the 
regulatory policies in place and address particularly how online intermediaries were forced to 
remove alleged child pornographic content from domestic servers and to limit  access to such 
material within the United Kingdom. 
The IWF played a central role within the regulatory scheme to remove child pornography from 
UK online intermediaries and block access to child pornographic overseas websites. In short, 
the IWF received and processed reports from the public, it  notified the UK online intermediaries 
about potentially criminal content  to preserve evidence and took down the material reported, it 
managed a blocklist  of overseas URLs786  that  was implemented by member ISPs, and it 
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interacted with a number of public bodies (e.g. the police and the Home Office) and private 
actors (e.g. search engines, social network systems, online payment  systems and overseas 
Internet hotlines). The Internet  Watch Foundation was created in 1996 as self-regulatory Internet 
industry body to tackle the availability of criminal content  on the UK Internet. It  has 
experienced substantial growth both in relation to the number of reports received from the 
public and to the number of members it has.787  Its (i) scope; (ii) mechanics; (iii) regulatory 
tools; (iv) interface with other actors; (v) nature; and (vi) criticisms are explored below.
3.3.1 Scope: the online criminal content targeted
According to the 2011 remit, the IWF targeted three different  types of online criminal content: 
(1) child pornographic content hosted anywhere in the world; (2) criminally obscene adult 
content hosted in the UK; and (3) prohibited images of children (i.e. non-photographic child 
sexual abuse images, also cartoon child pornography) hosted in the UK. The IWF preferred to 
use the term ‘potentially criminal content’ instead of ‘criminal content,’ because it  had no 
judicial authority to consider the content  removed as criminal. In addition, it preferred the term 
‘child abuse images’ over ‘child pornography,’ because it believed that the latter represented 
more accurately the violent nature of these images. Yet, the term child pornography is used 
hereinafter, because of its wide acceptance in the literature and international legal documents.788
The scope of material covered by the IWF’s remit  has been reduced and enlarged over the years. 
For example, incitement  to racial hatred was part  of the IWF’s remit  until 2011. In addition, the 
IWF has been involved in labelling and rating policies (under its R3 Safety-Net  Agreement) to 
tackle online harmful content but these policies were discontinued after 2002, which left only 
the anti-criminal online content  policies within the remit. On the other hand, the IWF’s remit 
was also subject to increment  following the criminalisation of certain types of online material. 
For example, the Home Office asked the IWF in 2007 to receive reports of online extreme 
pornography789 within its remit  of obscene material, which was approved by the IWF Board and 
implemented in January 2009. Similarly, the IWF remit was changed again in April 2010 so as 
to include the prohibited images of a child,790 following a request  from the Ministry of Justice in 
June 2009.791  This increment is not  surprising because, as material become illegal under UK 
law, so the IWF would alter its remit  to extend the protection offered to member ISPs. As such, 
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789 Following Section 63 of The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (c.4) 2008 (England and Wales).
790 Following Sections 62-69 of the Coroners and Justice Act (c.18) 2009 (England and Wales).
791  See IWF, 'Internet Watch Foundation - The UK Hotline for reporting illegal  online content', at <http://
www.iwf.org.uk/>, accessed 08 June 2011.
they are able to avoid the risk of the liability for hosting or distributing potentially criminal 
material.
There has been political pressure to include other types of content (e.g. terrorism related content 
and copyright  infringement) within its remit (e.g. via the NTD and blocking measures) which 
produced fears of scope creep. Nevertheless, the IWF reported that  only child pornographic 
content was covered by the blocking policy, and the use of the scheme to target  other kinds of 
controversial content  has been opposed not only by Internet  industry representatives792  but other 
sectors of society such as children right’s organisations.
3.3.2 Mechanics: the basic operation of the IWF
Generally any online criminal content found in the open Internet  (i.e. websites, newsgroups, 
social network systems) that  fell within the IWF’s remit could be submitted anonymously and 
confidentially via the IWF website. Once submitted, the report was assessed by the IWF content 
analyst according to the IWF threefold remit. This leads to two situations: (1) the content 
reported was judged to be legal or it  was outside the IWF remit thus no further action was taken; 
or (2) the content  was regarded as potentially criminal under UK law and the analyst would 
trace the source server where the content reported was hosted.
If the content reported was hosted in the United Kingdom, irrespective of its criminal nature 
(i.e. child pornography, criminally obscene adult  content or a prohibited image of a child), the 
domestic police agency (i.e. the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre - CEOP)793 
was notified and a NTD was sent  to the relevant  host provider so they were under notice to 
remove the reported content  and preserve evidence for future criminal investigation. In addition, 
the webpage was monitored until the content was removed. 
If the content  reported was hosted overseas and it referred to child pornography, then the 
relevant international hotline (if any operating in the country) and the UK police agency (i.e. the 
CEOP, which would contact Interpol) were both notified. In addition, the webpage URL was 
added to the IWF blocklist that  was used by the member ISPs to make these images inaccessible 
from the United Kingdom. The IWF constantly monitored this URL to check if the content  has 
been removed. When this occurred, the URL was removed from the IWF blocklist. Although the 
IWF had no authority to request overseas providers to take down alleged child pornographic 
websites, (i) it has begun notifying them anyway on a voluntary basis; and (ii) some major 
international providers (such as Google and Yahoo!) applied the list against  all their services 
worldwide.
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(Edinburgh: School of Law, University of Edinburgh, 2010) at  <http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/
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793 CEOP, 'Child Exploitation and Online Protection', at <http://www.ceop.gov.uk/>, accessed 29 February 2012.
A series of internal procedures for the NTD scheme was established via the Service-level 
Agreement794  negotiated between the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the 
IWF. This institutional agreement795  set  a standard investigatory protocol in relation to 
potentially criminal content  hosted in UK servers and provided detailed information about  the 
internal procedures and liaisons with the law enforcement agencies. The Agreement  established 
that the IWF was responsible for assessing and tracing the online content that  contravenes the 
UK law in England and was hosted in the United Kingdom. If the relevant content was hosted in 
the UK, (i) the IWF sent  a preservation of evidence request and a NTD to the relevant ISP; (ii) a 
request  of investigation by the relevant  police agency was made; and (iii) the relevant ISP was 
called by phone so they received proper advice by the IWF staff in relation to the investigator’s 
visit and after the fact monitoring.
The IWF reports that  it did not  deal with closed groups (such as P2P, real-time messaging and 
closed websites) but  only with the public space Internet. However, it could pass the reports 
about closed platforms on to police agencies so they could perform the investigatory activities. 
In addition, the IWF argued that  its blocklist  only contained URLs of child pornographic 
content hosted overseas, so both the criminally obscene adult content  and the non-photographic 
child pornography were outside the blocklist policy.
The IWF acquired in 2004 the status of relevant authority to receive reports in relation to online 
child pornography, following Section 46 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.796  This was 
negotiated via the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the IWF, the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) and the ACPO,797  and came into existence because what the IWF was doing was 
not covered by the legislation and arguably illegal, particularly after R v. Bowden.798  The 
Memorandum was established to ‘protect those who report the availability of a potentially 
illegal image to law enforcement  agencies’ so as to use a defence against  a ‘making offence’ as 
defined in Section 46 of the abovementioned 2003 Act, and it addressed the factors affecting the 
plausibility of this defence which included (i) the way the material was discovered; (ii) the 
speed it  was reported; (iii) secure handling and storage; (iv) copying the minimum to achieve 
the result. Generally this was to avoid the indiscriminate use of the making defence, to protect 
the IWF’s staff from criminal liability and to regard the reports made to the IWF as reports 
made to a relevant authority.
183
794  Service Level Agreement between the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Internet Watch Foundation 
(2010). IWF and ACPO, at <http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/crime/2010/201010CRIIW01.pdf> accessed 14 
June 2010.
795  Interestingly this  agreement was negotiated between the IWF and the Association of Police Officers, which was 
neither a police agency nor a Public Prosecution Service.
796 Sexual Offences Act (c.42) 2003 (England and Wales).
797  'Memorandum of Understanding Between Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) concerning Section 46 Sexual Offences Act 2003', (2004) at <http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/
docs/mousexoffences.pdf> Accessed 07 June 2011.
798 R. v Bowden [2000] 2 All ER 418.
In short, the IWF did not require the UK online intermediaries to do anything. It  merely 
informed the relevant  intermediary that it  received a report of content, or found content, which 
was hosted on the online intermediary’s server, that its staff looked at  this content, assessed it 
and concluded that it  was potentially illegal under UK law. This put  the intermediary under 
notice and thus at risk of losing their immunity under the 2000 EU Commerce Directive.799 The 
online intermediaries were free to examine the material and perhaps take a different view, but in 
practice they usually took the reported content  down expeditiously to avoid any criminal 
liability.
3.3.3 Regulatory tools: notices of take down and the IWF blocklist
3.3.3.1 Notices of take down (NTD)
The IWF was founded in 1996 amidst the problem of availability of child pornographic content 
on the UK Usenet newsgroups. It  implemented a notice and take down policy so the member 
ISPs could be notified and expeditiously remove the reported image from the Usenet  newsgroup 
they were hosting. Nevertheless, after removal, the images were usually published again in the 
newsgroup feed, and this lead the IWF to change its NTD policy and include the automated 
monitoring of the newsgroups content. The IWF changed this NTD policy in 2002 so as to 
suggest  the removal of the entire newsgroup if (i) potentially criminal images were found on a 
regular basis or if (ii) the name of the newsgroup was related to paedophilia (e.g. 
alt.binaries.lolita). Although the use of newsgroups has decreased over the years in the United 
Kingdom, they were still subject to this automated monitoring measure.
The NTD scheme in relation to websites hosted domestically followed a similar approach.800 
Once reported and assessed as potentially criminal by the IWF, the relevant online intermediary 
was notified to remove the reported material and preserve evidence for further police 
investigation. This was to avoid any criminal liability and was in line with the provisions of the 
2000 EU Directive on Electronic Commerce. According to the IWF, the content reported was 
removed from domestic servers in less than 24 hours after notice. Indeed, the UK member ISP 
was highly motivated to expeditiously remove the content  reported to avoid the risk of criminal 
liability, and this could be the reason why the NTD scheme employed against  content hosted 
domestically has been arguably successful. According to the IWF, since 2003 less than 1% of 
website related child pornographic content  reported to the IWF was found to be hosted in the 
United Kingdom, in comparison to 18% in 1997.801 Nevertheless, these figures referred only to 
websites reported to the IWF, and therefore, perhaps a larger proportion of potentially criminal 
content, not reported to the IWF, could be hosted in the UK and available via P2P networks, 
private online repositories, or exchanged via emails).
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Given that the NTD scheme was not effective to remove child pornographic content hosted in a 
overseas website802  because amongst other reasons the IWF had no authority to request  the 
removal from a foreign host  provider, or the traditional international police channels were often 
slow, and the foreign police authorities generally had other pressing priorities, another approach 
was implemented: the blocking of child pornographic websites.
3.3.3.2 The IWF blocklist: blocking access to child pornography websites hosted overseas
Effectively, therefore, the UK has put  in place, without public debate, new laws, or a 
system of public accountability, a universal non-transparent scheme of online censorship 
that is in theory capable of blocking any particular piece of Internet  content, whether 
illegal or not.803
The IWF blocking scheme addressed child pornography URLs available to UK Internet users 
but hosted overseas, where the NTDs have limited effect  and the developments in relation to 
international treaties were slow. The implied rationale here was: if overseas law enforcement 
agencies were unable to act  swiftly to take down the content  reported, the IWF had to do 
something about it  domestically.804  Nevertheless, the IWF cautiously stated that  the blocking 
scheme was unable to stop persistent viewers. On the contrary, it  was designed to protect UK 
Internet users from unwanted and inadvertent exposure to illegal images, i.e. it was only a ‘short 
term disruption tactic to protect  users from stumbling across child pornography images whilst 
processes to have them removed overseas are instigated’.805  In addition, the IWF emphasised 
that any discussion about tackling online child pornography must  include the effort towards the 
harmonisation of international laws and pan organisational cooperation.806
The regulatory landscape around 2002 was susceptible to the implementation of a blocking 
strategy in the United Kingdom. For example, the IWF reported that its Board allowed the 
release of a blocklist containing URLs allegedly hosting child pornographic content to ISP 
members so they could implement blocking or filtering solutions earlier in 2002.807  Similarly, 
Hunter mentions that  John Carr, an Internet consultant on child safety, wrote to Paul Goggins, 
from the Home Office, in July 2003 demanding a governmental response to the issue of child 
pornographic content available on websites hosted abroad.808 Later, the British Telecom Group 
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plc. (BT) completed pilot  tests around a website blocking system in May 2004. The idea of a 
blocking scheme faced initial resistance from ISPs but was fully implemented in 2004 by the 
BT via the ‘BT Anti-child Abuse Initiative,’ aka BT Cleanfeed.
The IWF compiled a list  of URLs allegedly containing child pornographic content  hosted 
overseas. This blocklist contained around 500 to 800 entries and it  was updated twice daily so as 
to remove the URLs already taken down. The blocklist  was then passed on under a license and 
via a secured interface to member ISPs that employ their own blocking solution (e.g. BT 
Cleanfeed, and WebMinder).809  In order to receive the IWF blocklist, the member ISPs were 
required to pay a membership fee called ‘CAIC income’ and this subscription fee varied 
according to the size of the ISP.810 The IWF only managed the blocklist  and its implementation 
was entirely on the member ISP. They discouraged its member ISPs from adding more URLs or 
tinkering with the list but  there were no safeguards to restrain ISPs from doing so. In addition, 
there was nothing stopping the list  being passed on to other Internet hotlines and private 
companies (e.g. online content filtering providers, mobile operators and search engines) 
operating overseas and this could raise concerns about  whether one country could determined 
what should be blocked in another.
It  seems that member ISPs did not collect  information from users trying to access the blocked 
URLs via their systems. For example, Hunter points out that  around 230,000 attempts to access 
blocked URLs were made in less than a month and were detected by the BT via its Cleanfeed 
system. He reported that  the BT  did not  keep the source IP  address of users trying to access 
blocked URLs, but the BT and other ISPs could at least theoretically be forced to do so under 
the RIPA 2000 provisions.811 Nevertheless, identifying 230,000 IP addresses may be extremely 
time-consuming and would discourage law enforcement agencies, with already scarce 
resources, to pursue investigations in this regard.
There was no law to mandate filtering or blocking of child pornographic content in the United 
Kingdom and the adoption of the IWF blocklist  was done ‘voluntary’ by member ISPs.812  A 
number of ISPs refused to join the scheme because of financial costs involved in implementing 
the blocklist and also because of free speech concerns.813  The government threatened passing 
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legislation to force the remaining ISPs to follow suit,814 but backed down later. 815 Nevertheless, 
the government  required public bodies to contract Internet access services only from contractors 
implementing the IWF blocklist816 which made clear its desire to see other ISPs following suit. 
In addition, even those ISPs that did not  employ the blocklist could get  their feed via BT or 
other large provider and thus would be using the IWF blocklist  indirectly anyway. It  is 
estimated that around 98.6% of UK commercial ISPs817  and around 100% of mobile operators 
employed the IWF blocklist, which was a significant coverage under a ‘self-regulatory’ model
3.3.4 Interface with other actors: the IWF and other online intermediaries
The IWF developed a number of interfaces not  only with those within the UK Internet 
industry818 but with other online intermediaries such as search engines, mobile operators, online 
payment  systems, overseas Internet  hotlines and social network systems, to take down and limit 
access to potentially criminal content available online. For example, Google implemented both 
the IWF blocklist  of URLs and the IWF blocklist  of child pornography related keywords on the 
results provided by its search engine in the United Kingdom.819  The IWF was a partner of the 
Mobile Alliance Against  Child Sexual Abuse Content,820 a self-regulatory international initiative 
to make the mobile infrastructure hostile to child pornographic content  and has contributed to 
the development of the Mobile Operators Code of Practice.821 
The IWF was also a partner of the European Financial Coalition, a police-lead initiative to limit 
purchases of child pornographic content via commercial websites,822and it provided reported 
URLs of websites allegedly selling child pornography related material to the online payment 
systems, so they could block online payments to the reported illegal commercial website. The 
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IWF requested the ICANN823  to unregister the domain names of URLs included in the IWF 
blocklist. Finally, the IWF was a member of the INHOPE Association824  which comprised a 
number of Internet hotlines operating in different jurisdictions.
3.3.5 The nature of the IWF: a hybrid creature?
Although the IWF was often considered an Internet  industry self-regulatory body, it  was 
perhaps not  entirely the case because it operated in a context of substantial governmental 
interference and has been subject  to changes in its governance structure to include wider sectors 
of society.
Its governance structure has changed over the years. The organisation was revamped in 2000825 
after a review of the IWF, commissioned by the UK Department  of Trade and Industry, was 
published in 1999.826  Its governance structure was revised again in 2003, and another 
governance review was commissioned in 2006 because of the growing membership. The IWF 
Board of Trustees had 10 members: 6 non-industry members selected via open selection 
procedure; 3 industry members (elected by the Funding Council) and 1 Independent Chair. They 
served for a mandate of three years term renewable once. The Board of Trustees and the 
Funding Council oversaw the operation of the IWF. There was a Board Executive comprised of 
the Audit Committee, Communications Committee and a Remuneration Sub-Committee.827
Its funding came initially from the Dawe Charitable Fund in 1996 but  moved to the members of 
the IWF Management Board in 1997. In 2010, a new funding scheme was developed and 
approved but  generally the funding came from the European Union (around 25%) and the UK 
Internet industry (75%), including the membership fees from the IWF blocking scheme.828 
In 2005, the IWF achieved Charity Status which allowed the organisation to pursue different 
funding streams and financial subsidies.829  Its charitable status has been criticised largely 
because of its close association with the UK Internet  industry (in the end, the IWF is tackling 
unintended consequences of the Internet industry’s economic activity) and arguable lack of 
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823  The ICANN is the private sector, non-profit corporation, responsible for managing and coordinating the Domain 
Name System (DNS) to ensure that every address is unique and that all  users of the Internet can find all  valid 
addresses. See ICANN, 'Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers', (updated 01 February 2008) at 
<http://www.icann.org/>.
824 INHOPE, 'International Association of Internet Hotlines', at <https://www.inhope.org/>, accessed 28 March 2010.
825  Davies, C., 'The hidden censors of the internet', Wired UK,  (2009) at <http://www.wired.co.uk/wired-magazine/
archive/2009/05/features/the-hidden-censors-of-the-internet?page=all> accessed 13 July 2010.
826 Marwick, P. and Hall, D., 'Review of the IWF', (London: KPMG, 1999) .
827 IWF, '2008 - Annual and Charity Report ', (Cambridge, UK: IWF, 2009) at <http://www.iwf.org.uk>, accessed 07 
June 2011.
828  Marling, C., 'Interview with Sarah Robertson, director of communications for the Internet Watch Foundation', 
Broadband Genie, 08 April 2009 at <http://www.broadbandgenie.co.uk/blog/full-internet-watch-foundation-
interview-20090408>, accessed 07 June 2011.
829  IWF, 'Annual and Charity Report  2005', (Cambridge, UK: IWF, 2006) at <http://www.iwf.org.uk>, accessed 07 
June 2011.
charitable character; a formal complaint was lodged to the Charity Commission in 2009,830  but 
this complaint  has been dismissed. The Charities Act 2006831  describes a number of purposes 
capable of being charitable (i.e. including the advancement of human rights and a number of 
other purposes for the public benefit) and the IWF could arguably fit  them as these criteria were 
generally subjective. 
The IWF has altered its governance structure so as to include wider sectors of the society in 
addition to representatives from the UK Internet  industry. Yet, its major funding sources 
remained in the Internet  industry and covered a wide spectrum of members from traditional 
ISPs to mobile phone companies. There were calls however to include members of the judiciary 
and increase ‘publicness’,  because of the arguable public functions the IWF performed.832
For Price and Verhulst, self-regulation rarely exists without any form of government 
interference and can take many forms such as ‘coerced self-regulation’ where voluntary action 
is coerced via the governmental threat  for compliance.833 As such, it  seems that the regulatory 
approach taken in the United Kingdom is not  so self-regulatory nor so voluntary as it  might 
seem at  first: the police and the government has been playing a substantial role in the operation 
of the IWF since its creation in 1996. For example, Walden argues that the activities performed 
by the IWF are government sanctioned, whether directly or under the veil of self-regulation.834 
Indeed, its ‘voluntary’ nature has been formed and employed amidst both the police and 
government threats for regulatory action. The IWF had also strong liaisons with the police and 
could be seen sometimes undertaking policing and judicial activities rather than performing 
social responsibility as a self-regulatory industry body. What has been employed was not  pure 
self-regulation but the hybrid regulation addressed in Chapter 2.
This section addressed the laws, cases and regulation to limit access to online child 
pornographic content in the United Kingdom. It  covered state and multi-state regulation as well 
as key court’s decisions in relation to anti-child pornography laws, and overall relevant 
regulatory landscape. Against this background, the IWF’s operation was explored in detail, 
taking into account  its scope, mechanics, regulatory tools, interface with relevant  actors and 
legal nature. 
4 Final remarks
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830  See Ozimek, J., 'The IWF: Charity disparity?', The Register, 20 February 2009, sec. Law at <http://
www.theregister.co.uk/2009/02/20/iwf_charity/>, accessed 02 March 2012.
831 Charities Act (c. 50) 2006 (England and Wales).
832 See Edwards, L., 'Pornography, Censorship and the Internet', in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds.), Law 
and the Internet (3rd edn.; Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 623-69.
833  Price, M. and Verhulst, S., 'In the search of the self: Charting the course of self-regulation on the Internet in a 
global environment', in Chris Marsden (ed.), Regulating the Global Information Society (London: Routledge, 2000), 
57-78. See also Price, M. and Verhulst, S., Self Regulation and the Internet  (The Hage, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 2005).
834  Walden, I., 'Criminal Content  and  Control', in  David  Goldberg, Gavin Sutter, and Ian Walden (eds.), Media Law 
and Practice (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 427-62, p 459.
Child pornographic material hosted in Australia was targeted via notices of take down sent by 
the federal regulator ACMA to relevant  Internet content  service or hosting service providers. 
Overseas child pornographic websites were targeted via a voluntary user-level filtering scheme 
employed since 2000. Nevertheless, a voluntary filtering scheme employed at the ISP-level was 
launched by the Internet Industry Association in July 2011 to block access to overseas child 
pornographic websites by the means of a partnership with the Australian Federal Police and 
Interpol. In addition, the federal government has been trying since 2007 to implement a 
nationwide mandatory filtering scheme at  the ISP-level via legislation to target  not  only child 
pornographic content but other types of material included in the federal regulator’s blocklist.
In Brazil, the major problem that  regulators had to face in relation to limiting the access to child 
pornographic content  until the mid-2005 has been the availability of this material in commercial 
and non-commercial websites mainly hosted overseas but produced, distributed or accessed by 
Brazilian residents. Against this background, the Brazilian Internet  industry has had little 
involvement helping to tackle the problem until 2005, amidst no comprehensive national 
legislation to regulate the operation of online intermediaries. In order to address the failure of 
both domestic state legislation and Internet industry self-regulation, the Federal Public 
Prosecution Service MPF-SP, the Internet  hotline Safernet  Brasil, and later, the Senate CPI have 
employed a concerted action to update the domestic anti-child pornography legislation and 
bring private actors into line after 2005.
The United Kingdom operated a regulatory model based on Internet industry self-regulation, 
centred on the Internet Watch Foundation. The model was not  based in legislation nor was 
directly managed by the government, but it  was centred in the work of a self-regulatory body 
created by the Internet  industry that, via a number of interfaces with both public and private 
actors, operated a system taking down alleged child pornographic content hosted domestically 
and blocking access to overseas URLs hosting such material.
Although all three jurisdictions employ a hybrid regulatory approach, they are rather different. 
The Australian regulatory model was established by legislation and relies on a statutory 
regulator to enforce its rules. Brazil employed a regulatory model based on agreements. The 
United Kingdom is more self-regulation orientated and relies on a private regulator. 
This chapter explored the laws and regulations to limit access to online child pornography in 
Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom: it  is the documentary evidence. It aimed to provide a 
detailed account of current  regulatory policies. The following Chapter 5 employs the evaluative 
criteria designed in Chapter 2 against  this case study material and develops the analysis further 
in order to produce a comparative evaluative report on each jurisdiction.
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CHAPTER 5: EVALUATING CURRENT MODELS: 
APPLYING THE EVALUATIVE CRITERIA
This chapter employs the evaluative criteria designed in Chapter 2 against the case study 
material explored in Chapter 4 to produce an evaluative report on each jurisdiction for the 
criteria.
The evaluative criteria have three broad categories: (1) free speech - involving issues of 
unchecked private censorship, scope creep, lack of focus and excessive use of architecture-
based regulatory tools; (2) privacy protection - involving issues of increased unchecked and 
more invasive surveillance powers given to law enforcement authorities; and (3) general 
democratic values and good regulation - involving issues around the lack of transparency, 
accountability, legitimacy, proper oversight, and citizen involvement as well as inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness of regulatory intervention which includes difficulties in evaluating hybrid 
regulation, crime displacement, unchecked regulatory powers and insufficient safeguards.
Such criteria derive from relevant  academic literature and may incorporate other issues arising 
from each particular case study. As such, the criteria were designed not  only as an evaluative but 
also as a mapping mechanism so as to identify new issues found during fieldwork. Two 
situations can therefore occur: (1) issues neglected by the literature but  found in the field can be 
added to the criteria; and (2) some items from the evaluative criteria may be irrelevant, or not 
emphasised in a particular jurisdiction. As a consequence, not all comparators of the evaluative 
criteria may be discussed in regards to one particular jurisdiction, but  only those which were 
considered relevant in that jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the evaluative criteria are not expected to privilege any jurisdiction in terms of 
‘best’ regulatory practices according to pre-established top-down criteria, because each 
jurisdiction has a regulatory culture of its own and therefore concepts such as ineffectiveness 
and inefficiency have to be understood under such cultural underpinnings. This is not  an 
obstacle, for example, to discuss whether the Brazilian model over or under regulates for 
freedom of speech in comparison to Australia or the United Kingdom. In short, although the 
regulatory analysis developed here is aware of the dangers of such cultural relativism, it  is free 
to explore a number of avenues for comparison.
Chapter 2 explored a number of regulatory arrangements for online child pornography in a 
decentred, polycentric, multi-jurisdictional and resilient  regulatory environment as well as the 
negative consequences of hybrid regulation for free speech, privacy protection and general 
democratic values. Against  this background, this chapter explores and compares in detail the 
different  levels of state involvement and the specific public-private hybrid arrangements 
employed in Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom; it  addresses the different ways whereby 
hybrid arrangements between public and private actors were designed and implemented to 
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target  the problem of child pornographic material available on the Internet. The critical analysis 
of such regulatory configurations is expected to help improving current  policymaking both 
domestically and internationally, to identify advantages and disadvantages of each arrangement, 
and to identify the safeguards needed. Notably, it  is also expected to help in moving forward the 
debate about economic effectiveness of regulation versus principles of justice (i.e., increased 
regulation to protect children with sufficient  safeguards to protect  civil liberties and minimise 
unintended consequences) forward and to show that  the problem of controlling online child 
pornography is not only legal but also regulatory. 
1 Summary of case study material
Chapter 4 explored the regulatory models in place in the three chosen jurisdictions. In Australia, 
although many actors were in the regulatory environment (for example, the Commonwealth 
statutory regulator, the content service, hosting service and Internet service providers, the 
Internet industry association, and law enforcement authorities) the state played a central role 
coordinating the overall regulatory regime. The interface with online intermediaries was 
performed by a statutory body, the ACMA, and the regulatory regime relies to a great  extent in 
legislation and Internet industry Codes of Conduct. The evaluation criteria applied to the 
Australian case study material raised the following issues: (1) its potential for scope creep and 
indiscriminate private censorship; (2) lack of sufficient focus; and (3) problematic transparency, 
accountability and effectiveness. 
In Brazil, many actors were involved in the regulatory intervention such as the Federal Public 
Prosecution Service, a non-governmental Internet hotline, the Senate and major online 
intermediaries. Nevertheless, the state was also the main driver of regulatory intervention via 
the abovementioned Prosecution Service and the Senate both of which forced online 
intermediaries to come to line with a number of regulations based on agreements. It  is also 
worth noting the role of Safernet  Brasil, a NGO Internet hotline, which helped putting the 
problem in the governmental agenda and providing technical expertise. The mechanics of the 
regulatory regime is only partially based on legislation; it is to a greater extent based on 
agreements. The evaluation criteria applied to the Brazilian case study material raised the 
following issues: (1) regulation via undemocratic channels, unchecked private censorship, and 
the need of legislated safeguards; (2) problems in terms of legitimacy, transparency and 
effectiveness or regulatory measures; and (3) crime displacement  as well as the issue of which 
actor is supposed to bear the regulatory costs.
In the UK, although the state was a key actor whether enacting relevant  legislation or forcing 
online intermediaries to do something about the problem (for example, the police), the Internet 
industry self-regulatory organisation IWF was the main interface with online intermediaries; the 
key regulator was not statutory but from the Internet industry. Anti-child pornography and 
legislations escalated over time to cope with developments in digital communication 
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technologies but  the mechanics of the regulatory regime was not  legislated; it follows a self-
regulatory approach and was implemented voluntarily by the online intermediaries involved. 
The evaluation criteria applied to the UK case study material raised the following issues: (1) 
unchecked private censorship, overblocking, scope creep, and alleged violation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights; and (2) lack of legitimacy, judicial oversight, transparency, 
accountability, and effectiveness. Although most  of the implications discussed in regards to the 
UK regulatory regime are in relation to the operation of the IWF, some apply to the relevant 
online intermediary such as ISPs, hosting and content providers.
2 Freedom of expression
2.1 Unchecked private censorship, scope creep, lack of focus and excessive use of 
 architecture-based regulatory tools
In Australia, concerns about  free speech violations occurred mainly in relation to the filtering 
and blocking measures targeting overseas child pornography websites. First, there was a 
filtering scheme in place grounded in legislation, managed by a statutory regulator, and 
implemented via Codes of Practice set up by the Australian Internet  industry. It was voluntary at 
the user-level and thus the reported child pornography websites were still available if customers 
decided not to use the filtering software provided. This voluntary scheme did not much harm 
free speech, but  it was ineffective in stopping people accessing child pornographic material, 
because customers could opt to use the filters or not. In addition, it had low usage rate by 
Australian users. This has forced regulators to take more controversial filtering measures 
onboard.
As a result, major Australian ISPs decided to implement  voluntarily, at the ISP-level, a blocklist 
of alleged child pornography websites provided by Interpol. This scheme was not based on 
legislation, the relevant  safeguards (for example, put back and appealing procedures) were 
neither robust nor clear, and the assessment of material in the blocklist was performed by an 
international police agency, not local Australian police forces. Unchecked private censorship 
was an issue because the blocklist was managed by Interpol, which had an assessment criteria of 
their own and this might not  be in line with the Australian legislation. In addition, the scheme 
targeted entire websites not the individual URLs; it  was therefore wide in scope, although only 
child pornography was said to be targeted. In addition, the safeguards provided were poorly 
stated and there were doubts about the possibility of enforcement; it was unclear whether 
Australian residents could make Interpol accountable for potential abuses.
The Commonwealth government  was trying to implement  a mandatory blocking scheme via 
legislation to target overseas websites and cover the broad range of Refused Classification rated 
material (meaning not  only child pornography but other violent  material), and it  was therefore 
much wider in scope than the voluntary scheme put in place by the major Australian ISPs. The 
RC category was under review following a request of the Commonwealth government and, as a 
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result, the proposed mandatory scheme has been put on hold since then. The proposed blocking 
scheme based on legislation was also expected to have a more robust range of legislative 
safeguards. Nevertheless, it was still unclear whether it would be implemented via legislation or 
administrative regulation, whether there would be any guidance set up by an Internet industry 
CoP, or whether there would be any statutory safeguards to make the scheme transparent and 
accountable. The scope of the proposed mandatory blocking scheme was under discussion 
because it  was unlikely that a RC-wide blocklist would pass parliamentary scrutiny and thus an 
only-child pornography blocklist had more chances to become law under the current  political 
environment.
It  has been suggested that  online content filtering and blocking are more adequate when 
implemented via legislation, because it  is more democratic, legitimate, and subject  to the 
constitutional channels of accountability and transparency.835  Although the regulatory 
framework for online content  was established via legislation in Australia (in conjunction with 
guidance provided by the relevant CoPs), the voluntary blocking scheme implemented recently 
by major ISPs was employed without a clear legislative mandate and without any statutory 
safeguards to prevent indiscriminate private censorship. Yet, the fact  that  there is a statutory 
regulator and censorship measures are implemented via legislation provides no automatic 
guarantee that  free speech will be protected; the actual implementation of policies and their 
impact have to be assessed in practice.836
Chapter 2 showed that blocklists are often secretive, developed under opaque procedures, 
largely exempt from public scrutiny, created by institutions unaccountable in the relevant 
jurisdiction, and that could also be indiscriminately tinkered with by the private actors involved 
if no sufficient  safeguards and transparent procedures are in place. This seemed to be the case in 
Australia.
For example, blocklists provided by ‘accredited’ family-friendly filter vendors and also the 
Interpol blocklist were created and maintained by overseas companies. They were built 
according to assessment criteria that  may not be entirely in accordance with Australian anti-
child pornography laws. As such, the responsibility for assessing apparent illegality of online 
material is delegated to foreign organisations (not under the control of Australian law) without 
proper redress procedures.837  These blocklists were relatively unproblematic when employed 
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835  See Lessig, L., Code: version 2.0  (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2006). See also Bambauer, D., 'Filtering in  Oz: 
Australia's Foray into Internet Censorship', Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 125,  (2008).
836  Duffy argues that this  is particularly worrying because of insufficient constitutional protection for free speech in 
Australia. He argues  that  censorship  laws  in relation to  online content in Australia has developed since 1999 whereas 
free speech protection legislation is still stuck in the 1990s. See Duffy, J., 'Toothless  Tiger, Sleeping Dragon: Implied 
Freedoms, Internet Filters and the Growing Culture of Internet  Censorship in Australia.', Murdoch University 
Electronic Journal of Law, 16(2) (2009), 91-105, p 104. Bambauer has also reported the lack of express guarantee for 
free speech in  the Commonwealth  of Australia Constitution. Bambauer, D., 'Filtering in Oz: Australia's Foray into 
Internet Censorship', Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 125,  (2008), p 8.
837 Ibid , p 10-11.
voluntarily at the user-level.838 because it  is up to Internet  users to decide whether they trust or 
want a censor to filter content for them, but there was scope for free speech violations and 
unchecked private censorship when these filters are made mandatory for all users or employed 
voluntarily at the ISP-level.
Another issue is the lack of sufficient focus. The Australian online content  regulation targeted 
both harmful and illegal content  as prohibited or potential prohibited materials. As such, it 
employed measures that  targeted not only child pornographic material but a wide range of 
content deemed inappropriate to children. For example, adult  pornography, violent  content, 
highly offensive material and also ‘adult discourse on social and political issues’ such as texts 
and images related to suicide, crime, corruption and marital problems, were targeted.839 Again, 
this is relatively unproblematic when implemented voluntarily at  the discretion of individual 
users, but  potential threats to free speech arises when there are limited options available for 
unfiltered access to the Internet. Although the voluntary scheme employed by major Australian 
ISPs was said to target only overseas child pornography websites, the Australian online 
censorship regime was wide in scope and this could be even more problematic in relation to free 
speech protection if the proposed scheme is made mandatory via legislation without robust 
safeguards implemented in practice such as independent audit of blocklists.
In Brazil, the interface between public and private actors controlling online child pornography 
was largely based on agreements negotiated between law enforcement authorities and online 
intermediaries. There were neither filtering nor blocking regimes in place but  this does not mean 
that regulatory measures are exempt from criticisms. Although the NTD scheme, enacted via 
legislation in 2008, applied only in relation to child pornography, relevant  regulatory measures 
including the overall reporting scheme, liability of online intermediaries, specific regulations of 
the notice and take down scheme, and safeguards against both the governmental and private 
indiscriminate censorship were not legislated.
It  has been argued elsewhere that the absence of a statutory basis for the regulatory framework 
may lead to regulation performed via non-democratic means in the online environment.840 This 
seemed to be, at least partially, the case in Brazil. Although these agreements: (1) were arguably 
in accordance with the current  legal constitutional environment; and (2) were derived from a 
dialogue amongst law enforcement  authorities (for example Federal and State Public 
Prosecution Services and the Federal Police), both houses of Parliament (there were a number of 
public sessions), an NGO (Safernet Brasil), and relevant  private actors from the Internet 
industry; there were no representatives from the judiciary; and the consumer rights, civil 
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838 It is important to bear in mind however that even when filtering is employed voluntarily at  the user level, Internet 
service and content providers, and also filtering manufacturers, should be transparent about what they filter and  the 
limitations of the technology employed so parents and Internet users in general are better informed.
839 See Graham, I., 'Blinded by Smoke:  The Hidden Agenda of the Net Censorship Bill 1999', Libertus.net,  (1999) at 
<http://libertus.net/censor/rdocs/blinded.html> accessed 01 September 2011.
840 See Lessig, L., Code: version 2.0 (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2006) and also Lemos, R., Direito, Tecnologia e 
Cultura (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. FGV, 2005), p 93.
liberties and children rights’ activists were largely absent  from the debate. In addition, these 
agreements were not enacted via the democratic and formal channels of the Parliament  as in the 
case of a legislation.
Furthermore, the agreements created obligations and sanctions not  defined by current legislation 
and pushed online intermediaries to implement monitoring and removal measures of their own 
without  adequate safeguards and without a comprehensive legislated framework regulating the 
activities of online intermediaries in Brazil.841
Legislative safeguards seem to be needed to avoid abuses from both law enforcement  authorities 
and private actors in Brazil. The implementation of regulatory measures via agreements and 
without  a comprehensive statutory basis represents a potential threat  to both privacy protection 
(in relation to the way access’ logs and contents of online communications were disclosed to 
law enforcement  authorities) and free speech (in relation to unchecked censorship performed by 
both public and private actors).842 This begs the question of whether legislated safeguards are 
the way forward (irrespective of the fact that the scheme is established by legislation or based 
on agreements) or whether such protection can be left  to the regulatory actors’ will. The 
examples of Australia and Brazil seem to indicate the need of more robust  legislated safeguards 
to prevent abuses and unchecked censorship.
The problematic regulatory role of private actors controlling online content is also an issue in 
Brazil, particularly in relation to the Internet  hotline Safernet  Brasil, which was a key interface 
with online intermediaries because it  managed a national database of reports and had an 
authoritative position to force online intermediaries to remove the material reported. Safernet 
Brasil received, processed and forwarded reports to law enforcement authorities concerning the 
availability of child pornography on the Internet (mainly websites). It  also created, and 
maintained a central database of reports that  was shared by a substantial number of law 
enforcement authorities.
There has been little opposition to the website reporting scheme implemented by the hotline, 
particularly because child pornographic content was considered blatantly illegal and thus 
expected to be removed immediately without further discussions.843 Nevertheless, judgement  of 
illegality of content should be a function of the courts, because there is a possibility that non-
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841  There was a bill  under discussion within the government but it was unclear when it would be submitted  to 
Parliament; the bill is expected to address the issue of NTD in relation to all types of online content, and this may 
have implications for the existing  notification scheme in regards to online child pornographic content. See Marco 
Civil da Internet (2010). at <http://culturadigital.br/marcocivil/>,  accessed 26 April 2011.
842 Notably, the need of legislated safeguards has been stressed in other jurisdictions  as well. For example, Nunziato 
suggests that online intermediaries should be considered  as public organisations in relation to free speech laws, 
because they are arguably performing public functions, and then goes on to recommend that legislated safeguards 
should  be put in  place so as to force these private actors to refrain from unchecked censorship of online speech. See 
Nunziato, D., Virtual freedom: net neutrality and free speech in the Internet age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2009).
843  For this opinion see Leonardi, M., 'Controle de conteúdos na Internet: filtros, censura, bloqueio e tutela', in 
Newton de Lucca and Adalberto  Simão Filho (eds.), Direito & Internet: aspectos jurídicos relevantes (vol. II;  São 
Paulo: Quartier Latin, 2008), 377-401.
child pornographic material (such as legal adult  pornography, cartoon pornography and texts) be 
considered child pornography by the content  analyst of the Internet hotline. Excessive reporting 
and high removal rates were an issue in Brazil.844 Another problem was the level of dependency 
that public authorities had in relation to one unaccountable private institution; Safernet  Brasil 
was not  subject  to wider public scrutiny. The Internet hotline was generally unaccountable to the 
public, it was under no permanent judicial oversight, its activities were not subject to any 
external audit,845  and its financial sources (it was funded in a non-permanent way by public and 
private actors) raised doubts about its true independence.
In the UK, the problem of unchecked private censorship was also emphasised, particularly 
because of the central role that a private actor from the Internet industry had in the regulatory 
arena. The fact that the main interface with online intermediaries was a self-regulatory body 
raised a number of concerns in relation to free speech protection. For example, the problem of 
overblocking, i.e., when not only the targeted illegal but also legal content  is blocked, has been 
associated with IWF blocklist.846 Another issue was the lack of control and transparency around 
the implementation of the IWF blocklist  on the part of ISPs: there were no safeguards to avoid 
controversial material being added to the IWF blocklist by member ISPs. As such, it was very 
likely that  UK Internet  users had different filtered access to websites depending on the ISP they 
subscribed to. Internet  service and content  providers had contractual agreements with each 
costumer that determined the kind of service they provide, and these contracts did not establish 
that the user had an absolute right to access anything on the Internet. Such position represents a 
discretionary power that can be used to chill free speech; online intermediaries were not under 
any public obligation to restraint from including other material in the blocklist provided by the 
IWF.847 
In any case, it is no easy task to know when overblocking occurs. In principle, it should be an 
objective judgement based on what  type of content is considered illegal and what has been 
included in the blocklist. If the blocklist contains legal material, overblocking is occurring. 
Nevertheless, some jurisdictions deny access to the contents of such blocklists (for example, 
Australia) and there is also the problem of interpreting the law to identify what  illegal material 
is in practice, especially in the case of borderline material such as child erotica and explicit 
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844  Excessive reporting occurs  when members of the public wrongly consider offensive content such as extreme 
pornography as illegal. Excessive removal rates occurs when the relevant online intermediary removes  the reported 
content indiscriminately because it has more incentive to do so than to risk being criminally liable. See for example 
the complaint made by the MPF-SP about the great volume of obscene content reported to them by Google Brasil as 
if the material was child pornography. Suiama, S., 'Nota Técnica GCCC/PR/SP', (São Paulo: MPF-SP, 2010) at 
<http://www.prsp.mpf.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/pdfs-das-noticias/crimes-ciberneticos> Accessed 19 April 2011.
845 For example, the MPF-SP  audited the operation of its partner Safernet Brasil for the first time only after five years 
from initial institutional cooperation, and the Internet hotline failed the test. See Section 4.5 above.
846  The Wikipedia incident  discussed below can be understood as an example of overblocking but it  also shows the 
difficulties in  establishing what  is, or is not, illegal under the UK law without the adequate judicial scrutiny. That 
were also claims that  the secretive blocklist of URLs contained not only child  pornography related websites but 
perfectly legal material. See, e.g., Ozimek, J., 'A  censorship  model', The Guardian, 02 August 2009, sec. Global at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/aug/02/internet-censor>, accessed 20 June 2011.
847  There were public calls to make these online intermediaries  subject  to wider civil liberties protection via 
legislation. See Section 4 of Chapter 2.
sexual material involving adolescents. In the end, what  should be a result  of objective judgment 
may become a subjective judgement  call on the side of content  analysts.848 Greater transparency 
about what  has been blocked (for example, via independent audits), the development of industry 
standards of good practice and permanent automatic monitoring are needed to check whether 
overblocking has occurred or not.
This criticism was particularly strong after the 2008 Wikipedia incident. On 04 December 2008, 
the IWF received a complaint about the availability of an album cover849  depicting potentially 
criminal content under UK law; this was an image of a naked child with a cracked glass effect 
covering her genitals made available on the free-encyclopaedia project Wikipedia.850 
Subsequently, the IWF included the reported URL in its blocklist and, because of the technical 
nature of the blocking system, not  only this specific image was blocked within the United 
Kingdom, but the ability of UK users to add new content or to edit existing content  were also 
undermined. This produced a public outcry, particularly because the image was freely available 
via commercial websites such as Amazon.com.851  Following this, the IWF Board started its 
appeal process852 and, although it considered its content analyst  right  to block the image, under 
UK law,853  the Board decided to remove the URL from the blocklist because of contextual 
issues, i.e. the image was not within a paedophilia related context.854 For Edwards, this incident 
made evident the problematic operation of a non-judicial body assessing the illegality of content 
online because the IWF had no legal authority to assess the illegality of content, there were no 
adequate appeal process nor was explicit  notice sent to content  providers.855 It  is worth stressing 
however that in addition to the problem of overblocking, the 2008 Wikipedia incident  showed 
the difficulties in establishing the illegality of borderline child pornographic images without 
adequate judicial oversight.856
The IWF’s operation also raised fears of scope creep. This relates to the fact that, after the 
blocking scheme is implemented, other types of content  (such as terrorism related, incitement to 
racial hatred, copyright infringement, politically sensitive and adult pornography) may be 
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848  Interestingly, many ISPs filtered for other things such as viruses and phishing messages but these did not lead to 
strong criticisms as  in the case of child pornography. Perhaps, this is  because the problem of online child 
pornography draws much more public attention and thus are pushing the law and regulatory  measures quickly and 
with greater public support, which is a real threat to free speech and privacy protection.
849 The 1976 Virgin Killer’s album by the German heavy metal band Scorpions.
850  Wikipedia, 'Wikipedia: a multilingual, web-based, free-content encyclopedia project based on an openly editable 
model.', at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page>, accessed 09 July 2011.
851 Petley, J., 'Web Control', Index on Censorship, 38(1) (2009), 78-90, p 90.
852  Indeed, this shows a certain degree of responsiveness. See IWF, 'Content Assessment  Appeal Process', at <http://
www.iwf.org.uk/accountability/complaints/content-assessment-appeal-process>, accessed 09 July 2011.
853 The Protection of Children Act (c.37) 1978 (England and Wales).
854  See IWF, 'IWF statement regarding Wikipedia webpage' (2008); <http://www.iwf.org.uk/media/
news.archive-2009.251.htm> accessed 13 July  2010. See also Ozimek, J., 'IWF chief: We don't need  crusaders', The 
Register, 08  September 2009 at <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/09/08/iwf_peter_robbins_interview/>, accessed 
07 June 2011.
855 Edwards, L., 'The Fall  and Rise of Intermediary Liability Online', in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds.), 
Law and the Internet (3rd edn.; Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 47-88.
856 This point was made by one of the UK experts consulted during the validation scheme.
included in the blocklist.857  For McIntyre, the UK Internet  industry has opposed so far the 
inclusion of other less contentious types of material within the IWF blocklist,858  but there were 
nor legislative safeguards to limit  censorship escalation towards other regulatory targets; neither 
industry standards in relation to redress procedures, independent audits, and monitoring of 
overblocking.
The IWF has also been criticised on other grounds. For example, McIntyre859  stresses that  the 
IWF blocking regime violates the right to free speech under Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).860  In addition, McIntyre stresses that  the IWF blocking 
scheme violates the right  to free speech because the scheme is not prescribed by law and have to 
be performed under the conditions and safeguards established by Article 6 of the ECHR.861
Nevertheless, the right to free speech is not  without limitations. It permits a certain degree of 
interference as it  is prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. According to 
Article 10(2) of the ECHR, it may be subject  to ‘[…] formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime 
[...].’ The issue here is not  that blocking schemes should be scrapped entirely but that they 
should be implemented according to the law and subject to sufficient  safeguards so as to secure 
the right to impart and receive information.862
Finally, it has been reported that  the IWF blocking system could be easily circumvented and 
used as an ‘oracle’ to obtain the list of URLs blocked,863 and the secretive blocklist  can leak as it 
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857 Edwards, L., 'Editorial: From child porn to China, in one Cleanfeed ', Script-ed, 3(3) (2006), 174-5 Also Petley, J., 
'Web Control', Index on Censorship, 38(1) (2009), 78-90, p 87. 
858  McIntyre, T., 'Internet  Filtering:  Implications of the “Cleanfeed” System', Third Year PhD Presentation Series 
(Edinburgh: School of Law, University of Edinburgh, 2010) at  <http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/
communities/245_tj%20macintyre%20-%20internet%20filtering-%20implications%20of%20the%20cleanfeed
%20system.pdf>, accessed 29 February 2012.
859  See McIntyre, T., 'Blocking child  pornography on the Internet: European Union developments', International 
Review of  Law, Computers  and Technology, 24(3) (2010), 209-21. See also Akdeniz, Y., 'To block or not  to block: 
European approaches to content regulation, and implications for freedom of expression', Computer Law & Security 
Review, 26 (2010), 260-72.
860 EU Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols No. 11 
and 14. 1950 (04 Nov 1950) (European Union).
861  See McIntyre, T., 'Blocking child  pornography on the Internet: European Union developments', International 
Review of  Law, Computers and Technology, 24(3) (2010), 209-21. This  criticism is also advanced by Akdeniz. See 
Akdeniz, Y., 'To block or not  to  block: European approaches to content regulation, and implications  for freedom of 
expression', Computer Law & Security Review, 26 (2010), 260-72
862 It is  worth noting that free speech involves not  only the right to impart information but also to receive information. 
Walden argues that the legal debate around free speech is moving from the right to (or regulation in relation to) 
impart information towards the right to  (or regulation in relation to) receive information, because it is increasingly 
more difficult to monitor the publication and availability of user generated content, particularly hosted overseas, by 
content and hosting providers,  in comparison to the easier implementation of automatic content filters by ISPs. See 
Walden, I., 'Criminal Content  and Control', in David Goldberg, Gavin Sutter, and Ian Walden (eds.), Media Law and 
Practice (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 427-62, p 461-2.
863  See Clayton, R., 'Anonymity and traceability in  cyberspace', Technical Report  Number 653 (Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge, 2005) at <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-653.html>, accessed 20 
June 2011. Updates and fixes could have been implemented by the BT since the release of the report in 2005.
happened in Australia in 2009,864  the material blocked can be moved to a different  location in a 
different  URL (so the blocking system has to be updated permanently). Another criticism is that 
blocking schemes implemented domestically inhibits international cooperation,865  because this 
deviates attention from policies that may remove the material at its source.
Such numerous criticisms made to the IWF derives in part  from the fact  it  is a private regulator 
acting as a gatekeeper for content control, working in line with the anti-child pornography laws 
but largely in a self-regulatory manner; and that  by over regulating, the IWF risks chilling free 
speech. The problem here is the lack of transparency, legitimacy and accountability of a private 
actor undertaking censorship duties as well as the inexistence of robust and clear scheme of 
safeguards to guide its operation and make it accountable to the public.866
2 Privacy protection
2.1 Increased unchecked and invasive surveillance powers given to law enforcement 
 authorities
The crusade against  online child pornography has updated not only substantive criminal laws 
and regulations but it has also increased the investigatory powers of law enforcement  authorities 
and facilitated the disclosure of personal data by online intermediaries to the latter. This has 
certainly a deterrent effect on those trying to access child pornographic material, but more 
importantly, it  facilitated the launch of a number of international police operations. 
Nevertheless, increasing invasive surveillance powers of law enforcement  authorities can also 
have unintended consequences such as the violation of privacy of individuals, wrongful 
accusations and trial by the media, if proper checks and balances are not in place.
The three case studies showed that anti-child pornography laws and investigatory powers of law 
enforcement authorities have been updated to catch up with the increased use of digital 
technologies by online criminals involved with online child pornography offences. Under these 
updated provisions, many police operations took place domestically and internationally. These 
legislative developments also make evident  the need of a framework of checks and balances to 
avoid abuses and facilitate the compensation for unlawful interceptions.
Chapter 4 showed that Australia has a robust legislative framework to regulate the issuing of 
warrants and use of surveillance equipment, and also an oversight scheme to protect against 
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864  Bingemann, M., 'ACMA blacklist leaked  on the internet', The Australian, 19 March 2009, sec. Australian IT at 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/acma-blacklist-leaked-on-the-internet/story-e6frgb5x-1225700508594>, 
accessed 24 June 2011; See also Moses, A., 'Leaked Australian blacklist reveals banned sites', The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 19 March 2009, sec. Technology at <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2009/03/19/1237054961100.html>, 
accessed 24 June 2011.
865  Villeneuve, N., 'Barriers to cooperation: An analysis of the origins  of international efforts to  protect children 
online', in Ronald J. Deibert, et al. (eds.), Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010), 59-70.
866 See a similar point advanced by Laidlaw in relation to search engines. Laidlaw, E., 'Private Power, Public Interest: 
An Examination of Search Engine Accountability', International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 17(1) 
(2008), 113-45.
unlawful interceptions. In Brazil, there were bills under discussion in Parliament about the 
preservation of access’ logs and the contents of online communications as well as about the way 
they could be requested by and disclosed to law enforcement  authorities. Although, a number of 
agreements with ISPs established protocols for the disclosure of customers’ data to aw 
enforcement authorities, as for 2010, a court  order was needed to access the contents of an 
online communication,867  whereas the access logs (including IP address, GMT’s data and time 
etc.) could be disclosed to law enforcement  authorities without  a court order.868  In the UK, the 
RIPA 2000 established a regime for the interception of communication, acquisition and 
disclosure of data, carrying out covert surveillance, use of covert human intelligence sources 
and encryption; this allowed the police and other law enforcement authorities to request 
information from online intermediaries without a court order.869
This investigation and the methods employed were unable to reveal many relevant  points in 
relation to privacy protection. As such, further research is needed to explore in detail the laws 
and regulations in this area and their impact on the privacy of Internet users. It is also necessary 
to identify which type of violations occur in each jurisdiction in relation to child pornography 
related investigations and the existing safeguards. The documentary analysis alone was unable 
to identify how these provisions work in practice and how violations of privacy occur. Another 
research method such as interviews and participant  observation are necessary to uncover the 
implications that such legislative developments may have in terms of privacy protection.
3 Democratic values and good regulation
3.1 Lack of transparency, accountability, legitimacy, proper oversight and citizen 
 involvement
Although the Australian regulatory scheme was established via legislation and therefore under 
the existing constitutional accountability and transparency principles, access to the ACMA 
blocklist  of prohibited and potential prohibited material was particularly controversial following 
the denial of a Freedom of Information (FOI) request. In February 2000, the Electronic 
Frontiers Australia (EFA)870 submitted a request to the Commonwealth regulator, under the FOI 
Act 1982,871 demanding detailed data about the online content added to the ACMA blocklist.
The regulator at that time, the ABA, released part of the information requested but denied access 
to other parts of the blocklist arguing that the disclosure would have an adverse effect  on the 
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867 Following Article 5(X and XII) of the Brazilian Constitution. See Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil 
1988  (Brazil). US-based companies  are required by law to disclose the contents of an online communication, without 
a court order, in  some critical circumstances e.g. the reports of child pornography and immediate threat  to life. See '18 
U.S.C. § 2702 US Code - Section 2702:  Voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records', (USA, at 
<http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/18/I/121/2702>, accessed 20 March 2012.
868 This is  subject  to legal controversy, because some believe that  even the disclosure of such data is also subject to a 
judicial order.
869 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (c.23) 2000 (England and Wales).
870 See EFA, 'Electronic Frontiers Australia', at <http://www.efa.org.au/>, accessed 22 August 2011.
871 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth Australia).
ABA’s ability to administer the regulatory scheme either properly or efficiently; indiscriminate 
disclosure would make public a list  of overseas websites containing material forbidden in 
Australia. As a result, the EFA appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) in 
October 2000 and a final decision was issued on 12 June 2002.
Although the Tribunal emphasised the ‘honourable reasons’ presented by the EFA and that 
‘secrecy may of itself undermine the public’s confidence’ in the federal regulator, they ruled in 
favour of the ABA: the list  of URLs included in the blocklist  were exempt  from disclosure 
under the FOI Act  1982. The Tribunal decided that  the documents in dispute (URLs and IP 
addresses) were exempt from disclosure, and argued that the adverse effects of disclosing such 
information outweighed the public interest.872  Two weeks later, the federal government 
proposed amendments to the FOI Act 1982 so as to exempt from disclosure even a wider 
spectrum of prohibited material included in the blocklist. Perhaps, to minimise criticisms and 
accelerate the approval, the Parliamentary debate around these amendments focused on the 
harms of disclosing URLs and IPs allegedly hosting child pornographic material overseas, 
despite the fact that a broader range of content categories might  have been added to the ACMA 
blocklist.
The Tribunal decision and the following statutory amendment raised a number of issues not 
only in relation to the transparency but the accountability of the federal regulator as well as the 
potential for scope creep, because not even independent  audit could scrutinise the ACMA 
blocklist. This was one of the reasons why some critics argued that  regulation of online material 
in Australia is more opaque and unaccountable when compared to regulation of traditional 
media such as print publications, offline films and videos, and DVDs.
The online censorship regime operates in stark contrast  to the offline censorship regime. 
Not only is online content  censored, information about what  is censored is also censored. 
Offline material is classified by the government appointed Classification Boards. 
Members of the Boards are publicly named, and titles of classified material, including 
that 'Refused Classification' (i.e. banned from sale etc.), are made publicly available in 
the Board's online classification decision database. Publishers/distributors of offline 
material are entitled to 'appeal' a Classification Board decision by applying for review by 
the Classification Review Board, which from time to time overturns a classification 
decision and grants lower a classification rating, including in relation to material that was 
refused classification/banned by the Classification Board.873
In regards to the accountability of the scheme, the ACMA hotline was required to report to the 
Minister of DBCDE every six months about the operation of its blocklist  and the Minister was 
required to report this to the Commonwealth Parliament  following a resolution from the 
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Q2000/979 (2002). Adminstrative Appeals Tribunal, at <http://www.efa.org.au/FOI/AAT2000-979_dec.pdf> accessed 
01 September 2011.
873  Graham, I., 'Australia's Internet Censorship System', (updated 11 April 2010) at  <http://libertus.net/censor/
netcensor.html>, accessed 01 September 2011. See also Penfold, C., 'Village Idiot, or Wisest Person in Town? 
Internet Content Regulation in  Australia', University of  Ottawa Law and Technology Journal, 3(2) (2006), 333-52, p 
348.
Senate.874  Nevertheless, these six-months reports ceased being made after 2005 and no 
explanation for this has ever been publicly stated. Decisions about  including any prohibited or 
potential prohibited material available online to the blocklist  were made by unnamed staff. They 
assessed the potential prohibited nature of the reported content and this decision cannot  be 
appealed because it was not  subject to review under Schedule 5 of the amended 1992 Act.875  In 
addition, the ACMA was not required to inform the relevant  overseas content service and 
hosting service providers about overseas websites included in the blocklist.
In Brazil, in regards to the transparency of policies in place, it  has been claimed that the 
notification scheme was transparent and democratic, because many institutions can report, 
manage and have access to the national database of reported websites. Nevertheless, it  was also 
the case that many online intermediaries were developing regulatory measures of their own in 
non-transparent ways after law enforcement  authorities made them come into line and the 
agreements were in place.
The lack of legitimacy of policies was also an issue in Brazil. The fact that  regulatory measures 
were put forward by the Public Prosecution Service (the MPF-SP and others), a non-
governmental organisation (Safernet  Brasil), the Senate (via the CPI) and online intermediaries 
may indicate that these policies are legitimate. Nevertheless, this is debatable because during 
policymaking there were no representatives from the judiciary; and consumer rights, civil 
liberties and children rights’ activists were largely absent from the debates that  led to legislative 
changes and negotiation of agreements.
The lack of transparency was also an issue in the United Kingdom. For Davies, the image of a 
heroic body fighting online child pornography saved the IWF from greater scrutiny,876  but  the 
lack of transparency and public scrutiny in relation to its operation have been criticised, 
particularly the NTD and blocklist  schemes, where no information was given by the member 
ISPs to the content provider that the relevant  content has been removed or blocked, nor was any 
specific message given to those who try to access the website URL or blocked (some ISPs 
provided only a standard 403 message without reporting the reason for blocking it).877  It  is 
important  to bear in mind however that  the IWF creates the blocklist  but  it  is up to member ISPs 
to implement  it. As such, it was up to the member ISPs to provide this information to a content 
provider and, perhaps, it was not in their interest  to give any transparent  information about the 
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874 See 'Six Month Report on Co-Regulatory Scheme for Internet Content Regulation', (Australia: Minister for 
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, 2000) at <http://www.archive.dbcde.gov.au/__data/assets/
file/0013/11560/Six-month_report_on_co-
regulatory_scheme_for_internet_content_regulation_January_to_June_2001.rtf>.
875 See Collins, L., et al., 'Feasibility Study: ISP Level Content  Filtering - Part 2', Internet Industry Association - IIA 
Australia, 2008) at <http://www.dbcde.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/95311/Part_2_-_Attachments_Final.pdf>, 
accessed 07 September 2011, p 123.
876  Davies, C., 'The hidden censors of the internet', Wired UK,  (2009) at <http://www.wired.co.uk/wired-magazine/
archive/2009/05/features/the-hidden-censors-of-the-internet?page=all> accessed 13 July 2010.
877 Whether a 403 or 404 page is displayed or not, is a choice for the relevant ISP.
specific website blocked because this could reveal they were blocking more than prescribed by 
the IWF. 
In short, these criticisms about  the lack of transparency apply to both the IWF and the ISPs that 
operate the website blocking scheme. Nevertheless, the IWF reported on these accounts that its 
blocklist  was independently audited and considered to be following the best standards. Finally, 
there were criticisms about  the lack of appeal process and put back procedures, but it seemed 
that after the Wikipedia incident, the IWF established a series of provisions in this regard.878
In terms of accountability, Petley argues that the existence of the IWF masks the fact that  the 
state is covertly censoring the Internet in the United Kingdom via third parties, and this 
arguably undermines the ability of content authors, whose photographic or non-photographic 
material may be deemed illegal, to defend themselves in courts. In addition, he argues that  there 
is a strong governmental support  for the operation of the IWF but no ‘sustained parliamentary 
or public scrutiny or debate.’879 This highlights the issue of censorship performed via indirect 
manners, i.e. the fact  that the state undertakes censorship without the political cost  (for example, 
of proposing legislation and facing both the political opposition and challenges in courts) by 
forcing online intermediaries to do the politically unattractive work via self-regulatory non-
transparent initiatives that go unnoticed by the population at large.880
The IWF has also been accused of performing privatised policing and censorship of online 
content and of acting as self-appointed judges.881  Although the nature of child pornographic 
content may be self-evident  and the IWF seemed to be focusing on the more dangerous 
images,882  not on borderline material such as child erotica, it  has been put  forward that  the 
evaluation of content legality should be a responsibility of the courts.883 This raises the question 
of whether the perception of illegality, the determination of potential illegality, or even the 
determination of illegality is inherently a judicial responsibility. In fact, these processes are 
performed by different social actors, on a daily basis, on a number of different  areas, not just  on 
the Internet. The judgement  of IWF’s staff has never been exempt from judicial redress; 
although it  seems that there are not strong incentives for free speech activists or UK online 
intermediaries to challenge IWF’s decisions in courts in relation to alleged child pornographic 
content. The problem is perhaps that  digital communication technologies made possible for 
these processes, related to the perception and determination of illegality, to operate in an 
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878  See IWF, 'Content Assessment Appeal Process', at  <http://www.iwf.org.uk/accountability/complaints/content-
assessment-appeal-process>, accessed 09 July 2011.
879 Petley, J., 'Web Control', Index on Censorship, 38(1) (2009), 78-90, p 84 and 87.
880 See Lessig, L., Code: version 2.0 (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2006), p 133, about ‘indirection’.
881Akdeniz, Y., 'Controlling Illegal  and Harmful Content on the Internet', in David Wall (ed.), Crime and the Internet 
(London: Routledge, 2001), 113-39.
882  In relation to levels of seriousness of indecent photographs of children for sentencing purposes. See Sexual 
Offences Act  2003: Definitive Guideline (2007). Sentencing Guidelines Council, at <http://
sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/web_SexualOffencesAct_2003.pdf> accessed 10 July 2011, p 109.
883 This is one of the reasons why the IWF labels the content it notifies as ‘potentially illegal’ rather than ‘illegal’.
automated manner, in larger scale, and therefore with wider implications if something goes 
wrong.
Despite the fact  that the IWF has suffered governance reforms along its existence, it  has been 
criticised for not  representing the public at  large, for lacking citizen involvement  in most aspects 
of its operation and for its self-appointed private nature that lacked adequate legislative 
foundations. The problem here is the dubious constitutional nature of the IWF as a private body 
performing a quasi-judicial (investigating content  and assessing its illegality) and a public 
function (determining what  should be or not  be seen by the Internet users) in the United 
Kingdom, which led some to advance the argument for increase ‘publicness’ (or its 
transformation into a statutory body) of the IWF, or to include in its Board not only members of 
the Internet  industry but legal professionals and charity representatives, chaired by an 
independent  member of the judiciary.884  Although the IWF has been externally audited by 
independent  experts, perhaps more public oversight is needed to increase transparency. It may 
be the case that the IWF should be embraced by the government in order to be under broader 
public scrutiny, subject  to judicial review and the traditional channels of accountability.885 
Nevertheless, there seems to be little motivation in this regard as well as to enshrine the IWF 
and its functions in law. The IWF has been debated and referred to in both Houses of 
Parliament, in a number of court  cases, and it often cited as an example of good practice by the 
British government; at least, in practice, it has been legitimised by the executive, legislative and 
judiciary. Nevertheless, as explained in regards to the Australian regime, this is no automatic 
guarantee that  free speech will be protected in practice and that  a robust scheme of safeguards 
are needed.
It  is difficult  to define the regulatory nature of the Internet  Watch Foundation. Is it a private 
organisation undertaking a public function? Is it a government body or a charity? Is it  a ‘quasi-
public’886  or a ‘quasi-private’ organisation? In which legal framework should the IWF be 
placed? Ultimately, the IWF is a hybrid creature that  incorporates features of a statutory 
regulatory body and, at  the same time, constitutes an Internet industry self-regulatory 
organisation. It  on one hand this hybrid configuration overcomes a number of disadvantages of 
a state or self-regulatory institution, on the other hand, it  is also subject to the criticisms of both 
models. It is worth noting that  these questions are not only theoretical, but  have practical 
implications for the accountability of the IWF. For example, McIntyre stresses that questions are 
crucial to determine the grounds for the IWF’s accountability, i.e. whether the IWF should be 
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885  Ozimek, J., 'A censorship model', The Guardian, 02 August 2009, sec. Global at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/
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viewed as a (1) public body, and therefore subject  to judicial review; or as a (2) body 
undertaking a public function and thus subject to the Human Rights Act.887
The lack of sufficient safeguards is another issue found in the UK both in relation to the NTD 
and blocking schemes. The NTD regime established by the 2000 EU Directive on Electronic 
Commerce,888  and on which the IWF operation is based, was not  without  criticism. For 
Edwards, the Directive is unclear about  what ‘expeditious’ take-down means, is omissive about 
the rules of a notification regime and lacks both adequate mechanisms of appeal and put back 
procedures.889  As a result, the lack of safeguards on the part of the online intermediaries could 
lead to excessive and indiscriminate content removal, because there were no incentives to do 
otherwise.890  In addition, there was no safeguard in place to stop ISP members tinkering with 
the IWF blocklist.
In short, online intermediaries were subject to increased control by domestic regulators and had 
no incentive to challenge these regulatory measures in courts as advocates of free speech or civil 
rights. Unless the issue at stake involved financial expenses on their part  (for example, the 
implementation of notification mechanisms associated with online copyright  infringement in the 
UK or the debate over the use of public funds to finance the regulatory infrastructure in 
Brazil).891 
In addition, Edwards points out that  the strategy892  employed by online intermediaries around 
the late 1990s no longer apply and thus there has been increased regulation and liability being 
placed on them over the years.893  This seems to suggest that it is necessary to design and 
implement safeguards, statutory or otherwise, to prevent abuses committed by either 
governments or online intermediaries worldwide.
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For example, the 2011 EU Directive was concerned about these safeguards in relation to the 
blocking of child pornography websites in Europe. According to Article 25(2):
These measures [against websites containing or disseminating child pornography] must 
be set  by transparent procedures and provide adequate safeguards, in particular to ensure 
that the restriction is limited to what is necessary and proportionate, and that users are 
informed of the reason for the restriction. Those safeguards shall also include the 
possibility of judicial redress.894
Although there are a number of criticisms on the work of the IWF, this organisation has 
survived so far and changed its governance structure and regulatory methods to address some of 
these criticisms. It  operates according to current  UK domestic legal framework, has substantial 
support  from the government and both Houses of Parliament, and it has inspired other European 
countries in the area of online content  regulation, particularly in relation to child pornographic 
material.
Indeed, the IWF operates in a problematic area where regulatory configurations involving 
public and private regulators are still in their infancy and are subject  to constant change and 
permanent learning. In addition, such complicated operation involves numerous reports from 
the public and thus extensive and detailed analysis of material that may result in errors and 
wrongful actions. This is the reason why a robust scheme of safeguards is needed to meet 
standards of accountability and transparency as well as to minimise violations of free speech 
and focus only on the problem they were designed for: child pornographic material. Such claim 
for stronger accountability of the IWF which act as a gatekeeper of online content is also made 
elsewhere in relation to other private organisations such as search engines. This makes evident 
the importance that private actors have in regulation of content, the need of state intervention to 
design and enforce minimum standards of accountability, transparency and citizen involvement, 
and a flexible system to enforce sanctions whenever necessary.895
3.2 Difficulties in evaluation of hybrid regulation
In Australia, the online content regulatory regime was implemented to address preoccupations 
about the easy access to material available on the Internet  which was either pornographic or 
unsuitable for children and young people in addition to material of more serious nature such as 
child pornography. Although regulatory measures were arguably effective to remove child 
pornography available in public websites hosted in Australia,896 they were unable to stop people 
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895  See e.g. Laidlaw, E., 'Private Power, Public Interest: An Examination of Search Engine Accountability', 
International Journal of  Law and Information Technology, 17(1) (2008), 113-45; Nunziato, D., Virtual  freedom: net 
neutrality and free speech in  the Internet age (Stanford: Stanford University  Press, 2009) and Perritt  Jr., H. H., 
'Towards a hybrid regulatory scheme for the Internet', University of Chicago Legal Forum,  (2001), 215-332.
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accessing such material hosted overseas, or even the child pornographic material hosted in 
Australian but  available in online private repositories accessed via Internet platforms and 
applications other than websites. This ineffectiveness was partially because the voluntary 
filtering scheme established via legislation depended on the will of customers to buy and use 
any of the ‘accredited’ family-friendly filters. This approach changed after the IIA’s ISP-level 
voluntary scheme came into effect  in July 2011, but (1) this new initiative only affected the 
customers of participating ISPs and (2) it  only targeted overseas websites, not the applications 
and platforms such as e-mail, private websites, file transfer protocol, P2P  and other anonymised 
channels. These applications and platforms were outside the scope of the planned mandatory 
blocking regime put forward by the Commonwealth government. As a result, existing 
policymaking targeted only a small part  of the problem, it did little to protect  children from 
inappropriate material available on the Internet  and it  may be giving parents a false sense of 
security.897
In Brazil, the provisions implemented via legislation (particularly the possession offence and the 
limitation of criminal liability of online intermediaries), the number of agreements negotiated 
amongst law enforcement authorities and private actors, the creation of a national reporting 
scheme as well as the monitoring and removing schemes developed by the online 
intermediaries, all have been arguably effective in limiting access to commercial and non-
commercial child pornography websites hosted domestically. Nevertheless, the problem 
remained in relation to websites hosted overseas and the many other platforms where child 
pornography was distributed and accessed in Brazil. Indeed, the fact  that only a portion of 
reported websites were found to be hosted domestically did not mean that  online child 
pornography was non-existent  in the country. In addition to material that goes unreported but is 
hosted in the country whether available via websites or other anonymised online platforms, 
Brazilian residents are able to produce, as well as distribute and access child pornographic 
material hosted overseas. Blocking of overseas child pornography websites has not been 
employed in Brazil, neither voluntarily nor mandatorily. On the one side, this decision avoided a 
number of potential threats to free speech, but  on the other side, it left part  of the problem 
unchallenged.898
Another important  issue derived from the Brazilian case study concerns who is to bear the costs 
of implementing the regulatory measures. Much of the opposition made by online 
intermediaries against regulation from the government, and perhaps the lack of participation of 
the Brazilian Internet industry in a self-regulatory environment, had to do not with the 
protection of free speech and privacy of users online, but  rather with the will of online 
intermediaries to avoid bearing the costs in implementing regulatory measures advanced by the 
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state. Given that  there was neither a statutory regulator of online content (like in Australia) nor a 
self-regulatory Internet  industry body (like in the UK) to bear most  of the regulatory costs 
involved, agreements that  did not  established clearly who would finance such regulatory 
enterprise was a good compromise for the Internet  industry, until legislation makes clear who is 
to bear these costs. In fact, there is a strong lobby from the Internet  industry for the use of 
public funds to finance the regulatory costs.
If on the one hand, the government is expected to enforce the anti-child pornography laws and 
protect children online, on the other hand, it  should achieve such aims with efficient  and 
effective regulations without imposing excessive financial burden on online intermediaries to 
make these regulations work. In principle the Internet industry should be more pro-active in the 
search of and funding of solutions. Nevertheless, whether the state should use public money to 
implement regulatory measures or which portion of such expenses is to be on the side of private 
actors, is to be decided via the democratic political debate, particularly in Brazil where private 
companies are already under substantial strain from tax collection offices at the federal, State 
and local levels. 
In the UK, the NTD employed domestically is considered arguably successful but the figures 
used to support this argument (for example, the reduction of child pornographic content  hosted 
in the UK to 1%) is related to reports sent  to the IWF and thus a larger number of content hosted 
in the United Kingdom could go unnoticed.899 In relation to the NTD scheme employed against 
websites hosted overseas, it  is only partially effective because of the difficult international 
cooperation discussed in Chapter 2. In addition, the blocking scheme can be circumvented by a 
persistent viewer and both the NTD and blocking schemes addressed only the public open 
Internet (involving public websites and newsgroups).900 Another problem with the NTD scheme 
was its limitations in taking down alleged illegal content hosted in overseas websites. Moore 
and Clayton reported that, even though taking down child pornographic content hosted 
domestically by the IWF took about  24 hours, the longevity of reported websites hosted abroad 
was far longer, because cross-national policing was usually slow and the foreign police often 
had more pressing priorities.901 The IWF reported however that this situation has changed; there 
has been a significant  reduction in the length of time these webpages stay ‘live’ in other 
countries after being reported.902
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In all three jurisdictions, access to online child pornography remains unchallenged and the 
availability os such material is only partially targeted. Regulatory measures targeting national 
and overseas websites (for example, via NTD schemes or website blocking) advances the 
control over online content but it  addresses only part of the child pornographic content available 
on the Internet. This is not only partially effective but may also lead to crime displacement: it 
pushes offenders towards more complex technologies such as anonymised P2P channels, hidden 
Internet, and highly secured networks, which are outside the reach of current  regulatory 
measures undertaken by the hybrid public-private regulators addressed in this research; they are 
a matter of intensive police investigation.
This raises concerns about why to invest  resources in policies that can only provide limited 
results instead of investing heavily in the harmonisation of laws and regulatory standards at the 
international level as well as preventing the commercial and non-commercial sexual 
exploitation of children in the ‘offline’ world. For Akdeniz, for example, institutions such as the 
IWF should tone down the emphasis on ineffective and costly initiatives and instead pursue 
international cooperation to remove foreign websites via an integrated and worldwide NTD 
scheme.903
4 Conclusions
This chapter employed the evaluative criteria against  the case study material explored in 
Chapter 4 to produce an evaluative report  on each jurisdiction. It  also showed that  each chosen 
jurisdiction has a different  configuration to force the online intermediaries removing or blocking 
access to the reported child pornographic material. Nevertheless, although substantially 
different  in regards to the way each models is designed and operated, they all involve a public-
private configuration that aims to remove the material reported domestically and limit  access to 
material hosted abroad. Such configuration, or functional equivalent, may involve a statutory 
regulator controlling the online intermediaries via legislation and CoCs set up by the Internet 
industry; the Public Prosecution Service, the Senate and a non-governmental Internet hotline 
forcing online intermediaries to comply with agreements; or an Internet industry regulator, 
closely connected with the police and government, that forces its own members to comply with 
self-regulation rules.
In Australia, there is a statutory regulator that  controls the availability of child pornographic 
material on the Internet and operates under substantial legislation and regulations as well as 
CoCs formulated and implemented by the Australian Internet industry. It  employs a NTD 
scheme domestically and it blocks child pornographic material via a voluntary scheme at the 
ISP-level in partnership with the Interpol. Such blocking scheme is expected to be based on 
legislation and wider in scope in the future, pending parliamentary approval.
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In Brazil, the Federal Public Prosecutor Service, the Senate and the non-governmental Internet 
hotline, Safernet Brasil, were the key regulatory actors to force online intermediaries in Brazil 
to come into line in regards to regulatory policies for removing child pornographic material 
hosted domestically and disclosing information of alleged offenders. Such policies are partially 
based in legislation (for example, the NTD scheme only in relation to child pornography) but 
mostly grounded on agreements negotiated with relevant  members of the Internet  industry. So 
far, there has not been any scheme for blocking material hosted overseas.
In the United Kingdom, the private regulator IWF is the key interface with the British Internet 
industry. The system is grounded on a self-regulatory approach whereby online intermediaries 
created, financed, and agreed to comply with the Internet  industry regulator’s decisions in 
regards to policies against  online child pornography. It  employs a NTD scheme domestically 
and an ISP-voluntary scheme to block access to overseas URLs that includes around 100% of 
ISPs in the UK.
All three models presented problems of their own and were subject to similar criticisms when 
assessed by the evaluative criteria developed in Chapter 2. First, despite the different 
configurations and regulatory measures employed, all models presented problems in relation to 
private censorship whether there was a statutory or a private regulator, particularly where a 
blocking system was in place. In Brazil, although blocking of websites was not  employed, 
private censorship was also an issue because online intermediaries were developing measures of 
their own as a response to the pressure put by the Federal Public Prosecution Service. 
Second, in all three jurisdictions, privacy protection was an issue because of the increased 
investigatory powers given to law enforcement  authorities and lack of robust safeguards to 
protect users from wrongful accusations and abuses. Nevertheless, further research is needed to 
advance these claims further and also to assess the deterrent  effect that such increased powers 
have on those who access child pornographic material on the Internet. 
Third, a lack of transparency, accountability, legitimacy, proper oversight, and citizen 
involvement were issues in all three jurisdictions. The three models were also successful to 
remove reported websites hosted domestically, but these policies are only partially effective 
because child pornographic material can be accessed and exchanged via other platforms and 
anonymised channels, and hosted overseas where enforcement is problematic.
Generally, the evaluative criteria served the purpose of assessing the three regulatory models for 
free speech and privacy protection as well as in regards to the principles of good regulation such 
as transparency, accountability and legitimacy. Nevertheless, some improvements can be made 
to the original evaluative criteria developed in Chapter 2. These items are: (1) how the 
regulatory measures are funded; (2) how each jurisdiction assess the success of regulatory 
policies employed. Another important addition to the criteria is to include both the domestic and 
international dimensions of each criteria in order to assess the regulatory policies and liaisons 
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implemented at the international level, which is crucially important  for regulating content  on the 
Internet.
It  is also worth noting the importance of choosing a jurisdiction like Australia that  relies on a 
statutory regulatory framework and a statutory regulator to control online content to show that 
employing such model is no guarantee that accountability, transparency and legitimacy criteria 
are meeting proper regulatory standards, for example that free speech and privacy are protected, 
and the principles of good regulation are in place. 
In fact, the problematic public-private configurations applied to online content regulation 
presented problems in all the three jurisdictions in relation to the evaluative criteria, irrespective 
of the fact  that there is more or less state influence. This seems to contradict the assumption that 
more state regulation minimises the violations of free speech and privacy protection commonly 
associated with private regulators. Yet, the claim for more ‘publicness’ of the IWF for example 
seems legitimate, particularly, because of current  lack of closer judicial oversight  and need of 
more public scrutiny.
Indeed, the way forward for these public-private configurations is towards a greater degree of 
‘publicness’ but  with flexibility and stronger involvement of the Internet industry via an 
escalation of sanctions if codes of conduct  are violated. This involves the creation and 
implementation of a scheme of safeguards that clearly states the minimum standards that 
regulatory actors should meet  both domestically and internationally. These safeguards should 
also be established via legislation in line with international standards.904
The next chapter is the conclusion of this research. It  draws on findings from this evaluative 
report and links them with the theories of regulation, governance and criminology addressed in 
Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
This research employed the evaluative criteria developed in Chapter 2 against the anti-child 
pornography laws and regulations in place in Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom to 
assess the implications of hybrid regulation for free speech, privacy protection and democracy 
in the online environment. This provided an opportunity to explore different  features of public-
private regulatory configurations found in these jurisdictions, and also to address a number of 
issues raised in the literature review chapter.
This conclusion chapter explores the findings from Chapter 5 and links them back to what was 
discussed in Chapter 2, showing what regulatory and governance theorists as well as 
criminologists may learn from this research.
1 Regulatory models, the role of the state and functional equivalents
Chapter 2 divided the regulatory strategies applied to online content into three different  models 
taking into account the main regulatory actors involved. They were: (1) state and multi-state 
regulation; (2) self-regulation; and (3) hybrid regulation. Generally, state and multi-state 
regulation are centred in the notion of the state imposing standards backed by the threat of 
criminal sanctions domestically and internationally, respectively; self-regulation involves the 
development  and enforcing of rules by a group of private actors; and hybrid regulation is a 
mixed approach that involves both state and private actors acting as regulators.
Although these three ‘pure’ regulatory models were useful to understand and compare the ways 
access to child pornographic material is regulated on the Internet, the existing models explored 
in the three jurisdictions were much more complex than these categories. Despite the fact  that 
the state played a central role within the regulatory dynamics, the regulatory mechanics, the 
relevance of public and private regulatory actors, and the instruments to address the problem 
varied in each jurisdiction. The public-private configurations regulating access to online child 
pornographic material in Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom showed different levels of 
state influence and participation of the private actors from the Internet industry. This is in line 
with the literature which states that decentred and polycentric regulatory regimes reject  a clear 
distinction between the public and the private, because these actors are combined in a number of 
different  ways; and that not only the knowledge is fragmented in the regulatory arena but  also 
the exercise of power and control.905
In all three jurisdictions, the state played a significant role, and sometimes regulated directly. 
This may be a result of the criminal nature of the regulatory target, which demanded action in 
less flexible forms. The state still enjoyed substantial powers enforced via institutions and 
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instruments designed to address the problem domestically. Nevertheless, there was also 
fragmentation in the regulatory environment and the distinctions between state and private 
regulatory actors were blurred to some extent. For example, private actors also regulated 
domestically: online intermediaries performed unchecked private censorship and disclosed 
information about users in non-transparent ways, Internet hotlines were set up to assess the 
potential illegality of material available online, private international organisations such as the 
INHOPE cooperated cross-nationally.
Understanding and exploring the anti-online child pornography regulatory environment in terms 
of a decentred and polycentric model strengthened the analysis and exposed the array of 
complex interrelationships established amongst  different relevant actors, be they state regulatory 
bodies and law enforcement  authorities, online intermediaries and manufacturers of software 
and hardware, Internet  users and hotlines, vigilante groups, legislators or free speech advocates. 
The evidence collected showed that, to some extent, the regulatory actors behaved 
independently, and that  regulatory intervention altered the behaviour of actors, changed the 
configuration of the system, and produced unintended consequences.
Such understanding of the regulatory problem is often found in the literature about online 
content regulation. For example, Murray proposes a three-dimensional dynamic regulatory 
matrix to represent the regulatory landscape and intervention taking into account  different 
examples, including the ICANN, the development  of the video cassette recorder (VCR) 
standard, and the copyrights infringements via filesharing.906  His representation of regulatory 
intervention considers that actors behave independently, that the behaviour of one actor can 
influence the action of others, and that it is difficult to predict the result of such actions: the 
regulatory environment is plastic, complex, and resilient in such a manner that it  mimics the 
functioning of the living organisms. These assumptions are also used elsewhere to suggest  that 
regulatory actors’ normative understanding of cyberspace (for example communitarianism and 
spontaneous ordering) and the dynamic resilience of the Internet should be part of lawmaking 
and policymaking processes in order to increase the regulatory effectiveness and the respect  for 
regulatory authority in cyberspace.907  Reed also employs these assumptions in order to analyse 
how laws and regulations can work for those willing to ‘act  lawfully’,908 for example copyrights 
protection, resolution of domain names’ disputes, and establishment of technical standards. 
Although these discussions advance knowledge about online content regulation, there is one 
important  question to ask: is this way of understanding the regulatory phenomenon applicable to 
online content of a more violent nature such as child pornography?
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In regards to child pornography, the relevant  Internet users (involving producers, distributors 
and viewers of online child pornography) are unwilling to act lawfully; they are the alleged 
offenders using the resilient  and dynamic nature of the regulatory environment to produce, 
distribute and access child pornographic material. It is improbable that  a desired regulatory 
settlement would follow organically from within the extant regulatory environment: Chapter 2 
showed that  the state was needed to bring institutions and individuals into line forcefully. Again, 
although there are many actors within the regulatory landscape, the state remains a prominent 
regulatory actor domestically in relation to anti-online child pornography regulation, whether 
making or enforcing the laws.
Understanding the problem of online child pornography regulation in terms of network 
complexity theories helps visualising the extent of the regulatory problem and the many nodes 
that affect the regulatory target, particularly at  the international level, but  at  the moment, the 
everyday regulatory practice takes a more pragmatic approach that focuses on the most relevant 
regulatory nodes such as state regulators and online intermediaries. It is yet  to be seen how such 
sophisticated theory can be employed by regulators in practice.
This is where the model proposed by Hood and Margetts is helpful, because the state is at 
central stage using its detectors and effectors as well as its nodality, authority, treasure and 
organisation.909 As such, one potential application of Murray’s three-dimensional hybrid matrix 
might  be to consider each node (or actor) subject to state regulation. As such, policymakers 
would consider the organic (or symbiotic) nature of the regulatory environment, represent  the 
relationships and tensions already in place, and harness the regulatory matrix instead of relying 
on blunt command-and-control measures, in addition to identifying ways by which the state 
could achieve its regulatory aims using detectors and effectors.
It  is important  therefore that policymakers are aware of the relevant  actors involved and their 
interrelationships when designing regulatory intervention mechanisms. Perhaps, future research 
on the subject  should develop strategic computational models that  take into account such 
interrelationships that change the configuration of the regulatory environment  and produce 
probable scenarios to guide intervention. For example, the implications (expected ‘success’, 
unintended consequences and costs) of a particular regulatory intervention that  aims to block 
access to child pornographic material in Brazil can be analysed in advance against  different 
scenarios and improved before it is applied in practice. Again, the configuration and relevance 
of such interactions are context  dependent and vary according to the jurisdiction where they 
occur.
It  is also worth noting that  although the problems these three jurisdictions face are similar, and 
that the regulators involved are aware of advances made in other jurisdictions, the choices over 
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the regulatory strategy used were a result  not only of the local social environment910 but  also of 
‘irrational policymaking, faith and politics’.911  In Brazil for example there was no blocking 
scheme and a lack of participation from the Internet  industry. In Australia, not  only child 
pornography was targeted but also adult  pornography available online, and there was a statutory 
regulator. In the United Kingdom, there was a blocking scheme in place and also an Internet 
industry regulator. In short, these public-private regulatory arrangements addressing the 
regulation of access to child pornographic material on the Internet varied in each jurisdiction 
depending on a number of factors related to the local regulatory culture: they are local 
regulatory solutions to a multi-jurisdictional problem.912
This raises the question of whether it  is more adequate to employ a taxonomy not based on 
‘pure’ regulatory models, but  on the function that these regulatory arrangements play in order to 
compare regulatory arrangements employed in different  jurisdictions.913  In other words, it is 
perhaps more useful to compare these jurisdictions not in terms of the main regulatory actors 
involved (because regulatory responsibilities are shared in different levels depending on the 
jurisdiction studied), but in terms of their ‘functional equivalents’914  (a common ground for 
comparison): the function that the regulatory arrangements plays - in this case, limiting access 
to online child pornography. In this case, the research question is no longer ‘who is the central 
regulatory actor in this jurisdiction?’, but becomes ‘how is the public-private arrangement 
limiting access to child pornography on the Internet in this jurisdiction?’. The comparative 
process would be based not  on the relevant  regulatory actor, but in terms of the regulatory 
functionalities.
2 Problematic international interfaces of local regulatory arrangements
Another layer of complexity of online child pornography regulation is the multi-jurisdictional 
nature of the Internet. In an ideal world for regulators, the international environment  should be a 
domestic jurisdiction, and every digital transaction performed by users would be monitored and 
the contents of a communication known. As such, it would be possible to pass unified and 
standard criminal laws to punish people worldwide who produce, distribute or access child 
pornography; to increase criminal liability of online intermediaries uniformly; have law 
enforcement bodies with enforcement authority over the entire environment; have architecture-
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based regulatory technology capable of monitoring all data transferred via the digital networks. 
Many of the regulatory obstacles that  need international agreements, protocols and standards 
would disappear. Nevertheless, this is not  the case. The anti-child pornography laws and 
regulations vary, the authority of law enforcement  institutions are only within the domestic 
territory, online intermediaries operate both nationally and internationally under varying rules; 
the regulatory environment is complex, dynamic and international.
For example, despite arguably successful regulatory action targeting websites hosted 
domestically, other measures such as website blocking have also been employed to limit  access 
to overseas websites. This requires the cooperation and action of other regulatory actors and 
increases the complexity of regulatory inter-relationships, which has to extend beyond national 
boundaries. State regulators have to interact more closely with overseas online intermediaries, 
international agencies, delegate more regulatory powers to private actors, and increase powers 
of law enforcement authorities.
Generally, the local regulatory arrangements involving public and private regulatory actors in 
place in all three jurisdictions were arguably successful at  limiting the availability of online 
child pornographic material domestically. Nevertheless, the international interfaces of these 
arrangements need improvements (meaning the mechanisms of communication for these local 
regulatory arrangements to interact  at  the international level). These interfaces involve not only 
the establishment of legal consensus via international treaties, but  require international 
standards and protocols established by the states and private actors involved, because the 
exercise of regulatory power is fragmented at both the domestic and international levels. This 
shows that the multi-jurisdictional challenge of the Internet is not only legal but regulatory.
There is scope for these protocols and standards to advance at the international level vis-à-vis 
the inability of international treaties to obtain worldwide consensus on regulatory policies 
addressing the availability of online child pornography. Whilst international law may establish 
general terms for action, international protocols and standards can be established in a more 
flexible and creative way between countries or amongst a group of countries independently.
In the light of this, international law can be established generally where a rough consensus can 
be obtained at the international fora, but the detailed operational protocols and standards can be 
implemented bilaterally by these public-private arrangements tackling online child pornography 
domestically (for example, the key regulatory actors such as online intermediaries and the 
statutory or Internet  industry regulator). In addition, these varying regulatory arrangements may 
operate domestically according to a self-enforced regulatory approach915 subject to escalation of 
state sanctions if private actors violate the Internet industry codes of conduct. 
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At the international level, these public-private arrangements can be considered as regulatory 
nodes (operating in a particular jurisdiction) within an international network and with the ability 
to communicate with other nodes via protocols and standards (international interfaces) 
established in advance by the nodes involved. Such model of international interaction resembles 
the operation of the Internet  to some extent  because: (1) domestic regulatory nodes 
communicate via international interfaces independently of a central international regulator; (2) 
standards and protocols (international interfaces) may undergo permanent  improvements by the 
domestic nodes involved until there is a consensual and optimum standard for these domestic 
nodes to communicate with each other; (3) once one optimum international interface become 
preferred, it will motivate other domestic nodes to take part and adhere to the network.
3 Evaluative criteria for anti-child pornography regulatory policies
The academic literature discussed in Chapter 2 provided the building blocks on which to 
develop evaluative criteria to assess the regulatory measures in place in Australia, Brazil and the 
United Kingdom. Such evaluative criteria have three broad categories: (1) free speech; (2) 
privacy protection; and (3) general principles of good regulation and democratic values. The 
criteria were made as flexible as possible to reflect  the different priorities and agendas, cultural 
regulatory contexts and cultures, and more importantly, to incorporate fieldwork issues not 
previously found in the academic literature. The literature provided most of the issues covered 
in the case study material, but other issues such as the lack of citizen involvement in 
policymaking, the economics of regulation, and cross-national differences in terms of the 
importance given to certain criteria within the three categories were obtained from the empirical 
evidence collected.
The existence of blocking schemes raised the most pressing concerns about  free speech. In 
Australia, although there was a statutory regulatory body in place, not only state censorship but 
also private censorship was an issue. This was largely because there were filtering schemes in 
place via state regulation (involving legislation creating the user-level voluntary regime) and 
self-regulation (involving the implementation of ISP-level voluntary regimes). As such, 
censorship powers were given to private online intermediaries in addition to state controlled 
regulation of child pornographic content. Free speech concerns were also an issue in the UK 
where there was a voluntary ISP-level blocking scheme managed by the IWF. In Brazil, there 
was not  any blocking scheme in place legislated or otherwise to limit access to child 
pornographic content  hosted overseas and thus the issue of free speech protection had little 
relevance. Moreover, Brazilian free speech advocates were less active when the issue at stake 
was child pornography regulation.
The legitimacy of regulatory measures was a concern in Australia. Although the Australian 
regulatory scheme was designed via legislation, there was little evidence to suggest that 
Australian citizens participated actively in the policymaking process. A voluntary filtering 
218
scheme at the ISP-level to block access to online child pornography was implemented via self-
regulation before legislation in this regard was discussed in the Commonwealth Parliament. 
Regulation via agreements between law enforcement  authorities and online intermediaries set 
the stage in Brazil and this also led to concerns over their legitimacy. It  may be true that  these 
agreements: (1) were arguably in accordance with the current  legal constitutional environment; 
and (2) were derived from partnerships amongst  law enforcement authorities, both houses of the 
Parliament, a non-governmental organisation, and major online intermediaries. Nevertheless, 
these regulations were not enacted via the democratic channels of the Parliament as would have 
been the case with legislation. There were no representatives from the judiciary; and consumer 
rights, civil liberties, and children rights’ activists were largely absent  during the discussions 
that led to these agreements being negotiated. In the United Kingdom, IWF’s legitimacy as an 
Internet industry self-regulatory body was also subject to criticism. The lack of citizen 
involvement in anti-child pornography policymaking was not strongly addressed by the 
academic literature but highlighted in the documentary evidence.
This was the case in Australia where legislation created a regulatory environment  that 
encouraged, and even supported financially, the use of content filtering software by Australian 
users, whereas the recent developments over the voluntary ISP-level regime dependent  on the 
Interpol blocklist  may be a disincentive to local industry, because it  is developed by an 
international organisation, the Interpol, and it excludes therefore Australian filtering companies.
Another area worth exploring is the economics of regulation around the problem of online child 
pornography. Different  regulatory tools will predominate in different settings also because of a 
cost-benefit factor.
First, different instruments are likely to generate different  kinds of administrative 
(transaction) costs associated with their use. Monitoring and enforcement  costs will be 
entailed for the government; compliance costs, for the private sector. Second, different 
instruments, in attaining a specified objective, are likely to generate different incentive 
structures for affected parties, which in turn will have different  effects on the amount of 
social resources expended in attaining the objective.916
In Brazil, the economic interest of online intermediaries to avoid the costs associated with 
regulation drove regulation and influenced the nature of the agreements negotiated. In Brazil, 
private online intermediaries and relevant  telecommunications economic groups influenced 
substantially the regulatory measures put  in place via agreements so as to avoid bearing the 
costs to implement the proposed regulatory measures. There was a consorted action by powerful 
economic groups to influence the agreements on their benefit and to support  a ‘hands-off 
government’ legislative approach. Often this was pushed forward under a free speech and 
privacy protection discourse which were arguably more morally acceptable and appealing. 
These issues were not clearly manifested in the Australian and the UK case study material.
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In Australia, most of the regulatory cost  is under ACMA’s governmental budget. Nevertheless, 
major ISPs, the IIA, the AFP and Interpol developed a voluntary model and it  seems the 
resulting costs are under the Australian Internet industry. In Brazil, there was permanent 
opposition from online intermediaries to avoid the costs of regulation. They were lobbying for 
legislation that  establishes the use of public money from a technology related Trust  to 
implement such measures. In the United Kingdom, the IWF’s operation was largely funded by 
the Internet industry, and it was not  clear how the costs of regulatory mechanisms in place 
designed to identify alleged offenders and disclose information to law enforcement  authorities 
are funded.
Generally, different regulatory instruments are likely to have direct and indirect  costs of 
creation, implementation and operation. The direct costs may be related to personnel and 
equipment to enforce the rules established via legislation and regulations, for example software, 
hardware, and institutional operation. There indirect costs may be related to the time used 
during the political and parliamentary discussions, and the potential inhibition of creativity and 
digital economy developments.
Another issue concerns the apparent  separation between ‘online’ and ‘offline’ sexual 
exploitation of children. Reed distinguishes between ‘offline’ and ‘online’ child pornography to 
emphasise the scale and difficulties associated with regulating content in the online 
environment.917  Nevertheless, although each has regulatory challenges of their own, these 
problems are interconnected: the ‘offline’ and ‘online’ problems should be tackled together by 
policymakers. For example, although ‘online’ child pornography arguably seems to be larger in 
scale and demand than ‘offline’ physical sexual abuse committed against children and the 
production of related material, the ‘online’ problem needs the intensive ‘offline’ traditional 
policing enforced domestically as well as the cooperation amongst  international police forces to 
be tackled properly. It  seems counter-productive to spend the limited governmental resources 
only tackling the ‘offline’ commercial sexual exploitation of children and neglect  the other 
forms of sexual violence committed against children on, or related to, the Internet. Similarly, it 
seems unwise to spend all resources available to tackle the overwhelming range of threats posed 
to children in the online environment, and neglect  the existing ‘offline’ physical abuse of 
children. In any case, more research is needed in this area to uncover the economic agendas 
moving the regulation of access to online child pornography forward, to identify who 
financially benefit  from the regulatory choices made, and to unveil the actual costs involved to 
implement such measures.918 
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The partial effectiveness of regulatory policies and the problem of crime displacement were a 
concern in all jurisdictions, particularly because the content  policies in place addressed only 
web-based applications and platforms, whereas child pornographic content was exchanged and 
accessed via more resilient online channels. This makes evident  the multi-jurisdictional 
challenge that  the Internet poses to content  regulation and the need of regulatory policymaking 
to advance in this regard.919 Indeed, efficiency of regulatory intervention is another issue worth 
exploring, particularly the question of whether it is efficient to spend these different  resources 
on regulation that is only partially effective. Although some of these policies, for example 
website blocking, may be effective to protect  people from inadvertent access to child 
pornographic content, they are less effective to limit  access generally and have a number of 
unintended consequences such as potential violation of civil liberties and crime displacement. 
They may also be distracting attention from more relevant  issues, for example increased 
international cooperation, children welfare, and awareness programmes.920
Nevertheless, such ‘programmed inefficiency’921  of regulatory instruments may be a necessary 
concession for the democratic political process, human rights protection, interest groups’ 
demands and other non-strictly market  driven rationales. In the area of online child 
pornography, the regulatory problem cannot be tackled solely from a narrow cost-benefit 
approach: there should be a broader understanding of the costs involved that goes beyond the 
limits of a narrow economicist  approach.922 This understanding is crucial to approach important 
questions such as: what  is the optimal degree of efficiency to limit access to online child 
pornography? How many resources should governments and private actors spend on such 
problem? What is the optimal level of enforcement? How much child pornography should be 
left  unregulated? Why not to use these scarce resources entirely in preventing ‘offline’ 
commercial sexual exploitation of children? These are key questions left  to the implementation 
phase which are commonly outside the political debate around lawmaking and should be taken 
onboard whenever the ‘success’ or failure of anti-child pornography regulations are assessed.
Judging success of regulatory intervention in relation to anti-online child pornography 
regulation is a controversial area, particularly, because it  is difficult  to assess the impact of such 
regulatory measures to online child pornography industry as a whole. Generally, to assess the 
success of a regulatory policy it  is necessary to identify its aims in advance. Whether it  is to 
limit  access to, to minimise the chance of inadvertent access to, or to have a deterrent  effect  on 
potential viewers of child pornographic websites; these are indicators to measure its success. 
There are however other indicators of success or failure. For example, whether the regulatory 
measure is able to achieve a balance between increased surveillance powers given to state 
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2008).
921 In the sense that a number of checks and balances have to be implemented, and compromises have to  be made to 
protect civil liberties and accommodate demands from a wide range of interest groups.
922 See e.g. Becker, G., 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach', in George Stigler (ed.), Chicago Studies in 
Political Economy (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 537-92.
regulators and safeguarding civil liberties, or whether employing automated architecture-based 
regulatory technologies avoids restricting the creative and lawful use of the Internet. 
Successful regulatory measures to limit access to child pornographic material available on the 
Internet are not only those which fulfil primary regulatory aims. For the regulatory policy to be 
successful it  should also identify the potential negative implications and have safeguards to 
minimise the threats posed to free speech, privacy protection and democracy online. This is 
relatively easy to state in theory, but  finding an effective and efficient optimal policy mix in 
practice is not so straightforward, because the possible combinations are context dependent, 
may be counterproductive or incompatible.923
In short, the success of an anti-online child pornography regulatory intervention can be assessed 
not only by the extent  to which it  fulfils its aims and objectives, but  if it limits the potential for 
free speech and privacy violations and employs a scheme of safeguards that works in practice: it 
should articulate efficiently, effectively and fairly the practicalities of protecting both children 
and civil liberties in the online environment.
Interestingly, the more states enacted anti-child pornography criminal laws over the years to 
cope with the perceived threats posed to children on the Internet, the more opportunities for 
crime commission, enforcement  problems, and regulatory failure are created (creating 
ineffective laws that undermines the individuals’ belief on the authority of the state). It seems 
that the regulatory enterprise is not only creating more problems than solutions, but also making 
it difficult to achieve regulatory success.
Against this background, how should success be measured when the Internet and the wide range 
of anti-online child pornography laws produced numerous venues of regulatory action? Should 
the police use all their resources to investigate everything that  is reported, or focus on the most 
exemplary cases? Should the police and other regulators use a managerial or a moral approach? 
These questions remain open, but this thesis exposed the conflict between a zero-tolerance 
moral approach of both political and media discourses, and the managerial stance of law 
enforcement authorities amongst other regulators.
The role of the regulatory culture cannot be overlooked in relation to a cross-national evaluative 
criteria. For example, the wider scope of the Australian online censorship regime which 
included in the regulatory remit  not only criminal material such as child pornography but legal 
adult  pornography, made evident the importance that protection of children from online material 
considered inappropriate had for agenda setting in that jurisdiction. Of course this was also a 
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concern in both Brazil and the UK, but in these countries it  has been generally left  to parents 
and the Internet industry to resolve things on their own via self-regulation.924
For Hood and Margetts, regulatory ‘[…] applications and effects vary with culture’.925 And this 
is a similar point  made by Reed who argues that ‘[…] different  societies have different views on 
such fundamental values as privacy and free speech’.926 Indeed, the importance given to each 
category within the evaluative model varied across the jurisdictions and therefore it has to take 
the cultural variations into account if it  is to be employed cross-nationally. The grand-concepts 
of free speech, privacy protection and democratic values may mean different things in different 
contexts. For example, the acceptability of more surveillance powers given to law enforcement 
authorities could be stronger on jurisdictions already subject to terrorist  attacks; some 
jurisdictions could be more sensitive to free speech restrictions than others; and some 
bureaucracies could be more prepared than others to safeguard and promote democratic values. 
The success of a regulatory measure could be strongly influenced by the transparency and 
protection of free speech in some jurisdictions, whereas legitimacy and efficiency could be 
more relevant in others.
The importance given to particular issues was a result of different  agendas and interests driving 
the regulatory actors. Whenever there were well-established civil rights and anti-censorship 
groups, the protection of free speech and privacy of individuals were emphasised in the agenda 
and discussions. These groups were only recently active in Brazil and they mainly focused on 
the debate around the Marco Civil and Cybercrime legislative proposals, not anti-child 
pornography regulation. The anti-censorship and protection of online privacy discourses were 
only used by the Brazilian online intermediaries to avoid the burden of regulation.
In Australia and the UK, for example, the protection of free speech in relation to anti-child 
pornography measures was emphasised not only in the relevant academic literature but the 
empirical evidence, such as policy documents, campaigning groups and the general public. This 
may be a result  of the blocking mechanisms being employed voluntarily at  the ISP-level. The 
free speech concerns were less evident in the Brazilian case study, partially because of little 
academic literature available, and because of no blocking mechanism in place. The absence of a 
content blocking scheme might  had been a result of telcos’ opposition in relation to the 
operational costs involved but  also a result of a national aversion against censorship policies 
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usually associated with the authoritarian military government that ruled the country from March 
1964 to March 1985.927
Overall, the evaluative criteria developed in Chapter 2 proved to be a robust tool for an impact 
assessment  mechanism to evaluate the anti-online child pornography regulations, and also to 
explore the problematic relationships between state and private regulatory actors. It  showed that 
hybrid regulation of online child pornographic material was problematic in all three 
jurisdictions irrespective of the regulatory mechanics employed. Nevertheless, improvements 
can be made.
Evaluative criteria to assess and compare internationally the impact  of anti-child pornography 
regulatory interventions for free speech, privacy protection and good regulation involves 
therefore: (1) free speech - involving issues of unchecked private censorship, scope creep, lack 
of focus and excessive use of architecture-based regulatory tools; (2) privacy protection - 
involving issues of increased unchecked and more invasive surveillance powers given to law 
enforcement authorities; and (3) general democratic values and good regulation - involving 
issues around the lack of transparency, accountability, legitimacy, proper oversight, and citizen 
involvement as well as inefficiency and ineffectiveness of regulatory intervention which 
includes difficulties in evaluating hybrid regulation, crime displacement, unchecked regulatory 
powers and insufficient  safeguards. In addition to this, the economics around the regulation of 
online child pornography (for example, the sharing of costs to implement the regulatory 
measures), how each jurisdiction evaluates the success of the regulatory polices employed, the 
constitutional framework and mechanics of the international interfaces associated with the 
regulatory arrangements, and the cross-national differences in terms of the importance given to 
each criteria are issues that  should be aggregated to the cross-national criteria for future 
comparisons.
4 The adjudication of apparent illegality of online content by private actors
The adjudication of apparent illegality of material available online by private actors was 
relevant to all case studies, and it is an issue that deserves special attention. This theme raises 
the question of whether the perception of illegality, the determination of potential illegality, or 
even the determination of illegality are inherently judicial responsibility, or whether it  can also 
be performed by private actors.
These concerns were minimised in Australia, because of the statutory nature of ACMA, but 
even in that jurisdiction, there was a voluntary ISP-level blocking scheme in place that used 
Interpol’s blocklist; the judgment about the potential illegality was transferred to an 
international institution. In Brazil, any institution or individual could report any suspected 
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criminal activity to a law enforcement authority, which is required by law to act. Nevertheless, a 
few institutions such as Safernet  Brasil performed most  of the reporting activities, and this 
relieved the courts and law enforcement  authorities from most of the burden of assessing the 
potential illegality of the reported material. The proposed 2010 Marco Civil Bill made any 
online content removal of a reported material by online intermediaries dependent on a judicial 
order, but this has been criticised as excessive dependence on judicial orders928 and it is likely to 
be withdrawn during parliamentary discussions. In the United Kingdom, the problem of 
assessing the potential illegality of online material was highlighted in the aftermath of the 
Wikipedia incident  discussed in the UK case study material. Although the ‘incorrect’ judgement 
of IWF’s staff was not  exempt from future judicial redress, there were no incentives for free 
speech activists or UK online intermediaries to challenge IWF’s decisions in courts in relation 
to alleged child pornographic content being blocked.
Such adjudication processes are not  limited to cyberspace. Indeed, they are performed by 
different  social actors, on a daily basis, in a number of different areas. For example, members of 
the public often notify the relevant authority if they suspect  that a criminal act  was committed; 
police agents use their discretion to decide whether to investigate or not, based on their own 
judgment about  the evidence presented; and prosecutors take the decision to pursue a criminal 
prosecution if they believe this serves the public interest. Moreover, in all these events the 
judicial authority may still decide whether the reported ‘crime’ has not  been committed after all. 
Generally, a limited judicial oversight could manage these situations reasonably well.
Nevertheless, the online environment  has a number of features that render these traditional 
adjudication processes problematic. Controversial material and reporting mechanisms are easily 
available to a larger public and therefore an immense volume of alleged criminal material can 
be reported to law enforcement  authorities. Unfair accusations can be made anonymously and in 
great  numbers, authorities are unable to assess the immense volume of reports received, online 
intermediaries undertake unchecked private censorship, perfectly legal material may be taken 
down and such decisions stay unchallenged, wrongful accusations can have a devastating effect 
on an individual’s reputation before any judicial remedy is put in place (for example, when 
defamatory information is made available online), and courts are unable to undertake proper 
judicial oversight vis-à-vis the great volume of requests in relation to controversial online 
material.
The traditional judicial oversight is unable to cope with such demand, but  on the other hand, the 
excessive judicialisation of online content regulation is also undesirable. Indeed, if on the one 
hand, regulators need to address the material available online that may put  individual’s life at 
risk or facilitate sexual abuse committed against children without  delays, on the other hand, 
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proper judicial oversight  is also needed to prevent  illegal taking down of material and 
unchecked private censorship. The challenge here is to find a balance between an excessive 
dependence on courts’ decisions and a total absence of judicial oversight around the operation 
of private actors controlling online content.
The great volume of potentially controversial material available on the Internet and the 
operational cost of monitoring all this material in different  platforms and applications would 
largely extrapolate the capacity of the judicial system. The courts are arguably not  needed in all 
situations; its operation is costly and demands time. As such, automated regulatory technologies 
employed by non-judicial actors are welcome if used judiciously. Such use is expected to rise 
because of the more sophisticated technologies available for content regulation.
The problem is perhaps that  the digital communication technologies enabled private actors to 
employ these processes (in relation to the perception and determination of illegality) in an 
automated manner, in larger scale, and therefore with wider implications. Again, these tools are 
becoming more precise because of the developments computational semantic analysis and 
artificial intelligence that  inform automated content analysis systems. Although the fast 
assessment  of apparent  illegality of content is welcome to cope with the regulatory demands, 
minimum judicial standards and safeguards should be in place.
5 Increasing publicness of hybrid arrangements and the need of legislative 
 safeguards
Chapter 5 shows that all regulatory models explored in the case study material are problematic 
in relation to the evaluative criteria irrespective of the level of state involvement. This is in line 
with the claim that  accounts on the greater accountability, transparency and legitimacy of a state 
regulator may be exaggerated and it  is no guarantee that free speech and privacy are protected 
nor are good regulation practices followed.929
The need to incorporate public values and safeguards around the operation of self-regulatory 
bodies were a constant  concern in the case of both Internet hotlines: IWF in the UK, and 
Safernet  in Brazil. These safeguards were to strengthen the judicial oversight, legislative 
scrutiny, citizen involvement, external audits and overall transparency. Given that these 
organisations were exercising arguably public functions, there should be mechanisms to 
increase their accountability to the public at large (a publicisation process to make them look 
more like a statutory body) and minimise the influence of private interests that might  capture 
these institutions. Nevertheless, the existence of a statutory regulatory body is no automatic 
guarantee that concerns about transparency, accountability and legitimacy of regulation are 
addressed properly. For example, the ACMA blocklist could not be made public via FOI 
requests, was not independently audited, nor could the people responsible for creating it  be 
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named. In addition, the ACMA’s reports about the blocklist’s operation ceased to be made to the 
Commonwealth Parliament. Overall, in all three jurisdictions, increased regulation meant the 
need to establish safeguards to prevent potential abuses.
The need to increase publicness of public-private arrangements is discussed in Chapter 2 but 
one important question to ask in relation to online child pornography regulation is how such aim 
is to be implemented in practice. One way forward may be via legislated safeguards which 
establish general principles and permanent monitoring of such principles around the operation 
of the domestic public-private regulatory arrangements and their international interfaces.
Indeed, the assessment  of the case studies identified a number of threats to free speech. One of 
them was the proliferation of unchecked private censorship. Both the use of legislation and the 
threat of legislation forced online intermediaries in the jurisdictions studied to adopt regulatory 
measures of their own, whether be they automated or via human-based analysis. This is 
expected to increase as architecture-based regulatory technologies get  cheaper and more 
sophisticated, and with developments in terms of semantic analysis of image content. 
Furthermore, the availability of cheaper regulatory tools may minimise the financially 
motivated opposition of Brazilian intermediaries against  the regulatory will of state regulators 
and pave the way for further unchecked regulation. The evidence from Australia and the UK 
suggested that the online intermediaries were more willing to automatically take down or block 
alleged child pornographic content reported by IWF or ACMA rather than considering these 
requests carefully, or challenging them in courts. Once the regulatory platform was up and 
running, it was more cost  effective to automatically enforce the requests made and avoid the 
risk of criminal liability. Safeguards in this regard include the use of regular independent audits 
and reports to the Parliament, increased judicial review, detailed and comprehensive appeal and 
put back procedures, and checking regularly the architecture-based regulatory tools employed 
by the private actors.
Concerns about  scope creep930  found in the literature were also an issue in the case study 
material. In Australia, the voluntary ISP-level blocking scheme was reported to target child 
pornography only, but there were governmental plans to block access to the wide range of RC-
rated content  via legislation. In Brazil, although the agreements were settled following a moral 
crusade against  online child pornography by politicians and the media, the regulatory system 
was used to target  other criminal content, e.g. incitement to racial hatred and religious 
intolerance. In the United Kingdom, the IWF reported that  the voluntary ISP-level blocking 
scheme limited access to overseas child pornographic URLs only. Nevertheless, recent 
developments, for example court orders to block access to copyright infringement via 
filesharing applications and the ISPs ‘opt in’ policy to access adult pornography showed that 
using the existing IWF blocking platform to block access to other material was possible to occur 
despite the alleged opposition from the UK Internet industry. Safeguards in this regard include 
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restricting the use of more invasive regulatory measures only to criminal content  of more 
violent nature, e.g. child pornography and terrorist-related, leaving copyright infringement  via 
filesharing and adult pornography, for example, outside the scope of such measures.
The low level of citizen involvement in policymaking was highlighted in both the Australian 
and Brazilian case studies. In the United Kingdom, although the IWF drew its Board members 
of different  sectors of society, it was unclear how civil society at large, including free speech 
and civil rights’s groups, could influence IWF’s operation. Safeguards in this regard include the 
participation of citizens in the policymaking process and encouragement  of free-speech and 
civil rights’ protection organised groups. 
Although privacy implications of regulatory measures were only peripherally addressed in the 
case studies, regulatory developments in relation to disclosure of information about Internet 
users by online intermediaries to law enforcement  authorities should be closely scrutinised and 
carefully discussed by society at large. This is particularly important at  this stage of online 
regulatory development  when more invasive surveillance powers and less privacy protection are 
considered the natural antidotes to the resilient nature of the Internet,931  which represents a 
move from a ‘fire-alarms’ towards a ‘police-patrol’ regulatory approach.932  Perhaps these 
measures are not the only answers, and they may be wasting valuable resources and displacing 
crime. Safeguards in this regard include more judicial oversight, punishment  of abuses 
committed by state regulators, and compensation of victims of improper privacy violation.
Regulation of online content  is increasing across the world, and the question is no longer 
whether the Internet  should be regulated or not, but  rather which type of regulation should be 
implemented and which safeguards ought to be put in place to deter abuses. 933  Accordingly, 
after the relevant threats posed by regulatory measures were identified and explained, 
safeguards can be designed and employed. The academic literature discussed in Chapter 2 
(Section 4) suggests a number of safeguards to minimise the risk of free speech and privacy 
violations as well as to tackle the democratic deficit vis-à-vis the use of hybrid regulation. These 
include measures of extended accountability, enhanced democratic governance, stronger judicial 
and legislative oversight, more citizen involvement, and improved transparency. Designing 
safeguards in advance is needed to avoid the problems of the ‘implementation game’, meaning 
that the process of organising the administrative machine and making it work as intended.934
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A permanent  scheme of safeguards to minimise violations of free speech and privacy as well as 
to secure transparency, legitimacy and accountability should be preferable enforced via 
legislation, which considers the public function that regulatory actors (whether public or 
private) have as information gatekeepers, and include mechanisms that: (1) strengthen the 
citizen involvement (from relevant  sectors of society) in formulating, management and 
monitoring of regulatory policies; (2) secure the transparency about all aspects of the regulatory 
model both in relation to its domestic and international interfaces; (3) provide sufficient 
channels for accountability, independent audits, reports to Parliament, detailed and 
comprehensive appeal and put-back procedures to avoid abuses and compensate victims of 
wrongful decisions; (4) deliver permanent and adequate judicial oversight; (5) assess the 
invasive level of regulatory policies in relation to privacy protection; and (6) assess the 
adequacy of architecture-based regulatory tools.
Generally, the general principles of such safeguards may be established via legislation whilst 
specific details around its actual implementation can be established via self-enforced 
mechanisms that  includes escalation of sanctions by the state. Of course, these mechanisms may 
not be the same as they derive from political bargaining, regulatory and cultural agendas as well 
as financial interests that  depends on a particular jurisdiction. As such, it is an open question 
whether such scheme can be replicated in other countries. It  is also worth noting that such 
scheme of safeguards should be enforced not  only against the main regulator but all actors 
involved in a regulatory environment  where the policing powers are dispersed.935  This adds 
another layer of complexity because it  involves enforcing such safeguards at the international 
level.
6 Broad lessons of online child pornography regulation
The second part  of Chapter 2 shows the existence of an international consensus about the 
criminal nature of and the need to tackle the child pornographic material available on the 
Internet. For example, there were numerous anti-child pornography laws, cross-national police 
operations and conferences, substantial visibility of the topic in the media, and a range of 
regulatory measures intended to target the production and distribution of, and the access to 
online child pornography both nationally and internationally. It also suggested that there were a 
number of regulatory rationales driving this regulatory expansion: (1) the exaggerated 
dimension of perceived harms; (2) the new venues where child abuse could be performed; and 
(3) institutional agendas geared by symbolic politics, moral entrepreneurs, media-made 
criminality, the prospects of financial gain and survival, and a legitimate interest in protecting 
children against sexual abuse.
Generally all these factors were present in all three jurisdictions, and they provided a basis on 
which to support and justify the expansion of anti-online child pornography laws and 
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regulations domestically. Nevertheless, some of the reasons driving the regulatory expansion 
were emphasised more than others depending on the jurisdiction observed.
For example, in Australia the development  of anti-online child pornography regulations was 
part of the movement to apply the current censorship scheme of Tv broadcasting to the online 
environment. There was a statutory Commonwealth censorship body operating the scheme that 
made the online intermediaries come into line with the regulations established. The established, 
and for some time supported, filtering scheme provided commercial opportunities for software 
and hardware manufacturers. Moreover, the Commonwealth government’s intention to create a 
mandatory website blocking scheme at the ISP-level faced parliamentary opposition, but  was 
employed voluntarily by major Australian ISPs.
In Brazil, the role of moral entrepreneurs was evident. Some political figures and institutions, 
such as the MPF-SP  and Safernet Brasil jointly conducted a moral crusade against the problem 
with interests of their own, whether to increase political capital, centralise investigatory powers 
or secure financial survival. The focus on a big player (for example, the SNS Orkut owned by 
Google Inc.) to drive media attention, a self-regulation discourse that  was never implemented in 
practice by the online intermediaries, and sensationalist  media portrayal of the problem were 
also reasons to push these regulations forward. The Brazilian regulators made online 
intermediaries come into line under threat of criminal liability. 
In the UK, the media demonisation of some Internet entrepreneurs who opposed the state call 
for removal of alleged child pornographic content hosted in newsgroups in 1996, and an 
environment  prone to self-regulatory practices provided the conditions for the creation of IWF. 
The government forced the UK Internet industry to create a solution of its own under threat of 
legislation.
Overall, online child pornography regulation provided rich material to explore the implications 
of hybrid regulation. First, the consensus about  its criminal nature and the will to regulate were 
common grounds to explore regulatory differences and similarities of the jurisdictions chosen. 
Second, this investigation not  only covered most implications from the academic literature but 
also covered other issues from the documentary evidence. Third, it explored a number of 
regulatory measures (for example comprehensive systems of website and blocklist  for search 
engines) that remained politically sensitive and inappropriate to be employed against other types 
of material available online in modern industrialised democracies. Furthermore, the subject 
matter made evident the regulatory appeal of both child pornographic material and the 
convincing discourse of child protection as a justifying basis for increased regulation of both 
content and users’ activities on the Internet generally.
Although there were a number of other applications and platforms to exchange and access child 
pornographic content, the regulatory measures in place targeted only the WWW environment; 
this made the measures only partially effective. For some, the web-based regulatory policies are 
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entirely ineffective to limit  access because much of the pornographic material moved from 
public websites to more resilient online platforms and applications. Such situation not only 
motivated and justified the use of mandatory and increasingly invasive regulatory policies, but 
put in place a regulatory infrastructure that could be used to target  other types of material. This 
suggests that  child pornography was used as a means to increase the regulation of the online 
environment  generally. Of course, other types of material (such as terrorism-related and material 
containing incitement to racial hatred) and behaviour (for example, online attacks to national 
infrastructure) contributed to this regulatory expansion, but anti-child pornography discourse 
was widely used as a regulatory justification in all jurisdictions observed.
Nevertheless, the resilience of the Internet to evade regulation and enhance crime displacement 
is no reason to eliminate the prospects of a successful regulatory policy. After all, resilience to 
regulation and crime displacement  are also features of ‘offline’ crimes or other regulated 
activities, for example drug trafficking, tax evasion and prostitution. These are all subject  to 
crime displacement after regulation is employed, but this condition does not  eliminate the 
possibility of assessing how successful the regulatory policies employed are.
Another important point concerns whether anti-child pornography policies are converging or 
diverging internationally, in other words, whether these domestic public-private regulatory 
arrangements are experiencing increased homogenisation (a type of ‘institutional 
isomorphism)936 or whether regulatory arrangements are following different paths. The nature of 
such institutional arrangement  is of interest here, whether it  is: (1) domain orientated - punctual 
experiences from one country are used to formulate policy proposals in another jurisdiction; or 
(2) paradigm orientated - transformations in one jurisdiction aims to achieve overall congruence 
with a wider policy concept in place in another country.937
Taking into account the case study material, developments in this area seems to be not only 
domain orientated (particularly in relation to the use of the blocking scheme that was 
implemented in 2004 in the UK and has influenced other countries to follow suit; it is at the 
moment spreading around the EU) but also policy orientated (for example in relation to the 
NTD scheme implemented domestically by some countries in Europe after the enactment of the 
2000 EU Directive on Electronic Commerce). Furthermore, other factors seem to be in favour 
of such overall congruence around a wider policy project: the economic interests of online 
intermediaries to avoid regulatory costs and operate under minimum restrictions worldwide, the 
need to have a cross-national harmonised response to the problem of child pornography, and the 
development of uniform regulations in some areas are some of these converging forces.
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937 These two sources of isomorphism are explored in Lodge, M., On Different Tracks: Designing Railway Regulation 
in Britain and Germany (London: Praeger, 2002), p 22-23.
Finally, another point worth stressing is the selection of priorities after anti-child pornography 
are enacted and regulation is implemented. Although anti-child pornography discourse pushes 
online regulation forward, other regulatory targets are prioritised in reality and many other areas 
are left  unchallenged. For example, the daily practice of policing of online crimes showed that 
much more human and financial resources were employed to target  online financial crimes in 
Brazil when compared to online child pornography.938  There is therefore a gap between anti-
child pornography discourse and regulatory practice that needs further investigation.
7 Concluding comments
This investigation employs evaluative criteria to assess the anti-child pornography laws and 
regulations in place in Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom in regards to free speech and 
privacy protection as well as democracy and principles of good regulation in the online 
environment. This aimed to explore different features of public-private regulatory 
configurations found in these jurisdictions, to learn from current policymaking in the area, and 
also to advance the debate over a number of issues raised in the literature review chapter. This 
research is therefore important to regulatory and governance theorists as well as criminologists. 
First, this investigation makes a number of contributions for the comparative research of 
regulatory models tackling online child pornographic material domestically and internationally. 
It  designed and employed a typology of regulatory models to conduct  comparative research and 
also discussed the option of comparing such regulatory configurations in terms of public-private 
arrangements and functional equivalents. It  shows that the existing models in all three 
jurisdictions are much more complex than the state, self and hybrid categories and that, 
although the state played a significant role,939 there is fragmentation of power and authority in 
the regulatory environment. As such, it  suggests a comparative classification based not  on 
‘pure’ regulatory models but  on the function that such public-private arrangements play. In 
addition, it  improves the cross-national evaluative criteria for anti-online child pornography 
regulations designed in Chapter 2 taking into account  the contributions from fieldwork. These 
are all important tools and discussions to undertake cross-national comparative studies in the 
area of child pornography regulation and may represent  a starting point  where further research 
is developed such as an international comparative impact assessment tool.
Second, it  suggests a number of improvements to current policymaking: (1) minimising 
violations of free speech and privacy as well as securing that  the principles of good regulation 
are met via legislated safeguards and their permanent monitoring; (2) strengthening 
international interfaces of domestic regulatory arrangements so as to tackle the challenges posed 
by the multi-jurisdictional nature of the Internet; and (3) achieving a balance to adjudicate the 
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Brasil: Departamento de Polícia Federal, 2009) at <http://www.dpf.gov.br/institucional/relatorio-anual-pf/>, accessed 
28 May 2012.
939 A regulatory compromise would not follow organically from within the environment.
apparent  illegality of online material. These serve as guide to policymaking in the area and also 
advance current knowledge about judicial oversight within the online environment. 
This investigation shows that the existence of a state regulator is no guarantee that 
accountability, transparency and legitimacy are met, and thus a legislative scheme of safeguards, 
establishing general principles and the permanent monitoring of such principles, is needed. It 
also shows that the multi-jurisdictional challenge of the Internet is not only legal but regulatory 
and whilst international law may establish general terms for action, international protocols and 
standards can be established in a more flexible and creative manner, for example, taking into 
account that  the public-private arrangements can operate as regulatory nodes. Furthermore, it 
stresses that automated regulatory technologies employed by non-judicial actors are welcome if 
used judiciously.
Third, it  shows the relevance of the local regulatory environment and culture for child 
pornography regulation and their implications for cross-national comparison and international 
regulatory interfaces: there are cultural variations despite the international consensus about  the 
problem that reflect both domestically and internationally. In addition, it  makes evident how the 
resilient and multi-jurisdictional nature of the Internet contributes to crime displacement, and 
that the problem of online child pornography provided rich material to explore the implications 
of hybrid regulation and to enrich the dialogue amongst  regulation and governance theorists, 
and criminologists.
The next chapter reflects on the research process, explores the contribution made to knowledge, 
the originality and limitations of this research, and also a number of avenues for future 
investigation about the topic.
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CHAPTER 7: LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This investigation employs evaluative criteria against the laws and regulations limiting access to 
child pornography available on the Internet in Australia, Brazil and the United Kingdom to 
address the implications of hybrid regulation. It  designs evaluative criteria for anti-online child 
pornography regulations and a scheme of safeguards to minimise violations of free speech and 
privacy protection as well as to strengthen democratic values and secure good regulation. It also 
discusses the broad lessons associated with online child pornography regulation, the use of 
decentred and polycentric theories of regulation to approach the child pornography problem, 
the problematic international interfaces of domestic regulatory arrangements, the adjudication of 
apparent  illegality of online material by private actors, and explores the way forward for the 
regulatory intervention in this area.
This final chapter reflects on the research process and explores the contribution made to 
knowledge, the originality and limitations of this study, and a number of avenues for future 
investigation about the topic
1 Originality and contribution to knowledge
This investigation identifies and explains anti-child pornography laws and regulations in place 
in three jurisdictions and maps out  a number of negative consequences of hybrid regulation for 
free speech, privacy protection and democracy on the Internet. The findings from such diverse 
regulatory environments may help improving current policymaking in the area. 
Although cultural issues are not entirely excluded from the analysis, this investigation is not 
intended to explain the regulatory differences in terms of their cultural and institutional 
dissimilarities. Such a research question would demand other methods in addition to the 
documentary analysis. In short, the documentary analysis undertaken here does not  allow to 
explore in detail the reasons why a configuration was in place, or which political struggles were 
that led to such configuration in one jurisdiction or another; such approach would demand a 
review of the relevant literature, further in loco unstructured interviews and perhaps also 
participant observation for a longer period.
Chapter 3 argues that this research is important for three key reasons: (1) policymaking; (2) 
legal, criminological and regulatory scholarship; (3) and new case study evidence of how 
regulation works. Indeed, these are the key contributions made.
First, the comparative analysis identifies a range of potential threats from anti-online child 
pornography regulation, develops cross-national evaluative criteria, and suggests a scheme of 
safeguards. In addition, it  explores a number of ways by which policymakers can tackle the 
multi-jurisdictional challenge of the Internet. These have further practical utility as a guide for 
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policymaking in relation to regulation designed to limit  access to child pornographic material 
available online.
Second, the academic literature about Internet  regulation and governance are explored and 
tested out  against the evidence from case studies. The topics discussed include the implications 
of hybrid regulation, the use of decentred and polycentric theories of regulation to explain child 
pornography regulation, the problematic assessment  of apparent illegality of online material by 
private actors, the models of regulation applied to online pornography and the cross-national 
similarities and differences of public-private regulatory arrangements, and the call for increased 
publicness of such arrangements.
Third, this investigation addresses a number of issues of interest  to criminologists such as the 
evolution of anti-online child pornography laws, the resilient  nature of the Internet  and 
displacement of cybercrime, and the regulatory rationales used to criminalise a number of 
conducts and material associated with child pornography. Furthermore, it critically analyses the 
the problematic enforcement of existing legal frameworks (for example, in relation to criminal 
content regulation) on the Internet and whether simpler and more flexible legal approaches may 
solve most of the enforcement problems identified.
Finally, this research also explores the evolution of anti-child pornography laws and regulations 
in Brazil, where little academic information was available. It  provides therefore a starting point 
for further research in the field.
It  is also worth stressing the role of the experts’ consultation exercise. This is innovative in the 
sense that  the experts’ feedback about the case study material is part of the overall research 
methodology, instead of a mere peer-review activity, similar to those used in journal 
publications. The consultation exercise is used as a validation method, and helps to explore 
issues neglected during the documentary analysis. It hints at  other relevant questions that can be 
explored in future research.940
2 Strengths and limitations
This investigation provides detailed and through data about  laws and regulations to limit  access 
to child pornography available on the Internet in three jurisdictions and explores the Brazilian 
regulatory landscape where little information was available about the topic. In addition, the case 
study material is validated by local experts from each jurisdiction. 
The research also lays out the basis for the development of an international evaluative model, 
and a scheme of safeguards needed to protect free speech, privacy and democracy online. In 
addition, it  tests out  a number of assumptions from the academic literature against documentary 
evidence, and provides data where further research on the topic can be pursued.
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The problem of online child pornography regulation is addressed in a multidisciplinary manner 
taking into account the regulation, criminological and legal academic literature. The 
contributions from different  areas of knowledge provides varied perspectives about  the topic 
and enhances the overall analysis. Concepts, ideas and debates from each of these areas are used 
to explore the problem of online child pornography regulation.
Finally, this investigation helps developing a number of skills such as accessing people, 
convincing experts to participate, giving papers in conferences, accepting criticisms, and 
understanding that research can be a never-ending process.
Nevertheless, this study has a few limitations that may indicate further research trajectories. 
Although the evaluative criteria developed in this investigation helped comparing and analysing 
the case study material and thus achieving the aims proposed at  the outset  of this research 
project, this topic needs a more detailed and robust critical appraisal about its derivation in order 
to improve current limitations, increase cultural adaptability and be used in future comparative 
work. Indeed, this is a key research area worth exploring further.
In addition, confidence in the evaluative criteria and scheme of safeguards proposed here can be 
made more robust if the regulation of access to other types of material available on the Internet 
such as copyrights protected, defamatory, and state classified information are included in future 
analysis.
This investigation can also benefit  from including other jurisdictions (such as the US, Russia 
and China) as case studies to enlarge the sample and achieve more generalising power. The US 
is important  as it illustrates a different approach of imposing criminal liability on online 
intermediaries; Russia, because it has been accused of being a worldwide repository of child 
pornographic material available on public websites, and because it  has recently experienced the 
operation of an Internet hotline domestically;941 and China for its extensive regulatory approach 
in relation to online content. 
Other issues such as the political struggles that  led to the regulatory choices made domestically, 
the institutional agendas, the cultural variables that  shaped regulation are all relevant topics that 
should be explored further. These ‘why’ questions are not  easily addressed via documentary 
analysis, but need in loco unstructured interviews and participant observation. Although the 
documentary analysis is able to fulfil the aims and objectives set  out  for this investigation,942 
this research is unable to explain in detail why the regulatory landscape is the way it is. 
Nevertheless, this is another area that deserves attention. The process of agenda setting and the 
reasons why certain policy alternatives are chosen, and others not, vary cross-nationally and 
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cultural and institutional dissimilarities, mainly because of limited time and financial resources.
have to do with the cultural contexts where these decisions are taken.943  These questions are 
important  in explaining the cross-national differences, the economics of anti-online child 
pornography regulation, the regulatory history, and to justify future regulatory intervention.
Another area that needs further exploration is the negative implications of anti-child 
pornography regulatory measures for privacy protection. The laws and regulation in regards to 
investigatory and surveillance powers given to law enforcement authorities are only peripherally 
addressed in each jurisdiction and it  deserves an investigation of its own, particularly in relation 
to police investigations and relationships established with online intermediaries for the 
disclosure of information about Internet users.
Finally, this investigation does not  intend to explore in depth other aspects around the problem 
of online child pornography, for example its production and distribution, the police 
investigations, criminal prosecutions, and the operation of the courts. Further research on this 
topic is important to provide the wider context  where the anti-online child pornography laws 
and regulations operate. Further research about the convicted offenders, victims, and other 
Internet applications and platforms may provide important  information to guide policymaking 
in this area. One thing that this author would do differently would be to conduct  in loco 
unstructured interviews and participant  observation as well as to add other jurisdictions as case 
studies. 
3 Future research
Although this research covers only part of the problem and has its own limitations, it provides a 
number of avenues for future research on the topic. They are: (1) to explore further and enhance 
both the evaluative criteria and scheme of safeguards so as to develop an international 
comparative model, and an impact  assessment tool in relation to free speech and privacy 
protection as well as good regulation on the Internet; (2) to employ the evaluative model against 
other types of criminal material available on the Internet; (3) to include other jurisdictions’s 
regulatory measures to limit  access to child pornographic content available on the Internet; (4) 
to address the regulatory measures tackling the production and distribution of online child 
pornography; (5) to explore the developments in relation to multi-state regulation, such as 
international treaties, standardised legal definitions, liability and responsibilities of online 
intermediaries, and improvements around the international interfaces of these public-private 
regulatory arrangements; (6) to explore possible uses of complex network theory to the 
regulation of criminal online material; (7) to assess the impact of the liability placed on online 
intermediaries in the USA in relation to child pornographic material; (8) to explore the economy 
or regulation in relation to child pornographic material, the impact of regulatory measures for 
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943  Kingdon provides a conceptual  framework on which to explore these issues further. See Kingdon, J., Agendas, 
Alternatives, and Public Policies (Updated 2nd edn.; London: Longman, 2011).
the digital economy and for the creativity in the Internet  industry; and (9) to conduct  research 
about assessing successful anti-online child pornography regulatory policies.
This study shows that regulation of the Internet  is increasing not only in relation to issues of 
infrastructure, but also in relation to the controversial material available online. There are 
increased legal liabilities placed on online intermediaries, more invasive surveillance powers 
given to law enforcement authorities, and widespread use of sophisticated and automated 
architecture-based regulatory tools. The question is no longer whether the Internet  should or 
should not be regulated but  which forms of regulation are appropriate. This is the reason why 
the discussion developed here concerned the potential negative implications of current policies 
for the protection of free speech, privacy and principles of good regulation online.
Another important research topic is however whether the escalation of laws and regulations in 
relation to online criminal content is creating more problems than solving them. Indeed, such 
legislative proliferation may undermine the judicial process (for example, creating legal 
inconsistencies, making the process of reaching judicial decisions more costly and problematic, 
and putting too great  a demand on the criminal justice system) and also the implementation of 
online content regulatory measures such as ineffective and inefficient  policies, unattainable 
expectations, violation of civil liberties, and limit  the digital economy’s growth. It is perhaps 
about time to explore new theoretical legal models, less punitive criminal laws, and flexible 
regulatory approaches towards the criminal content available online.
Of course, there is much more to do but  this research matters because it describes and compares 
the anti online child pornography policies in place in three different  jurisdictions; it assesses the 
implications of these policies for online democracy in general; it  may serve as a guide for future 
cross-national comparisons and policymaking in the field; and explores the broader lessons of 
online child pornography regulation such as that  the evaluation of ‘success’ should not follow 
an economicist  approach only, that  the existing regulatory culture plays a crucial role in the 
regulatory dynamics, and that the excessive judicialisation on online content regulation may 
pose more dangers than guarantee proper protection. In addition, this research tests out  some 
key assumptions found in the academic literature, particularly that  a statutory regulator may 
guarantee transparency, legitimacy and accountability of regulatory intervention; also, it 
critically reviews the practicalities and costs involved in implementing children and civil 
liberties protection principles as well as crime control and economic development  strategies in 
the online environment. It  is expected that these contributions will help advancing existing 
knowledge in the field and also open new avenues for academic enquiry.
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f 
a 
ch
ild
 a
nd
 n
on
-
ph
ot
og
ra
ph
ic
 d
ep
ic
tio
ns
 (
pr
oh
ib
ite
d 
im
ag
es
 o
f 
a 
ch
ild
 e
g 
tra
ci
ng
s,
 c
ar
to
on
s 
an
d 
dr
aw
in
gs
). 
Th
e 
ch
ild
 c
an
 b
e 
re
al
 o
r c
om
pu
te
r-
ge
ne
ra
te
d
St
at
e-
re
gu
la
tio
n
A
nt
i-c
hi
ld
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hy
 
cr
im
in
al
 la
w
s
pr
od
uc
tio
n
St
at
es
 a
nd
 T
er
rit
or
ie
s. 
C
th
 if
 w
ith
 th
e 
in
te
nt
io
n 
of
 
us
in
g 
a 
ca
rr
ie
r s
er
vi
ce
 to
 a
ch
ie
ve
 th
is
Pr
od
uc
e,
 r
ep
ro
du
ce
, 
di
re
ct
, 
ph
ot
og
ra
ph
, 
fil
m
 o
r 
re
gi
st
er
 b
y 
an
y 
m
ea
ns
 c
hi
ld
 p
or
no
gr
ah
y
To
 ta
ke
, p
er
m
it 
to
 b
e 
ta
ke
n,
 to
 m
ak
e
St
at
e-
re
gu
la
tio
n
A
nt
i-c
hi
ld
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hy
 
cr
im
in
al
 la
w
s
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
St
at
es
 a
nd
 T
er
rit
or
ie
s. 
C
th
 if
 w
ith
 th
e 
in
te
nt
io
n 
of
 
us
in
g 
a 
ca
rr
ie
r s
er
vi
ce
 to
 a
ch
ie
ve
 th
is
B
ot
h 
th
e 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 (t
o 
se
ll 
or
 s
ho
w 
w
ith
 in
te
nt
 
to
 se
ll)
 a
nd
 n
on
-c
om
m
er
ci
al
 d
is
tri
bu
tio
n 
(to
 o
ff
er
, 
ex
ch
an
ge
, 
m
ak
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
tra
ns
m
it,
 
di
st
rib
ut
e,
 
pu
bl
is
h)
 a
re
 c
rim
in
al
 o
ff
en
ce
s
B
ot
h 
th
e 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 
an
d 
no
n-
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
ar
e 
cr
im
in
al
 o
ff
en
ce
s: 
to
 d
is
tri
bu
te
 o
r 
sh
ow
, 
to
 p
ub
lis
h 
or
 c
au
se
 t
o 
be
 p
ub
lis
h 
an
y 
ad
ve
rti
se
m
en
t, 
St
at
e-
re
gu
la
tio
n
A
nt
i-c
hi
ld
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hy
 
cr
im
in
al
 la
w
s
in
te
nt
io
na
l a
cc
es
s
(C
th
) t
o 
ac
ce
ss
 o
r s
ol
ic
it
It
 is
 n
ot
 c
rim
in
al
is
ed
, 
bu
t 
‘to
 a
cq
ui
re
’ 
ha
s 
be
en
 
cr
im
in
al
is
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
m
ea
ni
ng
 o
f ‘
to
 b
uy
’
D
ow
nl
oa
di
ng
 o
r 
pr
in
tin
g 
of
f 
ca
n 
am
ou
nt
 t
o 
a 
m
ak
in
g 
or
 a
 p
os
se
ss
io
n 
of
fe
nc
e.
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 m
en
s 
re
a.
 
Th
e 
20
11
 E
U
 D
ire
ct
iv
e 
cr
im
ia
nl
is
ed
 
th
e 
in
te
nt
io
na
l 
ac
ce
ss
 
an
d 
pr
om
ot
ed
 
th
e 
w
eb
si
te
 
bl
oc
ki
ng
 m
ea
su
re
s
St
at
e-
re
gu
la
tio
n
A
nt
i-c
hi
ld
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hy
 
cr
im
in
al
 la
w
s
po
ss
es
si
on
Q
ua
lif
ie
d 
po
ss
es
si
on
 =
 w
ith
 in
te
nt
io
n 
to
 d
is
tri
bu
te
 
it 
vi
a 
th
e 
ca
rr
ia
ge
 
se
rv
ic
e 
(C
th
) 
an
d 
m
er
e 
po
ss
es
si
on
 (S
ta
te
s a
nd
 T
er
rit
or
ie
s)
Th
e 
m
er
e 
po
ss
es
si
on
 is
 a
 c
rim
in
al
 o
ff
en
ce
 s
in
ce
 
20
08
Th
e 
m
er
e 
po
ss
es
si
on
 w
as
 c
rim
in
al
is
ed
 i
n 
19
88
: 
pr
iio
r 
to
 t
hi
s 
on
ly
 t
o 
ha
ve
 i
n 
po
ss
es
si
on
 w
ith
 a
 
vi
ew
 to
 b
ei
ng
 d
is
tri
bu
te
d
St
at
e-
re
gu
la
tio
n
A
nt
i-c
hi
ld
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hy
 
cr
im
in
al
 la
w
s
pe
na
lti
es
G
en
er
al
ly
 1
5 
ye
ar
s i
m
pr
is
on
m
en
t (
C
th
)
Fr
om
 0
1 
to
 0
8 
ye
ar
s 
im
pr
is
on
m
en
t d
ep
en
di
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
of
fe
nc
e
H
ar
sh
er
 p
an
al
tie
s w
er
e 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
in
 2
00
0
St
at
e-
re
gu
la
tio
n
A
nt
i-c
hi
ld
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hy
 
cr
im
in
al
 la
w
s
ex
tra
te
rr
ito
ria
l
Y
es
 
to
 
pu
ni
sh
 
th
e 
A
us
tra
lia
n 
na
tio
na
ls
 
an
d 
re
si
de
nt
s 
co
m
m
itt
in
g 
th
es
e 
of
fe
nc
es
 
ab
ro
ad
. 
Se
ct
io
n 
27
3.
5 
of
 th
e 
C
C
A
 1
99
5 
as
 a
m
en
de
d.
N
ot
 fo
un
d
N
ot
 fo
un
d
St
at
e-
re
gu
la
tio
n
A
nt
i-c
hi
ld
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hy
 
cr
im
in
al
 la
w
s
lia
bi
lit
y 
of
 o
nl
in
e 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
rie
s
G
en
er
al
ly
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
vi
a 
C
th
 la
w
, w
hi
ch
 d
ef
in
es
 
ch
ild
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hy
, 
ho
st
in
g 
se
rv
ic
e 
an
d 
co
nt
en
t 
se
rv
ic
e 
pr
ov
id
er
. S
ee
 C
rim
in
al
 C
od
e 
A
ct
 1
99
5 
as
 
am
en
de
d 
in
 2
00
4.
 T
he
re
 a
re
 a
ls
o 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 in
 th
e 
B
ro
ad
ca
st
in
g 
Se
rv
ic
es
 A
ct
 1
99
2 
as
 a
m
en
de
d
Es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
in
 t
he
 E
C
A
 a
s 
am
en
de
d 
in
 2
00
8.
 
Th
es
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
nl
y 
ap
pl
y 
in
 r
e 
to
 c
hi
ld
 p
or
n 
co
nt
en
t. 
O
Is
 
ex
em
pt
 f
ro
m
 c
rim
in
al
 l
ia
bi
lit
y 
if  
un
aw
ar
e 
of
 t
he
 c
rim
in
al
 c
on
te
nt
, 
bu
t 
su
bj
ec
t 
to
 
cr
im
in
al
 l
ia
bi
lit
y 
af
te
r 
no
tif
ic
at
io
n 
(a
rt.
 2
41
-A
). 
N
o 
co
m
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
of
 o
nl
in
e 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ire
s 
in
 r
el
at
io
n 
to
 N
TD
 (
m
ar
co
 c
iv
il 
bi
ll)
E
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 
vi
a 
th
e 
20
00
 
E
U
 
C
om
m
er
ce
 
D
ire
ct
iv
e.
 S
af
e 
ha
rb
ou
r 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 (
m
er
e 
co
nd
ui
t, 
ca
ch
e 
op
er
at
io
ns
 
an
d 
co
nt
en
t 
ho
st
s)
. 
C
rim
in
a 
lia
bi
lit
y 
is
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
an
d 
co
nt
ro
l 
an
d 
no
 o
bl
ig
at
io
n 
to
 m
on
ito
r 
or
 c
on
tro
l 
co
nt
en
t. 
Th
e 
pr
es
er
va
tio
n 
of
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
is
 u
nd
er
 t
he
 2
00
9 
EU
 
D
at
a 
R
et
en
tio
n 
R
eg
ul
at
io
ns
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C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
Au
str
al
ia
Br
az
il
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
 (E
ng
la
nd
 a
nd
 W
al
es
)
de
fe
nc
es
se
ct
io
n 
47
4.
21
 o
f 
C
C
A
 1
99
5 
as
 a
m
en
de
d:
 p
ub
lic
 
be
ne
fit
, l
aw
 e
nf
or
ce
m
nt
 o
ff
ic
er
 in
 d
ut
y,
 g
oo
d 
fa
ith
LE
A
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 a
re
 n
ot
 li
ab
le
 w
he
n 
th
ey
 m
an
ip
ul
at
e 
th
e 
ch
ild
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hi
c 
m
at
er
ia
l 
fo
r t
he
 p
ur
po
se
s o
f n
ot
ifi
ca
tio
n
fo
r 
po
ss
es
si
on
: 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
re
as
on
, 
un
ko
w
n 
po
ss
es
si
on
 a
nd
 u
ns
ol
ic
ite
d 
po
ss
es
si
on
; t
he
 I
W
F 
is
 
a 
re
le
va
nt
 a
ut
ho
rit
y 
in
 2
00
3 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
R
. 
v 
B
ow
de
n
in
ve
st
ig
at
or
y 
po
w
er
s o
f l
aw
 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
bo
di
es
Es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
by
 t
he
 I
nt
er
ce
pt
io
n 
an
d 
A
cc
es
s 
A
ct
 
19
79
, a
nd
 th
e 
Te
le
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 A
ct
 1
99
7 
bo
th
 
am
en
de
d 
by
 th
e 
20
04
 an
d 
20
07
 A
ct
s.
 a 
co
ur
t o
rd
er
 
is
 
ne
ed
ed
 
to
 
ac
ce
ss
 
th
e 
co
nt
en
t 
of
 
a 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
 
th
er
e 
is
 
a 
m
em
or
an
da
 
of
 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
se
ttl
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
A
C
M
A
 a
nd
 th
e 
A
us
tra
lia
n 
po
lic
e 
fo
rc
es
A
 c
ou
rt
 o
rd
er
 i
s 
ne
ed
ed
 t
o 
ac
ce
ss
/in
te
rc
ep
t 
th
e 
co
nt
en
ts 
of
 a
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
bu
t L
EA
s 
ca
n 
ob
ta
in
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
tim
e,
 l
oc
at
io
n,
 I
P 
et
c.
 u
po
n 
re
qu
es
t t
o 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 O
I
Th
es
e 
ar
e 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
vi
a 
th
e 
R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
of
 
In
ve
st
ig
at
or
y 
Po
w
er
s 
A
ct
 2
00
0.
 T
he
 R
IP
A
 2
00
0 
al
lo
w
s 
th
e 
la
w
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t b
od
ie
s 
to
 re
qu
es
t i
nf
o 
fr
om
 O
Is
 
ab
ou
t 
us
er
s 
w
ith
ou
t 
a 
co
ur
t 
or
de
r; 
re
gu
la
te
s 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
el
ec
tro
ni
c 
ke
ys
; f
itt
in
g 
su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e 
eq
ui
pm
en
t 
on
to
 O
Is
’ 
ne
tw
or
ks
. 
Th
e 
go
v 
ha
s 
pl
an
s 
to
 r
ev
ie
w 
th
e 
la
w 
so
 a
s 
to
 e
xt
en
d 
th
es
e 
po
w
er
s
M
ul
ti-
sta
te
 
re
gu
la
tio
n
20
01
 C
oE
 
C
yb
er
cr
im
e 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n
N
o
N
o 
an
d 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
no
 p
la
ns
 f
or
 th
at
. T
he
 c
ou
nt
ry
 is
 
fo
r 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
a 
ne
w 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l U
N
-
le
ad
 t
re
at
y 
th
at
 ta
ke
s 
in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 th
e 
vi
ew
s 
of
 a
 
w
id
er
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
om
m
un
ity
 
Y
es
. 
It
 s
ig
ne
d 
th
e 
tre
at
y 
on
 2
3 
N
ov
 2
00
1 
an
d 
ra
tif
ie
d 
it 
on
 2
5 
M
ay
 2
01
1
M
ul
ti-
sta
te
 
re
gu
la
tio
n
20
00
 U
N
 
O
pt
io
na
l P
ro
to
co
l
Y
es
. 
It
 s
ig
ne
d 
th
e 
tre
at
y 
on
 1
8 
D
ec
 2
00
1 
an
d 
ra
tif
ie
d 
it 
on
 0
8 
Ja
n 
20
07
Y
es
. 
It
 s
ig
ne
d 
th
e 
tre
at
y 
on
 0
6 
Se
pt
 2
00
0 
an
d 
ra
tif
ie
d 
it 
on
 2
7 
Ja
n 
20
04
 w
ith
ou
t r
es
er
va
tio
ns
Y
es
. 
It
 s
ig
ne
d 
th
e 
tre
at
y 
on
 0
7 
Se
p 
20
00
 a
nd
 
ra
tif
ie
d 
it 
on
 2
0 
Fe
b 
20
09
PE
RI
O
D
PE
RI
O
D
PE
RI
O
D
19
90
 - 
20
10
19
99
 - 
20
10
19
90
 - 
20
10
Ke
y 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts 
ov
er
 ti
m
e
Ke
y 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts 
ov
er
 ti
m
e
Ke
y 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts 
ov
er
 ti
m
e
B
B
S 
Ta
sk
-f
or
ce
 
in
 
19
94
, 
A
B
A
 
re
po
rt
 1
99
6,
 
G
ov
er
nm
en
ta
l 
pr
op
os
al
 i
n 
19
97
, 
Se
na
te
 S
el
ec
t 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 
in
 
19
97
, 
Pr
op
os
al
 
of
 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 
fr
am
ew
or
k 
by
 th
e 
C
th
 G
ov
, B
SA
 1
99
2 
am
en
de
d 
in
 1
99
9 
(a
pp
ly
in
g 
th
e 
no
rm
s 
of
 T
v 
br
oa
dc
as
t 
to
 
th
e 
In
te
rn
et
), 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
fil
te
rin
g 
sc
he
m
e,
 c
al
l f
or
 a
 
m
an
da
to
ry
 fi
lte
rin
g 
sc
he
m
e 
in
 2
00
7 
(d
is
cu
ss
io
n 
is
 
on
go
in
g)
, 
an
ti-
ch
ild
 
po
rn
 
cr
im
in
al
 
C
th
 
la
w
s 
am
en
de
d 
in
 2
00
4,
 O
pe
ra
tio
n 
A
ux
in
 in
 2
00
4,
 C
oP
 
re
gi
st
er
ed
 i
n 
20
05
, B
SA
 1
99
2 
am
en
de
d 
ag
ai
n 
in
 
20
07
, C
oP
 re
gi
st
er
ed
 in
 2
00
8,
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
 IS
P-
le
ve
l 
fil
te
rin
g 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
in
 2
01
1 
by
 th
e 
II
A
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
co
nf
er
en
ce
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
la
te
 1
99
0s
, 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t 
of
 I
nt
er
ne
t 
ho
tli
ne
s 
ar
ou
nd
 e
ar
ly
 
20
00
s,
 
se
lf
-r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
rh
et
or
ic
 
ne
ve
r 
sy
st
em
at
ic
al
ly
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d,
 
cr
im
in
al
 
la
w
s 
up
da
te
d 
in
 2
00
3,
 c
re
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
Sa
fe
rn
et
 in
 2
00
5,
 
pr
es
su
re
 f
ro
m
 t
he
 M
PF
-S
P 
an
d 
Sa
fe
rn
et
 a
fte
r 
20
05
, a
 n
um
be
r o
f a
gr
ee
m
en
ts 
w
ith
 O
Is 
ar
e 
se
ttl
ed
 
to
 
ta
ke
-d
ow
n 
co
nt
en
t 
ho
st
ed
 
in
 
th
e 
co
un
try
, 
id
en
tif
y 
al
le
ge
d 
of
fe
nd
er
s 
an
d 
pr
es
er
ve
 c
rim
in
al
 
ev
id
en
ce
 
af
te
r 
20
05
, 
G
oo
gl
e 
ha
s 
re
fu
se
d 
to
 
co
op
er
at
e,
 S
en
at
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 I
nq
ui
ry
 la
un
ch
ed
 in
 
20
08
, 
th
e 
O
rk
ut
 c
as
e 
se
ttl
ed
 i
n 
20
08
, 
cr
im
in
al
 
la
w
s u
pd
at
ed
 a
ga
in
 in
 2
00
8,
 se
ttl
em
en
t w
ith
 te
lc
os
 
in
 2
00
9,
 m
ar
co
 c
iv
il 
bi
ll
C
om
m
er
ci
al
 I
nt
er
ne
t s
ta
rte
d 
to
 fl
ou
ris
h 
in
  
19
94
, 
ps
eu
do
-p
ho
to
gr
ap
hs
 a
nd
 m
ak
in
g 
ar
e 
ou
tla
w
ed
 i
n 
19
94
, g
ro
w
in
g 
co
nc
er
ns
 o
ve
r c
hi
ld
 p
or
n 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
in
 
ne
w
sg
ro
up
s 
in
 1
99
6,
 
po
lic
e 
an
d 
go
v 
pu
t 
pr
es
su
re
 o
n 
O
Is
 t
o 
co
m
e 
up
 w
ith
 a
 s
ol
ut
io
n,
 
In
du
st
ry
 
se
lf-
re
gu
la
to
ry
 
bo
dy
 
(S
af
et
yN
et
/IW
F)
 
w
as
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
in
 1
99
6,
 a
ut
om
at
ed
 m
on
ito
rin
g 
of
 
ne
w
sg
ro
up
s,
 w
eb
si
te
s 
gr
ow
 
in
 i
m
po
rta
nc
e,
 E
U
 
D
ire
ct
iv
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
in
 2
00
0 
es
ta
bl
is
hi
ng
 s
af
e 
ha
rb
ou
r p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
an
d 
N
TD
 fr
am
ew
or
k.
 o
ve
rs
ea
s 
U
R
L 
bl
oc
ki
ng
 st
ar
ts
 in
 2
00
4
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C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
Au
str
al
ia
Br
az
il
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
 (E
ng
la
nd
 a
nd
 W
al
es
)
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
O
R
Y
 
FR
A
M
E
W
O
R
K
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
O
R
Y
 
FR
A
M
E
W
O
R
K
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
O
R
Y
 
FR
A
M
E
W
O
R
K
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
O
R
Y
 
FR
A
M
E
W
O
R
K
Re
gu
la
to
ry
 n
at
ur
e
Re
gu
la
to
ry
 n
at
ur
e
Re
gu
la
to
ry
 n
at
ur
e
C
o-
re
gu
la
tio
n 
an
d 
co
m
pl
ai
nt
-b
as
ed
. 
Th
e 
C
th
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
is 
th
e 
ke
y 
ac
to
r: 
C
th
 s
ta
tu
te
 (
B
SA
 
19
92
 a
s 
am
en
de
d 
in
 1
99
9,
 2
00
4 
an
d 
20
07
) 
an
d 
C
th
 
re
gu
la
to
r 
A
C
M
A
, 
fo
rm
er
ly
 
A
B
A
 
(s
ta
te
-
re
gu
la
tio
n)
, 
se
lf-
re
gu
la
tio
n 
vi
a 
C
oP
 (
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
fi
lt
er
in
g 
at
 
th
e 
us
er
 
an
d 
IS
P-
le
ve
l)
 
an
d 
m
em
or
an
da
 o
f 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
(a
gr
ee
m
en
t)
 s
et
tle
d 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
A
C
M
A
 a
nd
 t
he
 p
ol
ic
e 
fo
rc
es
. T
he
re
 
ar
e 
tw
o 
ke
y 
C
oP
s 
(2
00
5 
an
d 
20
08
). 
Th
e 
A
C
M
A
 
re
gi
st
er
s 
an
d 
m
on
ito
rs 
th
e 
C
oP
 a
nd
 c
an
 im
po
se
 a
 
st
an
da
rd
 o
f i
ts 
ow
n 
if
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
. I
t a
ls
o 
op
er
at
es
 a
 
ho
tli
ne
 t
ha
t 
re
ce
iv
es
, 
in
ve
st
ig
at
es
 a
nd
 f
or
w
ar
ds
 
re
po
rt
s. 
Th
e 
on
lin
e 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ir
es
 
ha
ve
 
no
 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
to
 p
ro
ac
tiv
el
y 
m
on
ito
r c
on
te
nt
M
id
dl
e-
w
ay
 
be
tw
ee
n 
an
 
in
co
m
pl
et
e 
st
at
e 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
of
 c
on
te
nt
 a
nd
 a
bs
en
t 
se
lf-
re
gu
la
tio
n.
 
So
 
th
e 
LE
A
 
se
ttl
ed
 
ag
re
em
en
ts 
w
ith
 
on
lin
e 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ire
s.
 T
he
re
 is
 n
o 
co
m
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 la
w 
to
 
re
gu
la
te
 th
e 
on
lin
e 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ire
s 
ge
ne
ra
lly
. N
TD
 
is 
ba
se
d 
in
 l
aw
 
bu
t 
on
ly
 i
n 
re
la
tio
n 
to
 c
hi
ld
 
po
rn
og
ra
ph
y.
 T
he
 p
re
se
rv
at
io
n 
of
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ha
ve
 
be
en
 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
vi
a 
ag
re
em
en
ts
 s
et
tle
d 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
la
w 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
au
th
or
iti
es
 a
nd
 I
SP
s 
- 
fo
r 
id
en
tif
yi
ng
 o
ff
en
de
rs
 
an
d 
co
lle
ct
in
g 
ev
id
en
ce
 a
nd
 
IH
Ps
/IC
Ps
 
- 
fo
r 
re
m
ov
in
g 
co
nt
en
t, 
id
en
tif
yi
ng
 
of
fe
nd
er
s 
an
d 
co
lle
ct
in
g 
ev
id
en
ce
 w
ith
 t
he
 h
el
p 
of
 t
he
 N
G
O
 
In
te
rn
et
 h
ot
lin
e 
an
d 
th
e 
Se
na
te
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 In
qu
iry
In
te
rn
et
 i
nd
us
tr
y 
se
lf
-r
eg
ul
at
or
y 
bo
dy
 
IW
F 
m
an
ag
es
 
th
e 
ta
ke
-d
ow
n 
/ 
bl
oc
ki
ng
 
sc
he
m
e 
/ 
in
te
rf
ac
e 
w
ith
 
O
Is
. 
B
ot
h 
th
e 
po
lic
e 
an
d 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
al
so
 p
la
y 
a 
ro
le
 
an
d 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d  
ag
re
em
en
ts
 w
ith
 t
he
 I
W
F.
 T
he
 I
W
F 
ha
s 
B
oa
rd
 
th
at
 h
av
e 
m
em
be
rs
 o
r d
ife
re
nt
 so
ci
et
y 
gr
ou
ps
. T
he
 
IW
F 
ac
qu
ire
d 
th
e 
st
at
us
 o
f 
re
le
va
nt
 a
ut
ho
rit
y 
vi
a 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
in
 2
00
3.
 T
he
 t
ak
e-
do
w
n 
of
 c
on
te
nt
 
ho
st
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
U
K
 a
nd
 t
he
 im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
U
R
L 
bl
oc
ki
ng
 s
ys
te
m
 i
s 
ba
se
d 
on
 a
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
 
ag
re
em
en
t 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
IW
F 
an
d 
U
K
 O
Is
 t
ha
t 
co
ve
rs
 a
ro
un
d 
98
%
 o
f t
he
 U
K
 c
us
to
m
er
 b
as
e.
 T
he
 
20
11
 E
U
 D
ire
ct
iv
e 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
ru
le
s 
fo
r 
w
eb
si
te
 
bl
oc
ki
ng
 
an
d 
in
te
nt
io
na
l 
ac
ce
ss
. 
Th
e 
bl
oc
ki
ng
 
sc
he
m
e 
is
 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
at
 
th
e 
IS
P-
le
ve
l 
- 
no
t 
le
gi
sl
at
ed
Sc
op
e:
 o
nl
in
e 
m
at
er
ia
l t
ar
ge
te
d
Sc
op
e:
 o
nl
in
e 
m
at
er
ia
l t
ar
ge
te
d
Sc
op
e:
 o
nl
in
e 
m
at
er
ia
l t
ar
ge
te
d
Th
e 
on
lin
e 
m
at
er
ia
l i
s 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
ca
te
go
rie
s 
ap
pl
ie
d 
to
 t
he
 f
ilm
 i
nd
us
try
. 
Se
e 
th
e 
20
05
 C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
C
od
e.
 C
hi
ld
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hy
 a
nd
 
ot
he
r 
vi
ol
en
t 
m
at
er
ia
l 
ar
e 
R
C
-r
at
ed
. 
O
th
er
 
cl
as
si
fi
ca
ti
on
s 
in
cl
ud
e 
co
nt
en
t 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 
in
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 t
o 
m
in
or
s 
(X
18
+,
 R
18
+,
 M
A
15
+)
. 
Th
es
e 
m
at
er
ia
ls
 m
ay
 b
e 
la
be
lle
d 
pr
oh
ib
ite
d 
or
 
po
te
nt
ia
l p
ro
hi
bi
te
d.
 R
C 
an
d 
X
18
+ 
ra
te
d 
m
at
er
ia
l 
ar
e 
po
t/p
ro
hi
bi
te
d 
m
at
er
ia
l. 
R
18
+ 
an
d 
M
A
15
+ 
m
ay
 b
e 
al
so
 p
ot
/p
ro
hi
bi
te
d 
m
at
er
ia
l d
ep
en
di
ng
 o
n 
R
A
S.
 P
ot
/p
ro
hi
bi
te
d 
co
nt
en
t 
ar
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
A
C
M
A
 
bl
oc
kl
is
t 
an
d 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 
on
li
ne
 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ry
 
is 
no
ti
fi
ed
 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
th
e 
no
tif
ic
at
io
n 
sc
he
m
e.
 C
hi
ld
 p
or
n 
do
es
 n
ot
 n
ee
d 
to
 
be
 c
la
ss
ifi
ed
 p
rio
r t
o 
a 
no
tic
e 
be
in
g 
is
su
ed
M
ai
nl
y 
ch
ild
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hy
 b
ut
 a
ls
o 
in
ci
te
m
en
t 
to
 
ra
ci
al
 
ha
tre
d 
an
d 
re
lig
io
us
 
in
to
le
ra
nc
e 
ei
th
er
 
ho
st
ed
 i
n 
B
ra
zi
l o
r 
ho
st
ed
 o
ve
rs
ea
s 
bu
t p
ro
du
ce
d 
or
 d
is
tri
bu
te
d 
by
 a
 B
ra
zi
lia
n 
re
si
de
nt
C
hi
ld
 p
or
n 
ho
st
ed
 a
ny
w
he
re
, a
nd
 b
ot
h 
cr
im
in
al
ly
 
ob
sc
en
e 
ad
ul
t 
co
nt
en
t 
an
d 
ca
rto
on
 c
hi
ld
 
po
rn
 
ho
st
ed
 in
 th
e 
U
K
. O
ve
rs
ea
s U
R
L 
B
lo
ck
in
g 
on
ly
 in
 
re
 to
 c
hi
ld
 p
or
n.
 I
nc
et
em
en
t 
to
 r
ac
ia
l 
ha
tre
d 
w
as
 
pa
rt
 o
f 
its
 r
em
it 
on
ly
 u
nt
il 
20
11
. 
Th
e 
ex
tre
m
e 
po
rn
og
ra
ph
ic
 c
on
te
nt
 w
as
 in
cl
ud
ed
 i
n 
its
 re
m
it
 o
f 
ob
sc
en
e 
m
at
er
ia
l 
in
 2
00
9 
an
d 
ca
rto
on
 c
hi
ld
 p
or
n 
in
cl
ud
ed
 i
n 
20
10
. 
Th
er
e 
ha
s 
be
en
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
fr
om
 
th
e 
go
v 
to
 i
nc
lu
de
 o
th
er
 t
yp
es
 o
f 
co
nt
en
tin
 t
he
 
bl
oc
kl
is
t
M
ec
ha
ni
cs
M
ec
ha
ni
cs
M
ec
ha
ni
cs
Ch
ild
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hy
 h
os
te
d 
do
m
es
tic
al
ly
Ch
ild
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hy
 h
os
te
d 
do
m
es
tic
al
ly
Ch
ild
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hy
 h
os
te
d 
do
m
es
tic
al
ly
V
ia
 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 
to
 
th
e 
A
us
tr
al
ia
n 
on
li
ne
 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ry
 a
nd
 a
ls
o 
th
e 
A
us
tra
lia
n 
po
lic
e 
fo
rc
es
 
in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f 
se
rio
us
 o
ff
en
ce
s.
 N
ot
ifi
ca
tio
ns
 a
re
: 
fin
al
 a
nd
 in
te
rim
 ta
ke
-d
ow
n,
 se
rv
ic
e-
ce
ss
at
io
n 
an
d 
lin
k-
de
le
tio
n 
no
tic
es
 to
 A
us
tra
lia
n 
IH
Ps
 a
nd
 IC
Ps
. 
Po
lic
e 
fo
rc
e 
no
tif
ie
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
m
em
or
an
da
 
of
 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
ie
 
A
C
M
A
 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
is
 
su
sp
en
de
d 
w
hi
ls
t 
th
e 
po
lic
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
ta
ke
s 
pl
ac
e.
 F
ai
lu
re
 to
 ta
ke
 d
ow
n 
th
e 
re
po
rte
d 
m
te
ria
l i
s 
ac
rim
in
al
 o
ff
en
ce
 a
nd
 m
ay
 a
ls
o 
re
su
lt 
in
 h
ea
vy
 
fe
es
V
ia
 n
ot
ic
es
 o
f 
ta
ke
-d
ow
n 
is
su
ed
 m
ai
nl
y 
by
 t
he
 
M
PF
-S
P 
an
d 
th
e 
Sa
fe
rn
et
 to
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 IC
Ps
 a
nd
 
IH
Ps
. 
O
nl
in
e 
pa
ym
en
t 
sy
st
em
s 
ar
e 
al
so
 n
ot
ifi
ed
 
ab
ou
t 
pa
id
 c
hi
ld
 
po
rn
og
ra
ph
y 
w
eb
si
te
s.
 T
he
se
 
no
tif
ic
at
io
ns
 l
ea
d 
to
 c
rim
in
al
 i
nv
es
tig
at
io
n 
an
d 
fu
rth
er
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is 
pr
ov
id
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 O
I 
to
 th
e 
LE
A
s
N
ot
ic
es
 
of
 
ta
ke
-d
ow
n 
an
d 
pr
es
er
va
tio
n 
of
 
ev
id
en
ce
 re
qu
es
t a
re
 is
su
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
IW
F 
to
 re
le
va
nt
 
U
K
 I
H
Ps
/IC
Ps
 -
 t
ou
gh
er
 m
ea
su
re
s 
(a
ut
om
at
ed
 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
an
d 
ta
ke
-d
ow
n 
of
 e
nt
ire
 n
ew
sg
ro
up
s)
 
w
er
e 
ap
lie
d 
to
 n
ew
sg
ro
up
s 
in
 2
00
2;
 U
K
 p
ol
ic
e 
fo
rc
e 
is 
no
tif
ie
d 
by
 a
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
un
de
r 
th
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 a
n 
ag
re
em
en
t; 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 O
I 
is 
co
nt
ac
te
d 
by
 p
ho
ne
; 
th
e 
w
eb
si
te
 i
s 
m
on
ito
re
d 
un
til
 
co
nt
en
t 
is 
re
m
ov
ed
. 
Th
e 
IW
F 
do
es
 
no
t 
re
qu
ire
 th
e 
O
I t
o 
do
 an
yt
hi
ng
; i
t o
nl
y 
pu
ts
 th
em
 o
n 
no
tic
e 
an
d 
th
us
 a
t r
is
k 
of
 fa
ci
ng
 c
rim
in
al
 li
ab
ili
ty
275
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
Au
str
al
ia
Br
az
il
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
 (E
ng
la
nd
 a
nd
 W
al
es
)
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
O
R
Y
 
FR
A
M
E
W
O
R
K
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
O
R
Y
 
FR
A
M
E
W
O
R
K
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
O
R
Y
 
FR
A
M
E
W
O
R
K
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
O
R
Y
 
FR
A
M
E
W
O
R
K
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
O
R
Y
 
FR
A
M
E
W
O
R
K
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
O
R
Y
 
FR
A
M
E
W
O
R
K
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
O
R
Y
 
FR
A
M
E
W
O
R
K
C
hi
ld
 
po
rn
og
ra
ph
y 
ho
st
ed
 
ov
er
se
as
 
bu
t 
ac
ce
ss
ed
 
wi
th
in
 th
e 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
n
C
hi
ld
 
po
rn
og
ra
ph
y 
ho
st
ed
 
ov
er
se
as
 
bu
t 
ac
ce
ss
ed
 
wi
th
in
 th
e 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
n
C
hi
ld
 
po
rn
og
ra
ph
y 
ho
st
ed
 
ov
er
se
as
 
bu
t 
ac
ce
ss
ed
 
wi
th
in
 th
e 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
n
V
ia
 n
ot
ifi
ca
tio
n 
to
 ‘a
cc
re
di
te
d’
 f
ilt
er
 v
en
do
rs
 a
nd
  
ac
ce
ss
-p
re
ve
nt
io
n 
no
tic
es
 to
 k
no
w
n 
IS
Ps
. W
eb
si
te
 
is 
in
cl
ud
ed
 
in
 
th
e 
A
C
M
A
 
bl
oc
kl
is
t. 
R
ul
es
 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
by
 th
e 
20
05
 C
oP
 a
re
: (
no
tic
e 
to
 fi
lte
r 
ve
nd
or
s,
 IS
Ps
 in
fo
rm
 c
us
to
m
er
s 
ab
ou
t t
he
 fi
lte
rs
 -
 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
fil
te
rin
g 
at
 t
he
 u
se
r-
le
ve
l).
 N
ot
ify
 a
 
m
em
be
r 
of
 a
n 
A
us
tra
lia
n 
po
lic
e 
fo
rc
e,
 a
nd
 t
he
 
IN
H
O
PE
. 
M
or
e 
re
ce
nt
ly
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
 f
ilt
er
in
g 
of
 
w
eb
si
te
s,
 n
ot
 U
R
Ls
, 
at
 t
he
 I
SP
-le
ve
l 
us
in
g 
th
e 
In
te
rp
ol
 b
lo
ck
lis
t (
se
ct
io
n 
31
3 
te
lc
o 
19
97
 ac
t?
) b
ut
 
m
an
da
to
ry
 IS
P-
le
ve
l f
ilt
er
in
g 
vi
a 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
(?
) i
s 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
R
C
-r
at
ed
 c
on
te
nt
 re
vi
ew
 b
ut
 it
 
is
 u
nc
le
ar
 h
ow
 th
is
 sc
he
m
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
m
pl
em
en
te
d
N
ot
ifi
ca
tio
ns
 a
re
 s
en
t 
to
 p
ar
tn
er
-h
ot
lin
es
 (
if 
an
y)
 
an
d 
to
 th
e 
Fe
de
ra
l p
ol
ic
e 
vi
a 
In
te
rp
ol
. E
m
ba
ss
ie
s 
ar
e 
al
so
 n
ot
ifi
ed
. N
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
un
d 
ab
ou
t t
he
 u
se
 
of
 b
lo
ck
lis
ts
 (
em
pl
oy
ed
 v
ou
nt
ar
ily
 o
r 
ot
he
rw
is
e)
 
to
 b
lo
ck
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 c
hi
ld
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hi
c 
co
nt
en
t 
ho
st
ed
 
ov
er
se
as
. 
O
nl
in
e 
pa
ym
en
t 
sy
st
em
s 
al
so
 
no
tif
ie
d 
ab
ou
t p
ai
d 
w
eb
si
te
s h
os
te
d 
ov
er
se
as
Th
e 
pa
rtn
er
 h
ot
lin
e 
in
 t
ha
t 
co
un
try
, 
if 
an
y,
 i
s 
no
tif
ie
d.
 
Th
e 
In
te
rp
ol
 
is
 
al
so
 
no
tif
ie
d.
 
Th
e 
ov
er
se
as
 h
os
ts
 a
re
 n
ot
ifi
ed
 a
s 
w
el
l. 
Th
e 
U
R
Ls
 a
re
 
ad
de
d 
to
 th
e 
IW
F 
bl
oc
kl
is
t w
hi
ch
 ar
e 
pa
ss
ed
 o
n 
to
 
m
em
be
r 
U
K
 
IS
Ps
 
(in
c.
 m
ob
ile
 
op
er
at
or
s 
an
d 
se
ar
ch
 e
ng
in
es
) 
un
de
r 
th
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 a
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
 
ag
re
em
en
t (
98
%
 c
ov
er
ag
e)
. (
A
 n
ot
ifi
ca
tio
n 
is 
se
nt
 
to
 I
C
A
N
N
 
to
 
un
re
gi
st
er
 t
he
 
re
le
va
nt
 d
om
ai
n 
na
m
e.
 
Th
e 
on
lin
e 
pa
ym
en
t 
sy
st
em
s 
ar
e 
al
so
 
no
tif
ie
d 
in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f p
ai
d 
w
eb
si
te
s.)
 T
he
 U
R
L 
is
 
m
on
it
or
ed
 
un
ti
l 
co
nt
en
t 
is
 
re
m
ov
ed
. 
T
he
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
bl
oc
kl
is
t i
s v
ol
un
ta
ry
 an
d 
at
 
th
e 
di
sc
re
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
IS
P 
w
hi
ch
 p
ay
 a
 m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
m
on
tlh
y 
fe
e 
to
 b
e 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
sc
he
m
e
Is
 th
e 
pr
o-
ac
tiv
e 
co
nt
en
t m
on
ito
rin
g 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
pe
rs
on
al
 d
at
a 
by
 th
e 
O
Is
 re
gu
la
te
d 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 a
bu
se
s?
Is
 th
e 
pr
o-
ac
tiv
e 
co
nt
en
t m
on
ito
rin
g 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
pe
rs
on
al
 d
at
a 
by
 th
e 
O
Is
 re
gu
la
te
d 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 a
bu
se
s?
Is
 th
e 
pr
o-
ac
tiv
e 
co
nt
en
t m
on
ito
rin
g 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
pe
rs
on
al
 d
at
a 
by
 th
e 
O
Is
 re
gu
la
te
d 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 a
bu
se
s?
N
o.
 A
cc
es
s 
to
 t
he
 b
lo
ck
lis
te
d 
w
eb
si
te
s 
ar
e 
no
t 
tra
ce
d 
ba
ck
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
po
lic
e 
fo
rc
e
N
o
N
o
C
om
pl
ai
nt
s 
an
d 
co
nt
en
t 
an
al
ys
is 
(h
um
an
 
or
 
au
to
m
at
ed
, e
x 
an
te
 o
r p
os
t) 
in
 re
 c
hi
ld
 p
or
n
C
om
pl
ai
nt
s 
an
d 
co
nt
en
t 
an
al
ys
is 
(h
um
an
 
or
 
au
to
m
at
ed
, e
x 
an
te
 o
r p
os
t) 
in
 re
 c
hi
ld
 p
or
n
C
om
pl
ai
nt
s 
an
d 
co
nt
en
t 
an
al
ys
is 
(h
um
an
 
or
 
au
to
m
at
ed
, e
x 
an
te
 o
r p
os
t) 
in
 re
 c
hi
ld
 p
or
n
C
om
pl
ai
nt
-b
as
ed
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 (b
y 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 o
r t
he
 p
ol
ic
e 
to
 th
e 
A
C
M
A
 o
r r
el
ev
an
t O
I)
 
bu
t 
th
er
e 
is 
al
so
 p
ro
ac
tiv
e 
co
nt
en
t 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
(h
um
an
-b
as
ed
 o
r 
au
to
m
at
ed
) 
pe
rf
or
m
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
A
C
M
A
 a
nd
 O
Is
. S
om
e 
O
Is
 o
ff
er
 fi
lte
re
d 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 
th
e 
In
te
rn
et
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
ly
U
nd
er
 th
e 
pr
es
su
re
 o
f 
la
w
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t 
ag
en
ci
es
 
th
e 
O
Is
 
ar
e 
pe
rf
or
m
in
g 
pr
oa
ct
iv
e 
co
nt
en
t 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
vi
a 
au
to
m
at
ed
 f
ilt
er
in
g 
an
d 
hu
m
an
 
an
al
ys
is
. T
he
re
 is
 n
ei
th
er
 le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
ov
er
si
gh
t n
or
 
ar
e 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
sa
fe
gu
ar
ds
 
to
 
pr
ot
ec
t 
ag
ai
ns
t 
ab
us
es
. O
pa
qu
e 
pr
iv
at
e 
ce
ns
or
sh
ip
IW
F 
w
or
k 
is 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 
re
ac
tiv
e 
bu
t 
th
er
e 
is
 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 p
ro
ac
tiv
e 
m
on
ito
rin
g.
 I
n 
ad
di
tio
n,
 
th
e 
IW
F 
m
an
ag
es
 th
e 
bl
oc
kl
is
t b
ut
 it
 is
 u
p 
to
 IS
Ps
 
to
 i
m
pl
em
en
t 
or
 t
in
ke
r 
w
ith
 i
t 
at
 t
he
ir 
ow
n 
di
sc
re
tio
n
In
te
rn
et
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 
ta
rg
et
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
on
li
ne
 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
rie
s i
n 
re
 c
hi
ld
 p
or
n
In
te
rn
et
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 
ta
rg
et
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
on
li
ne
 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
rie
s i
n 
re
 c
hi
ld
 p
or
n
In
te
rn
et
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 
ta
rg
et
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
on
li
ne
 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
rie
s i
n 
re
 c
hi
ld
 p
or
n
Pu
bl
ic
 
w
eb
si
te
s 
(ie
 
th
e 
op
en
 
In
te
rn
et
) 
an
d 
ne
w
sg
ro
up
s h
os
te
d 
in
 A
us
tra
lia
 o
r o
ve
rs
ea
s
Pu
bl
ic
 w
eb
si
te
s 
an
d 
cl
os
ed
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 w
eb
si
te
s 
(a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 w
ith
 th
e 
on
lin
e 
pa
ym
en
t s
ys
te
m
s)
N
ew
sg
ro
up
s,
 p
ub
lic
 w
eb
si
te
s 
(in
c 
un
re
gi
st
er
in
g 
do
m
ai
n 
na
m
es
), 
pa
id
 w
eb
si
te
s 
vi
a 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 
co
al
lit
io
n.
 O
nl
y 
pu
bl
ic
 s
pa
ce
 I
nt
er
ne
tb
ut
 i
t 
ca
n 
pa
ss
 t
he
 r
ep
or
ts 
re
ce
iv
ed
 a
bo
ut
 c
lo
se
d 
pl
at
fo
rm
s 
an
d 
su
sp
ec
t o
ff
en
de
rs
 o
n 
to
 th
e 
po
lic
e
Ap
pe
al
 o
r p
ut
 b
ac
k 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 in
 re
 c
hi
ld
 p
or
n
Ap
pe
al
 o
r p
ut
 b
ac
k 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 in
 re
 c
hi
ld
 p
or
n
Ap
pe
al
 o
r p
ut
 b
ac
k 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 in
 re
 c
hi
ld
 p
or
n
A
pp
ar
en
tly
 t
he
re
 a
re
 
so
m
e 
in
 r
el
at
io
n 
to
 t
he
 
In
te
rp
ol
 
bl
oc
kl
is
t: 
in
fo
 
vi
a 
In
te
rp
ol
 
w
eb
si
te
, 
ap
pe
al
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s m
an
ag
ed
 b
y 
In
te
rp
ol
 a
nd
 A
FP
N
on
e 
id
en
tif
ie
d
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
ap
pe
al
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
by
 t
he
 
IW
F
W
ho
 m
an
ag
es
 t
he
 b
lo
ck
in
g/
re
m
ov
al
 li
sts
/d
ec
id
es
 w
ha
t 
to
 b
lo
ck
?
W
ho
 m
an
ag
es
 t
he
 b
lo
ck
in
g/
re
m
ov
al
 li
sts
/d
ec
id
es
 w
ha
t 
to
 b
lo
ck
?
W
ho
 m
an
ag
es
 t
he
 b
lo
ck
in
g/
re
m
ov
al
 li
sts
/d
ec
id
es
 w
ha
t 
to
 b
lo
ck
?
M
ai
nl
y 
th
e 
C
th
 
re
gu
la
to
r 
A
C
M
A
 
H
ot
lin
e 
(d
om
es
tic
al
ly
 a
nd
 
ov
er
se
as
) 
to
ge
th
er
 
w
ith
 t
he
 
N
at
io
na
l 
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
B
oa
rd
, 
bu
t 
al
so
 t
he
 I
H
Ps
 
an
d 
IC
Ps
 (
do
m
es
tic
al
ly
) b
ec
au
se
 th
e 
la
tte
r r
ec
ei
ve
 
co
m
pl
ai
nt
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
. T
he
 I
nt
er
ne
t i
nd
us
try
 
is
 a
ls
o 
a 
ke
y 
ac
to
r
Th
e 
Fe
de
ra
l P
ub
lic
 P
ro
se
cu
tio
n 
Se
rv
ic
e 
(M
PF
-S
P)
 
an
d 
th
e 
Sa
fe
rn
et
 n
ot
ify
 th
e 
O
Is 
ab
ou
t t
he
 c
on
te
nt
 
ho
st
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
co
un
try
. O
th
er
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
 c
an
 a
ls
o 
re
po
rt
 th
e 
ch
ild
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hi
c 
co
nt
en
t. 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
, 
so
m
e 
O
Is
 o
pe
ra
te
 m
on
ito
rin
g 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 o
f 
th
ei
r 
ow
n 
an
d 
ta
ke
-d
ow
n 
al
eg
ed
el
y 
ch
ild
 p
or
no
gr
ap
hi
c 
at
 th
ei
r 
ow
n 
di
sc
re
tio
n 
bu
t a
re
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 n
ot
ify
 
th
e 
LE
A
Th
e 
IW
F 
re
ce
iv
es
 a
nd
 a
ss
es
s 
co
m
pl
ai
nt
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 a
nd
 m
an
ag
es
 th
e 
B
lo
ck
lis
t o
f 
U
R
Ls
 w
hi
ch
 
ar
e 
pa
ss
ed
 o
n 
to
 th
e 
IS
Ps
. T
he
se
 a
re
 re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
to
 
im
pl
em
en
t 
th
e 
B
lo
ck
lis
t 
ag
ai
ns
t 
th
ei
r 
cu
st
um
er
s. 
Th
e 
sc
he
m
e 
is 
vo
lu
nt
ar
ily
 b
as
ed
 b
ut
 h
av
e 
al
m
os
t 
10
0%
 m
em
be
rs
hi
p.
 T
he
y 
al
le
ge
dl
y 
ta
rg
et
 th
e 
m
os
t 
vi
ol
en
t i
m
ag
es
 o
f c
hi
ld
 p
or
n
O
nl
in
e 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
rie
s t
ar
ge
te
d
O
nl
in
e 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
rie
s t
ar
ge
te
d
O
nl
in
e 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
rie
s t
ar
ge
te
d
In
te
rn
et
 s
er
vi
ce
, 
ho
st
in
g 
an
d 
co
nt
en
t 
pr
ov
id
er
s 
(I
SP
 -
 o
ve
rs
ea
s;
 I
H
P 
an
d 
IC
P 
- 
do
m
es
tic
al
ly
). 
T
he
re
 
ar
e 
a 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 
In
te
rn
et
 
in
du
st
ry
 
as
so
ci
at
io
ns
 a
m
on
gs
t 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
II
A
 i
s 
th
e 
m
os
t 
im
po
rta
nt
. T
he
re
 a
re
 h
ig
h 
fe
es
 fo
r n
on
-c
om
pl
ia
nc
e  
an
d 
th
is
 is
 a
ls
o 
a 
cr
im
in
al
 o
ff
en
ce
IC
Ps
 a
nd
 I
H
Ps
 (
eg
 G
oo
gl
e,
 O
rk
ut
 - 
to
 ta
ke
-d
ow
n 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 c
on
te
nt
 h
os
te
d 
in
 B
ra
zi
l, 
pr
es
er
ve
 
ev
id
en
ce
 a
nd
 i
de
nt
ify
 a
lle
ge
de
ly
 o
ff
en
de
rs
), 
IS
Ps
 
(e
g 
te
lc
os
 - 
in
fo
 to
 h
el
p 
la
w
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t b
od
ie
s t
o 
id
en
tif
y 
al
le
ge
dl
y 
of
fe
nd
er
s)
, p
ay
m
en
t s
ys
te
m
s
IS
Ps
, I
C
Ps
/IH
Ps
, o
nl
in
e 
pa
ym
en
t s
ys
te
m
s,
 s
ea
rc
h 
en
gi
ne
s 
eg
 
Y
ah
oo
! 
an
d 
G
oo
gl
e 
(v
ia
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
U
R
L 
bl
oc
kl
is
t 
ag
ai
ns
t 
th
e 
se
ar
ch
 re
su
lts
), 
m
ob
ile
 o
pe
ra
to
rs
276
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
A
SE
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
T
ab
le
Au
str
al
ia
Br
az
il
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
 (E
ng
la
nd
 a
nd
 W
al
es
)
IM
PL
IC
A
T
IO
N
S
IM
PL
IC
A
T
IO
N
S
IM
PL
IC
A
T
IO
N
S
IM
PL
IC
A
T
IO
N
S
IM
PL
IC
A
T
IO
N
S
IM
PL
IC
A
T
IO
N
S
Ke
y 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 a
ct
or
s
Ke
y 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 a
ct
or
s
Ke
y 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 a
ct
or
s
C
th
 A
C
M
A
 (
it 
ha
s 
a 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 s
ta
tu
to
ry
 p
ow
er
s 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
O
Is
 c
om
e 
in
to
 li
ne
), 
In
te
rn
et
 In
du
st
ry
 
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n,
 f
ilt
er
 v
en
do
rs
, 
on
lin
e 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
rie
s 
(I
SP
s,
 I
H
Ps
 a
nd
 I
C
H
s)
, 
In
te
rn
et
 u
se
rs
 (
in
st
al
lin
g 
fil
te
rs
 b
ut
 o
nl
y 
as
 a
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
ag
ai
ns
t i
na
dv
er
te
nt
 
ac
ce
ss
)
Fe
de
ra
l P
ub
lic
 P
ro
se
cu
tio
n 
Se
rv
ic
e 
(M
PF
-S
P)
 a
nd
 
ot
he
r 
LE
A
s, 
O
Is
 (
IS
Ps
, I
C
Ps
 a
nd
 I
H
Ps
), 
In
te
rn
et
 
ho
tli
ne
 S
af
er
ne
t, 
Se
na
te
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 I
nq
ui
ry
 (
no
 
lo
ng
er
 in
 o
pe
ra
tio
n)
, o
nl
in
e 
pa
ym
en
t s
ys
te
m
s
Th
e 
IW
F 
an
d 
th
e 
m
em
be
r 
IS
Ps
. 
B
ut
 b
ot
h 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t a
nd
 t
he
 p
ol
ic
e 
pl
ay
 a
 k
ey
 r
ol
e 
in
 th
e 
sc
he
m
e;
 m
ob
ile
 o
pe
ra
to
rs
 a
nd
 o
te
r 
O
Is
. T
he
 IW
F 
is
 a
 m
em
be
r o
f t
he
 IN
H
O
PE
 A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
Th
e 
A
C
M
A
 B
lo
ck
lis
t 
is 
ex
em
pt
 f
ro
m
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
un
de
r 
th
e 
FO
I 
A
ct
 1
98
2 
as
 a
m
en
de
d.
 T
he
 u
se
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rp
ol
/IW
F 
bl
oc
kl
is
ts 
ar
e 
al
so
 p
ro
bl
em
at
ic
. 
N
o 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
au
di
t 
pe
rf
or
m
ed
 a
nd
 c
en
so
rs
 a
re
 
un
am
ed
. 
U
se
rs
 
ar
e 
in
fo
rm
ed
 
ab
ou
t 
bl
oc
ke
d 
w
eb
si
te
s v
ia
 th
e 
In
te
rp
ol
 w
eb
si
te
O
Is
 a
re
 p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
pr
oa
ct
iv
e 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
of
 o
nl
in
e 
co
nt
en
t 
in
 n
on
-tr
an
sp
ar
en
t 
w
ay
s 
at
 t
he
ir
 o
w
n 
di
sc
re
tio
n.
 T
he
 i
nt
eg
ra
te
d 
na
tio
na
l 
da
ta
ba
se
 o
f 
re
po
rts
 c
an
 b
e 
ac
ce
ss
ed
 b
y 
di
ff
er
en
t a
ct
or
s
So
m
e 
O
Is
 
pr
ov
id
e 
th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 
40
3 
m
es
sa
ge
 
un
de
r 
th
e 
bl
oc
ki
ng
 s
ch
em
e 
bu
t n
o 
re
as
on
 fo
r 
th
is
 
is 
gi
ve
n.
 IS
Ps
 im
pl
em
en
t t
he
 b
lo
ck
lis
t a
t t
he
ir 
ow
n 
di
sc
re
tio
n 
an
d 
m
ay
 ti
nk
er
 w
ith
 it
Ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y
Ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y
Ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y
Th
e 
A
C
M
A
 i
s 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 r
ep
or
t 
to
 th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
ev
er
y 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
ab
ou
t 
th
e 
B
lo
ck
lis
t 
op
er
at
io
n,
 
bu
t r
ep
or
ts 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
di
sc
on
tin
ue
d 
af
te
r 2
00
5 
an
d 
no
 e
xp
la
na
tio
n 
ha
s 
be
en
 g
iv
en
. 
Si
m
ila
rly
, 
th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
is
 
re
qu
ir
ed
 
to
 
re
po
rt
 
to
 
th
e 
C
th
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t. 
U
na
m
ed
 s
ta
ff
 c
la
ss
ify
 t
he
 c
en
so
re
d 
co
nt
en
t a
nd
 th
es
e 
de
ci
so
ns
 c
an
no
t b
e 
ap
pe
al
ed
Th
e 
Sa
fe
rn
et
 B
ra
si
l 
ha
s 
be
en
 c
rit
ic
is
ed
 f
or
 n
ot
 
be
en
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
le
, 
fo
r 
be
in
g 
a 
pr
iv
at
e 
in
st
itu
tio
n 
as
se
ss
si
ng
 
th
e 
ill
eg
al
ity
 o
f 
co
nt
en
t, 
un
de
r 
no
 
ju
di
ci
al
 
ov
er
si
gh
t 
or
 
ex
te
rn
al
 
au
di
t 
an
d 
its
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
so
ur
ce
s 
ra
is
e 
do
ub
ts
 
ab
ou
t 
its
 
tru
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
cy
Fo
r s
om
e,
 th
e 
he
ro
ic
 n
at
ur
e 
of
 th
e 
IW
F 
ha
s 
sa
ve
d 
th
em
 fr
om
 g
re
at
er
 sc
ru
tin
y
Le
gi
tim
ac
y
Le
gi
tim
ac
y
Le
gi
tim
ac
y
B
lo
ck
lis
ts
 g
en
er
at
ed
 b
y 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
(ie
 f
ilt
er
 v
en
do
rs
), 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
ns
 (
ie
 I
W
F)
 a
nd
 
po
lic
e 
fo
rc
es
 (
ie
 I
nt
er
po
l).
 T
he
 r
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 f
or
 
as
se
ss
in
g 
an
d 
ve
tti
ng
 
co
nt
en
t 
is
 
de
le
ga
te
d 
to
 
ov
er
se
as
 i
ns
tit
ut
io
ns
. 
Th
e 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 s
ch
em
e 
is
 
de
fin
ed
 v
ia
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n
Th
e 
N
G
O
-b
as
ed
 I
nt
er
ne
t 
ho
tli
ne
 is
 p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
a 
pu
bl
ic
 f
un
ct
io
n 
w
ith
ou
t 
a 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
m
an
da
de
 o
r 
pr
op
er
 p
ub
lic
 s
cr
ut
in
y.
 T
he
 S
en
at
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 
In
qu
iry
 h
ad
 
a 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 p
ub
lic
 s
es
si
on
s 
bu
t 
se
ct
or
s 
of
 s
oc
ie
ty
 w
er
e 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
pa
rli
am
en
ta
ry
 
di
sc
us
si
on
s 
(e
g 
ju
di
ci
ar
y,
 c
on
su
m
er
 r
ig
ht
s,
 c
iv
il 
rig
ht
s 
an
d 
ch
ild
re
n 
rig
ht
’s
 a
ct
iv
is
ts
). 
R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
vi
a 
ag
re
em
en
ts 
ca
n 
be
 i
lle
gi
tim
at
e 
an
d 
ha
ve
 a
 
de
m
oc
ra
tic
 d
ef
ic
it.
 T
he
re
 i
s 
a 
bi
ll 
on
 d
is
cu
ss
io
n 
(m
ar
co
 c
iv
il)
Th
e 
IW
F 
is 
an
 I
nt
er
ne
t 
in
du
st
ry
 r
eg
ul
at
or
y 
bo
dy
 
w
ith
ou
t 
a 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
m
an
da
te
. 
It
 h
as
 h
ow
ev
er
  
re
fo
rm
ed
 
its
 
B
oa
rd
 
so
 
as
 
to
 
in
cl
ud
e 
w
id
er
 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
fr
om
 d
iff
er
en
t s
ec
to
rs
 o
f s
oc
ie
ty
. I
t 
is 
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APPENDIX 2: INVITATION LETTER
INVITATION LETTER
Participant’s Contact Info Fabio A. S. Reis
PhD Student, School of Law
The Sheffield Of University
Bartolomé House, Winter Street, Sheffield
S3 7ND, United Kingdom
e-mail: F.Reis@sheffield.ac.uk
Dear Participant,             15 November 2011
This letter is asking for expert  opinion in a doctoral research project  that explores comparatively 
the Australian, Brazilian and British regulatory models designed to limit  access to child 
pornographic content on the Internet. The documentary analysis developed so far has addressed 
each of the three regulatory models in detail and produced three draft  chapters of around 8,000 
words each. The next  step is to validate the content of these three chapters by means of 
receiving written feedback from and, perhaps, conducting further interviews with experts in the 
three jurisdictions. 
This research project  is based at the School of Law of the University Of Sheffield and is 
partially funded by the Brazilian Government  (State of Bahia). The project is under the 
supervision of Dr. Maggie Wykes (e-mail: M.Wykes@sheffield.ac.uk) and Dr. Lindsay Stirton 
(e-mail: L.Stirton@sheffield.ac.uk). In addition, the project was approved by the University Of 
Sheffield Research Ethics Committee and: (i) a consent form will be provided before the 
interview in order to inform participants about the validation process; (ii) responses will be kept 
confidential, unless explicit  permission is given; and (iii) participants will be able to choose to 
be identified or not. Each participant is free to provide any feedback about the chapter from her/
his jurisdiction.
Given that  this research is mostly funded at my own expense, I will not be able to provide any 
remuneration for this task but  I will send a printed copy of the thesis to each participant  once it 
is finally awarded as a sign of gratitude. The research timetable is heavily dependent  on this 
validation process, so I do appreciate your prompt response about whether you are interested in 
taking part in this research.
If you have questions or need any further information about this, please do not hesitate to 
contact me (or my supervisors) via e-mail at F.Reis@sheffield.ac.uk.
Yours sincerely,
Fabio A. S. Reis
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Participant Consent Form
Title of Research Project:
Regulating to Limit Access to Child pornography on the Internet: a multiple case study.
Name of Researcher:
Fabio Andre Silva Reis
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 21 November 2011 
explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions 
about the project.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw  at any time 
without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In 
addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to 
decline. (Research supervisor: Dr. Maggie Wykes, e-mail: X.XXX@sheffield.ac.uk, 
phone: +44 XXX.XXX.XXXX).
3. I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential unless I have given 
written permission for them to be disclosed. I give permission for members of  the 
research team to have access to my anonymised responses. I understand that my name 
will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in 
the report or reports that result from the research.  
4.   I agree for the data collected from me to be used in future research.
5.   I agree/do not agree (delete as applicable) to be identified.
6.   I agree to take part in the above research project.
________________________ ________________         ____________________
Name of Participant Date Signature
(or legal representative)
FABIO ANDRE SILVA REIS 21/12/11                            ____________________
Name of person taking consent Date Signature
(if different from lead researcher)
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant
DR. MAGGIE WYKES ________________         ____________________
 Lead Researcher Date Signature
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant
Copies:
Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed 
and dated participant consent form, the letter/pre-written script/information sheet and any 
other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and dated consent 
form should be placed in the project’s main record (e.g. a site file), which must be kept in a 
secure location. 
University of Sheffield
APPENDIX 3: PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM
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